Ernest Hepnar photo: Rome 2019
Preface
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014) (2017), The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
In evangelical circles I hear (read) the terms uncaused (first) cause, used in terms of God.
I am not in disagreement. I will usually academically use the terms such as infinite, first cause, and necessary and contingent. Interestingly from Stanford University (non-exhaustive) as my main source for this article.
Selected Stanford References (Authors I have referenced in my academic career, not necessarily the articles listed on the Stanford website)
Plantinga, Alvin, 1967, God and Other Minds, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Pruss, Alexander R., 1999, “The Hume-Edwards Principle and the Cosmological Argument”, in Gale and Pruss 2003: 347–63.
Swinburne, Richard, 1977, The Coherence of Theism, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
van Inwagen, Peter, 1983, An Essay on Free Will, New York: Oxford University Press.
Article edited for an entry on academia.edu 2024316
Main source for this article:
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014) (2017), The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
In evangelical circles I hear (read) the terms uncaused (first) cause, used in terms of God.
I am not in disagreement. I will usually academically use the terms such as infinite, first cause, and necessary and contingent. Interestingly from Stanford University (non-exhaustive) as my main source for this article.
Stanford
Stanford University: Cosmological Argument
Cited
The cosmological argument is less a particular argument than an argument type. It uses a general pattern of argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from particular alleged facts about the universe (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally identified with or referred to as God.
Cited
I do not embrace any classic cosmological argument. I do not define my views as a cosmological argument (s). I have supported first cause arguments:
Among these initial facts are that particular beings or events in the universe are causally dependent or contingent, that the universe (as the totality of contingent things) is contingent in that it could have been other than it is, that the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact possibly has an explanation, or that the universe came into being. From these facts philosophers infer deductively, inductively, or abductively by inference to the best explanation that a first or sustaining cause, a necessary being, an unmoved mover, or a personal being (God) exists that caused and/or sustains the universe. The cosmological argument is part of classical natural theology, whose goal is to provide evidence for the claim that God exists.
Cited
Both theists and nontheists in the last part of the 20th century and the first part of the 21st century generally have shown a healthy skepticism about the argument. Alvin Plantinga concludes “that this piece of natural theology is ineffective” (1967: chap. 1).
Richard Gale contends, in Kantian fashion, that since the conclusion of all versions of the cosmological argument invokes an impossibility, no cosmological arguments can provide examples of sound reasoning (1991: chap. 7).
Cited
Once Aquinas concludes that necessary beings exist, he then goes on to ask whether these beings have their existence from themselves or from another. If from another, then we have an unsatisfactory infinite regress of explanations. Hence, there must be something whose necessity is uncaused.
As noted in several articles on this website, a vicious regress provides philosophically fatal (unreasonable) premises.
As Kenny points out, Aquinas understands this necessity in terms of being unable to cease to exist (Kenny 1969: 48). Although Aquinas understands the uncaused necessary being to be God, Rundle takes this to be matter/energy itself.
Infinite matter/energy seems a highly unlikely premise for a universe that is scientifically reasoned to have begun with a big bang. This defines as finite matter/energy. Time and space, also being finite.
Cited
One question that arises with Rundle’s view is whether there could have been more or less matter/energy than there is. That is, if there is nn amount of matter/energy in the world, could there be a possible world with +n+n or −n−n amounts of matter/energy? We do not know how much matter/energy existed in the first 10−3510−35 seconds of the universe. Even if the universe currently operates according to the principle of the Conservation of Matter and Energy, Rundle’s thesis depends on the contention that during the very early phase of rapid expansion, a period of time we know little about, this principle held.
Philosophically, how is there rapid expansion of something infinite?
Cited
A second significant problem concerns what follows from the existence of necessary beings. If the matter/energy nexus constitutes the necessary being, what causally follows from that nexus is itself necessary, and contingency, even in the composing relations within the universe, would disappear. Everything in the universe would be necessary, which is a disquieting position.
An infinite universe again is problematic. The universe simply would be, no big-bang, no expansion, no evolution.
Cited
Third, O’Connor (2004) argues that since the necessary being provides the ultimate explanation, there is no explanation of the differentiation of the kinds of matter or of contingencies that matter/energy causally undergo, for example, in terms of space-time location.
