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Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media
Edited for an entry on academia.edu, November 27, 2022
This view has intellectual merit, although problematic based on my studies.
Simon Blackburn documents in his entry 'scientia media' that middle knowledge is the way that God has of knowing the truth in regard to future events. This speculatively for philosophers enables God to reconcile his present knowledge with open choices. Blackburn (1996: 343). In other words this view of middle knowledge presupposes a type of libertarian free will and incompatibilism.
This view reasons that there is the simultaneous act of given grace and the persons freely accepting it, as opposed to a prior determination of that grace leading to acceptance. Blackburn (1996: 343). The concept was elaborated on by Luis de Molina (1535-1600). Blackburn (1996: 343). It is known as a view among many of the followers of Thomas Aquinas. Blackburn (1996: 343).
William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Hasker (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occurred with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.
A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.
My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes. If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.
Middle Knowledge Revisited
If hard determinism did take place, in my view there would not be significant moral responsibility from a finite creature and human being. I reason significant human freedom requires limited free will and not libertarian free will.
Example:
Did you with libertarian free will have a choice of your nature, as in either perfect and sinless, or imperfect and sinful?
The answer is a definitive, no.
This is problematic for libertarian free will supporters that claim that if 'one could not do otherwise', outside of libertarian free will and choices, it is not true freedom. This is a problem for those that reason significantly free human beings must take the initiative in free will, when one could not take the initiative in regard to core nature, behind the will.
This example seems to indicate that it is not a matter of 'being able to do otherwise', but is rather a matter of being able to via nature and will (and the hypothetical chain which I have speculated on my PhD and on this website) to significantly understand and embrace sinful thoughts, acts and actions that God simultaneously causes (Feinberg in the Many Faces of Evil). This based on Scripture (Romans) leads to human guilt. To have a significant understanding of good and evil and to embrace one's nature with significant freedom.
Human nature was created by God, that willingly caused and allowed, in my view without force or coercion, the first human beings (Genesis 1-3) to via nature and will (Feinberg adds desires in the chain), to reject the command of God with led to corrupted sinful nature and sinful choices. In my view, God sanctioned this and therefore willed and caused it as primary cause, and this was significantly embraced by the first persons as secondary cause. Therefore, they were held morally responsible for sin as sinners (Genesis 1-3, Romans 5, Romans 1-6). Humanity as descendants of Adam and Eve (Romans) embrace sinful nature and sinful choices and therefore are held morally responsible, despite not being the primary cause; or being able to cause human nature, will and choices outside of God's simultaneous influence (Feinberg).
Libertarian free will supporters attempt to often state that God with permissible will merely allows this to occur. We do have some common ground. I agree with a perfect will and permissible distinction as very helpful. I found this well explained by Erickson (Christian Theology) in my theses research. But, I reason that this in a sense does not 'get God off the hook'. As God is infinite and omnipotent, which most Biblical Christians agree on theologically, if God allows something, within permissible will, he is the still the primary cause. If he could prevent thoughts, acts and actions as he is infinite and omnipotent, and he does not, then he is still the first cause/primary cause.
Here I think Calvin's work is useful as it points to differing motives in thoughts, acts and actions. God's being perfectly good and holy, and humanity (and demonic beings at times) being imperfect and sinful. The historical, Biblical, crucifixion of Christ, being in my mind, the best classic example of this theological and philosophical concept. Satanic beings and human beings having wrong, sinful motives in killing Christ, and being held morally responsible by God. The triune God having perfect motives in the same events, leading to the atoning work, resurrection and eventual culminated Kingdom of God.
Calvin stated concerning free will:
If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).
Human beings in Calvin’s thinking were not forced by God to sin, but God as an infinite being had and used the power to use their sin for the greater good. So to say that God willed evil for the greater good means that God could use sinful actions of others in order to accomplish his divine purpose.
Calvin stated:
For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another.
For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgements (judgments) to execution. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).
