Wednesday, November 12, 2008

Gratuitous evil revisited

Gratuitous evil revisited

Revised and reformatted for an entry on academia.edu, June 20, 2022

Butchart Gardens (photo from trekearth.com)

This is material based on MPhil/PhD research. When I began my research it was noted by a few writers that the gratuitous/evidential problem of evil was being discussed by some scholars more than the logical problem. I have primary dealt with the logical problem in my MPhil and PhD research only theses and related questionnaires, but I did not want to negate the gratuitous problem and so I discussed it without it being suggested by an advisor.

I reason a sovereignty theodicy/approach can reasonably state that as an infinite, omnipotent God can use all evil for the greater good, no amount of evil is too much or gratuitous. God remains perfectly good and holy in the process. God's plans achieved means the evil he willfully allows is not gratuitous.

Romans 8:28 (New American Standard Bible)
New American Standard Bible (NASB)
Copyright © 1960, 1962, 1963, 1968, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1995 by The Lockman Foundation

28And we know that [a]God causes (A)all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are (B)called according to His purpose.

However, from our human perspective much evil often remains unexplainable and very painful.

Gratuitous evil is also known as the evidential argument for evil and has been presented by atheistic philosopher William Rowe on more than one occasion. He presents an argument for gratuitous evil in ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’ in The Problem of Evil.

Rowe’s evidential argument for evil, states the following propositions: Rowe (1990: 1).

(1) God, an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being exists.
(2) Gratuitous evil exists.
(3) A perfectly good being would always eliminate gratuitous evil as far as it can.
(4) There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do. Rowe (1990: 3).

Rowe concludes that there is no good state of affairs where an omnipotent, omniscient being would be justified in allowing evils where no possible good can arise from them taking place; he also calls these inscrutable evils, which are evils that cannot be understood. Rowe (1990: 3). Rowe’s proposition (1) and those like, seem reasonable from a traditional Christian perspective. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 89-99). Proposition (2) is debatable because it assumes that concepts of those within sovereignty and soul-making theodicy are incorrect and that an infinite, omnipotent God cannot use all wrong actions by creatures for the greater good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). Hick (1970: 292). Proposition (2) really does not prove anything, but simply states a disagreement between Rowe and many within Christian theism on whether or not God’s purposes are being fulfilled, even when horrendous evils occur. Rowe states that there is too much evil that does not make sense in existence. Rowe (1990: 3). Numerous theists would answer that although finite human beings cannot know the purposes of evil, God has a purpose. In my view, the human being is therefore unable to truly judge if too much evil exists. 

Proposition (3) is questionable because it builds upon the debatable proposition (2). It assumes that God cannot use all evil towards the greater good, and since gratuitous evil would exist, it implies that God likely is not a perfectly good being. Proposition (4) can be challenged by the theist because although God technically could rid the world of evil, both Feinberg and Hick for example, have provided good reasons why the creator would allow preventable evil. Feinberg states that eliminating evil would prohibit other divine plans for the greater good, Feinberg (1994: 130). Hick writes that God must allow a hostile imperfect environment in order for soul-making to occur. Hick (1970: 292).

Rowe has written a logical argument, but it is not necessarily true because theists can debate proposition (2) and claim the infinite, perfectly good God can always use the evil actions of his finite creations for the greater good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). It also can be stated concerning proposition (3) that as Calvin noted, God’s motives would remain pure even while horrendous evils take place, and God need not be less than perfectly good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 40). This would seem reasonable and possible for an infinite deity to accomplish as he is dealing with finite creatures that could never match him in morality, power, and knowledge.

Frances and Daniel Howard-Snyder reason that a way to deny premise (3) is to state that there is no such thing as a minimum amount of suffering that God must allow in order for the greater good to be accomplished. Howard-Snyder (1999: 129). This idea would not accept the critic’s notion that there is a minimum amount of evil and suffering that God must allow in a situation, and if he goes beyond that amount, gratuitous evil has occurred and God therefore does not exist. Howard-Snyder (1999: 129). Jeff Jordon disagrees and argues that the no minimum of suffering claim is false or implausible, because for any distribution of evil for divine purposes there is always a less painful distribution that would accomplish the same purposes. Jordon (2003: 238). 

I think it more likely that for each varying amount of suffering that God willingly allows there are resulting amounts of greater good or evil that occur. There is also the possibility that if God allows a certain amount of suffering in a given situation that the greater good will not occur and therefore God would not allow this amount of suffering to take place. Since the amount of suffering is largely related to the amount of greater good, it is not likely that a smaller amount of suffering could accomplish the same results as a greater amount, either good or bad. I therefore, doubt Jordon’s claim that a less painful distribution of evil would accomplish the exact same purposes. Jordon (2003: 238).

A critic may state that Jesus could have simply atoned for sins by dying with a much less brutal death. Christ could have been beaten less, not been crucified, died in a less painful way, and still died for sins, but I reason that the exact purposes of God would not have been accomplished through less suffering. I conclude that in the case of the death of Christ, a less painful distribution of evil would not have accomplished the exact same purposes. 

Unfortunately from our human perspective, what we may often view as gratuitous unnecessary evil, is in a sense, God accomplishing his purposes in a situation. I can certainly relate on a personal level, with the atheist and non-Christian that deems this as wrong and unfair, but as human beings we are in no position to judge God’s motives and plans in working in his creation in regard to the problem of evil. I have determined that my sufferings which are often very annoying, do not provide me with a strong enough intellectual argument to overcome the Biblical, theological and philosophical evidence for God's existence. 

My suffering, and the suffering of others, is certainly very difficult and often unappreciated, but from Job 40:1-2, from the New American Standard Bible, it states.

Then the Lord said to Job,
‘Will the faultfinder contend with the Almighty? Let him who reproves God answer it.’
---

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CARSON, D.A. (1990) How Long, O Lord?, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

CLINES, DAVID J. A. (1986) Job, The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

CLINES, DAVID J. A. (1986) Proverbs, The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press. 

HOWARD-SNYDER, FRANCES AND DANIEL (1999) ‘Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 26, Number 2, April, pp. 115-130, Chicago, University of Illinois.

JORDAN, JEFF (2003) ‘Evil and Van Inwagen’, Faith and Philosophy, Volume 20, Number 2, pp. 236-238. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

MESLE, C. ROBERT (1986) ‘The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of John Hick’s Theodicy’, in The Journal of Religion, Volume 66, Number 4, pp. 412-430. October, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 

MESLE, C. ROBERT (1991) John Hick’s Theodicy, New York, St. Martin’s Press. 

MESLE, C. ROBERT (2004) ‘Suffering, Meaning, and the Welfare of Children: What Do Theodicies Do?’, in American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, Volume 25, Number 3, September. Lamoni, Iowa, Graceland University. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1990) ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, in Adams and Adams (eds.) The Problem of Evil, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1994) ‘The Problem of No Best World’, Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 269-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1996) ‘Privation’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1999) ‘The Problem of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 16, Number 1, January, pp. 98-101. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College

Images and the problem of evil:

Just to be clear, I realize all human beings are tainted by sin (Romans 3: 23), but I would support the Allies in World War One and Two. I also believe in a military for the defence of the state (Romans 13).


German propaganda poster from 1944 entitled Liberators.

Soviet World War Two propaganda poster.

Canadian World War Two propaganda poster.

