Friday, March 29, 2024

Vicious sports regress

January 16, 2017
Vicious sports regress

Preface

This posting was published January 16, 2017, and was revised March 29, 2024 for an entry on academia.edu.

Some related articles

Monday, October 02, 2006 A Vicious Regress (There is a version on academia.edu) 



Prime Time Sports 

This was hosted by Bob McCown on Sportsnet at the time. (Paraphrased conversation)

Prime Time

Caller: The baseball player mentioned, signed with a new agent. But how did he find that agent? Did he not need an agent to find that agent?

Host: The player knows the industry and player agents. If you are meaning that the player needed to find an agent to find an agent, then that agent would need to find an agent to infinitude.
---

Blackburn on Vicious Regress

In the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn discusses ‘infinite regress’ and mentions that this occurs in a vicious way whenever a problem tries to solve itself and yet remains with the same problem it had previously. Blackburn (1996: 324) A vicious regress is an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem, while a benign regress is an infinite regress that does not fail to solve its own problem. Blackburn (1996: 324). Blackburn writes that there is frequently room for debate on what is a vicious regress or benign regress. Blackburn (1996: 324). An example of a benign regress is infinite numbers both plus and minus, as they in reality represent conceptualized things as opposed to being real things. 'Problem' solved. 

Therefore: Based on my philosophical reading and Blackburn's explanation, it can be deduced that philosophers would debate whether a particular vicious regress is illogical and whether it is using a logical fallacy. A formal fallacy is concerned with presenting a logical form to avoid being fallacious, and an informal fallacy occurs when there are errors in reasoning with a premise (s) and conclusion. The vicious regress is considered by some an informal fallacy. The fact that it is debated is a clue that it is not a matter of formal, logical, form.

Further: An argument can be logical and not sound, as sound arguments are not the only valid arguments but are those where 'all the premises are true'. Elements (1997: 35). Whether or not a particular vicious regress, and the examples I raised, are illogical and using a logical fallacy in the sense of invalid argument is of secondary importance. It is of primary importance when a vicious regress is not reasonable and does not solve its own problem and is fallacious as in presenting faulty reasoning. I reason. 

Bradley (371) opines that it is not illogical, and not a vicious regress that each act of free choice is caused by another act of free choice. I agree that it is not necessarily illogical, but disagree that the argument as described is not a vicious regress. Bradley mentions that overall, a vicious regress is not necessarily illogical. This point is debated by philosophers. But, I reason a vicious regress is not philosophically reasonable.

This regress can be stopped by stating as premise that a particular agent is sufficient.

Necessary/Sufficient


Department of Philosophy Dr. Craig Hanks

Cited 

Confusion of Necessary with a Sufficient Condition 

A causal fallacy you commit this fallacy when you assume that a necessary condition of an event is sufficient for the event to occur. A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur. A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event. A necessary condition must be there, but it alone does not provide sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. Only the sufficient grounds can do this. In other words, all of the necessary elements must be there. 

Cited 

I don't know why the car won't run; I just filled the gas tank. 

A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event.

The vehicle needs to be started too. A missing premise.

I reason that as God is the necessary cause of all things, directly or indirectly, God is also the sufficient cause of all things. As a theistic philosopher of religion and theologian within the Reformed tradition, everything that occurs is caused by God, either directly willed, or indirectly willed, which could also be called, allowed. The necessary cause exists, but contingent caused things only exist when the necessary cause is the sufficient cause.

Blackburn on Necessary/Sufficient conditions

Philosopher Blackburn explains... 'If p is a necessary condition of q, then q cannot be true unless p is true. If p is a sufficient condition of q, then given that p is true, q is so as well.' (73). Blackburn provides the example: Steering well is a necessary condition of driving well... (73). But it is not sufficient, as one can steer well, but be an overall bad driver. (73). Perhaps, one steers very well, but is overly occupied by texting while driving. (My add, and not my practice) 

This concept from Blackburn with the use of symbolic logic, provides a level of complexity, yet consistent and logical at the same time. But providing a true example provides another level of difficulty. 

A solid/true example

Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b). Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b), then infinite nature (b) cannot be true unless infinite attributes (a) are true. If infinite attributes (a) are a sufficient condition of infinite nature (b), then given that infinite attributes (a) are true, then infinite nature (b) is so as well.

Based on a 2017 phone conversation, with additions

In a 2017 phone conversation, paraphrased, I referenced in brief, the three examples of a vicious regress, below. 

A god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. 

In answer

From a theistic philosophy of religion, perspective, the first cause, can be considered what is necessary and exists by necessity. The necessary is infinite and eternal. The sufficient cause. The contingent is finite, and at best, everlasting.

From a biblical perspective this is Almighty God, infinite and eternal. Finite creations are contingent. God created the finite...


ESV (English Standard Version) 

12 It is he who made the earth by his power, who established the world by his wisdom, and by his understanding stretched out the heavens.


NASB (New American Standard Bible) 

12 It is He who made the earth by His power, Who established the world by His wisdom; And by His understanding He has stretched out the heavens. 