God could set up events in such a way that someone would freely choose to sin, but this is not done in such a way that God is forcing or hard determining one to do so.
The objection is raised that this makes God, the author of sin. Again, divine motives are key, and if God as infinite and omnipotent, does not prohibit sin, then he is still, in a sense, the cause of it.
Based on what Calvin stated:
'For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them.'
Sin in this context is performed willfully by second cause human agents, held morally responsible by God. Sin, is caused by God in perfect and holy motives. I do not have an intellectual problem with stating God allowed it, but I do not think that terminology is exhaustive enough in context.
Mystery
There is the negative critique that the Reformed perspective involves an overuse of mystery.
From my Doctoral thesis (Edited).
'A praxis of sovereignty theodicy would be that, from start to finish, salvation is primarily the goal directed plan of God. Human beings are not brought to Christ through compulsion, but when predestined in election shall be convinced to accept the offer of salvation. Praxis shifts from the incompatibilism of free will that assumes God desires to save all persons, but can only save those who are eventually persuaded to believe, to an understanding that whom God desires to save shall be regenerated and placed in a process of salvation.
The problem of evil is therefore not primarily subject to, and in existence, because human sin is stalling the culmination of God’s plans. I do not doubt that human beings do often oppose God’s plans, but God being almighty can overcome the problem of evil, and is working through this process slowly in history. Within a sovereignty perspective human sin does oppose God, but God will use sin for his purposes and regenerate and mould those he chooses towards salvation.
As long as one can accept the idea that a perfectly moral God wills and allows evil within his plans for the greater good, there is a degree of intellectual certainty with sovereignty theodicy that free will theodicy lacks. God could inevitably bring about, through the use of the regeneration and the resurrection of elected human persons, the end of human corruption, and even Plantinga’s concept of transworld depravity.'
End citation
A mystery with incompatibilism is that in light of Romans and the universal corrupt nature of humanity, allowing for significant free will, and in light of Plantinga’s transworld depravity, why would anyone choose God and Jesus Christ, without being simultaneously influenced to do so? In my mind, this seems extremely unlikely (Ephesians 1: 5: ‘He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the intention of his will.’ New American Standard Bible). Ephesians 2 states that those in Christ are saved by grace through faith for good works.
To state that if God alone is the initiator of cause and therefore, secondary causes are not true causes is to misinterpret the theology of Ephesians. God as first and primary cause brings about salvation leading to the secondary cause, in my view, not being a hard determinist, simultaneously embracing this regeneration by grace through faith.
This is Biblically supposed to lead to legitimate good human works. This does not read as hard determinism, nor libertarian free will. Clearly it reads as compatibilism.
Overuse of Philosophy
I reasoned while researching and analyzing my MPhil and PhD work that both compatibilists and incompatibilists can be guilty at times of depending more on theology, philosophy and philosophy of religion than Scripture. But here I am using Ephesians as example.
Feinberg's work speculated on going behind will to desires within 'The Many Faces of Evil'. Perhaps going behind significant human free will to human nature is helpful. My example that one cannot choose their nature via will, at least in the context of perfection versus imperfection and sinless versus sinful, has merit.
In the case of the unregenerate that God eventually regenerates, the Reformed concept I reviewed in theses studies of God enlightening persons through preaching and teaching is reasonable. This would culminate in regeneration and the human embracing of salvation. In the regenerated in Christ, moulding of persons may be viewed as the sanctification process. Being set apart for holiness with God.
Note
I reason the Reformed 'tag' is more accurate for my position than that of Calvinist. I am not a resident or citizen of the United States of America and did not grow up in that culture. A stronger Calvinist in my mind would not favour Believer's Baptism to Infant Baptism, as do I. I am Reformed, theologically and philosophically on many issues, but I am also a baptized Mennonite Brethren in an Evangelical church. My sacramental leanings would be Anabaptist and Baptist. I state this because online in some what I view as rare unnecessarily heated contexts, I have been written-off as a Calvinist by upbringing, and that is far from the truth. My views, are of course a product of influence, as with everyone, but they are mainly a product of seeking the Lord's truth, academically. But I did with God's help manage to develop enough expertise to pass two major British theses of Reformed Theology and Philosophy of Religion in secular departments, not in agreement with my views.