World War Two propaganda poster from General Motors.

American World War Two propaganda poster.

German World War One propaganda poster.


American poster from World War Two, prior to the formation of the United Nations in 1945. China became communist in 1949 and here is using the present flag of Taiwan. India and Canada have colonial flags. India became independent in 1947. I personally prefer the old Canadian flag.




35 comments:

  1. Russ,
    You know, I have had this thought before concerning the brutality administered on Christ.
    It occurred to me that people have been reported to die in the floggings. Do you remember having a sun burn on your back and someone came along to slap it? What happened? I had one incident where the sting took my ability to breath. Being that the Jews were concerned for their holy day, the Day of Atonement coming at sundown, do you suppose the soldiers were ordered to beat Jesus to death? Do you suppose it was never intended for Jesus to reach Galgotha?
    If this is the case, this would be a testimony to the soldiers who beat him as to who he was. As to the determination that God was not going to remove the life from that body until all signs God had in mind were fulfilled, (i.e., the renting of the Temple veil). Time had to pass in order for "The Lamb of God" to be offerred on The Day of Atonement. I am aware of the Bible having said what the hours were for the Jewish day. But, the sky grew dark. Was this out of mystery or was it supposed to be dark, thus marking the end of one day and the beginning of another, the Day of Atonement?
    Was Jesus kept alive through the brutality? Certainly, there is a reason the Psalmist discusses the brutality prior to the crucifixion. There is always a reason.

    ReplyDelete
  2. Interesting and thoughtful remarks, Jim.

    I can concur that Christ was to stay alive to complete the atonement, which is incidentally the subject of a short article on Jim's blog presently.

    A critic can state that gratuitous evil occurred as Christ could have died for our sins with less suffering. He could have died with less or more suffering but the amount of suffering and evil Christ experienced was within the will of the Father and in my mind was therefore not too much.

    God used it for his exact purposes.

    Now of course, I personally desire NO or MINIMAL suffering for myself and friends and family and others I am concerned about, but the fact it does not always work that way does not mean God is less than perfectly good, or worse non-existent. God knows how to discipline his children and he also has the right and ability of course, to inflict suffering and death upon his fallen, corrupted creation. Thank God those in Christ have the gift of everlasting life.

    Cheers.

    ReplyDelete
  3. I reason a sovereignty theodicy/approach can reasonably state that as an infinite, omnipotent God can use all evil for the greater good, no amount of evil is too much or gratuitous.

    On the surface, this is hard to understand. Restating the obvious arguments: If God is holy and good, why would He use evil? And if He is all-powerful, how could He allow evil to exist? Evil and good would seem to be contradictions and in total conflict with each other; therefore, if God is good, as well as all-powerful, then logic would dictate that He should either never have allowed evil to exist, or else wipe out any and all evil. (But note that my posted comments here are progressive, taken in their entirety.)

    However, from our human perspective much evil often remains unexplainable and very painful.

    Yes, for example, if we see a child die, we see that as evil and horrible. However, if we were to see the bigger picture, we might then gain a different opinion. For example, when you see fictitious TV shows or movies, or read books, about time travel, sometimes the idea is relayed that, if something is changed in the time-stream, then that could have ripple effects, or could alter history. Though time travel is not humanly possible, God is not limited by time or space, and He sees the past, present and future.

    If that aforementioned-child were allowed to grow up, maybe he/she would do horrible things that would mess things up big-time. Conversely, if the child died young, maybe certain relatives would become saved as a result. Who knows? I'm looking at it from a sort of 'envisioning all possible realities or logical probabilities and choosing the best option' perspective, though maybe God doesn't do this at all.

    A perfectly good being would always eliminate gratuitous evil as far as it can.

    If said evil posed no threat to God or to the accomplishment/fulfillment of His ultimate will, then there might not be any reason to eliminate it. Furthermore, if said evil could even be used as a tool to accomplish God's ultimate will, then it could provide usefulness, and this could be a reason why God would allow it to continue (for a time). Therefore, to say that a perfectly-good Being would always eliminate evil (in general, because I'm not sure I comprehend the meaning of "gratuitous" evil, unless it means unchecked evil) is looking at it from a narrow-minded perspective. I believe that God is so powerful that He can even use evil to glorify His Name. And, after all, the purpose of man's existence is to glorify God.

    Rowe concludes that there is no good state of affairs where an omnipotent, omniscient being would be justified in allowing evils where no possible good can arise from them taking place

    I agree with this, if it were the case. However, I do not think this is the case, because I think good can arise from evil taking place, as I previously mentioned. God can use evil to glorify Himself, and it may also be true (I'm not sure) that God even uses evil to bring greater good to man (one example might possibly be that persecution makes Christians stronger).

    Rowe states that there is too much evil that does not make sense in existence.

    This would seem to me to be an act of putting man's intelligence on a plateau, and judging God's actions by the limitations of man's understanding. Just because certain things do not make sense to Rowe (or to anyone else) does not necessarily then mean that God also has those limitations of understanding and cannot therefore use that evil to accomplish a greater good. To me, that's like a child telling a chess master that he cannot make a certain move, or else he will lose the game; when, in fact, the chess master, by making that same move, will actually win the game (i.e., the child only sees checkmate from that move, but the chess master sees further, and sees a guaranteed victory for himself resulting from that move).

    Numerous theists would answer that although finite human beings cannot know the purposes of evil, God has a purpose. In my view, the human being is therefore unable to truly judge if too much evil exists.

    Since I'm making my replies as I read along, I'm glad to see that you and others agree with me.

    both Feinberg and Hick for example, have provided good reasons why the creator would allow preventable evil.

    This brings up an interesting thought. All God would have had to do was never allow there to be any Tree of Knowledge, plus never allow any temptation of any sort. But then I suppose that could bring up the question of how true relationship could exist if there was never any choice available (i.e., robots vs. those who love freely). Of course, the doctrine of Election would seem to complicate this further (i.e., corrupted man cannot love God freely unless God intervenes and causes the Elect to love Him freely), unless you argue that there was no Election necessary before the Fall.

    Feinberg states that eliminating evil would prohibit other divine plans for the greater good

    This makes a lot of sense to me. It would seem that man's fall and the resulting evil are all part of God's plan to show Himself glorious, merciful, gracious, forgiving, triumphant, etc.

    Hick writes that God must allow a hostile imperfect environment in order for soul-making to occur.

    Huh? What is "soul-making?"

    OK, my comments for the moment are long enough, I think...

    ReplyDelete
  4. Excellent comments, Jeff.

    Who knows? I'm looking at it from a sort of 'envisioning all possible realities or logical probabilities and choosing the best option' perspective, though maybe God doesn't do this at all.

    God is infinite with infinite knowledge and all creatures have finite/limited nature and knowledge.

    Gratuitous evil is deemed as needless, too much, evil.

    The atoning work of Christ is a primary example of how God uses evil for the greater good. The death of Christ came from the evil intentions of the Jewish religious leaders, the Roman rulers, some of the people, and Satanic powers. The death of Christ came from perfectly good intentions from God, in order to perform the atoning work and resurrection.

    To me, that's like a child telling a chess master that he cannot make a certain move, or else he will lose the game; when, in fact, the chess master, by making that same move, will actually win the game (i.e., the child only sees checkmate from that move, but the chess master sees further, and sees a guaranteed victory for himself resulting from that move).

