Edited from a recent email
Human ability in conjunction with compatibilism
This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will.
Middle Knowledge April 20, 2016
In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature and choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human thoughts, choice, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view.
An example:
I like theology by nature.
In my nature I pursue by choice, theology.
I do not have an alternative possibility as a secondary cause, to not like theology. This was determined by the primary cause.
The resulting choices to seek a PhD in Theology and related Philosophy of Religion, was not left to alternative possibility.
In regard to liking theology, we could also claim other secondary causes, like by hereditary (I am adopted, but perhaps someone biologically related liked theology?) but there is still a primary cause.
I do not have incompatibilist free will or a form of libertarian free will, to not like theology or not to pursue it. I have compatibilist free will and the term I coined as limited free will. During my British studies I looked for the term in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original.
I have significant moral responsibility in how I choose to deal with theology.
Limited Free Will June 29, 2015
God could have caused, willed and allowed me to not pursue my PhD, even though I like theology and then shown me the error of my ways. But I would have embraced the error as a secondary cause. I could understand the error at a later time and embrace the choice I should have made. But I am embracing my greatest desire at the time, so to speak.
As an adult, I did not initially pursue theological academia, but was eventually shown this to be error. I view it as not primarily a change of choice, but rather a divine molding of nature so I would pursue my natural interest in theology, as opposed to other interests, such as working and not being a student, being made more important. Within my soft determinism (not hard determinism) view, it was not that God gave me incompatibilist alternatives and I originally made an error; it was that God caused, willed and allowed my original view and then molded my nature in order that I would eventually, by nature, be different and therefore choose differently.
This is not to state that the sinful humanity both regenerate and unregenerate cannot have significant intellectual understanding of the alternative. I can very much understand by nature not liking theology. I can deduce a life without me studying theology. I know many that dislike theology, I can deduce it. I can deduce whether it is good or bad to be interested in theology. Therefore again, there is moral responsibility. As with Romans 1-3, a person can deduce truth about God without choosing or knowing God.
Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.
J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).
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