I am still in process.
BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.
Edited for an entry on academia.edu, November 27, 2022
This view has intellectual merit, although problematic based on my studies.
Simon Blackburn documents in his entry 'scientia media' that middle knowledge is the way that God has of knowing the truth in regard to future events. This speculatively for philosophers enables God to reconcile his present knowledge with open choices. Blackburn (1996: 343). In other words this view of middle knowledge presupposes a type of libertarian free will and incompatibilism.
This view reasons that there is the simultaneous act of given grace and the persons freely accepting it, as opposed to a prior determination of that grace leading to acceptance. Blackburn (1996: 343). The concept was elaborated on by Luis de Molina (1535-1600). Blackburn (1996: 343). It is known as a view among many of the followers of Thomas Aquinas. Blackburn (1996: 343).
William Hasker explains middle knowledge is knowledge of certain kinds of propositions usually defined as 'counterfactuals of freedom' traced back to Luis de Molina. Hasker (1996: 492). These propositions state in each situation, concerning each possible free creature that God could create, and what that creature would do in each situation with the use of libertarian free will/choice. Hasker (1996: 492). The claim that God with foreknowledge knows these libertarian potential actions explains how he can maintain providential control over the universe. Hasker (1996: 492). Hasker argues that opponents of middle knowledge typically state that it is impossible for there to be true counterfactuals of freedom. Hasker (1996: 492). By this I reason he means knowledge of what might have occurred with the use of free will, assuming it libertarian. The view is indeed questionable without libertarian freedom.
A view of middle knowledge is also known as Molinism. Middle knowledge was a view I came across in my MPhil and PhD theses work within texts and journal articles which dealt with the problem of evil and theodicy, free will and determinism, but I never actually discussed it thoroughly within either theses work.
My view is a Reformed view of compatibilism and reasons that God as first cause wills all things. Therefore God would not only have knowledge and foreknowledge of all potential and actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free will, but God would cause and will as the primary cause the actual thoughts, acts/actions of persons, angelic beings and demonic beings with significant and yet limited free wills and these finite beings would be secondary causes. If any secondary thoughts, acts/actions were somehow forced or coerced, for example, with the use of drugs forced upon him or her, a human being would not be morally responsible lacking significant freedom. God as infinite, eternal, and holy would will all things in moral and ethical perfection even when at times willing events that were evil, although I reason leading to greater good purposes.
Middle Knowledge Revisited
If hard determinism did take place, in my view there would not be significant moral responsibility from a finite creature and human being. I reason significant human freedom requires limited free will and not libertarian free will.
Example:
Did you with libertarian free will have a choice of your nature, as in either perfect and sinless, or imperfect and sinful?
The answer is a definitive, no.
This is problematic for libertarian free will supporters that claim that if 'one could not do otherwise', outside of libertarian free will and choices, it is not true freedom. This is a problem for those that reason significantly free human beings must take the initiative in free will, when one could not take the initiative in regard to core nature, behind the will.
This example seems to indicate that it is not a matter of 'being able to do otherwise', but is rather a matter of being able to via nature and will (and the hypothetical chain which I have speculated on my PhD and on this website) to significantly understand and embrace sinful thoughts, acts and actions that God simultaneously causes (Feinberg in the Many Faces of Evil). This based on Scripture (Romans) leads to human guilt. To have a significant understanding of good and evil and to embrace one's nature with significant freedom.
