Dr. Russell Norman Murray: Search results for middle knowledge

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Saturday, October 06, 2012

Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)

French Riviera from trekearth

Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)

Updated on December 13, 2022

A later related article with some of the same content.

Wednesday, April 20, 2016 Middle Knowledge Revisited

Middle Knowledge

Simon Blackburn documents in his entry 'scientia media' that middle knowledge is the way that God has of knowing the truth in regard to future events. This speculatively for philosophers ables God to reconcile his present knowledge with open choices. Blackburn (1996: 343). In other words this view of middle knowledge presupposes a type of libertarian free will and incompatibilism. Free will and related topics have been discussed many times on this website in previous posts and definitions can be found by the use of the 'search' application. This view reasons that there is the simultaneous act of given grace and the persons freely accepting it, as opposed to a prior determination of that grace leading to acceptance. Blackburn (1996: 343). The concept was elaborated on by Luis de Molina (1535-1600). Blackburn (1996: 343). It is known as a view among many of the followers of Thomas Aquinas. Blackburn (1996: 343).

William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Hasker (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occurred with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.

A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.

My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes. If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.

As God would cause and will all things in a compatibilist sense this would go beyond incompatibilistic middle knowledge in regard to the sovereignty and providence of God, and I do not hold to libertarian free will for created finite beings. I do not hold to 'determinism' or to be more clear hard determinism, but hold to soft-determinism. John Calvin explains this basic idea in theological terms as opposed to philosophical in 'Bondage and Liberation of the Will' in stating that Satan too and all wicked are under submission to God and his authority and cannot move beyond the commands of the sovereign God. They are guided divinely. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). Further Calvin explains that God uses the evil work of persons and executes his works through them. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). I reason a connection here could be made to Romans 8: 26-30 in that all things do work together for the good for those that love God.

As stated on this blog previously in various posts:

John S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). Calvin explains:

'If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection.' Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Therefore, middle knowledge although a logical view with merit is not a philosophically necessary view or most reasonable view to accept within a Reformed perspective.

Bibliography

AQUINAS, THOMAS (1261)(1920) Summa Theologica, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London, Fathers of the English Dominican Province.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Middle Knowledge: Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy

Selected references

a. Books

Craig, William Lane. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience. New York: Brill, 1990.

Craig, William Lane. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. New York: Brill, 1988.

Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: Cornell, 1988. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974.

b. Articles

Hasker, William. “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited.” Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April 1995): 223-36.

Hasker, William. “A New Anti-Molinist Argument.” Religious Studies 35:3 (September 1999): 291-97.

Author Information John D. Laing

Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary U. S. A.

Also online

Lonergan, Bernard J.F. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.

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Still true.

Motivation?

Wednesday, April 20, 2016

Middle Knowledge Revisited

French Riviera

Middle Knowledge Revisited

Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media

This view has intellectual merit, although problematic based on my studies.

Simon Blackburn documents in his entry 'scientia media' that middle knowledge is the way that God has of knowing the truth in regard to future events. This speculatively for philosophers enables God to reconcile his present knowledge with open choices. Blackburn (1996: 343). In other words this view of middle knowledge presupposes a type of libertarian free will and incompatibilism.

This view reasons that there is the simultaneous act of given grace and the persons freely accepting it, as opposed to a prior determination of that grace leading to acceptance. Blackburn (1996: 343). The concept was elaborated on by Luis de Molina (1535-1600). Blackburn (1996: 343). It is known as a view among many of the followers of Thomas Aquinas. Blackburn (1996: 343).

William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Hasker (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occurred with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.

A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.

My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes. If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.

Middle Knowledge Revisited

If hard determinism did take place, in my view there would not be significant moral responsibility from a finite creature and human being. I reason significant human freedom requires limited free will and not libertarian free will.

Example:

Did you with libertarian free will have a choice of your nature, as in either perfect and sinless, or imperfect and sinful?

The answer is a definitive, no.

This is problematic for libertarian free will supporters that claim that if 'one could not do otherwise', outside of libertarian free will and choices, it is not true freedom. This is a problem for those that reason significantly free human beings must take the initiative in free will, when one could not take the initiative in regard to core nature, behind the will.

This example seems to indicate that it is not a matter of 'being able to do otherwise', but is rather a matter of being able to via nature and will (and the hypothetical chain which I have speculated on my PhD and on this website) to significantly understand and embrace sinful thoughts, acts and actions that God simultaneously causes (Feinberg in the Many Faces of Evil). This based on Scripture (Romans) leads to human guilt. To have a significant understanding of good and evil and to embrace one's nature with significant freedom.