Perhaps one way to rescue Rundle’s thesis would be to invoke an indeterministic presentation of quantum phenomena, which would allow contingency of individual phenomena but not of the overall probabilistic structure.
The lack of a deterministic first cause, also leads to vicious regress. A regress of indeterministic causes.
From my PhD
Stanford University: Cosmological Argument
Cited
The cosmological argument is less a particular argument than an argument type. It uses a general pattern of argumentation (logos) that makes an inference from particular alleged facts about the universe (cosmos) to the existence of a unique being, generally identified with or referred to as God.
Cited
I do not embrace any classic cosmological argument. I do not define my views as a cosmological argument (s). I have supported first cause arguments:
Among these initial facts are that particular beings or events in the universe are causally dependent or contingent, that the universe (as the totality of contingent things) is contingent in that it could have been other than it is, that the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact possibly has an explanation, or that the universe came into being. From these facts philosophers infer deductively, inductively, or abductively by inference to the best explanation that a first or sustaining cause, a necessary being, an unmoved mover, or a personal being (God) exists that caused and/or sustains the universe. The cosmological argument is part of classical natural theology, whose goal is to provide evidence for the claim that God exists.
Cited
Both theists and nontheists in the last part of the 20th century and the first part of the 21st century generally have shown a healthy skepticism about the argument. Alvin Plantinga concludes “that this piece of natural theology is ineffective” (1967: chap. 1).
Richard Gale contends, in Kantian fashion, that since the conclusion of all versions of the cosmological argument invokes an impossibility, no cosmological arguments can provide examples of sound reasoning (1991: chap. 7).
Cited
Once Aquinas concludes that necessary beings exist, he then goes on to ask whether these beings have their existence from themselves or from another. If from another, then we have an unsatisfactory infinite regress of explanations. Hence, there must be something whose necessity is uncaused.
As noted in several articles on this website, a vicious regress provides philosophically fatal (unreasonable) premises.
As Kenny points out, Aquinas understands this necessity in terms of being unable to cease to exist (Kenny 1969: 48). Although Aquinas understands the uncaused necessary being to be God, Rundle takes this to be matter/energy itself.
Infinite matter/energy seems a highly unlikely premise for a universe that is scientifically reasoned to have begun with a big bang. This defines as finite matter/energy. Time and space, also being finite.
Cited
One question that arises with Rundle’s view is whether there could have been more or less matter/energy than there is. That is, if there is nn amount of matter/energy in the world, could there be a possible world with +n+n or −n−n amounts of matter/energy? We do not know how much matter/energy existed in the first 10−3510−35 seconds of the universe. Even if the universe currently operates according to the principle of the Conservation of Matter and Energy, Rundle’s thesis depends on the contention that during the very early phase of rapid expansion, a period of time we know little about, this principle held.
Philosophically, how is there rapid expansion of something infinite?
Cited
A second significant problem concerns what follows from the existence of necessary beings. If the matter/energy nexus constitutes the necessary being, what causally follows from that nexus is itself necessary, and contingency, even in the composing relations within the universe, would disappear. Everything in the universe would be necessary, which is a disquieting position.
An infinite universe again is problematic. The universe simply would be, no big-bang, no expansion, no evolution.
Cited
Third, O’Connor (2004) argues that since the necessary being provides the ultimate explanation, there is no explanation of the differentiation of the kinds of matter or of contingencies that matter/energy causally undergo, for example, in terms of space-time location.
Perhaps one way to rescue Rundle’s thesis would be to invoke an indeterministic presentation of quantum phenomena, which would allow contingency of individual phenomena but not of the overall probabilistic structure.
The lack of a deterministic first cause, also leads to vicious regress. A regress of indeterministic causes.
From my PhD
Links for both papers
PhD, University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter, 2010: Theodicy and Practical Theology
MPhil, Bangor University, 2003: The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives
Plantinga reasons that for Kant the intellectual problem is not that persons cannot think about God but that persons cannot come to speculative metaphysical knowledge of God. Plantinga (2000: 9).
