PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015)
How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.
This is the conclusion that denies its own premises. (66).
Pire writes that this type of argument maintains one thing in the premises and then denies that same thing in the conclusion. (66).
This is a fallacy of inconsistency. (67).
From Elements of Reasoning:
Validity in deductive arguments is a technical term in logic. Elements (1997: 33).
The concept of true premises and false conclusion would be 'inconceivable in a valid argument'. Elements (1997: 33).
Validity is a set of premises supporting a conclusion. Technically in logic the premises do not have to be true, simply valid. Elements (1997: 33).
Therefore a valid deductive argument can have
False premises and a true conclusion (FT)
False premises and a false conclusion (FF)
True premises and a true conclusion (TT)
However
True premises and a false conclusion (TF) is invalid.
Valid arguments with all true premises are called sound arguments. These also have true conclusions.
Pirie explains that a conclusion must be consistent with the arguments present in support of it. (66).
A conclusion must be reasonably and legitimately supported by propositions/premises.
Based on certain religious argumentation presented in history, Pirie then states: 'But if everything must have a cause, how can there be such a thing as an uncaused cause?' (67). The author opines that throughout history, 'first cause' is an example of this fallacy. (67). To avoid this problem. he reasons, attempts have usually led to examples that 'beg the question' and 'subvert the argument', being used.
'Everything' is a key term in his example.
I do not see fallacious means as being required, such as circular reasoning or unreasonable assumption, or unreasonable avoidance.
A key here is to eliminate the term 'everything' when discussing 'first cause'. To differ from the author's sceptical perspective, one could state with various propositions that the universe, time, space and matter are finite. The finite has origin. Therefore there is an infinite first cause.
This is not a fallacious or illogical argument.
A new concept is being introduced into the conclusion that is not 'everything' noted in Pirie's example. Of course the concepts are related as the propositions are supposed to support and prove the conclusion.
Further, hypothetically, based on the same propositions, the conclusion for example, could assume vicious regress, or that there is no cause and we have mystery.
Pirie does not mention and avoids the issue of vicious regress in this entry. If there is not a first cause and instead there is a supposedly an implied, infinite regress of causes, it is a vicious regress (an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem). As I have noted in a recent post, there is debate on whether or not a vicious regress is illogical, but I state that it is certainly unreasonable, in this context, because it does not solve its own problem.
Appealing to mystery, may occur because of lack of significant cumulative evidences. It is often an intellectual cop-out as pointed out to me by Dr. William Kay, Wales, one of my United Kingdom, academic tutors. Mystery too, does not solve its own problem. I am not stating therefore that it is always error to state 'I do not know'.
I have discussed vicious regress on this site with the assistance of the work of Simon Blackburn and others. I reason this miss on this entry in the Pirie text, is a much larger philosophical problem than the misuse of the term 'everything' Pirie raised, although I appreciate this entry and the text, therefore the review.
Pirie seems critical that a divine being would be the exception to the rule, but 'everything' other than God in existence would be finite and God would be infinite, therefore to make a separation and distinction is not fallacious. I disagree with Pirie (67) and reason it is obviously true that an infinite, first cause, God, would be categorically different than everything finite in context. Even a non-theist could reason this theoretically without belief. I agree with the author that the universe is the universe (67), but it is finite. In significant contrast, God is infinite and eternal as transcendent as well as being immanent while being in sovereign control over finite creation.
From this entry I can appreciate Pirie for making it apparent that in regard to this issue theists need to use clear and concise premises and arguments. These type of critiques are a reason secular philosophy and philosophy of religion are intellectually valuable academic disciplines. This type of reading was consistently required in my British MPhil and PhD research theses.
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in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Regress’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.
CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE, (1991)(2006) ‘The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe’,Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991) 85-96. http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html pp. 1-18.
EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas.http://www.jonathanedwards.com
GIJSBERS, VICTOR, (2006) ‘Theistic Arguments: First Cause’http://positiveatheism.org/faq/firstcause.htm
pp. 1-2.
KREEFT, PETER, (2006) ‘The First Cause Argument’ excerpted from Fundamentals of Faith.http://catholiceducation.org/articles/apologetics/ap0168.html
pp. 1-5.
LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.
PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.
SKLAR, LAWRENCE, (1996) ‘Philosophy of Science’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
TOLHURST, TOLHURST, WILLIAM (1996) 'Vicious Regress', in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