Human nature was created by God, that willingly caused and allowed, in my view without force or coercion, the first human beings (Genesis 1-3) to via nature and will (Feinberg adds desires in the chain), to reject the command of God with led to corrupted sinful nature and sinful choices. In my view, God sanctioned this and therefore willed and caused it as primary cause, and this was significantly embraced by the first persons as secondary cause. Therefore, they were held morally responsible for sin as sinners (Genesis 1-3, Romans 5, Romans 1-6). Humanity as descendants of Adam and Eve (Romans) embrace sinful nature and sinful choices and therefore are held morally responsible, despite not being the primary cause; or being able to cause human nature, will and choices outside of God's simultaneous influence (Feinberg).

Libertarian free will supporters attempt to often state that God with permissible will merely allows this to occur. We do have some common ground. I agree with a perfect will and permissible distinction as very helpful. I found this well explained by Erickson (Christian Theology) in my theses research. But, I reason that this in a sense does not 'get God off the hook'. As God is infinite and omnipotent, which most Biblical Christians agree on theologically, if God allows something, within permissible will, he is the still the primary cause. If he could prevent thoughts, acts and actions as he is infinite and omnipotent, and he does not, then he is still the first cause/primary cause.

Here I think Calvin's work is useful as it points to differing motives in thoughts, acts and actions. God's being perfectly good and holy, and humanity (and demonic beings at times) being imperfect and sinful. The historical, Biblical, crucifixion of Christ, being in my mind, the best classic example of this theological and philosophical concept. Satanic beings and human beings having wrong, sinful motives in killing Christ, and being held morally responsible by God. The triune God having perfect motives in the same events, leading to the atoning work, resurrection and eventual culminated Kingdom of God.

Calvin stated concerning free will:

If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

Human beings in Calvin’s thinking were not forced by God to sin, but God as an infinite being had and used the power to use their sin for the greater good. So to say that God willed evil for the greater good means that God could use sinful actions of others in order to accomplish his divine purpose.

Calvin stated:

For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another.

For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgements (judgments) to execution. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

God could set up events in such a way that someone would freely choose to sin, but this is not done in such a way that God is forcing or hard determining one to do so.

The objection is raised that this makes God, the author of sin. Again, divine motives are key, and if God as infinite and omnipotent, does not prohibit sin, then he is still, in a sense, the cause of it.

Based on what Calvin stated:

'For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them.'

Sin in this context is performed willfully by second cause human agents, held morally responsible by God. Sin, is caused by God in perfect and holy motives. I do not have an intellectual problem with stating God allowed it, but I do not think that terminology is exhaustive enough in context.

Mystery

There is the negative critique that the Reformed perspective involves an overuse of mystery.

From my Doctoral thesis (Edited).

'A praxis of sovereignty theodicy would be that, from start to finish, salvation is primarily the goal directed plan of God. Human beings are not brought to Christ through compulsion, but when predestined in election shall be convinced to accept the offer of salvation. Praxis shifts from the incompatibilism of free will that assumes God desires to save all persons, but can only save those who are eventually persuaded to believe, to an understanding that whom God desires to save shall be regenerated and placed in a process of salvation.

The problem of evil is therefore not primarily subject to, and in existence, because human sin is stalling the culmination of God’s plans. I do not doubt that human beings do often oppose God’s plans, but God being almighty can overcome the problem of evil, and is working through this process slowly in history. Within a sovereignty perspective human sin does oppose God, but God will use sin for his purposes and regenerate and mould those he chooses towards salvation.

As long as one can accept the idea that a perfectly moral God wills and allows evil within his plans for the greater good, there is a degree of intellectual certainty with sovereignty theodicy that free will theodicy lacks. God could inevitably bring about, through the use of the regeneration and the resurrection of elected human persons, the end of human corruption, and even Plantinga’s concept of transworld depravity.'

End citation

A mystery with incompatibilism is that in light of Romans and the universal corrupt nature of humanity, allowing for significant free will, and in light of Plantinga’s transworld depravity, why would anyone choose God and Jesus Christ, without being simultaneously influenced to do so? In my mind, this seems extremely unlikely (Ephesians 1: 5: ‘He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the intention of his will.’ New American Standard Bible). Ephesians 2 states that those in Christ are saved by grace through faith for good works.