    Yes.

    Soul-making or soul-building

    Hick rejects Augustinian and Calvinistic views on theodicy, and instead supports what he views as the Irenean position. Hick (1970: 221). Ramsay (2004: 2). Hick also rejects conservative Christian doctrines and instead favours the idea of universalism. Hick (1970: 172). Hick (1970: 381). He reasons that human beings were made immature and capable of committing wrong human actions in order that God eventually can bring all persons to the creator through soul-making. Hick (1970: 292). I can accept that some type of soul-making is used by God in the development of believers, but without the atoning work of Christ and resurrection within a Christian tradition we do not have a revealed divine means of salvation and are left to speculate on how God should or could save persons, as Hick speculates.

    HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

    RAMSAY, MEGHAN (2004) ‘John Hick: ‘Evil and Soul Making’, Philosophy of Religion, (ed.) Philip A. Pecorino, Web Surfers Caveat, Suffolk, Virginia, Philosophy of Religion.

    ReplyDelete
  5. Hi, Russ! I really enjoyed looking at those posters, though the ones by the Germans and Russians were scary... scary that people actually saw things that way.

    I've seen many atheists use the evil argument to rule out the existence of God. But our concepts of good and evil are very limited, as are our ideas about God. The saying, "you can't make an omelet without breaking some eggs" comes to mind. There are things that God does or allows that may seem bad to us (such as natural disasters), that must have a reason behind them (such as a single person getting saved, because of that disaster).

    Additionally, evil is merely the absence of good, and sin is the result of man's ability to choose between good and evil, without which we cannot truly love God.

    Because He is Holy, God never actually performs evil deeds, but He allows evil to occur, simply because He loves us and wants a people that will love Him back. All the trouble evil brings is worth it to Him. If it wasn't He wouldn't have even created man, in the first place. How unfathomable is the idea that when God blew life into Adam, He knew that He would have to die on the cross for him!

    ReplyDelete
  6. Thanks, Greg.

    I appreciate all commenters, readers, and links very much.

    I am glad you like the posters. I appreciate propaganda posters and have used some of them previously. I wanted to have imagery related to the problem of evil without being too controversial or gross.

    The atheistic critic like the rest of us does not have the infinite knowledge to state that God cannot use such and such for the greater good. As Christians we can see Biblically, theologically and philosophically that God can use all evil for the greater good.

    We can along with the critic find evil very painful and frustrating and often it does not make very much sense.

    Evil as an absence of good is known as privation. I wrote an article on this earlier and dealt with it in my PhD.

    I may republish it later with some slight changes.

    privation

    ReplyDelete
  7. Hi, Russ. Umm... yeah. That article was either way over my head, or I'm too tired right now to process it. That's why your PhD will be in theology, while my Master is in Electrical Engineering. :)

    One thing I noticed is that there was no mention of Satan. Does Augustine leave Satan out entirely?

    ReplyDelete
  8. Thanks, Greg.

    Well I am no expert on electrical engineering.:)

    Augustine does suggest that Satanic beings are involved in evil.

    Augustine wrote that humanity is in bondage to the prince of the world, Satan, who makes people subject to him through persuasion. Augustine understood humanity as losing its dominion over creation, and that dominion has been awarded substantially to Satan who he calls the prince of this world. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 111).

    AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

    ReplyDelete
  9. The atoning work of Christ is a primary example of how God uses evil for the greater good. The death of Christ came from the evil intentions of the Jewish religious leaders, the Roman rulers, some of the people, and Satanic powers. The death of Christ came from perfectly good intentions from God, in order to perform the atoning work and resurrection.

    Excellent. I never thought of that being a prime example of how God can use evil for good, though it would seem an obvious example.

    ReplyDelete
  10. OK, so now you have introduced me to the idea of soul-making, Russ, and I read this as well:

    "One very important type of theodicy, championed especially by John Hick, involves the idea that the evils that the world contains can be seen to be justified if one views the world as designed by God as an environment in which people, through their free choices can undergo spiritual growth that will ultimately fit them for communion with God:

    The value-judgement that is implicitly being invoked here is that one who has attained to goodness by meeting and eventually mastering temptation, and thus by rightly making responsibly choices in concrete situations, is good in a richer and more valuable sense than would be one created ab initio in a state either of innocence or of virtue. In the former case, which is that of the actual moral achievements of mankind, the individual's goodness has within it the strength of temptations overcome, a stability based upon an accumulation of right choices, and a positive and responsible character that comes from the investment of costly personal effort. (1977, 255-6)

    Hick's basic suggestion, then, is that soul-making is a great good, that God would therefore be justified in designing a world with that purpose in mind, that our world is very well designed in that regard, and thus that, if one views evil as a problem, it is because one mistakenly thinks that the world ought, instead, to be a hedonistic paradise.

    Is this theodicy satisfactory? There are a number of reasons for holding that it is not. First, what about the horrendous suffering that people undergo, either at the hands of others — as in the Holocaust — or because of terminal illnesses such as cancer? One writer — Eleonore Stump — has suggested that the terrible suffering that many people undergo at the end of their lives, in cases where it cannot be alleviated, is to be viewed as suffering that has been ordained by God for the spiritual health of the individual in question. (1993b, 349). But, given that it does not seem to be true that terrible terminal illnesses more commonly fall upon those in bad spiritual health than upon those of good character, let alone that they fall only upon the former, this ‘spiritual chemotherapy’ view seems quite hopeless. More generally, there seems to be no reason at all why a world must contain horrendous suffering if it is to provide a good environment for the development of character in response to challenges and temptations.

    Secondly, and is illustrated by the weakness of Hick's own discussion (1977, 309-17), a soul-making theodicy provides no justification for the existence of any animal pain, let alone for a world where predation is not only present but a major feature of non-human animal life. The world could perfectly well have contained only human persons, or only human person plus herbivores.

    Thirdly, the soul-making theodicy provides no account either of the suffering that young, innocent children endure, either because of terrible diseases, or at the hands of adults. For here, as in the case of animals, there is no soul-making purpose that is served.

    Finally, if one's purpose were to create a world that would be a good place for soul-making, would our earth count as a job well done? It is very hard to see that it would. Some people die young, before they have had any chance at all to master temptations, to respond to challenges, and to develop morally. Others endure suffering so great that it is virtually impossible for them to develop those moral traits that involve relationships with others. Still others enjoy lives of ease and luxury where there is virtually nothing that challenges them to undergo moral growth."

    from:
    http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/evil/#SouMakThe

    ReplyDelete
  11. Hey Russ,

    I've been pretty busy lately with learning the Mac and work, so I haven't had an opportunity to read your article. Thanks for reminding me that it's here--hopefully this weekend I'll get to it.

    Wow...a whole comment without an exclamation point (though I was tempted to end this sentence with one).

    Later,
    GGM

    ReplyDelete
  12. The atoning work of Christ is a primary example of how God uses evil for the greater good. The death of Christ came from the evil intentions of the Jewish religious leaders, the Roman rulers, some of the people, and Satanic powers. The death of Christ came from perfectly good intentions from God, in order to perform the atoning work and resurrection.

    "Excellent. I never thought of that being a prime example of how God can use evil for good, though it would seem an obvious example."

    Thanks, Jeff. It is an excellent Biblical example.

