 |
| Vancouver |
2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Tuesday, January 10, 2006 MPhil Wales 2003
J. L. Mackie’s contention was that God could have created people with free will that always chose to do good.
He stated: If God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not have made men such that they always freely choose the good? Mackie (1971) (1977: 32).
If there is no logical impossibility in a man’s freely choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automa and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong; there was an open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good. Mackie (1971) (1977: 32).
Plantinga answered this objection by stating that Mackie’s idea is possible in a broad logical sense. However, Plantinga provided arguments against Mackie’s points. Plantinga noted that God, although omnipotent, could not have simply actualized any possible world he desired. This is because human beings who act freely inevitably made one bad judgement causing the problem of evil. So, even if God made a world with no evil in it, eventually a human being would make one mistake causing evil.
To Plantinga, in any world that God created where human freedom existed, it was partially up to God and partially up to the individual what would take place. This was the only way that human beings could truly commit actions freely. Plantinga stated that each person suffered from transworld depravity, meaning that in any possible world, they would make one mistake, causing evil. How is transworld depravity relevant in this?
As follows. Obviously it is possible that there be persons who suffer from transworld depravity. More generally, it is possible that everybody suffers from it. And if this possibility were actual, then God, though omnipotent, could not have created any of the possible worlds containing just the persons who do in fact exist, and containing moral good, but no moral evil. For to do so He’d have to create persons who were significantly free (otherwise there would be no moral good) but suffered from transworld depravity. Such persons go wrong with respect to at least one action in any world God could have actualized and in which they are free with respect to morally significant actions; so the price for creating a world in which they produce moral good in creating one which they also produce moral evil. Plantinga (1977: 48-49).
Plantinga, in my view, produced a plausible counter to Mackie’s challenge of the free will defence. Mackie raised a logical objection, but he went too far by challenging God’s omnipotence and goodness with it. The problem, as I see it, is that freedom is largely a matter of degrees. Mackie reasoned correctly that God could make free human beings who only did good, but I think Plantinga was correct to challenge his objection to God as almighty and good, as the amount of freedom these people would have would be considerably more limited than that of actual human beings. To act freely, as Plantinga put it, human beings needed the opportunity to reject God.
Yes, technically human beings could be made to only commit good acts and avoid sin, but this would not be the type of goodness God was seeking from his creatures. I think Plantinga, by the use of the word freely, indicated a type of freedom which produced a goodness which was good because it rejected evil for God, not merely goodness which avoided evil because human nature could never experience anything contrary to God.
Mackie’s view was plausible in that God could have made human beings who were not automa who would never commit evil, but these beings would quite possibly not bring about the true goodness based in a choice between a life with God and a life without God, which Plantinga, Lewis, and Augustine had all alluded to.
This is not to say, that free will is specifically necessarily the prime factor in the human fall; the cause of the human fall is not clear. J.S. Feinberg, for example, stated that desires and not free will were the cause of human sin. He rejected the free will defence because he believed that the concepts of human freedom and God creating people who do not commit evil were two compatible concepts, he is thus a compatibalist as was Mackie. Many free will defenders would see this as contradiction and would be known as incompatibalists.
I can see the plausibility of the compatibalist position; however, as I stated earlier, the degree of human freedom required to truly do good acts would likely require the ability to do wrong.
However, based on...
2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter
J. L. Mackie’s contention was that God could have created people with free will that always chose to do good.
He stated: If God has made men such that in their free choices they sometimes prefer what is good and sometimes what is evil, why could he not have made men such that they always freely choose the good? Mackie (1971) (1977: 32).
If there is no logical impossibility in a man’s freely choosing the good on one, or on several occasions, there cannot be a logical impossibility in his freely choosing the good on every occasion. God was not, then, faced with a choice between making innocent automa and making beings who, in acting freely, would sometimes go wrong; there was an open to him the obviously better possibility of making beings who would act freely but always go right. Clearly, his failure to avail himself of this possibility is inconsistent with his being both omnipotent and wholly good. Mackie (1971) (1977: 32).
Plantinga answered this objection by stating that Mackie’s idea is possible in a broad logical sense. However, Plantinga provided arguments against Mackie’s points. Plantinga noted that God, although omnipotent, could not have simply actualized any possible world he desired. This is because human beings who act freely inevitably made one bad judgement causing the problem of evil. So, even if God made a world with no evil in it, eventually a human being would make one mistake causing evil.
To Plantinga, in any world that God created where human freedom existed, it was partially up to God and partially up to the individual what would take place. This was the only way that human beings could truly commit actions freely. Plantinga stated that each person suffered from transworld depravity, meaning that in any possible world, they would make one mistake, causing evil. How is transworld depravity relevant in this?
As follows. Obviously it is possible that there be persons who suffer from transworld depravity. More generally, it is possible that everybody suffers from it. And if this possibility were actual, then God, though omnipotent, could not have created any of the possible worlds containing just the persons who do in fact exist, and containing moral good, but no moral evil. For to do so He’d have to create persons who were significantly free (otherwise there would be no moral good) but suffered from transworld depravity. Such persons go wrong with respect to at least one action in any world God could have actualized and in which they are free with respect to morally significant actions; so the price for creating a world in which they produce moral good in creating one which they also produce moral evil. Plantinga (1977: 48-49).
