Sunday, March 13, 2011

Natural Evils (PhD Edit)


Hoffstadt Creek Bridge, Mount Saint Helens (trekearth.com)

In light of the news from Japan I thought I would present my work on Natural Evils from my PhD. I am not in any way going to try and explain why Japan is specifically suffering the way it is.

Natural Evils

Augustine’s Perspective

Philip L. Quinn (1996) defines natural evils as the bad consequences of impersonal forces operating in nature, and this is a good secular definition.[1] Feinberg explains the concept of natural evils is often considered to be missing from Augustine’s theodicy;[2] however, ideas taken from Augustine can shed light on his leanings.[3] Feinberg notes the fact Augustine does not deal specifically with natural evils is not a devastating problem. To Feinberg, Augustine’s work is successful because the free will theodicy is logically presented without contradiction, and solves the moral problem of evil presented within Augustine’s work. It accomplishes its purpose as natural evil is not the same as moral evil, and Augustine does not need to deal with natural evils in order for his theodicy to be successful. Augustine wrote that humanity is in bondage to the prince of the world, Satan, who makes people subject to him through persuasion.[4] Augustine understood humanity as losing its dominion over creation,[5] and that dominion has been awarded substantially to Satan who he calls the prince of this world.[6] Feinberg points out that natural evils are not specifically explained by Augustine.[7] Natural evils will be discussed further in this Chapter in the context of Plantinga.

Natural Evils

Plantinga’s Perspective

Plantinga, although a modern philosopher, postulated the existence of satanic beings that were involved in causing the problem of evil.[8] He emphasized cautiously that significantly free actions of non-human persons/devils were quite possibly responsible for natural evils,[9] so his theory would be in line with basic assumptions of Augustine, and were likely influenced by Augustine.[10] Certainly, such beings as devils would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove empirically.[11] However, it seems Augustine’s and Plantinga’s beliefs that demonic beings could be involved in natural evils are plausible for at least the following reasons: (1) If material human beings were made significantly free[12] and rebelled against an immaterial God[13] then it is logical and reasonable God could create significantly free immaterial beings[14] that could rebel against him. (2) A traditional approach to Biblical interpretation tends to lead to an acceptance of the existence of satanic beings.[15] Erickson explains these beings are understood as Biblical, literal, and historical.[16] Roman Catholic scholar Peter Kreeft, working with Ronald K. Tacelli, states Satan is a deceiver of humanity,[17] and this implies the assumption that Satan has personality.[18] There is of course a debate between those of traditional conservative perspectives and those of liberal, progressive, mainline perspectives on the existence of satanic beings.[19] It would be far beyond the scope of this thesis to exhaustively debate the strengths and weaknesses of arguments of both sides.[20] The conservative, traditional position claims that the context of the Scripture allows for Satan and his demons to be understood as literal, historical beings, and referencing Greek scholars such as Strong,[21] which was done previously, allows this as an academic and intellectual possibility.[22] Greek scholar,

Walter Bauer (1979) in agreement with Strong,[23] describes ‘Satan’ or ‘Satanas’ as the Adversary, enemy of God and those who belong to God.[24] Bauer goes on to note that Revelation, Chapter 2, verse 13, is describing Satan as persecuting the Church.[25] It appears by studying the Greek copies of the New Testament and assuming a type of contextual, literal hermeneutical method of examining Scripture, it is possible to view satanic beings as literal and historical beings,[26] and this makes Augustine’s and Plantinga’s deduction that satanic beings may be involved in natural evils as at least an intellectual possibility to consider academically.[27] The liberal, progressive, mainline perspectives can point out that there is no empirical evidence for such satanic beings,[28] and that it is not a satisfactory explanation for evil.[29] I can also understand how some within a mainline tradition in the post Enlightenment era,[30] would view it as more beneficial to deal with the empirical human problem of evil,[31] as opposed to a hypothetical satanic one.[32] Erickson writes that it would be wrong to too quickly credit physical and psychological phenomena with satanic beings.[33] I agree with this assertion and the human problem of evil should be the main focus of Christian churches and ministries as opposed to a possible satanic problem.[34]

[1] Quinn (1996: 610).

[2] Feinberg (1994: 58).

[3] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[4] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[5] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[6] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[7] Feinberg (1994: 58). Feinberg (1994: 80).

[8] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58). The existence of satanic beings are a logical possibility for Plantinga.

[9] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58).

[10] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 58). Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111). Natural evils for Plantinga could be caused by immoral actions of superhuman fallen angels.

[11] Phillips documents the idea that Plantinga does at times demonstrate a desire to deal with the problem of evil practically and not just with abstract philosophy. Phillips (2005: 56). Plantinga’s comments on natural evils may be an indicator that he at least intellectually can admit that empirical natural evils are a serious concrete problem.

[12] As within both theistic compatibilism and incompatibilism.

[13] God is spirit, as noted in John 4: 24. Erickson (1994: 267).

[14] Sharing God’s immaterial nature.

[15] Within that Biblical worldview which accepts the possibility of fallen angels, for Plantinga natural evils are as compatible with the existence of God as are moral evils.

[16] Erickson (1994: 445-451).

[17] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).

[18] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 294).

[19] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[20] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[21] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).

[22] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).

[23] Strong (1890)(1986: 152).

[24] Bauer (1979: 744).

[25] Bauer (1979: 745).

[26] Strong (1890)(1986: 152). Bauer (1979: 744).

[27] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

[28] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[29] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[30] Richardson (1999: 521-522).

[31] And to deal with everyday human problems based in science and psychology, along with Scripture.

[32] Richardson suggests demonic beings provide a pictorial description of evil in the universe. Richardson (1999: 521-522). Demonic beings would serve as metaphor.