    ReplyDelete
  13. Thanks, Jeff.

    In overall terms I do not support Hick's theodicy, but can support soul-making in general terms, but within a sovereignty and not soul-making theodicy. By soul-making in general terms, I reason God uses evil to discipline and mould the elect.

    In brief reply to the philosophy article:

    Horrendous evils are not gratuitous as God has purposes for them. But, not everyone will develop good character from them. Scripture indicates that many ultimately reside in the lake of fire of Revelation 20, as you know. It could be stated in a sense that evil is used by God to bring his children to him and to keep the non-elect away.

    Animal. pain and suffering, at least to the level it is at with the extinction of some species taking place, for example, to me, is evidence that the fall has affected animals.

    I am not stating, however, that animals were ever definitely meant to be immortal. This would be a complex theological and philosophical issue to speculate on.

    Some children, at least, can learn from suffering as well, and adults can learn from the suffering of children. Hick would suggest that soul-making continues post-mortem and so this could cover infants with his view I suppose.

    God has different purposes for different persons. There is a directed purpose and some will suffer more or less than others in this realm. With both Hick's soul-making and a sovereignty theodicy, after death experience is an aspect of spiritual for growth. But, my Reformed view does not view soul-making as universal for all persons.

    Hick never stated that this life would have persons master spiritual weakness and one of the reasons he is a universalist is because he reasons that with many people much of soul-making will take place post-mortem.

    Within the concept of soul-making theodicy, John Hick explains that once a human being dies a conscious personality continues to exist. Hick (1978: 12). He concludes that for soul-making to succeed post-mortem existence must include the ability to make moral and spiritual choices. Hick (1978: 13).

    HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

    ReplyDelete
  14. Thanks, Jason.

    I have a new satire and theology article as well...sorry...LOL.

    ReplyDelete
  15. Thanks Big Jim, and speaking of Jim, check out the satire article, if you dare.

    Happy weekend.

    ReplyDelete
  16. Sadly, there is more problem of evil material to discuss on the other blog.

    Cheers, Jim.

    ReplyDelete
  17. Hi Russ,
    Jim here with another blog link.
    I call her W.O.A.M..
    She is a minister. Her blog is Coffee, God and Me..

    ReplyDelete
  18. Thanks, Jim.

    I will send her a message after my walk/prayer.

    Russ:)

    ReplyDelete
  19. Excuse this, Russ. My blog at the moment is not at the normal .com url but at a .biz url.

    There should be no need to update your links Russ, as the redirect should kick in as soon as the DNShas updated, and at the point in time, there is some chance that this will not be the new permanent url.

    ReplyDelete
  20. Russ,

    Certain things come to mind. God is the absence of evil, but he has allowed the existence of evil. I believe for the basic reasons you have said. I suppose, for one, how do we know love, good, perfection, anything without an opposite? And without temptation and the ability to fall, we would be rather empty creations.

    Apparently the angels were tested the same way and Lucifer and a third of these creatures failed. Divorced from God they only grew more evil. If God is all good and the absence of evil, then evil is the absence of God.

    When man fell, he allowed evil to take hold. Mankind cut the relationship to God, but God being all good, provided ways to allow us access to a relationship by sacrifices, these were temporary, demanding and painful.

    Once evil had entered man, it was progressive. We see in the early verses of Genesis how it grew. We are later told the heart of man is depraved.

    The evil within we humans, encouraged by Satan, knows no bounds. If left to our devices, if left with no possible relationship to God this world would be even worse than it is and the suffering would be almost unimaginable.

    But God being Good, just and merciful did not leave us to our own devices, but despite our depraved hearts, provided us a means to escape our evil and come to Him. many, however, reject this opportunity.

    We also cannot say God has not limited the extent of evil. God has seen to the utter destruction of some people whom he found lacked any righteousness. Things had reached a point of such evil, he once wiped out all life on the planet through a flood, except for a representative handful to regenerate man and animals. This was a kind of tempering down evil for a while. We also know God will eventually remove all evil.

    He will create a new heaven and earth and Christ will rule for a thousand years, yet even in this period, he will allow evil. Therefore, evil serves some refining purpose toward God's ultimate desire for his creatures.

    At the end of this period, evil is finally banished, locked away and punished.

    To some, Hell seems the ultimate evil. How could God, they ask? My question would be how could God not? If we are to live eternally in a relationship with God, evil cannot be present. The horror of Hell, in my opinion, is it is a place where those who rejected God got their wish. God is not present and evil is free, in a sense, to be evil unimpeded, but contained.

    Larry E.

    ReplyDelete
  21. Thanks very much, Larry.

    I hold to a sovereignty theodicy which is Reformed and in contrast in some aspects to the more typically evangelical free will approach. I wrote an article on this earlier that I will paste here which explains somewhat.

    Five influential books concerning the problem of evil, and back to bed for me.:)

    This is not a top five list, but a short diverse review of books that have been influential in my writing on the problem of evil with my MPhil and PhD dissertations. I am not necessarily in agreement with these texts on several points. These explanations are brief but further information will be provided in my completed doctorate. God willing.

    In alphabetical order:

    AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

    Augustine was one of the first ancient writers to deal with the problem of evil. Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231). Within On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine presents his free will theodicy, theodicy being an explanation for the problem of evil in a theistic universe. Augustine was somewhat influential on Alvin C. Plantinga’s free will defence in the 1970’s. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 26). Augustine reasons that God is not the cause of evil, but rather human beings create the problem when they choose to follow their own temporal ways rather than God’s. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). A possible problem with Augustine’s view is that he blames the problem of evil on human choice but at the same time places a heavy emphasis on God’s sovereignty in creation. Augustine’s view on human free will appears libertarian while, as John Feinberg points out, Augustine’s concept of God’s sovereignty would seemingly require some form of determinism. Feinberg (1994: 98).

    FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

    Within this text Feinberg presents a defence which could be labeled a sovereignty theodicy. My personal sovereignty theodicy is embedded within my MPhil and more so my PhD and is somewhat similar to Feinberg’s work. As well as presenting his own perspective Feinberg does a thorough job of reviewing various theistic and atheistic concepts on the problem of evil. He reasons that God does not presently eliminate the problem of evil because to do so would violate divine plans and human development. Feinberg (1994: 130). I found Feinberg’s explanation of this a bit repetitive and it would perhaps be good for him to have speculated on God’s reasons for willingly allowing evil in more specific terms as I have to some degree in my work.

    GEBARA, IVONE (2002) Out of the Depths, Translated by Ann Patrick Ware, Minneapolis, Fortress Press.

    Gebara is a Brazilian, feminist, Catholic sister. The back of the text notes that she is one of Latin America’s leading theologians. The book is interesting because, although no formal theodicy or defence is presented, she looks at the problem of evil from the perspective of the suffering of women. Gebara, Ivone (2002: 13-59) I can agree with Gebara that women within this corrupted creation have experienced much suffering, and some of it has not been thoroughly acknowledged. However, I disagree with her tendency to reinterpret the Christian faith, for example concerning the doctrine of physical resurrection which she reasons is idealistic theory. Gebara (2002: 122). She thinks it more valuable to look at resurrection in metaphorical terms today as lives are improved and evil resisted. Gebara (2002: 122).

    PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

    Plantinga successfully demonstrates that a free will defence is logical and reasonable. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 28). He speculates that the price of God creating a universe with significantly free creatures is that wrong actions will inevitably occur leading to the problem of evil. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Plantinga’s free will approach is not primarily theological as is Augustine’s and therefore offers a different but somewhat related perspective. A question arises if Plantinga has really successfully answered the objection of theistic critics such as Feinberg, and atheists such as J.L. Mackie on why God could not simply create human beings who were significantly free and never committed wrong actions. I believe that God could have created significantly free human beings, or at least human-like creatures that only committed right actions. Perhaps God desired to create human beings that would ultimately posses a greater spiritual maturity than Adam and Eve prior to the fall because those restored in Christ would have experienced sin, the problem of evil, death and the atoning work and resurrection of Christ. Quite possibly restored human beings would ultimately be more spiritually mature and valuable to God than persons that never knew what it was like to disobey God and experience evil. I would also point out that Biblically speaking the angels that did not fall would seemingly be significantly free and have not committed wrong actions.

    HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

    Hick rejects Augustinian and Calvinistic views on theodicy, and instead supports what he views as the Irenean position. Hick (1970: 221). Ramsay (2004: 2). Hick also rejects conservative Christian doctrines and instead favours the idea of universalism. Hick (1970: 172). Hick (1970: 381). He reasons that human beings were made immature and capable of committing wrong human actions in order that God eventually can bring all persons to the creator through soul-making. Hick (1970: 292). I can accept that some type of soul-making is used by God in the development of believers, but without the atoning work of Christ and resurrection within a Christian tradition we do not have a revealed divine means of salvation and are left to speculate on how God should or could save persons, as Hick speculates.

    AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

    FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

    GEBARA, IVONE (2002) Out of the Depths, Translated by Ann Patrick Ware, Minneapolis, Fortress Press.

    HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

    PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, and DAVID BASINGER (1996) (eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

    PLANTINGA, ALVIN, C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

    RAMSAY, MEGHAN (2004) ‘John Hick: ‘Evil and Soul Making’, Philosophy of Religion, (ed.) Philip A. Pecorino, Web Surfers Caveat, Suffolk, Virginia, Philosophy of Religion.

    ReplyDelete
  22. Speaking of gratuitous evil, Russ is gleeful that his first attempt at a guillotine choke on me tonight was successful.

    ReplyDelete
  23. And we were working on a knee bend defence to the choke as well.

    ReplyDelete
  24. Always enjoy the interesting and humerous paintings, pictures, and comics that you add to your blog articles. Thank You!
    -Blog Fan-

    ReplyDelete
  25. Thanks.

    I reason the imagery adds a multi topic aspect to my blog posts.

    ReplyDelete
  26. Tim Horton's! Russ that is so good! If one word in the English language distinguishes the modern Canadian, it's got to be "double-double!"

    ReplyDelete
  27. The funny thing is Robert, I think I have only visited Tim Hortons 6-8 times in my life.

    It has become more visible in BC the last twenty years.

    Russ

    ReplyDelete
  28. I apologize for the length of this comment, but I wish to stand by my opinion that evil is the absence of good and since scripture has told us “only God is good”, then evil is the absence of God. The heart of man is perverse. I accept that as fact based on my own life. When man rejects Christ, thus any relationship with God, then man is given over to his own desires. Men lacking God then embrace evil and evil feeds upon itself and grows progressively greater. I look again to myself before I turned to God for mercy as proof of that.
    However, evil is repulsive to God, He turns His face from it. God, in my opinion, has tolerated evil for His own purposes, which we may not in this life fully understand, but has declared a day when He will end evil. It is through the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the redemptive sacrifice of Christ and the love and mercy in the grace of God the Father that we ever free our self from the slavery to sin and our innate evil. It is not God who commits evil, but we, and our punishment is brought on our selves.
    "But if a wicked man turns away from all the sins he has committed and keeps all my decrees and does what is just and right, he will surely live; he will not die. None of the offenses he has committed will be remembered against him. Because of the righteous things he has done, he will live. Do I take any pleasure in the death of the wicked? declares the Sovereign LORD. Rather, am I not pleased when they turn from their ways and live?
    "But if a righteous man turns from his righteousness and commits sin and does the same detestable things the wicked man does, will he live? None of the righteous things he has done will be remembered. Because of the unfaithfulness he is guilty of and because of the sins he has committed, he will die.
    "Yet you say, 'The way of the Lord is not just.' Hear, O house of Israel: Is my way unjust? Is it not your ways that are unjust? If a righteous man turns from his righteousness and commits sin, he will die for it; because of the sin he has committed he will die. But if a wicked man turns away from the wickedness he has committed and does what is just and right, he will save his life. Because he considers all the offenses he has committed and turns away from them, he will surely live; he will not die. Yet the house of Israel says, 'The way of the Lord is not just.' Are my ways unjust, O house of Israel? Is it not your ways that are unjust?
    "Therefore, O house of Israel, I will judge you, each one according to his ways, declares the Sovereign LORD. Repent! Turn away from all your offenses; then sin will not be your downfall. Rid yourselves of all the offenses you have committed, and get a new heart and a new spirit. Why will you die, O house of Israel? For I take no pleasure in the death of anyone, declares the Sovereign LORD. Repent and live! Ezekiel 18: 21-32
    Now, there are also events that occur that we men interpret as evil, but which are brought about by God to bring ultimate good. (Some forms of this I wrote about in my “Seven Sufferings”). Such things as the deaths of the firstborn of those in Egypt not protected by the blood of lambs smeared on door lentils. Some of the firstborns were infants and children, who like the slaughtered lambs, were innocent. Some of the other firstborn were adults who were sinners beyond redemption. Nonetheless, each died. This was toward the good of freeing the Hebrews from their enslavement and moving forth with God’s plan as well as pointing to the salvation that would be provided in the sacrifice of the innocent blood of Christ. The innocent children were saved and those adults simply went to the doom that would have eventually been their fate anyway. Where then was there evil? There are many instance in history which we mortals may view as evil, but God with His foreknowledge and perfect balance of justice and mercy knows were not evil, but done for the ultimate good. We, as Paul said, “see through a glass darkly” while God see all in clarity.
    This argument of God and evil is not new and was argued by Job and Habakkuk, and God’s answer to both was how little you know, how dare you question me.
    How long, O LORD, must I call for help, but you do not listen? Or cry out to you, "Violence!", but you do not save? Why do you make me look at injustice? Why do you tolerate wrong? Destruction and violence are before me; 
there is strife, and conflict abounds.
    Therefore the law is paralyzed, and justice never prevails. The wicked hem in the righteous, so that justice is perverted. Habakkuk 1: 2-4.
    The answer given Habakkuk and the answer given us today is the one found in Isaiah 55: 7-9:
    Let the wicked forsake his way and the evil man his thoughts. 
Let him turn to the LORD, and he will have mercy on him, and to our God, for he will freely pardon. "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways," declares the LORD. "As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.”
    It is difficult for us to recognize good or the good resulting from evil. For instance did not good arise from evil in the case of Sister Lucy Vertruse, who became pregnant and had a child as a result of being raped and brutalized by soldiers in Yugoslavia. She wrote:
    “I will be poor again, I will return to the old aprons and the wooden shoes that the women in the country use for working, and I will accompany my mother into the forest to collect the resin from the slits in the trees.