To state that if God alone is the initiator of cause and therefore, secondary causes are not true causes is to misinterpret the theology of Ephesians. God as first and primary cause brings about salvation leading to the secondary cause, in my view, not being a hard determinist, simultaneously embracing this regeneration by grace through faith.

This is Biblically supposed to lead to legitimate good human works. This does not read as hard determinism, nor libertarian free will. Clearly it reads as compatibilism.

Overuse of Philosophy

I reasoned while researching and analyzing my MPhil and PhD work that both compatibilists and incompatibilists can be guilty at times of depending more on theology, philosophy and philosophy of religion than Scripture. But here I am using Ephesians as example.

Feinberg's work speculated on going behind will to desires within 'The Many Faces of Evil'. Perhaps going behind significant human free will to human nature is helpful. My example that one cannot choose their nature via will, at least in the context of perfection versus imperfection and sinless versus sinful, has merit.

In the case of the unregenerate that God eventually regenerates, the Reformed concept I reviewed in theses studies of God enlightening persons through preaching and teaching is reasonable. This would culminate in regeneration and the human embracing of salvation. In the regenerated in Christ, moulding of persons may be viewed as the sanctification process. Being set apart for holiness with God.

Note

I reason the Reformed 'tag' is more accurate for my position than that of Calvinist. I am not a resident or citizen of the United States of America and did not grow up in that culture. A stronger Calvinist in my mind would not favour Believer's Baptism to Infant Baptism, as do I. I am Reformed, theologically and philosophically on many issues, but I am also a baptized Mennonite Brethren in an Evangelical church. My sacramental leanings would be Anabaptist and Baptist. I state this because online in some what I view as rare unnecessarily heated contexts, I have been written-off as a Calvinist by upbringing, and that is far from the truth. My views, are of course a product of influence, as with everyone, but they are mainly a product of seeking the Lord's truth, academically. But I did with God's help manage to develop enough expertise to pass two major British theses of Reformed Theology and Philosophy of Religion in secular departments, not in agreement with my views.

I am still in process.

BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CAIRD, GEORGE B. (1977) Paul's Letters from Prison Paperback, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville,

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

DUNN, JAMES D.G. (1988) Romans, Dallas, Word Books.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GUNDRY, ROBERT (1981) A Survey of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

LA SOR, WILLIAM SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old Testament Survey, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

LIGHTFOOT, JOHN B. (1993) The Destination of the Epistle to the Ephesians in Biblical Essays, New York, Macmillan.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

Middle Knowledge: Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy

Selected references

a. Books

Craig, William Lane. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience. New York: Brill, 1990.

Craig, William Lane. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. New York: Brill, 1988.

Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: Cornell, 1988. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974.

b. Articles

Hasker, William. “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited.” Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April 1995): 223-36.

Hasker, William. “A New Anti-Molinist Argument.” Religious Studies 35:3 (September 1999): 291-97.

Author Information John D. Laing

Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary U. S. A.

Also online

Lonergan, Bernard J.F. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.

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Saturday, October 06, 2012: Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)

Monday, August 09, 2021

The Orthodox Study Bible: Brief on Colossians-Author/Gnosticism

The Orthodox Study Bible: Brief on Colossians-Author/Gnosticism

Preface

While listening to a King James Version (KJV) of Colossians online, which is reasonably close in content to the New King James Version (NKJV) used by the Orthodox Study Bible; I reasoned it would be interesting to review some of the perspectives on Colossians, from Orthodoxy and work at a series of articles.

This while I have already been chipping away at reviewing various sections of the Orthodox Study Bible on my academic website. Again my perspective is within the Reformed tradition.

I will not promise that I will deal with the standard scholarly issues. As more usual than not, I tend to deal with what I find interesting and this is prayerfully as the Lord leads. As usual in a Blogger format, this project will be non-exhaustive.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

Author

Quoting the Orthodox Study Bible:

'All early testimony credit Paul with the authorship of Colossians. Some of the vocabulary is unusual for Paul because he is combating first-century Gnosticism using its own terminology--thereby deepening his own understanding of Christ.' (461).

Gnosticism

archive search gnosticism

Edited from previous versions with some new material

R. MCL. Wilson in the ‘Gnosticism’ entry in A New Dictionary of Christian Theology notes it is the term used to describe a religious movement that existed during the early Christian era. The gnosis was considered a special knowledge of God and the nature of humanity. This gnosis would provide a person with the power to be free from negative cosmic forces. Wilson (1999: 226).

Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard explain within Introduction to Biblical Interpretation that although gnosticism existed in the first century, it did not become a full-fledged philosophy until the second and third centuries. Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard (1993: 382).

