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Updated article for academia.edu on December 13, 2022
A later related article with some of the same content.
Middle Knowledge
FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.
Simon Blackburn documents in his entry 'scientia media' that middle knowledge is the way that God has of knowing the truth in regard to future events. This speculatively for philosophers ables God to reconcile his present knowledge with open choices. Blackburn (1996: 343). In other words this view of middle knowledge presupposes a type of libertarian free will and incompatibilism. Free will and related topics have been discussed many times on this website in previous posts and definitions can be found by the use of the 'search' application. This view reasons that there is the simultaneous act of given grace and the persons freely accepting it, as opposed to a prior determination of that grace leading to acceptance. Blackburn (1996: 343). The concept was elaborated on by Luis de Molina (1535-1600). Blackburn (1996: 343). It is known as a view among many of the followers of Thomas Aquinas. Blackburn (1996: 343).
William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Hasker (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occurred with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.
A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.
My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes. If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.
As God would cause and will all things in a compatibilist sense this would go beyond incompatibilistic middle knowledge in regard to the sovereignty and providence of God, and I do not hold to libertarian free will for created finite beings. I do not hold to 'determinism' or to be more clear hard determinism, but hold to soft-determinism. John Calvin explains this basic idea in theological terms as opposed to philosophical in 'Bondage and Liberation of the Will' in stating that Satan too and all wicked are under submission to God and his authority and cannot move beyond the commands of the sovereign God. They are guided divinely. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). Further Calvin explains that God uses the evil work of persons and executes his works through them. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). I reason a connection here could be made to Romans 8: 26-30 in that all things do work together for the good for those that love God.
'If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection.' Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).
Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.
Therefore, middle knowledge although a logical view with merit is not a philosophically necessary view or most reasonable view to accept within a Reformed perspective.
William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Hasker (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occurred with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.
A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.
My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes. If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.
As God would cause and will all things in a compatibilist sense this would go beyond incompatibilistic middle knowledge in regard to the sovereignty and providence of God, and I do not hold to libertarian free will for created finite beings. I do not hold to 'determinism' or to be more clear hard determinism, but hold to soft-determinism. John Calvin explains this basic idea in theological terms as opposed to philosophical in 'Bondage and Liberation of the Will' in stating that Satan too and all wicked are under submission to God and his authority and cannot move beyond the commands of the sovereign God. They are guided divinely. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). Further Calvin explains that God uses the evil work of persons and executes his works through them. Calvin (1543)(1996: 39). I reason a connection here could be made to Romans 8: 26-30 in that all things do work together for the good for those that love God.
As stated on this blog previously in various posts:
John S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does
not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can
simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or
will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain
nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction
with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this
viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create
human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed
actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains
that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft
determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are
uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976:
29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human
actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). Calvin explains:
'If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection.' Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).
Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.
Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one
is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational
creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are
done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).
Therefore, middle knowledge although a logical view with merit is not a philosophically necessary view or most reasonable view to accept within a Reformed perspective.
Bibliography
AQUINAS, THOMAS (1261)(1920) Summa Theologica, Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, London, Fathers of the English Dominican Province.
BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html
BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html
CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.
Selected references
a. Books
Craig, William Lane. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience. New York: Brill, 1990.
Craig, William Lane. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. New York: Brill, 1988.
Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: Cornell, 1988. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974.
b. Articles
Hasker, William. “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited.” Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April 1995): 223-36.
Hasker, William. “A New Anti-Molinist Argument.” Religious Studies 35:3 (September 1999): 291-97.
Author Information John D. Laing
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary U. S. A.
Also online
Lonergan, Bernard J.F. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.
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