King James Version (KJV) 

12 He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion.

I am not a linguist, but a fellow scholar from church mentioned Jerimiah 10:12 to me and I reason it works here. The English versions I chose appear to reasonably match the Hebrew translation to English.



























---

A choice is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. 

In answer

Human choice is traced back to human nature. Human nature is traced back to its creator, God, that has infinite, eternal nature and will/choice. God simply is. Existing outside of time eternally, and creating finite, time, matter, energy, space, outside of eternity.

Time is caused by time, is caused by time, is caused by time, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. 

In answer

It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. 

If time is infinitely past, how do we arrive at the present time?

(We do not)

If there is an infinite distance between Maple Ridge and Vancouver, how do we arrive in Vancouver? 

(We do not)

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE, (1991)(2006) ‘The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe’,Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991) 85-96. http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html pp. 1-18. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. http://edwards.yale.edu/archive/documents/page?document_id=10817&search_id=&source_type=edited&pagenumber=1

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas.http://www.jonathanedwards.com 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GIJSBERS, VICTOR, (2006) ‘Theistic Arguments: First Cause’ http://positiveatheism.org/faq/firstcause.htm pp. 1-2. 

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy). 

MARTIN, WALTER (2006) 'The Mormon Doctrine of God', San Juan Capistrano, Walter Martin.org. http://www.waltermartin.org/mormon.html#mormdoc 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology. 

SLICK, MATTHEW J. (2006) A logical proof that Mormonism is false, Meridian, Idaho, Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry. http://www.carm.org/lds/infinity.htm 

SMITH, JOSEPH (1844)(2006) ‘Sermon by the Prophet-The Christian Godhead-Plurality of Gods’, History of the Church, Vol. 6, p. 473-479. http://www.utlm.org 

STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368 

TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online. 

TOLHURST, WILLIAM (1996) 'Vicious Regress', in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Monday, March 04, 2024

The Orthodox Study Bible: Free will

The Orthodox Study Bible: Free will

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

Preface

Published January 2, 2019, I was disappointed and surprised to see that originally I did not provide in the main text, the free will citation from the Orthodox Study Bible. I will revise and republish this article on March 4, 2024 and also provide an entry on academia.edu.

Cited from the Orthodox Study Bible, Glossary:

'Free Will

The freedom to choose between good and evil, between God and sin, which is one aspect of humanity created in the image of God. According to Orthodox teaching, sin stains the image of God but does not destroy it. Human beings may choose to reject the gospel, but must suffer the consequences of their decision (see Gen. 3:22, 23, Rev 3:20).' (799).

Based on my MPhil/PhD and website work:

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Also known as libertarian free will.

I would consider the Orthodox view a form of incompatibilism, philosophically. Theologically it would be generally known as free will or libertarian free will. This is also the case with classic viewpoints within the Roman Catholic Church, the evangelical church (movement) and typically within charismatic and Pentecostal churches. From the citation, I agree that human beings are created in the image and I will add, likeness of God (Genesis 1: 26-27). I agree that the image and likeness of God within the human nature is tainted, but not destroyed through fallen human nature and human embracing of sin. I differ in that I reason, as Reformed, that any free will theology/philosophy of a human being freely choosing or rejecting the gospel in some autonomous way is not accurate.

By default no human being will freely choose the gospel, due to the universal sinful nature of humanity described in Romans, Chapter 3, where it is mentioned that there are none righteous in verse 10, and none that seek God in verse 11. C.E.B. Cranfield states that this passage (vv. 10-18) indicates that without exception, all people are sinners. Cranfield (1992: 66). Cranfield further writes that the idea being put across is that human beings live as if they have no reckoning with God, and are practical, even if not actual atheists. Cranfield (1992: 67). Robert H. Mounce notes concerning this passage that although some may seek a religious experience, it is not the same as seeking the true God. Mounce (1995: 109). To Mounce, God seeks the Christian believer, and not the other way around. Mounce (1995: 109). Therefore with this interpretation of the Romans passage, if libertarian free will was true, no one would ever come to Christ through the gospel, because God would not simultaneously will that a person believe it.

Within a Reformed theology and philosophy...

Philosophically, compatibilism (soft determinism) would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, for which there would be significant moral accountability, but contrary to incompatibilism reasons that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions for which there is significant human, moral accountability.

J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). If a human being is forced or coerced, the moral accountability is significantly diminished (at least) and would be considered determinism/hard determinism, not compatibilism/soft determinism. 

In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature, consciousness, desires, will and choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human thoughts, choice, acts and actions. This first cause would be God, in a biblical view. This would be the case in regard to both human salvation and a continued rejection of God, outside of salvation. A person cannot simply on his/her own, choose the gospel but must first be chosen by God (Romans 8-9, Ephesians 1, as examples) regenerated (John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1, as examples) through the Holy Spirit, and the atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ, applied to him/her. From my Reformed, biblical perspective, God causes regeneration in the chosen person (s).

Page 799
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