Human nature was created by God, that willingly caused and allowed, in my view without force or coercion, the first human beings (Genesis 1-3) to via nature and will (Feinberg adds desires in the chain), to reject the command of God with led to corrupted sinful nature and sinful choices. In my view, God sanctioned this and therefore willed and caused it as primary cause, and this was significantly embraced by the first persons as secondary cause. Therefore, they were held morally responsible for sin as sinners (Genesis 1-3, Romans 5, Romans 1-6). Humanity as descendants of Adam and Eve (Romans) embrace sinful nature and sinful choices and therefore are held morally responsible, despite not being the primary cause; or being able to cause human nature, will and choices outside of God's simultaneous influence (Feinberg).
Libertarian free will supporters attempt to often state that God with permissible will merely allows this to occur. We do have some common ground. I agree with a perfect will and permissible distinction as very helpful. I found this well explained by Erickson (Christian Theology) in my theses research. But, I reason that this in a sense does not 'get God off the hook'. As God is infinite and omnipotent, which most Biblical Christians agree on theologically, if God allows something, within permissible will, he is the still the primary cause. If he could prevent thoughts, acts and actions as he is infinite and omnipotent, and he does not, then he is still the first cause/primary cause.
Here I think Calvin's work is useful as it points to differing motives in thoughts, acts and actions. God's being perfectly good and holy, and humanity (and demonic beings at times) being imperfect and sinful. The historical, Biblical, crucifixion of Christ, being in my mind, the best classic example of this theological and philosophical concept. Satanic beings and human beings having wrong, sinful motives in killing Christ, and being held morally responsible by God. The triune God having perfect motives in the same events, leading to the atoning work, resurrection and eventual culminated Kingdom of God.
Calvin stated concerning free will:
If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).
Human beings in Calvin’s thinking were not forced by God to sin, but God as an infinite being had and used the power to use their sin for the greater good. So to say that God willed evil for the greater good means that God could use sinful actions of others in order to accomplish his divine purpose.
Calvin stated:
For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another.
For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgements (judgments) to execution. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).
God could set up events in such a way that someone would freely choose to sin, but this is not done in such a way that God is forcing or hard determining one to do so.
The objection is raised that this makes God, the author of sin. Again, divine motives are key, and if God as infinite and omnipotent, does not prohibit sin, then he is still, in a sense, the cause of it.
Based on what Calvin stated:
'For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them.'
Sin in this context is performed willfully by second cause human agents, held morally responsible by God. Sin, is caused by God in perfect and holy motives. I do not have an intellectual problem with stating God allowed it, but I do not think that terminology is exhaustive enough in context.
Mystery
There is the negative critique that the Reformed perspective involves an overuse of mystery.
From my Doctoral thesis (Edited).
'A praxis of sovereignty theodicy would be that, from start to finish, salvation is primarily the goal directed plan of God. Human beings are not brought to Christ through compulsion, but when predestined in election shall be convinced to accept the offer of salvation. Praxis shifts from the incompatibilism of free will that assumes God desires to save all persons, but can only save those who are eventually persuaded to believe, to an understanding that whom God desires to save shall be regenerated and placed in a process of salvation.
The problem of evil is therefore not primarily subject to, and in existence, because human sin is stalling the culmination of God’s plans. I do not doubt that human beings do often oppose God’s plans, but God being almighty can overcome the problem of evil, and is working through this process slowly in history. Within a sovereignty perspective human sin does oppose God, but God will use sin for his purposes and regenerate and mould those he chooses towards salvation.
As long as one can accept the idea that a perfectly moral God wills and allows evil within his plans for the greater good, there is a degree of intellectual certainty with sovereignty theodicy that free will theodicy lacks. God could inevitably bring about, through the use of the regeneration and the resurrection of elected human persons, the end of human corruption, and even Plantinga’s concept of transworld depravity.'
