Photo: University of Wales, Trinity
Saint David (UWTSD), official
PhD: Twitter quote 102
Twitter version (part 1)
Phillips reasons it is not logically
contradictory for one to ride a bicycle and therefore God should be able to do
it and yet he cannot. (part 1 of 2)
Twitter version (part 2)
(Phillips) Therefore, God is not
omnipotent. (I disagree on omnipotence) (part 2 of 2)
2010 Theodicy and
Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David,
Lampeter
Edited
One approach to Phillip’s argument[10] is to admit that God, as
non-finite, cannot commit finite actions[11] and is therefore not
omnipotent[12] as classically reasoned
by many within traditional thought.[13] A second approach
is in agreement with Frame’s point that even though God cannot by nature commit
the actions of finite creatures,[14] this does not disqualify
God as being omnipotent within his infinite nature.[15] God’s lack of
finiteness is actually a strength.[16] Frame states God could
commit the type of finite actions discussed if he so desired by taking human
form.[17] I reason God could
take human form to accomplish the task of riding a bicycle, as for example, God
is stated in Genesis[18] to have walked and
spoken[19] in the Garden of Eden.[20] Although I do not reason
this is a ridiculous suggestion to deduce God could take bodily form[21] to walk or ride a
bicycle,[22] it certainly would not
be within God’s nature to typically ride a bicycle.[23]
Philips summarizes his view on God’s
omnipotence in three points.[24] One, God
would only be omnipotent if he could do anything that can be explained that is
done without contradiction.[25] Two, he then
reasons there are many countless activities that God without contradiction
cannot do.[26] Three, his
conclusion is that God is not omnipotent.[27] Philips’
view can be accepted as reasonable and for some God’s omnipotence would need to
be redefined.[28] However, I reason
Frame’s explanation adequately offers the points that God can only do what is
logically possible[29] and as well what is not
contrary to his infinite and spiritual nature.[30]
Bibliography
BLACKBURN,
SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford
University Press.
CAUTHEN,
KENNETH (1997) ‘Theodicy’, in Frontier.net, Rochester, New
York, Kenneth Cauthen, Professor of Theology, Emeritus, Colgate Rochester
Crozer Divinity School.
GRENZ,
STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket
Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.
ERICKSON,
MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
ERICKSON,
MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know
It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.
FRAME,
JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans
3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1,
Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.
FRAME,
JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg,
New Jersey.
PHILLIPS,
D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.),
Atlanta, John Knox Press.
PHILLIPS,
D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God,
Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
HAMILTON,
VICTOR P. (1988) Handbook on the Pentateuch, Grand Rapids, Baker
Book House.
HUME,
DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and
Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York,
The Free Press.
HUME,
DAVID (1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion,
Digireads.com/Neeland Media LLC, Lawrence, Kansas.
LA SOR, WILLIAM
SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old
Testament Survey, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
SHEDD,
WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 1,
Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.
SHEDD,
WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2,
Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.
THIESSEN,
HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand
Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
WEBER,
OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics, Volumes 1 and 2,
Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company.
WRIGHT,
R.K.McGREGOR (1996) No Place for Sovereignty, Downers Grove,
Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
[1] Frame (2002:
518). Erickson (1994: 277). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume
1).
[2] Frame (2002:
518). Thiessen (1956: 126).
[3] Frame (2002:
518). Thiessen (1956: 126). Weber (1955)(1981: 440).
[4] Frame (2002: 520).
[5] Frame (2002: 520).
[6] Phillips (2005: 113).
[7] Phillips (2005: 113).
[8] Phillips (2005: 113).
[9] Phillips (2005: 113). For
Philips, God’s inability to do finite things is a weakness making God less than
all-powerful. For Frame it is a strength which maintains God as
omnipotent. Frame (2002: 520).
[10] Phillips (2005: 113).
[11] Frame (2002:
520). Phillips (2005: 113).
[12] Phillips (2005: 113).
[13] Cauthen (1997:
1). Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 85-86). Wright
(1996: 278).
[14] Frame (2002:
520). Phillips (2005: 113).
[15] Frame (2002: 520). A
traditional perspective would not view the lack of finite nature of God as a
negation, but God would be understood in the positive sense as not lacking
power by being infinite.
[16] Frame (2002: 520). With
Phillips’ view, God could be considered less than omnipotent with my own
example I provide here, because it is not illogical for a being to sleep, and
God cannot sleep. However, it could be stated that it is a strength
for God to not need to sleep or be able to sleep.
[17] Frame (2002:
520). Phillips would more than likely view this as an ‘absurd
suggestion’ with no contextual warrant, as he describes similar attempts to
counter his argument. Phillips (2005: 113).
[18] Genesis 3: 8 in The New
American Standard Version Bible Version (1984: 4).
[19] Old Testament scholar
Victor P. Hamilton reasons this could be taken from a literal (to some degree)
reading. Hamilton (1982: 48).
[20] I realize there is
debate on the creation story in Genesis concerning whether it is to be taken as
plain literal, figurative literal, myth or a combination of
approaches. La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush reason there is definitely
metaphorical language in Genesis. La Sor, Hubbard, and Bush (1987:
72). My example does serve well as agreement with Frame’s point,
however. Aspects of Genesis will be further discussed within this
thesis.
[21] Hamilton (1982: 48).
[22] Phillips (2005: 113).
[23] Phillips (2005: 113).
[24] Philips (2005: 11).
[25] Philips (2005: 11).
[26] Philips (2005:
11). Frame (2002: 518-520). I of course offered
Frame’s response to this view, and my own.
[27] Philips (2005:
11).
[28] Traditional perspectives
would still reason that God’s omnipotence need not be redefined as a lack of
finiteness would demonstrate God’s lack of impotency.
[29] Frame (2002:
518). Erickson (1994: 277). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359-360 Volume
1). Blackburn (1996: 268).
[30] Frame (2002: 520). Erickson (1994: 277). Thiessen (1956: 126). Weber (1955)(1981: 440). David Hume within Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion questions this traditional understanding of an omnipotent supreme being as human limitations make God’s attributes ‘totally incomprehensible.’ Hume (1779)(2004: 21).
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