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Preface
Again, this entry, as with my last entry, deals with my friendly discussion with a very intelligent scholar from the translation department at work.
The Calvinist God is a ‘monster’ theory was expressed.
Well, I pointed out that I refer to myself as Reformed and not a Calvinist. I am not a devotee of Calvin and also theologically with study, prefer believer’s baptism to infant Baptist.
In short, hard determinism, when accepted by someone with a Reformed or other position, could reasonably be connected to a God is a ‘monster’ theory.
Hard Versus Soft Determinism
Louis P. Pojman (1996) explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, Pojman (1996: 596). and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Within determinism (Pojman (1996: 596)) or hard determinism, God causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. The human will would be the secondary cause in human decisions. Persons would still therefore be morally responsible for moral actions. Pojman (1996: 596).
Philosophically, the first and/or primary cause could be an outside force, as well, that is not God. An atheist may be a compatibilist and/or an incompatibilist, or one could hold to hard determinism.
Schelling suggests that ‘absolute causal power in one being leaves nothing but unconditional passivity for all the rest.’ Schelling (1845)(1936: 11). This would be a difficulty with accepting hard determinism.
Incompatinilism
John S. Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will theodicy or defence that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg writes that for this view, freedom is incompatible with contingently sufficient nonsubsequent conditions of an action. The contingently sufficient nonsubsequent actions would be God making people in such a way that they only freely did one thing or another. Feinberg (1994: 60). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637).
Therefore, the compatibilist, soft-deterministic God of Reformed theology allows significant human freedom with the embracing of human thoughts, acts and action via human nature, desires and limited free will.
Although, in a basic agreement with Feinberg, I reason God at times, does force or coerce events in regard to humanity, in those cases, there is not significant human moral accountability. For example, a person unwillingly becomes an amputee. This is against the nature, desires and will. A person does not sin by rejecting the amputation with nature, desires and will.
The human ability with significant freedom to embrace thoughts, acts and actions as a secondary cause, philosophically and theologically eliminates God as forcing or coercing human thoughts, acts and actions where there is human, moral, accountability.
This answers the ‘monster’ theory.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.
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