[33] Erickson (1994: 450).

[34] I therefore do not hold to a fundamentalistic position on demonology. In other words, I am not ‘looking for Satan around every corner.’

Additional, March 13, 2011
Augustine and Plantinga have some good points. I grant in light of the book of Job for example that God willingly allows/wills demonic beings to participate in certain evil acts.

I tend to reason the laws of universe have remained the same since before the fall, but that is a deduction. Romans 8 speaks of in verse 20 creation being subject to futility. Mounce states the universe was frustrated by Adam's sin and there needs to be a new heaven and new earth of 2 Peter 3 and Revelation 21. Mounce (1995: 184-185). In this sense, at least, because of human sin the present universe is corrupted. Therefore, natural evils such as with Japan effect human beings harshly because persons are subject to death and decay because of the fall of Genesis 3.

I reason Quinn's definition is not incorrect if one sees impersonal forces as natural forces in scientific terms.

Therefore, I would tend to place most Natural Evils in the category of natural forces due to the laws of the nature that overpower human beings subject to suffering, death and decay, as opposed to from Satanic beings, while always allowing that as a possibility as is a combination.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

BAUER, W. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

QUINN, PHILIP L. (1996) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, Robert Audi (ed.), in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

RICHARDSON, ALAN (1999) ‘Satan’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Pickering, Ontario, Welch Publishing Company.


Malaysia (trekearth.com)


Boston Bar, BC (Google Images)


Mouria, Greece (Google Images)

Tuesday, March 01, 2011

Sabellianism and modalism (non-exhaustive)

Sabellianism and modalism (non-exhaustive)

Originally published March 1, 2011, edited on May 27, 2023.

Photo: Princeton University

February 25, 2011

On Sunday at the church related lunch, I was given a tract to examine by someone. It was from a local modalist church, I reasoned. 

According to C. A. Blaising, monarchianism, also known as patripassianism and Sabellianism refers to a mainly Western concept of the third century which attempted to defend monotheism against tritheism by denying personal distinctions between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Blaising (1996: 727). Blaising notes the term monarchianism was first used by Tertullian to denote those that wished to protect the monarchy of the one God from wrong theology concerning the economy of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Blaising (1996: 727).

Blaising noted this first (dynamic monarchianism) view had proposed monotheistic God, as in the Father in relation to Jesus a mere man who was 'endowed with the Holy Spirit'. Blaising (1996: 727). This view was supported in Rome in around 190 by Thedotus of Byzantium and then by Artemon/Theodotus. This first view was refuted by Hippolytus. Blaising (1996: 727).

Paul of Samosata depersonalized the Logos as the inherent rationality of God, the 'homoousia' of God. Blaising (1996: 727). The substance of God. For this Paul, the Holy Spirit was not a separate being but the grace of the Father. Blaising (1996: 727). This Paul also denied the preincarnate Word of God, and his teaching was condemned at the Synod of Antioch in 268.

This second view also became known as modalism. Blaising. (1996: 727). Sabellius was in Rome, Blaising (1996: 727), Turner (1999: 514). There is a possibility he may have been from Libya. Turner (1999: 514). He taught modalism in the third century and thus concepts developed the name Sabellianism. Turner explains sabellianism as an alternative denotation of modalism. Turner (1999: 514). Blaising states that Sabellius is often confused with Marcus of Ancyrra of the fourth century. He reasoned a divine monad named Huiopator projected itself as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The Father as creator and lawgiver, the Son as redeemer the Spirit as grace giver. These were three different modes revealing the same divine person. Blaising (1996: 727).

Erickson notes that dynamic monarchianism seemed to deny the trinity. Erickson (1994: 334). He did examine modalism in his text in regard to the trinity. There is one God, variously designated as Father, Son and Holy Spirit but they do not stand for any real distinctions, but are simply useable at different times. Erickson (1994: 334). Erickson also points out the difficulty with patripassianism, in other words the Father suffering along with Christ as if the Father suffers identically with the Son under modalism. Erickson (1994: 334). Perhaps a difficulty, perhaps, not. As God is one of spiritual united nature. Would not God the Father understand all the sufferings of God of the Son? I would think so.

And an objection raised by trinitarians, and rightly so, is that the New Testament interactions between the Father and Son appear to be very real conversations and not based in modes. A reasonable point could be made that yes the human Jesus was interacting with the divine Father in sinless perfection but this was being done largely because in eternity, God the Son/Word had been interacting with God the Father in a similar way (John 1).

Concerning Hebrews 1, for example, it is demonstrated in the New Testament that the Father and Son are of the same substance and nature. The Holy Spirit in Acts 5, and in Matthew 28: 19 can be demonstrated as divine and I would therefore deduce have the same substance and nature.

Therefore it should be noted that triune persons are not three separate natures/Gods.

Further:

Jesus Christ did of course in the incarnation take a separate human nature.

The persons of the trinity could also be called distinctions, but they do personally interact according to the New Testament.


Hawthorne (1986: 1506). Click twice to enlarge.


University of Wales, Bangor


University of Wales, Lampeter/University of Wales, Trinity Saint David.

BLAISING, C.A. (1996) ‘Monarchianism' in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

BLAISING, C.A. (1996) ‘Nicea, Council of (325)’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

BOWMAN, ROBERT M. (1990) Why You Should Believe in the Trinity, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

BROM, ROBERT H. (1983) The Eternal Sonship of Christ, San Diego, CIC 827. 

BROMILEY, G.W. (1996) ‘Trinity’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FRANKE, JOHN R. (2005) The Character of Theology, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids. 

HAWTHORNE, GERALD F. (1986) 'Hebrews', in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

TURNER, H. E. W. (1999) 'Sabellianism', in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Limited.