Friday, June 03, 2022

A fallacy of inconsistency: Premises should support the conclusion

A fallacy of inconsistency: Premises should support the conclusion

Photo: Civil Engineering Discoveries, LinkedIn, Germany, August 17, 2021

Edited second version for my entry on academia.edu.

Original entry 


Pirie

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

A fallacy of inconsistency.

This is the conclusion that denies its own premises. (66).

Pire writes that this type of argument maintains one thing in the premises and then denies that same thing in the conclusion. (66).

This is a fallacy of inconsistency. (67).

From Elements of Reasoning

Validity in deductive arguments is a technical term in logic. Elements (1997: 33). The concept of true premises and false conclusion would be 'inconceivable in a valid argument'. Elements (1997: 33). In other words, (TF). Validity is a set of premises supporting a conclusion. Technically in logic the premises do not have to be true, simply valid. Elements (1997: 33). Therefore a valid deductive argument can have

False premises and a true conclusion (FT)

False premises and a false conclusion (FF)

True premises and a true conclusion (TT)

However

True premises and a false conclusion (TF) is invalid.

Valid arguments with all true premises are called sound arguments. These also have true conclusions.

Pirie explains that a conclusion must be consistent with the arguments present in support of it. (66).

A conclusion must be reasonably and legitimately supported by propositions/premises.

Based on certain religious argumentation presented in history, Pirie then states: 'But if everything must have a cause, how can there be such a thing as an uncaused cause?' (67). The author opines that throughout history, 'first cause' is an example of this fallacy. (67). To avoid this problem. he reasons, attempts have usually led to examples that  'beg the question' and 'subvert the argument', being used.

'Everything' is a key term in his example.

I do not see fallacious means as being required, such as circular reasoning or unreasonable assumption, or unreasonable avoidance. A key here is to eliminate the term 'everything' when discussing 'first cause'. To differ from the author's sceptical perspective, one could state with various propositions that the universe, time and matter are finite, the finite has origin. Therefore there is an infinite first cause.

This is not a fallacious or illogical argument.

A new concept is being introduced into the conclusion that is not 'everything' noted in Pirie's example. Of course the concepts are related as the propositions are supposed to support and prove the conclusion.

Further, hypothetically, based on the same propositions, the conclusion for example, could assume vicious regress, or that there is no cause and we have mystery. Pirie does not mention and avoids the issue of vicious regress in this entry. If there is not a first cause and instead there is a supposedly an implied, infinite regress of causes, it is a vicious regress (an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem). As I have noted in a recent post, there is debate on whether or not a vicious regress is illogical, but I state that it is certainly unreasonable, in this context, because it does not solve its own problem.

Appealing to mystery, may occur because of lack of significant cumulative evidences. It is often an intellectual cop-out as pointed out to me by Dr. William Kay, Wales, one of my United Kingdom, academic tutors. Mystery too, does not solve its own problem. I am not stating therefore that it is always error to state 'I do not know'.

I have discussed vicious regress on this site with the assistance of the work of Simon Blackburn and others. I reason this miss on this entry in the Pirie text, is a much larger philosophical problem than the misuse of the term 'everything' Pirie raised, although I appreciate this entry and the text, therefore the review. I have added a Vicious Regress section after this one.

Pirie seems critical that a divine being would be the exception to the rule, but 'everything' other than God in existence would be finite and God would be infinite, therefore to make a separation and distinction is not fallacious. I disagree with Pirie (67) and reason it is obviously true that an infinite, first cause, God, would be categorically different than everything finite in context. Even a non-theist could reason this theoretically without belief. I agree with the author that the universe is the universe (67), but it is finite. In significant contrast, God is infinite and eternal as transcendent as well as being immanent while being in sovereign control over finite creation.

From this entry, I can appreciate Pirie for making it apparent that in regard to this issue theists need to use clear and concise premises and arguments. These type of critiques are a reason secular philosophy and philosophy of religion are intellectually valuable academic disciplines. This type of reading was consistently required in my British MPhil and PhD research theses.

Vicious Regress 

My explanation  

A god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. (In philosophy of religion, the first cause, can be considered what is necessary and exists by necessity. From a biblical perspective this is Almighty God, infinite and eternal.) 

A choice is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. (Human choice is traced back to human nature. Human nature is traced back to its creator, God, that has infinite, eternal nature and will/choice.) 

Time is caused by time, is caused by time, is caused by time, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. (If there is an infinite distance between Maple Ridge and Vancouver, one will never arrive in Vancouver. There is no amount of time that will see this distance travelled.) 


Prime Time Sports was hosted by the intelligent Bob McCown.

January 16, 2017 (Paraphrased)

Caller: The baseball player mentioned, signed with a new agent. But how did he find that agent? Did he not need an agent to find that agent?

Host: The player knows the industry and player agents. If you are meaning that the player needed to find an agent to find an agent, then that agent would need to find an agent to infinitude.

Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy

In the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn discusses ‘infinite regress’ and mentions that this occurs in a vicious way whenever a problem tries to solve itself and yet remains with the same problem it had previously. Blackburn (1996: 324) A vicious regress is an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem, while a benign regress is an infinite regress that does not fail to solve its own problem. Blackburn (1996: 324). Blackburn writes that there is frequently room for debate on what is a vicious regress or benign regress. Blackburn (1996: 324).

An example of a benign regress is infinite numbers both plus and minus, as they in reality represent conceptualized things as opposed to being real things. 'Problem' solved. Therefore: Based on my philosophical reading and Blackburn's explanation, it can be deduced that philosophers would debate whether a particular vicious regress is illogical and whether it is using a logical fallacy. Further: An argument can be logical and not sound, as sound arguments are not the only valid arguments but are those where 'all the premises are true'. (1997: 35). 

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy

Whether or not a particular vicious regress, and the examples I raised, are illogical and using a logical fallacy in the sense of invalid argument is of secondary importance. It is of primary importance when a vicious regress is not reasonable and does not solve its own problem and is fallacious as in faulty reasoning. That is the case with my three examples, I reason. Bradley (371) mentions that it is not illogical, and not a vicious regress that each act of free choice is caused by another act of free choice. I agree that it is not necessarily illogical, but disagree that the argument as described is not a vicious regress. A vicious regress can be stopped by stating as premise that a particular agent is sufficient.

Also within The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, William Tolhurst writes that a vicious regress is in some way unacceptable as it would include an infinite series of items dependent on prior items. A vicious regress may be impossible to hold to philosophically, or it may be inconsistent. Tolhurst (1996: 835). 

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Regress’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE, (1991)(2006) ‘The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe’,Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991) 85-96. http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html pp. 1-18.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas.http://www.jonathanedwards.com

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

SLICK, MATTHEW J. (2006) 'A logical proof that Mormonism is false', Meridian, Idaho, Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry, http://www.carm.org/lds/infinity.htm 

SMITH, JOSEPH (1844)(2006) ‘Sermon by the Prophet-The Christian Godhead-Plurality of Gods’, History of the Church, Vol. 6, p. 473-479. http://www.utlm.org 

TOLHURST, TOLHURST, WILLIAM (1996) 'Vicious Regress', in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.