Again from my PhD:
Plantinga reasons that aspects of Aquinas’ presentation are reasonable, but overall the argument is unsuccessful. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 80). In contrast, this does not render all arguments for first cause unsuccessful, but Plantinga points out difficulties with Aquinas’ approach, which is perhaps too extensive. Aquinas’ presentation although classic and important, is very speculative and Plantinga has disagreements with his overall work. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 80). Geivett reasons Plantinga is too negative concerning natural theology as possibly working. Geivett (1993: 59-60).
PhD, University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter, 2010: Theodicy and Practical Theology
MPhil, Bangor University, 2003: The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives
Plantinga reasons that for Kant the intellectual problem is not that persons cannot think about God but that persons cannot come to speculative metaphysical knowledge of God. Plantinga (2000: 9).
Again from my PhD:
Plantinga reasons that aspects of Aquinas’ presentation are reasonable, but overall the argument is unsuccessful. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 80). In contrast, this does not render all arguments for first cause unsuccessful, but Plantinga points out difficulties with Aquinas’ approach, which is perhaps too extensive. Aquinas’ presentation although classic and important, is very speculative and Plantinga has disagreements with his overall work. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 80). Geivett reasons Plantinga is too negative concerning natural theology as possibly working. Geivett (1993: 59-60).
End citations
As a theistic, philosopher of religion, I grant this point to Geivett.
The noumenon realm can only be understood through rational intuition in Kantian thought, and not empirically. I very much agree that God cannot be personally known (in a New Testament biblical context) via speculation, but I reason that within the academic discipline of philosophy of religion (rationalism) there can be true premises in regard to the existence of the first cause, implied as God. For God to be known personally requires divine revelation, in other words the infinite reveals to the finite. Which I support as reasonable in contrast to Kantian thought. A classic example of divine revelation below...
New American Standard Bible
Genesis 1: 1 a 1 In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.
The noumenon realm can only be understood through rational intuition in Kantian thought, and not empirically. I very much agree that God cannot be personally known (in a New Testament biblical context) via speculation, but I reason that within the academic discipline of philosophy of religion (rationalism) there can be true premises in regard to the existence of the first cause, implied as God. For God to be known personally requires divine revelation, in other words the infinite reveals to the finite. Which I support as reasonable in contrast to Kantian thought. A classic example of divine revelation below...
New American Standard Bible
Genesis 1: 1 a 1 In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.
---
Bibliography
AQUINAS, THOMAS (1261)(1920) Summa Theologica, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London, Fathers of the English Dominican Province. http://www.op.org/summa/
GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
Bibliography
AQUINAS, THOMAS (1261)(1920) Summa Theologica, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London, Fathers of the English Dominican Province. http://www.op.org/summa/
GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co. http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt
KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014) (2017), The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2014) (2017), The Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Selected Stanford References (Authors I have referenced in my academic career, not necessarily the articles listed on the Stanford website)
Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. 1. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975. [Summa Contra Gentiles available online]
–––, [ST] Summa Theologica, I, q. 2. [Summa Theologica available online]
Copan, Paul, 2017, 2019, The Kalām Cosmological Argument (2 vols), New York: Bloomsbury.
Copan, Paul and William Lane Craig, 2004, Creation out of Nothing, Grand Rapids: Baker.
Craig, William Lane, 1979, The Kalām Cosmological Argument, London: Macmillan.
–––, 1980, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz, London: Macmillan.
–––, 1992, “The Origin and Creation of the Universe: A Reply to Adolf Grünbaum”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43(2): 233–40. doi:10.1093/bjps/43.2.233.
–––, 1997, “In Defense of the Kalām Cosmological Argument”, Faith and Philosophy, 14(2): 236–47. doi:10.5840/faithphil19971422 [Craig 1997 available online]
–––, 2002, “Must the Beginning of the Universe Have a Personal Cause?: A Rejoinder”, Faith and Philosophy, 19(1): 94–105. doi:10.5840/faithphil20021917
–––, 2010, “Taking Tense Time Seriously in Differentiating Past and Future: A Response to Wes Morriston”, Faith and Philosophy, 27(4): 451–56. doi:10.5840/faithphil201027445
–––, 2018, “The Kalām Cosmological Argument”, in Jerry Walls and Trent Dougherty (eds.), Two Dozen (or so) Arguments for God, New York: Oxford University Press.