    “Someone has to begin to break the chain of hatred that has always destroyed our countries. And so, I will teach my child only one thing: love. This child, born of violence, will be a witness along with me that the only greatness that gives honor to a human being is forgiveness.”
    “The British Atheist, Bertrand Russell, of whom I will not take back my comment that I found him an ignorant man, once said this: "No one can believe in a good God if they've sat at the bedside of a dying child"
    I came to believe in God sitting at the bedside of my dying child, and this led me finally to Christ, and I believe in a totally good God. The death of those first seven children was not an evil allowed by God; it was a good by the grace of God because it probably saved the souls of those seven babes and it saved me.

    ReplyDelete
  29. Thanks, Larry.

    I do not disagree that evil is privation. However, Augustine realized that evil could not exist in itself, but some good had to remain.

    Augustine reasons that every human being that exists is good, but is evil where it is defective. Augustine (421)(1998: Chapter 13: 7).

    AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

    But, as God is infinite and omnipotent, he wills all things. He does not force or coerce persons to sin as this is done freely within a corrupt nature.

    Motive is the key.

    God hates sin, but willingly allows it, and therefore in philosophy can be stated to be its primary cause. But, persons sin on their own account as secondary cause.

    God cannot be absent in the presence of evil because God is infinite. God could only be absent from evil if he was finite.

    As well, nothing can exist outside the presence of God.

    I have come across some in England that rather than accept a Reformed sovereignty theodicy, attempt to deny that God is infinite and state that he does not have absolute foreknowledge. As God existed prior to Genesis 1: 1 and is the Alpha and Omega of Revelation, it can be reasonably concluded that God existed before the creation of all matter. God existed prior to the creation of the angels, and therefore only God existed prior to creation.

    God is therefore infinite as he existed before all finite creation.

    God cannot sin as this would violate his nature.

    Again, motive is key as God remains perfect in all he wills, but the motives of fallen angels and persons are sinful when evil occurs. There is always at least a taint of sin.

    I stated in my related article:

    Although privation seems true in a negative sense, a problem with the concept in creatures is that corruption and the resulting evil in creatures is not merely an absence of something good, but consists of its own positive, destructive quality, as private creatures not only lack the will to do what is good, but will to do evil. John Hick reasons that Augustine’s idea of privation fails to deal with the fact that corrupted persons do not always tend to disintegrate and cease to exist in will and personality. Hick (1970: 62). This would seem correct as a corrupted and evil entity can grow in intelligence and power, so a mere corruption of a being from original perfection does not appear to weaken it to that status of non-existence. Something is considered evil because it can be seen to have a diminished degree of goodness. This appears reasonable; however, the diminished goodness in a creature is not replaced by non-existence, but by an actual corrupted nature within the person. It should be noted that Augustine is quite difficult to read and understand and it is not surprising that he is interpreted in varying ways. His writing style makes interpretations difficult as well, in my opinion.

    As for free will views/theodicy, I have several problems. Here is some explanation from two previous articles.

    God bless, Larry!

    Jonathan Edwards and Libertarian Free Will

    Introduction

    Theologian, Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758)[1] wrote a treatise in 1754, known as ‘Freedom of the Will’, but the actual name is ‘A Careful and Strict Inquiry into the Modern Prevailing Notions of that Freedom of the Will, which is Supposed to be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue, and Vice, Reward and Punishment, Praise, and Blame’.[2] I think the shorter title shall suffice!

    I looked at this work from both a philosophical and theological perspective and realized it had similarities to aspects of J.S. Feinberg’s sovereignty theodicy, and the related sovereignty theodicy that I have been working on in my MPhil and PhD work. My review is primarily theological.

    Libertarian Free Will and Incompatibilism

    Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions) or simultaneous (at the same time) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise.[3] Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.[4]

    In regard to this article, I reject incompatibilism for two main reasons:

    1. Due to the universal sinful nature of humanity described in Romans, Chapter 3, where it is mentioned that there are none righteous in verse 10, and none that seek God in verse 11. C.E.B. Cranfield states that this passage (vv. 10-18) indicates that without exception, all people are sinners.[5] Cranfield further writes that the idea being put across is that human beings live as if they have no reckoning with God, and are practical, even if not actual atheists.[6] Robert H. Mounce notes concerning this passage that although some may seek a religious experience, it is not the same as seeking the true God.[7] To Mounce, God seeks the Christian believer, and not the other way around.[8] Therefore with this interpretation of the Romans passage, if libertarian free will was true, no one would ever come to Christ through the gospel, because God would not simultaneously will that a person believe it.

    In Ephesians, Chapter 1, believers in Christ are said to be chosen by God in verse 4, and predestined in adoption in verses 5 and 11. Francis Foulkes thinks that God’s sovereign will here in choosing people is not opposed to free will.[9] However, it seems because God’s sovereignty is involved this is not the concept of libertarian free will, or a type of hard determinism in which God coerces or forces human beings to believe in him, rather people are chosen and destined to be with God by believing and trusting in Christ. Bernard Berofsky writes that free will is an illusion within the concept of determinism.[10] This would not be the idea of compatibilism, as within compatibilism God is transforming previously rebellious sinners into people open to the gospel. The human free will would not be viewed as an illusion for compatibilism, but rather a will from a nature corrupted by sin that is in need of divine influence in order to freely accept the gospel. This requires God through the use of irresistible grace[11] to mould, change and persuade a person in order to accept the gospel, which they never could do on their own. Irresistible grace does consist of God determining that a person be saved, but this is through the use compatibilism or soft determinism and not compulsion. For a human being to be transformed by belief in the gospel in no way means that a human being is contributing to their merit for salvation.

    2. The infinite (unlimited) nature of God who has definite goals and plans for his creation would require that he simultaneously influence the actions of finite (limited) human and angelic beings alike. God in the Bible has established plans and made prophecies which seemingly require a compatibilistic divine influence.

    I therefore reject incompatibilism, in favour of compatibilism on the point of free will.

    Edwards on Libertarian Free Will

    Edwards, from his understanding, disagrees with Arminian libertarian free will. He views Arminianism as inconsistent because if the Arminians assume that human free will is the cause of choice then the human will determines its own actions. He argues:

    1. The Arminians speak of the will determining itself, meaning the soul is exercising the power of willing something.[12]

    2. If the will determines its own free acts, it thus determines its own acts by choosing them.[13]

    3. If the human will determines the will and resulting choices, and since every choice must have a cause, then a chain is established where a will and choice is determined by a preceding will and choice. Therefore, if the will determines its own free acts, then every free act of will and choice is determined by a preceding act of will and choice. If a preceding act of will also be of free choice, then that too was self-determined.[14] What Edwards is stating is that in the act of causing a free choice (choice1), the cause of that choice was also made freely (choice2), and the cause of that choice was made freely (choice3) and so on.[15] This becomes contradictory and Sam Storms states this type of concept goes on ad infinitum, meaning that the Arminian view on free will and choice is subject to infinite regress (goes on forever) and without solid intellectual foundation.[16] Edwards is therefore concluding that logically a free will and choice cannot be its own cause.

