Niagara Falls, Ontario (photo from trekearth.com)
This is material based on MPhil/PhD research:
Gratuitous evil is also known as the evidential argument for evil and has been presented by atheistic philosopher William Rowe on more than one occasion. He presents an argument for gratuitous evil in ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’ in The Problem of Evil.
Rowe’s evidential argument for evil, states the following propositions: Rowe (1990: 1).
(1) God, an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being exists.
(2) Gratuitous evil exists.
(3) A perfectly good being would always eliminate gratuitous evil as far as it can.
(4) There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do. Rowe (1990: 3).
Rowe concludes that there is no good state of affairs where an omnipotent, omniscient being would be justified in allowing evils where no possible good can arise from them taking place; he also calls these inscrutable evils, which are evils that cannot be understood. Rowe (1990: 3). Rowe’s proposition (1) and those like, seem reasonable from a traditional Christian perspective. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 89-99). Proposition (2) is debatable because it assumes that concepts of those within sovereignty and soul-making theodicy are incorrect and that an infinite, omnipotent God cannot use all wrong actions by creatures for the greater good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). Hick (1970: 292). Proposition (2) really does not prove anything, but simply states a disagreement between Rowe and many within Christian theism on whether or not God’s purposes are being fulfilled, even when horrendous evils occur. Rowe states that there is too much evil that does not make sense in existence. Rowe (1990: 3). Numerous theists would answer that although finite human beings cannot know the purposes of evil, God has a purpose. In my view, the human being is therefore unable to truly judge if too much evil exists. Proposition (3) is questionable because it builds upon the debatable proposition (2). It assumes that God cannot use all evil towards the greater good, and since gratuitous evil would exist, it implies that God likely is not a perfectly good being. Proposition (4) can be challenged by the theist because although God technically could rid the world of evil, both Feinberg and Hick for example, have provided good reasons why the creator would allow preventable evil. Feinberg states that eliminating evil would prohibit other divine plans for the greater good, Feinberg (1994: 130). Hick writes that God must allow a hostile imperfect environment in order for soul-making to occur. Hick (1970: 292).
Rowe has written a logical argument, but it is not necessarily true because theists can debate proposition (2) and claim the infinite, perfectly good God can always use the evil actions of his finite creations for the greater good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). It also can be stated concerning proposition (3) that as Calvin noted, God’s motives would remain pure even while horrendous evils take place, and God need not be less than perfectly good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 40). This would seem reasonable and possible for an infinite deity to accomplish as he is dealing with finite creatures that could never match him in morality, power, and knowledge.
Frances and Daniel Howard-Snyder reason that a way to deny premise (3) is to state that there is no such thing as a minimum amount of suffering that God must allow in order for the greater good to be accomplished. Howard-Snyder (1999: 129). This idea would not accept the critic’s notion that there is a minimum amount of evil and suffering that God must allow in a situation, and if he goes beyond that amount, gratuitous evil has occurred and God therefore does not exist. Howard-Snyder (1999: 129). Jeff Jordon disagrees and argues that the no minimum of suffering claim is false or implausible, because for any distribution of evil for divine purposes there is always a less painful distribution that would accomplish the same purposes. Jordon (2003: 238). I think it more likely that for each varying amount of suffering that God willingly allows there are resulting amounts of greater good or evil that occur. There is also the possibility that if God allows a certain amount of suffering in a given situation that the greater good will not occur and therefore God would not allow this amount of suffering to take place. Since the amount of suffering is largely related to the amount of greater good, it is not likely that a smaller amount of suffering could accomplish the same results as a greater amount, either good or bad. I therefore doubt Jordon’s claim that a less painful distribution of evil would accomplish the exact same purposes. Jordon (2003: 238).
A critic may state that Jesus could have simply atoned for sins by dying with a much less brutal death. Christ could have been beaten less, not been crucified, died in a less painful way, and still died for sins, but I reason that the exact purposes of God would not have been accomplished through less suffering. I conclude that in the case of the death of Christ, a less painful distribution of evil would not have accomplished the exact same purposes. Unfortunately from our human perspective, what we may often view as gratuitous unnecessary evil, is in a sense, God accomplishing his purposes in a situation. I can certainly relate on a personal level, with the atheist and non-Christian that deems this as wrong and unfair, but as human beings we are in no position to judge God’s motives and plans in working in his creation in regard to the problem of evil. I have determined that my sufferings which are often very annoying, do not provide me with a strong enough intellectual argument to overcome the Biblical, theological and philosophical evidence for God's existence. My suffering, and the suffering of others, is certainly very difficult and often unappreciated, but from Job 40:1-2, from the New American Standard Bible, it states.
Then the Lord said to Job,
‘Will the faultfinder contend with the Almighty? Let him who reproves God answer it.’
CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.
HOWARD-SNYDER, FRANCES AND DANIEL (1999) ‘Is Theism Compatible with Gratuitous Evil?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 26, Number 2, April, pp. 115-130, Chicago, University of Illinois.
JORDAN, JEFF (2003) ‘Evil and Van Inwagen’, Faith and Philosophy, Volume 20, Number 2, pp. 236-238. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.
KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1990) ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, in Adams and Adams (eds.) The Problem of Evil, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
http://www.otago.ac.nz/philosophy/210/15%20evidential%20prob%20of%20evil.pdf.
Niagara Falls, New York (photo from trekearth.com)
