Henry C.Thiessen (PhD Edit)

Henry C.Thiessen (PhD Edit) 

Preface 

Photo, May 2025. This work from my PhD was originally published on Blogger, 20140403, revised for an entry on academia.edu, 20250726. 

Henry Clarence Thiessen (1884-1947)

I bought Thiessen’s 1956 theology textbook used while an undergrad at Columbia Bible College. I find his work useful even though he takes an incompatibilist position in contrast to my compatibilist one. 

A Biblical Studies Professor at Columbia Bible College was quite dismissive of Thiessen stating, paraphrased that ‘Thiessen was a dispensationalist’. One of my local unofficial Doctoral, PhD advisers stated, Thiessen was basically a compiler of information and not very original. Also dismissive. Based on this limited work I shall let you form your own opinion.  

Naturalism 

Wheaton professor, Henry Clarence Thiessen (1956) explains that since naturalism holds that nature is the whole of reality, everything that occurs is due to the laws of nature.[1]  He comments Scripture recognizes the existence of the laws of nature, but it is reasoned they do not operate independently of God.[2] God concurs with the laws he has established,[3] and Thiessen reasons that miracles and revelation can occur when God operates outside of laws he established.[4]  

Incompatibilism 

Thiessen writes God knows the future,[5] and that is defined as foreknowledge.[6]  He also points out that God’s prescience does not mean God predetermined these actions.[7]  Thiessen is noting that human acts within God’s prescient foreknowledge are still significantly free.[8] 

Leibniz has a different view than Thiessen,[9] that is deterministic and reasons that foreknowledge has to do with God’s determined will and is not dependent on free human actions.[10] This predetermination should not be understood as by necessity eliminating all human choice.[11]  Erickson takes a reasonable compatibilistic position and writes God with foreknowledge sees many possibilities and influences that will be present, and then acts accordingly to his will.[12]   

Thiessen from an incompatibilist position writes that God does not want to create automaton type beings with no choice in whether or not they would glorify God.[13] For Thiessen, humanity can only truly glorify God by choosing to do so while still having the opportunity to choose not to glorify God in disobedience.[14] This concept appears on the surface to be primarily in line with noted incompatibilism and free will approaches almost verbatim.[15]  

On Scripture 

Thiessen dismisses the idea of a dictation theory of Scriptural inspiration, as the writers of Scripture were not persons that merely had divine information dictated to them.[16] The writers of Scripture were not ‘mere secretaries’ that wrote words dictated to them by the Holy Spirit.[17] It can therefore be reasoned it is not the Holy Spirit’s grammar being used.[18] The distinctive style of Biblical writers based on the study of original languages makes the dictation theory quite unlikely.[19] The concept of Biblical inspiration, with the Holy Spirit serving as guidance for the Biblical writer, seems both orthodox and reasonable.[20] The Biblical authors had full use of their intellect and used their own grammar, but were guided to write God’s word without error and omission.[21] The Holy Spirit guided the thoughts of Biblical writers.[22] Shedd names this basic theory of Biblical inspiration as ‘plenary inspiration’ meaning writers were moved by the Holy Spirit in respect to thought and language and were kept from error.[23]   

Modern theology needs to correctly discern what the Spirit is stating through the Bible and this needs to be done through proper research techniques. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?  Grand Rapids, Zondervan.  

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics. 

LINDSELL, HAROLD (1976) The Battle for the Bible, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

PACKER, J.I. (1996) ‘Regeneration’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

PACKER, J.I. (1973) Knowing God, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.  

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.  

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.  

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

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[1] Thiessen (1956: 186).

[2] Thiessen (1956: 186).

[3] Thiessen (1956: 186).

[4] Thiessen (1956: 186).

[5] Thiessen (1956: 125).

[6] Thiessen (1956: 125).

[7] Thiessen (1956: 126).

[8] Thiessen (1956: 126).

[9] Thiessen (1956: 126).

[10] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 147).

[11] Leibniz (1710)(1998: 147).

[12] Erickson (1994: 360).

[13] Thiessen (1956: 248).

[14] Thiessen (1956: 248).

[15] Geisler (1986: 76-77).

