More on fideism
20240402: London, my photo
Preface
Article originally published 20081001, revised for an entry on academia.edu, 20240630
Definitions
Blackburn writes that fideism takes a pessimistic view concerning the role of reason for achieving divine knowledge. The emphasis is instead on the merits of acts of faith. Blackburn (1996: 139).
'The term itself derives from fides, the Latin word for faith, and can be rendered literally as faith-ism.'
'Fideism” is the name given to that school of thought—to which Tertullian himself is frequently said to have subscribed—which answers that faith is in some sense independent of—if not outright adversarial toward—reason. In contrast to the more rationalistic tradition of natural theology, with its arguments for the existence of God, fideism holds that reason is unnecessary and inappropriate for the exercise and justification of religious belief.'
Blackburn writes that fideism takes a pessimistic view concerning the role of reason for achieving divine knowledge. The emphasis is instead on the merits of acts of faith. Blackburn (1996: 139).
Stanford.edu
Amesbury, Richard (2022) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Fideism, Department of Philosophy, Stanford University.
Amesbury, Richard (2022) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Fideism, Department of Philosophy, Stanford University.
'The term itself derives from fides, the Latin word for faith, and can be rendered literally as faith-ism.'
'Fideism” is the name given to that school of thought—to which Tertullian himself is frequently said to have subscribed—which answers that faith is in some sense independent of—if not outright adversarial toward—reason. In contrast to the more rationalistic tradition of natural theology, with its arguments for the existence of God, fideism holds that reason is unnecessary and inappropriate for the exercise and justification of religious belief.'
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According to R.K. Johnston, fideism is a term used by Protestant modernists in Paris in the late 19th century. It is often used as a pejorative term to attack various strands of Christianity as forms of irrationalism. Johnston (1999: 415). Fideists, following Kant, who noted that reason cannot prove religious truth is said to base their religious understanding upon religious experience alone. Reason is believed to be incapable of establishing faith's certainty or credibility. Johnston (1999: 415). Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling note that fideism states religious and theological truth must be accepted without the use of reason. Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling (1999: 51). An extreme form of fideism states that reason misleads one in religious understanding. Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling (1999: 51). Johnston explains that the concept of fideism has little value as most theologians would not deny the use of reason. The term fideism is useful when it describes an excessive emphasis on the subjective aspects of Christianity. Johnston (1999: 415).
According to R.K. Johnston, fideism is a term used by Protestant modernists in Paris in the late 19th century. It is often used as a pejorative term to attack various strands of Christianity as forms of irrationalism. Johnston (1999: 415). Fideists, following Kant, who noted that reason cannot prove religious truth is said to base their religious understanding upon religious experience alone. Reason is believed to be incapable of establishing faith's certainty or credibility. Johnston (1999: 415). Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling note that fideism states religious and theological truth must be accepted without the use of reason. Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling (1999: 51). An extreme form of fideism states that reason misleads one in religious understanding. Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling (1999: 51). Johnston explains that the concept of fideism has little value as most theologians would not deny the use of reason. The term fideism is useful when it describes an excessive emphasis on the subjective aspects of Christianity. Johnston (1999: 415).
More on fideism
From website writing, as expected, I have been in a few debates/discussions over the years. Now that I have a career with the government (2022 forward), those types of discussions will be especially very rare, as I am just too busy with career work during the week and then academic work on the weekend. With interactions persons are reasonable and kind most of the time as ideas can be exchanged and feelings are not hurt. However, at times a few people on certain issues seem to become very set in their ways and closed-minded. The same can be stated with church interactions.
Having studied for decades, I realize it often takes quite a bit of knowledge and understanding of an academic subject before I can become dogmatic concerning it. With all academic subjects, I am more of a student than a teacher. This is certainly the same, almost universally, for other persons if they are honest with themselves. My areas of expertise are within philosophical theology and theistic philosophy of religion, while holding to a Biblical, Reformed tradition. These are the nature of God, theodicy, the problem (s) of evil, free will and determinism. But I can still learn within these areas that I have been working on.
It appears to me that many persons with both religious and non-religious worldviews at times concerning certain subjects are fideists. I realize that fideism is traditionally connected to religious belief, in particular Christianity. However, I am expanding the definition of fideist and fideism for this article. They operate with an over-reliance on faith, as they rely heavily on the understanding of their own worldview and perspective at the expense of reason, other views and evidence which may challenge their own ideas. Again, I realize fideism is usually defined in the context of religion, in particular, the Christian faith, but I reason some non-religious persons can also potentially rely too much on faith over reason in the rejection of a particular religious position and within the personal worldview held to. Fideism in an unorthodox fashion could be defined as faith over reason in the rejection of religious truth.
To use figurative language, just because someone is born onto the green team, or has had an intellectual and/or emotional experience with the green team and joined it, does not make the green team the team with the most truth in comparison to the blue, red, yellow, black, or white teams, etcetera. Whether or not the green team is essentially correct in worldview is dependent on reason and evidence, and faith can be involved.
My Biblical, Reformed view is that God is the ultimate judge of each person. New Testament theology means that salvation alone is through Jesus Christ's applied atoning and resurrection work for a person. Otherwise, post-mortem, a person is left to be judged according to works righteousness. At the same time having rejected the Gospel work of salvation.
Hebrews 9:27-28 New American Standard Bible (NASB)
27 And just as it is destined for people to die once, and after this comes judgment, 28 so Christ also, having been offered once to bear the sins of many, will appear a second time for salvation without reference to sin, to those who eagerly await Him.
I am not against faith. As finite, I lack infinite knowledge. I have can have finite knowledge only. Christianity is dependent on reasonable faith, as God revealed himself historically through scribes, prophets, apostles and Jesus Christ himself. This took place over 1500 years and through various persons and in various regions. It was documented in Scripture and individual books were copied many times. There was also an oral tradition. Christianity also relies on archaeology to verify that places described in the Bible actually existed as described.
There are primary issues in Christianity that require reason and faith, and there are secondary issues that require reason and faith. When Christians are dealing with critics of the faith, primary and secondary doctrines and positions can be challenged. When Christians are dealing with other Christians with differing views on certain subjects, for the most part, primary doctrines are agreed upon and secondary doctrines and positions can be challenged. In my humble opinion, near maximally efficient Christian witness in these areas requires significant use of reason, research and open-mindedness, to make sure that presentations are not largely blinded by bias and fideism.
I do not claim complete objectivity. In many ways, we are made up of what we read, hear, and experience. But, in a sense, all things are intellectually up for grabs, and up for the intellectual challenge. We hold the primary doctrines of Christianity as essential and they can be defended well with biblical manuscript evidence, Bible versions, theology and theistic philosophy of religion. As well, at times, other academic disciplines. Through documented religious history, within the Christian community, we trust that God has revealed himself and is guiding his own through the Holy Spirit. Christianity should consist of a most reasonable faith.
In a fideistic approach, human beings that insist something must be true will likely find an intellectual way for it to be true to him/her, no matter what the evidence. I personally always ask the Lord, as in biblically, God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, for guidance when writing these articles and when discussing these subjects. Being guided by God in the process of finding the truth is of course of primary importance.
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