Craig, William Lane and James P. Moreland, (eds.), 2009, The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, London: Blackwell.
Craig, William Lane and James D. Sinclair, 2009, “The Kalām Cosmological Argument”, in Craig and Moreland 2009: 101–201. [This contains an exhaustive bibliography on the Kalām cosmological argument.] [Craig and Sinclair 2009 preprint available online]
Craig, William Lane and Quentin Smith, 1993, Theism, Atheism, and Big Bang Cosmology, New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198263838.001.0001
Davis, Stephen, 1997, God, Reason & Theistic Proofs, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Flew, Anthony and Alasdair C. MacIntyre (eds.), 1955, New Essays in Philosophical Theology, London: SCM.
Gale, Richard M. (ed.), 1991, On the Nature and Existence of God, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10.1017/CBO9781316499054
Gale, Richard M. and Alexander R. Pruss, 1999, “A New Cosmological Argument”, Religious Studies, 35(4): 461–476. Reprinted in Gale and Pruss 2003: 365–80. [Gale and Pruss 1999 available online]
–––, 2002, “A Response to Oppy, and to Davey and Clifton”, Religious Studies, 38(1): 89–99. doi:10.1017/S0034412501005923
––– (eds.), 2003, The Existence of God, Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Hick, John, 1960, “God as Necessary Being”, Journal of Philosophy, 57(22/23): 725–33.
Hume, David, 1779, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, London. Reprinted Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980. [Hume 1779 available online]
–––, 1748, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, London. Reprinted Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993. [Hume 1748 available online]
Kant, Immanuel, 1781/1787, Critique of Pure Reason, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. [Kant Critique available online]
Kenny, Anthony, 1969, The Five Ways, New York: Schocken Books.
Mackie, John L., 1982, The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the Existence of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 2006, The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2009, “The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument”, in Craig and Moreland 2009: 24–100. [Pruss 2009 available online]
–––, 2018, Infinity, Causation, and Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quinn, Philip, 2005, “Cosmological Contingency and Theistic Explanation”, Faith and Philosophy, 22(5): 581–600. doi:10.5840/faithphil200522520
Reichenbach, Bruce R., 1972, The Cosmological Argument: A Reassessment, Springfield: Charles Thomas.
–––, 2004, “Explanation and the Cosmological Argument”, in Michael L. Peterson and Raymond J. VanArragon (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Religion, London: Blackwell, pp. 97–114.
Rowe, William L., 1962, “The Fallacy of Composition”, Mind, 71(281): 87–92. doi:10.1093/mind/LXXI.281.87
–––, 1968, “The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason”, Man and World, 1(2): 278–92. doi:10.1007/BF01258405
–––, 1975, The Cosmological Argument, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
–––, 1997, “Circular Explanations, Cosmological Arguments, and Sufficient Reasons”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 21(1): 188–99. doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1997.tb00523.x
Rundle, Bede, 2004, Why There Is Something Rather than Nothing?, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Russell, Bertrand, 1937, The Principles of Mathematics, second edition (first edition 1903), London: George Allen & Unwin.
Russell, Bertrand and Frederick Copleston, 1948, “Debate on the Existence of God”, Reprinted in John Hick (ed.), 1964, The Existence of God, New York: Macmillan, pp. 167–90.
–––, 1979, The Existence of God, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 1983, “Mackie, Induction, and God”, Religious Studies, 19(3): 385–91. doi:10.1017/S0034412500015316
–––, 1993. The Coherence of Theism, revised edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 1996, Is There a God? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2001, Epistemic Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2004, The Existence of God, revised edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
–––, 2007, Revelation: From Metaphor to Analogy, 2nd edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199212460.001.0001
–––, 2010, “God as the Simplest Explanation of the Universe”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 2(1): 1–24.
–––, 2012, “What Kind of Necessary Being Could God Be?”, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 4(2), 1–18.
–––, 2016, The Coherence of Theism, 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/0198240708.001.0001