[16] Thiessen (1956: 106).

[17] Lindsell (1976: 32).

[18] Thiessen (1956: 106).  People were not robotically inspired to write Scripture.

[19] Erickson (1994: 207).

[20] Thiessen (1956: 106).  Lindsell (1976: 30).

[21] Thiessen (1956: 106).  The Scripture was presented accurately via inspiration, states Erickson.  Erickson (1994: 199).  J.I. Packer reasons God and Christ sent the Holy Spirit to teach his people the truth and to save them from error.  Packer (1973: 61).  

[22] Erickson (1994: 215).

[23] Shedd  (1874-1890)(1980: 72 Volume 1).  

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20250726

Preface II

Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism has been discussed on various MPhil/PhD related articles and on my website work. Below is the MPhil/PhD link.

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Scripture has been discussed significantly on my website, with an increased use of New Testament Greek citations within Biblical Studies entries. For the revised version of this article, I wish to further discuss naturalism which has been less reviewed within my work overall.

Naturalism

For Thiessen, he reasoned 'naturalism holds that nature is the whole of reality...' Thiessen (1956: 186).

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Naturalism (2007-2020).

David Papineau (2020)

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains that 'The term “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy. Its current usage derives from debates in America in the first half of the last century.' This reads as true. 'Naturalism', when used seems to be encompassing a series of varied beliefs, rather than one distinct philosophy. There is philosophical agreement where it is reasoned, reality is based in nature and not in the supernatural. 

My findings over the years with reading, listening online and with in-person discussions, have been that a person may not describe self as a naturalist, but may state he/she believes in science, as opposed to the supernatural; or a person might state they are an empiricist and do not hold to a belief in the supernatural. Such a person is making a naturalistic division philosophically from that which is supernaturalistic. But this does not in many cases mean as certain that such a person is philosophically embracing the term 'naturalism', within his/her worldview. Seems to me the term 'naturalism' is often used by evangelicals to describe the worldview of those that do not believe in the supernatural. Therefore, again, the description from Stanford that “naturalism” has no very precise meaning in contemporary philosophy, rings true and has for years for me via my research.

Stanford states: 'So understood, “naturalism” is not a particularly informative term as applied to contemporary philosophers.' Agreed. Stanford further notes that 'The great majority of contemporary philosophers would happily accept naturalism as just characterized—that is, they would both reject “supernatural” entities, and allow that science is a possible route (if not necessarily the only one) to important truths about the “human spirit”.' I can agree that this is likely the position of many modern philosophers (and scientists), but I do not agree with the rejection of the supernatural. 

Further from Stanford: 'Even so, this entry will not aim to pin down any more informative definition of “naturalism”. It would be fruitless to try to adjudicate some official way of understanding the term. Different contemporary philosophers interpret “naturalism” differently. This disagreement about usage is no accident.' Agreed. It is fruitless to attempt to officially tag everyone that does not hold to supernaturalism as primarily a naturalist, as if 'naturalism' is one uniform philosophy.

Instead Stanford writes that in regards to their entry: 'It will outline a range of philosophical commitments of a generally naturalist stamp...' In agreement, this is how I have viewed naturalism as well.

Cited: 

'As indicated by the above characterization of the mid-twentieth-century American movement, naturalism can be separated into an ontological and a methodological component. The ontological component is concerned with the contents of reality, asserting that reality has no place for “supernatural” or other “spooky” kinds of entity. By contrast, the methodological component is concerned with ways of investigating reality, and claims some kind of general authority for the scientific method.'

Ontologically (existence and reality), I do not view the supernatural as 'spooky', but rather view the non-finite, non-eternal, therefore, infinite and eternal first cause, uncaused cause, as philosophically necessary with sufficient key premises of support. The first cause is sufficiently of infinity, eternality and perfect goodness. Finite, supernatural, non-natural entities can also exist if created by the first cause entity, but are unnecessary, as contingent entities.

Academically, I can support scientific, empirical methodology within scientific research and overlapping academic disciplines. This is inductive reasoning, but I do not reject deductive reasoning within academic disciplines where reasonable, especially within philosophy and theology.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

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•