British Philosopher, Simon Blackburn, with the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy defines Gnosis from the Greek meaning knowledge. The root word is found in the words/concepts agnosticism, gnosticism, diagnosis, prognosis and the obsolete word for epistemology, gnoseology. Blackburn (1996: 159). In the academic discipline of theology, gnosis is noted by Blackburn to be considered higher knowledge of spiritual things, referencing claims of such knowledge within gnosticism. Blackburn (1996: 159).

Browning again from Oxford, but this time the Oxford Dictionary of the Bible, writes that gnosis, meaning knowledge, and gnosticism is a term used for 'a kind of religious speculation in vogue in the first two centuries CE'; the Church Fathers being hostile to it because of a perceived opposition to orthodox (Biblical, in context, my add) Christianity. Browning (1997: 151).

Gnosticism was a broad movement that did have influence over the Church, particularly in the second century states Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling. Gnosticism would emphasize the spiritual realm over the material realm which was considered evil, often claiming it needed to be escaped. Pocket Dictionary (1999: 56).

Edward Moore, author, St. Elias School of Orthodox Theology, Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy: A Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource

Cited

'Gnosticism (after gnôsis, the Greek word for “knowledge” or “insight”) is the name given to a loosely organized religious and philosophical movement that flourished in the first and second centuries CE. The exact origin(s) of this school of thought cannot be traced, although it is possible to locate influences or sources as far back as the second and first centuries BCE, such as the early treatises of the Corpus Hermeticum, the Jewish Apocalyptic writings, and especially Platonic philosophy and the Hebrew Scriptures themselves.' (Edward Moore)

Edward Moore listed sources

Dillon, John (1977). “Numenius of Apamea” in The Middle Platonists (Cornell University Press).

Filoramo, Giovanni. A History of Gnosticism, tr. Anthony Alcock (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers 1990, 1992).

Hegel, G.W.F. “The Gnostics” in Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol 2. “Plato and the Platonists,” tr. E.S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (University of Nebraska Press; Bison Books Edition 1995).

Jonas, Hans (1958, 2001). The Gnostic Religion: The Message of the Alien God and the Beginnings of Christianity (Boston: Beacon Press).

Layton, Bentley (1987). The Gnostic Scriptures (Doubleday: The Anchor Bible Reference Library).

Plato. Laws, tr. Trevor J. Saunders, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 1997).

Plato. Timaeus, tr. Donald J. Zeyl, in Plato: Complete Works.

Plotinus. The Enneads, tr. A.H. Armstrong, in 7 volumes (Harvard: Loeb Classical Library 1966).

Ricoeur, Paul. The Conflict of Interpretations (Northwestern University Press 1974).

Rudolph, Kurt. Gnosis: The Nature and History of Gnosticism, tr. Robert McLachlan Wilson (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark Ltd. 1984).

Segal, Robert A. (ed.) The Gnostic Jung (Princeton University Press 1992).

Bible Hub 1108 gnósis

Cited

'Strong's Concordance

gnósis: a knowing, knowledge

Original Word: γνῶσις, εως, ἡ

Part of Speech: Noun, Feminine Transliteration: gnósis

Phonetic Spelling: (gno'-sis)

Definition: a knowing, knowledge Usage: knowledge, doctrine, wisdom.'

Bible Hub 1108 gnósis

Englishman's Concordance

Cited

Colossians 2:3 N-GFS (Noun-Genitive, Feminine, Singular, my add)

GRK: σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως ἀπόκρυφοι (σοφίας of wisdom καὶ and γνώσεως of knowledge ἀπόκρυφοι hidden, my add using Marshall text)

NAS: the treasures of wisdom and knowledge.

KJV: of wisdom and knowledge.

INT: of wisdom and of knowledge hidden

References

ASHBY, E G. (1986) 'Colossians' in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Oxford Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

KLEIN, WILLIAM W., CRAIG, C. BLOMBERG, AND ROBERT L. HUBBARD, JR. (1993) Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, London, Word Publishing.

MARSHALL, ALFRED (1975)(1996) The Interlinear KJV-NIV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

PAYNE. DAVID F.(1986) Jude, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

WILSON, R. MCL (1999) ‘Gnosticism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

WRIGHT, N.T., Colossians and Philemon, (1986)(1989), IVP, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids.

Next related article, I will research and write more on the issue of the authorship of Colossians, where 'scholarly opinion is by no means unanimous on the point.' N.T. Wright page 31.