Plantinga, in my view, produced a plausible counter to Mackie’s challenge of the free will defence. Mackie raised a logical objection, but he went too far by challenging God’s omnipotence and goodness with it. The problem, as I see it, is that freedom is largely a matter of degrees. Mackie reasoned correctly that God could make free human beings who only did good, but I think Plantinga was correct to challenge his objection to God as almighty and good, as the amount of freedom these people would have would be considerably more limited than that of actual human beings. To act freely, as Plantinga put it, human beings needed the opportunity to reject God.
Yes, technically human beings could be made to only commit good acts and avoid sin, but this would not be the type of goodness God was seeking from his creatures. I think Plantinga, by the use of the word freely, indicated a type of freedom which produced a goodness which was good because it rejected evil for God, not merely goodness which avoided evil because human nature could never experience anything contrary to God.
Mackie’s view was plausible in that God could have made human beings who were not automa who would never commit evil, but these beings would quite possibly not bring about the true goodness based in a choice between a life with God and a life without God, which Plantinga, Lewis, and Augustine had all alluded to.
This is not to say, that free will is specifically necessarily the prime factor in the human fall; the cause of the human fall is not clear. J.S. Feinberg, for example, stated that desires and not free will were the cause of human sin. He rejected the free will defence because he believed that the concepts of human freedom and God creating people who do not commit evil were two compatible concepts, he is thus a compatibalist as was Mackie. Many free will defenders would see this as contradiction and would be known as incompatibalists.
I can see the plausibility of the compatibalist position; however, as I stated earlier, the degree of human freedom required to truly do good acts would likely require the ability to do wrong.
However, based on...
2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter
Saturday, September 19, 2020: PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD
From my PhD forward, I would state this differently. Again, I was required to write a certain way within the British academic system. I would explain that in the case of human beings and angelic beings, as finite; freedom features the logical possibility to choose to do good acts and bad acts. But I do not think the corruption and fall of a finite, significantly free entity, is necessary.
From my PhD forward, I would state this differently. Again, I was required to write a certain way within the British academic system. I would explain that in the case of human beings and angelic beings, as finite; freedom features the logical possibility to choose to do good acts and bad acts. But I do not think the corruption and fall of a finite, significantly free entity, is necessary.
Note from January 2024
In early 2024, I would suggest that 'type' rather than 'degree' of freedom is a more accurate word for my view, PhD work, forward.
I support a compatibalist position; however, the type of human freedom required to truly do good acts did come with the ability to do wrong, which led to an embraced sinful human nature. This occurs within everyone other than God incarnate. In other words, God could create significantly free entities, both physical and non-physical, that would not commit evil and would not fall. God made physical, humanity that would fall, some being saved through the applied atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ. In contrast, God made at least some, non-physical, angelic beings that have never committed evil and will never fall. God incarnate, Jesus Christ, as perfect human being, never committed evil, never sinned and never will fall.
End of note
Transworld Depravity can be avoided.
God is by nature infinitely good and unable to do wrong. God is necessarily good and holy. I reason God can create significantly, free entities that would never do wrong. As finite, they could theoretically fall in corruption, but they could be made by God and influenced in such a way that they would never do wrong. I hold to compatibilism in an even stronger sense, today compared to when I wrote my MPhil.
I can basically agree to some extent with Mackie’s compatibilism, but not his atheism.
I reason God created angelic beings (some eventually corrupted and fallen) and human beings (all eventually corrupted and fallen, other than the incarnate God-man, Jesus Christ), with the eternal plan of applying the atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ to those human beings, regenerated (John 3, Titus 3) within the Church.
This was predetermined within eternity:
Revelation 13:8
New American Standard Bible (NASB) 8 All who dwell on the earth will worship him, everyone whose name has not been [a]written from the foundation of the world in the book of life of the Lamb who has been slain. Footnotes: Revelation 13:8 Or written in the book...slain from the foundation of the world
In the new creation, humanity shall not become corrupted and fall. (Revelation 20-22)
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
God is by nature infinitely good and unable to do wrong. God is necessarily good and holy. I reason God can create significantly, free entities that would never do wrong. As finite, they could theoretically fall in corruption, but they could be made by God and influenced in such a way that they would never do wrong. I hold to compatibilism in an even stronger sense, today compared to when I wrote my MPhil.
I can basically agree to some extent with Mackie’s compatibilism, but not his atheism.
I reason God created angelic beings (some eventually corrupted and fallen) and human beings (all eventually corrupted and fallen, other than the incarnate God-man, Jesus Christ), with the eternal plan of applying the atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ to those human beings, regenerated (John 3, Titus 3) within the Church.
This was predetermined within eternity:
Revelation 13:8
New American Standard Bible (NASB) 8 All who dwell on the earth will worship him, everyone whose name has not been [a]written from the foundation of the world in the book of life of the Lamb who has been slain. Footnotes: Revelation 13:8 Or written in the book...slain from the foundation of the world
In the new creation, humanity shall not become corrupted and fall. (Revelation 20-22)
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.