End citation
A mystery with incompatibilism is that in light of Romans and the universal corrupt nature of humanity, allowing for significant free will, and in light of Plantinga’s transworld depravity, why would anyone choose God and Jesus Christ, without being simultaneously influenced to do so? In my mind, this seems extremely unlikely (Ephesians 1: 5: ‘He predestined us to adoption as sons through Jesus Christ to Himself, according to the intention of his will.’ New American Standard Bible). Ephesians 2 states that those in Christ are saved by grace through faith for good works.
To state that if God alone is the initiator of cause and therefore, secondary causes are not true causes is to misinterpret the theology of Ephesians. God as first and primary cause brings about salvation leading to the secondary cause, in my view, not being a hard determinist, simultaneously embracing this regeneration by grace through faith.
This is Biblically supposed to lead to legitimate good human works. This does not read as hard determinism, nor libertarian free will. Clearly it reads as compatibilism.
Overuse of Philosophy
I reasoned while researching and analyzing my MPhil and PhD work that both compatibilists and incompatibilists can be guilty at times of depending more on theology, philosophy and philosophy of religion than Scripture. But here I am using Ephesians as example.
Feinberg's work speculated on going behind will to desires within 'The Many Faces of Evil'. Perhaps going behind significant human free will to human nature is helpful. My example that one cannot choose their nature via will, at least in the context of perfection versus imperfection and sinless versus sinful, has merit.
In the case of the unregenerate that God eventually regenerates, the Reformed concept I reviewed in theses studies of God enlightening persons through preaching and teaching is reasonable. This would culminate in regeneration and the human embracing of salvation. In the regenerated in Christ, moulding of persons may be viewed as the sanctification process. Being set apart for holiness with God.
Note
I reason the Reformed 'tag' is more accurate for my position than that of Calvinist. I am not a resident or citizen of the United States of America and did not grow up in that culture. A stronger Calvinist in my mind would not favour Believer's Baptism to Infant Baptism, as do I. I am Reformed, theologically and philosophically on many issues, but I am also a baptized Mennonite Brethren in an Evangelical church. My sacramental leanings would be Anabaptist and Baptist. I state this because online in some what I view as rare unnecessarily heated contexts, I have been written-off as a Calvinist by upbringing, and that is far from the truth. My views, are of course a product of influence, as with everyone, but they are mainly a product of seeking the Lord's truth, academically. But I did with God's help manage to develop enough expertise to pass two major British theses of Reformed Theology and Philosophy of Religion in secular departments, not in agreement with my views.
I am still in process.
BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.
BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html
BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
CAIRD, GEORGE B. (1977) Paul's Letters from Prison Paperback, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html
CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville,
CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
DUNN, JAMES D.G. (1988) Romans, Dallas, Word Books.
ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
GUNDRY, ROBERT (1981) A Survey of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.
HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
LA SOR, WILLIAM SANFORD, DAVID ALLAN HUBBARD, AND FREDERIC WILLIAM BUSH. (1987) Old Testament Survey, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
LIGHTFOOT, JOHN B. (1993) The Destination of the Epistle to the Ephesians in Biblical Essays, New York, Macmillan.
MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.
MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Saturday, October 06, 2012: Middle Knowledge: Latin-Scientia Media (In Brief)
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.
STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.
The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.
Middle Knowledge: Internet Encylopedia of Philosophy Selected references
a. Books
Craig, William Lane. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism, Omniscience. New York: Brill, 1990.
Craig, William Lane. The Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents from Aristotle to Suarez. New York: Brill, 1988.
Molina, Luis de. On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia. Translated by Alfred J. Freddoso. Ithaca: Cornell, 1988. Plantinga, Alvin. The Nature of Necessity. Oxford: Clarendon, 1974.
b. Articles
Hasker, William. “Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited.” Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April 1995): 223-36.
Hasker, William. “A New Anti-Molinist Argument.” Religious Studies 35:3 (September 1999): 291-97.
Author Information John D. Laing
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary U. S. A.
Also online
Lonergan, Bernard J.F. Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.
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