Wednesday, April 07, 2021

PhD: Twitter quote 69

PhD: Twitter quote 69

Photo: Google Maps near where the Norwegian Benny Hill lives: Norway

P.S. Greenspan (1998) writes compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1).

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.

PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

Some Compatibilism & Incompatibilism related articles from archives

Tuesday, May 30, 2006 Arminianism and Free Will

Thursday, August 31, 2006 Jonathan Edwards and Libertarian Free Will

Sunday, November 11, 2007 Fatalism

Monday, March 10, 2008 Could they become Christians whenever they wanted?

Wednesday, January 14, 2009 PhD passed

Saturday, October 01, 2011 Alvin C. Plantinga and The Free Will Defence (PhD Edit)

Wednesday, February 01, 2012 Calvin on Augustine (PhD Edit)

Wednesday, July 11, 2012 Fatalism Revisited

Saturday, October 06, 2012 Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)

Wednesday, July 31, 2013 Compatibilism (MPhil)

Wednesday, April 30, 2014 Philosopher Frederick Ferre: Incompatibilism (PhD Edit)

Sunday, November 30, 2014 Prayer & Determinism (s)

Monday, June 29, 2015 Limited Free Will (Brief)

Wednesday, April 20, 2016 Middle Knowledge Revisited

Saturday, June 25, 2016 As exciting as watching a chess match (PhD Edit)

Sunday, February 12, 2017 Crucifixion & compatibilism

Thursday, February 23, 2017 Limited Free Will

Sunday, June 18, 2017 God cannot move a parked car

Friday, March 22, 2019 Brief on two sermons: Apostasy-Pelagianism

Thursday, December 19, 2019 Limited Free Will III

Tuesday, May 19, 2020 Reply to Miss Cia: Soft determinism, indeterminism, hard determinism, fatalism

Thursday, February 23, 2017

Limited Free Will

Edited from a recent email

Human ability in conjunction with compatibilism

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will.

Middle Knowledge April 20, 2016

In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature and choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human thoughts, choice, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view.

An example:

I like theology by nature.

In my nature I pursue by choice, theology.

I do not have an alternative possibility as a secondary cause, to not like theology. This was determined by the primary cause.

The resulting choices to seek a PhD in Theology and related Philosophy of Religion, was not left to alternative possibility.

In regard to liking theology, we could also claim other secondary causes, like by hereditary (I am adopted, but perhaps someone biologically related liked theology?) but there is still a primary cause.

I do not have incompatibilist free will or a form of libertarian free will, to not like theology or not to pursue it. I have compatibilist free will and the term I coined as limited free will. During my British studies I looked for the term in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original.

I have significant moral responsibility in how I choose to deal with theology.

Limited Free Will June 29, 2015

God could have caused, willed and allowed me to not pursue my PhD, even though I like theology and then shown me the error of my ways. But I would have embraced the error as a secondary cause. I could understand the error at a later time and embrace the choice I should have made. But I am embracing my greatest desire at the time, so to speak.

As an adult, I did not initially pursue theological academia, but was eventually shown this to be error. I view it as not primarily a change of choice, but rather a divine molding of nature so I would pursue my natural interest in theology, as opposed to other interests, such as working and not being a student, being made more important. Within my soft determinism (not hard determinism) view, it was not that God gave me incompatibilist alternatives and I originally made an error; it was that God caused, willed and allowed my original view and then molded my nature in order that I would eventually, by nature, be different and therefore choose differently.

This is not to state that the sinful humanity both regenerate and unregenerate cannot have significant intellectual understanding of the alternative. I can very much understand by nature not liking theology. I can deduce a life without me studying theology. I know many that dislike theology, I can deduce it. I can deduce whether it is good or bad to be interested in theology. Therefore again, there is moral responsibility. As with Romans 1-3, a person can deduce truth about God without choosing or knowing God.

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Wednesday, January 05, 2022

PhD: Twitter quote 113/After the last sermon, a friend at church asked me about free will

Photo: @vienna_austria fb d3021 places & people

PhD: Twitter quote 113/After the last sermon, a friend at church asked me about free will

Preface

A friend, I consider an amateur philosophical whiz, discussed free will with me last Sunday, after a related sermon. This article is an edited review with some new material.

I am a compatibilist within the Reformed, theological tradition and theistic, philosophy of religion.

Twitter version

After the last sermon, a friend at church asked me about free will.

Libertarian free will

Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. There cannot be another, predetermined, simultaneous cause in a theoretical chain within indeterminism.

Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions, my add) or simultaneous (at the same time, my add) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Geisler (1996: 429).

Incompatibilism/Indeterminism

Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. Feinberg (1994: 60).

An entity that is forced or coerced into conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not morally responsible, where these are done without significant freedom. Of course, only the infinite God is an infinitely accurate, moral judge of guilt or not, in regards to the deeds of a finite entity. (God judges deeds, post-mortem, Revelation 20, also 21-22, 2 Corinthians 5, 2 Peter 3, as some key examples)

Significant free will (human in this context, my add) would be viewed an incompatible with any form of determinism. Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324).

In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view, my add) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being. The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory. The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause.

Again to Norman Geisler, he describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75).

Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism.

Limited free will

During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced.

Compatibilism/Soft determinism

Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism. Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596).

It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example.

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24).

Again with Feinberg, he writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Hard determinism

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281).

Links

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Thursday, August 31, 2006 Jonathan Edwards and Libertarian Free Will

Sunday, November 11, 2007 Fatalism

Wednesday, April 20, 2016 Middle Knowledge Revisited

Saturday, June 25, 2016 As exciting as watching a chess match (PhD Edit)

Thursday, February 23, 2017 Limited Free Will

References

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

BEROFSKY, BERNARD (1996) ‘Determinism’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

CLINES, DAVID, J. A. (1986), 2 Corinthians, The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. http://www.jonathanedwards.com

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/gen2.html

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HUGHES, P.E. (1996) ‘Grace’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MOUNCE, R.H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

PAYNE. DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.

TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy,Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Tuesday, March 18, 2014

W.T. Stace (PhD Edit)

W.T. Stace (PhD Edit)

Preface

Stace was cited limitedly within my PhD thesis, but I have quoted this source often because it is so accurate and useful.

W.T Stace: Determinism & Soft determinism

At the same time, if human beings are not at least a secondary cause (Stace (1952)(1976: 30)), of actions primarily caused by God, then human actions would be morally insignificant. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). If one reasons that human actions are random and uncaused, and there is no primary or secondary cause to human actions, meaning neither determinism/hard determinism or compatibilism/soft determinism exists, this would make human actions amoral and morally irrelevant and insignificant.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

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W.T. Stace (1886-1967): Works

Works by W.T.Stace

Cited

The Philosophy of Hegel (1924)

The Teachings of the Mystics (1960)

Mysticism and Philosophy (1960)

A Critical History of Greek Philosophy (1920)

Religion and the Modern Mind (1952)

The Concept of Morals (1937)

Time and Eternity (1952)

The Theory of Knowledge and Existence (1932)

The Destiny of Western Man (1942)

The Meaning of Beauty (1929)

Man against darkness, and other essays

Critical History of Greek Philosophy (Papermacs) (1967)

Hegel Üzerine (2019)

Mysticism and Philosophy by W. T. Stace (1960-06-01)

A History of Greek Philosophy (2018)

The Philosophy of Hegel by Walter Terence Stace (1955-06-26)

Mysticism and human reason

The Nature of the World: An Essay in Phenomenalist Metaphysics (1969)

HEGEL ÜSTÜNE

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Incompatibilism/Indeterminism

Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Feinberg (1994: 60). Compatibilism (soft determinism), which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism states that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). God as the primary cause can cause a human action that is not significantly free, but there is only significant moral human responsibility when there is significant free human action as a secondary cause.

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, states that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view, my add) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being. The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory. The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause.

David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God. For Norman Geisler, he describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75).

Compatibilism/Soft determinism

Significant, limited free will (limited free will, my term and human, limited free will, in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism. Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596). It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example.

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Again with Feinberg, he writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

Limited free will

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view. During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced.

Note that human nature, leading to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not only finite, but is also corrupted and sinfully imperfect due to a human fall (see Genesis 1-3, Romans, Hebrews, as some key examples). According to the New Testament, the post-mortem fix of sin and sinfulness is resurrection (1 Corinthians 15, Revelation 20-22, as examples) within the salvation process, as the atoning and resurrection work of God the Son, Jesus Christ is applied to those in Christ. The spiritually regenerate (John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1) are enlightened, and convinced of salvation, justified and sanctified, leading to eventual post-mortem resurrection. The human nature remains everlastingly finite, but also everlastingly sinless.

Hard determinism

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586). Hard determinism denies secondary causation.

Bibliography

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BEROFSKY, BERNARD (1996) ‘Determinism’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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