    4. Edwards suggests that a way out of this contradiction is to come to the last act of will and choice and state that it is not self-determined, but is rather determined without the use of a will and choice. However, to Edwards, if the initial act of will and choice within the chain is not free, then none of the resulting willed choices can be free.[17] By stating that acts of the will occur without any cause at all is to render human choice random.[18] If human choices are made randomly it is difficult to establish any ethical value to acts which the human will had no part in causing.[19] If human acts are not caused by the will and choice, they must be caused by something within a person in order for them to not be random and to have ethical meaning.

    5. Edwards rejects the idea that the human will chooses in the absence of any motive or desire.[20] He writes that it would be ridiculous for someone to insist that the human soul chooses one thing over another, and at the same time claim that the human will and choice is indifferent to either choice.[21]

    Therefore to Edwards the Arminian view of libertarian free will is inconsistent.

    True Human Freedom

    Rejecting libertarian free will, Edwards thinks that people in their fallen state are freely able to choose what they most desire.[22] He believes that because of corrupted human nature human beings are free only to sin.[23] Human beings therefore freely choose within their sinful nature to disobey God. The choices of acts made by human beings do not depart from the motives and desires which fuel them as the motives and desires come from human nature.[24] Within Edwards' system God's sovereign grace would influence the nature of the elect in order that they would have motives and desires leading to a belief in Christ.

    Storms point out that, for Edwards, corrupted human nature was not caused by natural necessity. Natural necessity would consist of external natural or environmental deterministic forces that would coerce or force someone to commit an act.[25] If this type of determinism took place, human beings would be freed from moral responsibility in choosing sinful acts. However, for Edwards, there is within corrupted humanity an internal moral necessity by which fallen and corrupted human beings freely and willfully, without force, coercion, or compulsion, through motives and desires, choose to sin.

    This is in line with compatibilistic thought, as Feinberg views desires as preceding the human will in making choices.[26] I agree with both Edwards and Feinberg that human libertarian free will is not the cause of choice. I would cautiously deduce that behind human motives and desires is consciousness and self-awareness. This consciousness would be caused freely by God in the act of creation. God would give human beings within their nature consciousness and self-awareness, an understanding that they have identity as an individual. There would be in a sense significant, yet limited freedom present within the human consciousness to have an understanding of personal identity, apart from every other individual entity, but this in itself would not be free will or choice, and would not be libertarian free will. This idea does not fall prey to Edwards’ concept of infinite regression of will and choice. Human nature and consciousness does not choose to be as it is, but was created by God, and has been corrupt since the fall of humanity. From consciousness and self-awareness, human beings would develop motives and desires, and eventually make limited free will choices. The primary cause of human acts is determined by God who creates the human nature, and influences human choices. The secondary cause of human acts is the individuals that act according to nature, consciousness, motives, desires, and a limited free will influenced by God.

    It may be correctly pointed out that what God determines and causes must necessarily (logically must occur) take place. However, I do not think that God coerces or forces individuals to commit actions. Some Calvinists suggest that human beings are not free in any respect, but have liberty to follow their motives and desires. A problem with the use of the term liberty, although I am in agreement with the basic theological concept, is that it is often academically defined as autonomy and/or freedom of choice, therefore confusing the issue for some not familiar with Reformed theology. With my use of the terms compatibilistic free will or limited free will I hope to provide a concept of human freedom that is clearly understood to be different than libertarian free will.

    Even prior to the fall of humanity, because of God’s infinite presence and simultaneous willing of acts, I would not see human free will as libertarian free will, but rather limited free will simultaneously influenced by God. After the fall of humanity, the corrupted nature of humanity would produce a corrupted consciousness, motives, and desires, which would lead to people freely choosing to embrace sin.

    Norman Geisler on Edwards

    Geisler disagrees with Edward’s view, which he calls theistic determinism for four reasons.

    1. To view freedom as that which someone desires is inadequate because people sometimes commit acts which they do not desire. People also at times do not commit acts they desire to do.[27] I do not find this reasoning convincing. For example, I may not desire to get allergy injections because they are slightly painful and irritating, but I take them because I desire to overcome my allergies more than I desire not take the shots. So, even though I do not desire to receive injections, I take them because I desire to be healthy. I still am committing an act based on a conscious understanding of personal identity, leading to motives, desire, and limited free will. I may avoid certain things I would desire to do because of consequences. I won’t drive at 100 miles an hour even though it is fun, since in a greater way I do not desire to have a traffic accident and/or be given a ticket.

    2. Geisler states that human beings can freely cause their own actions, but not their own being. Geisler does not think a self-caused will comes from nothing, but from itself.[28] Edwards’ argument showing that each will and choice must have preceding will and choice is not overcome here. The will and choice, must in my view, be at least connected to human nature, which is initially caused by God, and has been corrupted by sin.

    3. Geisler writes that people are made in the image of God, and therefore have the ability to make choices. I agree with Edwards that the starting point is not will or choice, but in my view is human nature, consciousness, motives and desires.

    4. Human freedom to Geisler is not contrary to God’s sovereignty.[29] I agree with Geisler if we are meaning a compatibilistic limited free will, but not libertarian free will, or self-determinism as Geisler calls it.[30] In my view libertarian free will is contrary to God’s sovereign ability to save corrupted sinners, who oppose God by nature and choice and contrary to God’s sovereign ability to complete his plan for creation. Geisler writes that it is not the will that makes a decision, but the person acting by the means of that will.[31] He then adds that it is useless to ask what the first cause is, because it comes from the person.[32] I do not agree that it is useless to look beyond human choice, because even if by Geisler’s definition with his first use of the word will, we understand it as nature, consciousness, motives, and desires, the Bible appears to indicate in Romans, Chapter 3, that these have been corrupted.

    Practical Theology

    Incompatibilistic systems which claim libertarian free will, in my view, fail to adequately deal with the Biblical problem of a fallen corrupted human nature. I realize as small children many of us are taught that every person can choose good or evil, and this makes some sense humanly speaking, as most people do some good things for others. To many it seems unjust that we human beings are born with sin natures, and cannot choose God on our own. However, Christianity is a faith of grace where God shows love to human beings through the atoning work and resurrection of Christ.[33] Human beings sin freely and willfully, but by God’s irresistible grace human beings can freely accept the gospel through the use of compatibilistic limited free will.

    [1] Reed (2004:1).
    [2] Storms (2006: 1).
    [3] Geisler (1996: 429).
    [4] Feinberg (1994: 60).
    [5] Cranfield (1992: 66).
    [6] Cranfield (1992: 67).
    [7] Mounce (1995: 109).
    [8] Mounce (1995: 109).
    [9] Foulkes (1989: 55).
    [10] Berofsky (1996: 198)
    [11] P.E. Hughes defines irresistible grace as grace which a human being cannot reject. As a work this irresistible grace achieves its directed end. (1996: 481).
    I do not believe it is irresistible in a sense of coercion or force, but that every person God chooses for salvation shall be saved.
    [12] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1).
    [13] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1).
    [14] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 1-2).
    [15] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 2).
    [16] Storms (2006: 3).
    [17] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.1: 2).
    [18] Storms (2006: 3).
    [19] Storms (2006: 3).
    [20] Storms (2006: 3).
    [21] Edwards (1754)(2006: 2.7: 3).
    [22] Tchividjian (2001: 1).
    [23] Tchividjian (2001: 2).
    [24] Edwards (1754)(2006: 4.4: 3).
    [25] Storms (2006: 5).
    [26] Feinberg (1994: 128).
    [27] Geisler (1996: 429).
    [28] Geisler (1996: 429).
    [29] Geisler (1996: 429).
    [30] Geisler (1996: 430).
    [31] Geisler (1996: 430).
    [32] Geisler (1996: 430).
    [33] Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 56).

    BEROFSKY, BERNARD (1996) ‘Determinism’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

    BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

    CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

    EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.
    http://www.jonathanedwards.com

    FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

    FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.

    GEISLER, N.L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

    GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

    HUGHES, P.E. (1996) ‘Grace’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

    MOUNCE, R.H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

    REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology.

    STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com
    http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368

    TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online.

    Within my MPhil and PhD theoretical work on theodicy, sovereignty, free will, and determinism, I have dealt with free will perspectives from Lewis, Augustine and Plantinga, but not Arminianism. A friend of mine, Varun, asked me about Arminianism and not being a scholar on Arminianism I thought the posting below could be helpful. The following is a brief discussion of Arminianism and free will.

    Arminianism and Free Will

    Total Depravity

    A definition of total depravity that I used in my MPhil...The concept of total depravity does not mean (1) that depraved people cannot or do not perform actions that are good in either man's or God's sight. But no such action can gain favor with God for salvation. Neither does it mean (2) that fallen man has no conscience which judges between good and evil for him. But that conscience has been effected by the fall so that it cannot be a safe and reliable guide. Neither does it mean (3) that people indulge in every form of sin or in any sin to the greatest extent possible. Positively total depravity means that the corruption has extended to all aspects of man's nature, to his being: and total depravity means that because of that corruption there is nothing man can do to merit saving favour with God. Ryrie (1996: 312).

    Pelagianism

    It must be noted that Arminianism is not Pelagianism. Pelagianism believes that human beings can achieve salvation from their own powers. It is believed that human beings can choose in free will, good or evil. Original sin was a bad example, and not inherited. Yarnold (1999: 435).

    Arminianism, original sin, and prevenient grace

    Arminianism holds to original sin and human corruption and that people are not able to do good without prevenient grace. Grider (1996: 80). Prevenient grace could be explained as preceding grace.

    Does prevenient grace work?

    Arminians generally believe that God's grace is not irresistible, and that believers can fall away from God. Grider (1996: 80). A problem I see here is although Arminians believe in original sin, and total depravity, they state that people can reject God's salvific grace. Grider (1996: 80). I would think an understanding of original sin and the resulting fallen human nature, as described by Paul in Romans 1-3, for example, would view God's salvific grace to those who are totally depraved and corrupt, as having to be in a sense irresistible, although not forced or coerced. God would instead persuade and mould human beings he has predestined in order that they freely believe. God would have to change a human being that previously could not believe, so that he/she would follow God and Christ. In other words, from my Biblical perspective, human beings with a fallen human nature that were totally depraved would always reject God's prevenient grace, so for the Arminian to say that sometimes the grace is accepted and sometimes it is not, is to assume that the fallen human being has the ability to accept God's grace, despite total depravity. From my perspective this Arminian view does not present a fallen nature incapable of following God, but one that could possibly follow God if God provided prevenient (preceding) grace. So, an Arminian view is not Pelagian, but it presents a less than perfect nature that is seen as totally depraved, but still able to accept Christ with the help of God's grace. This idea was expressed by my Arminian influenced, Mennonite, Book of Romans professor who did not believe in a sinful nature, but that all human beings of less than perfect nature eventually took a sinful position against God. P.E. Hughes explains that prevenient grace precedes all human decision. Hughes (1996: 480). It sees God as taking the initiative. Hughes (1996: 480). I am not in disagreement with this aspect of prevenient grace, but as Erickson states, Arminians recognizing the human inability to respond to the gospel introduced the idea of prevenient grace. Erickson (1994: 925). Erickson explains that there is no clear and adequate basis in Scripture for this concept of universal enablement to believe. Erickson (1994: 925). I agree with Erickson that prevenient grace is an appealing concept. Erickson (1994: 925). However, I reason that Biblically when God predestines someone as in Ephesians 1, he regenerates a person that shall believe. God simultaneously has the individual person, with a limited human free will, willingly accept the gospel message in the regeneration process.

    Sin nature?

    As noted, Arminians hold to a belief in original sin, and total depravity. Grider (1996: 80). But a minority may not hold to a belief in a sin nature, although Grider points out that James Arminius himself viewed persons as fallen and unable to do any good thing on their own. Grider (1996: 80). A sin nature may seem too negative for those that want to believe that the human being can choose God with divine help, but it may be that some hold to theology that is both Arminian and Pelagian in nature. This may have been the case with my Mennonite professors who claimed to be Arminian, but preferred the concept of sin position over the idea of sin nature in regard to
    humanity. My view would require God to enlighten, persuade and mould an enslaved will, but without the use of force or coercion. This enslaved will would prior to salvation not be free to choose God and commit good actions pleasing to God in regard to salvation, but simultaneously in the salvation process the limited free will of a fallen human being would be enlightened, persuaded and moulded to believe in Christ. There must be a limited free will present in the salvation process or else hard determinism is taking place that is force or coercion. My view requires a sinful corrupt human nature, which is totally depraved, as in unable to freely choose God as is, without a divine spiritual alteration, whereas the Arminian view requires human beings to have sinned and be less than perfect, but to have the ability within their nature to accept God's prevenient grace with the use of free will. My view sees limited free will as allowing God to restore the elect to him by salvation via an alteration of the person, but is not libertarian free will which through prevenient grace allows people to choose or reject Christ. In my understanding the fallen human being has a limited free will that freely rejects God, and through the salvation process God enables the believer to freely follow Christ. By limited free will I accept the idea that a fallen human being is free in the sense that he/she can be restored by God if elected, but not free in a way the he/she could be saved through prevenient grace.

    John Calvin in my view held to a concept of free will similar to my own, and he has influenced my theology. He wrote in 1543 in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will.

    If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

    For Calvin although God must elect and restore an individual for salvation to occur, it is not done by force or coercion, but through the use of soft determinism as human beings are converted to a belief in Christ through the Holy Spirit. I would think a moderate sovereignty or Calvinistic view on human free will, especially in regard to salvation, provides the Christian with a good, Biblical, basic comprehension of something which is not completely understandable by the human mind. God predestines believers as shown in Ephesians 1, and is always the primary mover in human salvation. God has a perfect free will by which he chooses an individual which has far less than a perfect free will, and corrupted human nature.

    CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

    ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

    GRIDER, J.K. (1996) 'Arminianism', in Walter A. Elwell (ed.). Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

    HUGHES, P.E. (1996) 'Grace', in Walter A. Elwell (ed.). Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

    RYRIE, C.C. (1996) 'Depravity, Total', in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

    YARNOLD, E.J. (1999) 'Pelagianism', in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

    ReplyDelete
  30. Hi Russ,
    Here is another blogger link I picked up. I'm not sure if he will work for you. But, I told him I would send some visitors.

    Anyway, I have a new blogger for you to visit. His interest are in Christianity, music and The Nebraska State Corn Huskers. See what you can do to interact with him and maybe add a link.

    Here is his link nutuba

    ReplyDelete
  31. buy tramadol rx how to buy tramadol online overnight - can i buy tramadol online

    ReplyDelete