A Little Philosophy: Kant

A Little Philosophy: Kant 

A version of this article placed on academia.edu on May 20, 2023

SZUDEK, ANDY & TORSLEY, SARAH (2018) The Little Book of Philosophy, Landau Cecile (Ed), London, DK Publishing. 

Preface

'Kant wants to demonstrate that there is an external, material world, and that its existence cannot be denied.' (102). 

The text states that Kant's argument reasons that for something to exist it must be determinable in time. (102), as in it must be known when it exists and for how long, (102). But how does this proof affect a human consciousness?  (102).

Rightly in my mind, Kant acknowledged the scientific progress that had been made over the previous two centuries. (103). Empiricists, notably John Locke and David Hume '...argued that there is no knowledge except that which comes through our experience of the world.' (103).

This idea is connected to scientism...

Scientism

Blackburn:  

Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 

Scientism:  

A pejorative term for the concept that only the methods of natural science and related categories form the elements for any philosophical or other enquiry. Blackburn (1996: 344).  

From The Concise Oxford Dictionary Scientism: 1 a a method or doctrine regarded as characteristic of scientists b the use of practice of this. 2 often derogatory, an excessive belief in or application of scientific method. Oxford (1995: 1236).  

Oxford Science  

Empiricism: 'Denotes a result that is observed by experiment or observation rather than by theory.' (287). I view empiricism as a legitimate academic approach in reasonable contexts.

The text under review explains that Kant argues that empiricism and scientific knowledge provides vital answers but is not 'the whole answer' (104). The text explains: 'That a true empiricist would argue against Kant that all acquaintances come from experience, in other words, nothing is apriori.' (104-105).

The idea of God creating the world, is an apriori concept. (105). 

The next section is from my PhD (and as well, edited website entries), and to use make use of Kant as primary source as this textbook is a very fine, secondary source: 

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

In his Inaugural Dissertation[1] of 1770,[2] Kant provides the idea that persons can only have a priori knowledge of space and time by the use of forms of the mind, which are imposed by human experience.[3]  Kantian scholars Paul Guyer and Allen Wood (1999) with the Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, note that a priori knowledge originates independently of senses and experience.[4]  According to Pojman the word a priori is the latin for preceding and is considered knowledge that is not based on empirical experience, but is known by the meaning of words or definitions.[5]  

In the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781 and revised in 1787, Kant explains that the forms of appearance from which sensations can be understood are not themselves the empirical sensations.[6]  Human experience will determine the method and forms by which particular things are understood by what Kant calls pure intuition.[7] Concerning human experience, Kant reasoned categories are applied to objects not because the objects  make the categories possible, but rather because categories themselves provide and constitute necessary conditions for the representation for all possible objects of experience.[8]  

Therefore any human understanding of metaphysical reality would not be comprehended by empirical knowledge in a posteriori sense.[9]  Guyer and Wood point out that Kant was not an empiricist,[10] as while Kant criticized and limited the scope of traditional metaphysical thought,[11] he also sought to defend against empiricism’s claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge which he called a priori [12] knowledge,[13] because no knowledge derived from experience, a posteriori [14] knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.[15] 

Guyer and Wood explain that Kant sought to defend the scientific approach to the acquisition of  knowledge against skeptics that dismissed rigorous arguments in favor of  ‘common sense.’[16]  Kant critiqued the dogmatism of certain metaphysicians negatively,[17]  and he also negatively noted as dogmatists those that would be intellectually indifferent to metaphysical inquiry.[18]  Kant wished to limit the pretensions of dogmatic empiricists while defending metaphysical theories[19] as a science[20] and necessary in terms of practical reason.[21]  Basically, Kant defended metaphysics as important and necessary,[22] but was sympathetic to the empiricists view that certain metaphysical questions were insoluble.[23]  

Kant noted that a priori is relational without its own inherent content.[24]  It is synthetic and incapable of serving as metaphysical proof.[25]  A priori is relative to an experience only capable of producing appearances, and so a priori is factual as experience which it conditions.[26]  W.H. Walsh explains if human beings had no experience whatsoever, they would have no concept of knowledge, not even a priori knowledge. [27]  No ideas or items concerning knowledge are literally to be considered innate.[28]

Kant reasons objects that were present in empirical human experience were in the phenomena realm, while objects outside were the noumena realm.[29]  He writes that the contingent things experienced by persons are phenomena.[30]  These are things that could be experienced empirically and would be reasonably accepted as reality.[31] The noumena realm was not available to empirical senses.[32]  

Therefore, according to Mario Derksen (2006) who wrote ‘Kant and the Question of Noumenal Ontology’ claims of metaphysical knowledge[33] would not be certain as would be any resulting doctrines.[34]  Kant explains in a follow up work entitled The Critique of Practical Reason from 1788, that the noumena is the theoretical department of knowledge denied, while the phenomena is one’s own empirical consciousness.[35]  All positive speculative knowledge should be disclaimed for the noumena realm according to Kantian thought.[36]  Kant concludes The Critique of Practical Reason by noting that the phenomena realm is the external realm where consciousness has existence.[37]  The noumena realm is invisible and has true infinity where Kant believes one can reason that contingent personality is dependent on the universal and necessary connection to the invisible world.[38] 

Importantly Kant thought it legitimate for one to postulate the noumena realm in a ‘negative sense’ meaning things as they may be independently or how they are represented, [39] but not noumena in the ‘positive sense’ which would be things based on pure reason alone.[40]  Instead, noumena categories were only useful by applying them to empirical data structured in forms of intuition.[41]  The concept of noumena, according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumenon was of intellectual use.[42]  Noumena in its negative sense are that which is not an object of sense intuition.[43]  

Kant rejects concepts of positive noumena based on pure reason[44] because, according to T.C. Williams (1987),  noumenal concepts are not determinate knowledge of anything and must be based on a sense of sensible intuition.[45]  Kant rejects the positive use of the term as it postulates  objective knowledge of a metaphysical realm.[46]  The positive sense of the term noumena is therefore fully rejected by Kant.[47]  He explains that the noumenal in the negative sense is equivalent to the thing itself and alone is involved in the concept.[48]  Kant’s view leads to a moral theology which has a doctrine of God and immortality postulated, along with theories of human free will[49] and morality.[50]  His moral theology is postulated and is not dogmatic, rational metaphysics.[51]

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[1] Blackburn (1996: 205).  See also Karl Ameriks. Ameriks (1996: 399).   

[2] Blackburn (1996: 205). Ameriks (1996: 399).   

[3] Blackburn (1996: 205).

[4] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).

[5] Pojman (1996: 595).

[6] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). Rowan Williams writes that for Kant, the ‘real contains no more than the merely possible.’ Williams (2007: 205).

[7] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). 

[8] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[9] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66). 

[10] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2). Norman Kemp Smith within A Commentary to Kant’s ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ writes that empiricists eliminate  a priori principles, appealing to sense experience only,  therefore eliminating distinctions between inductive inference and expectation.  Smith (1930: xxvii).  Blackburn suggests Kant made a strong break from eighteenth century empiricism.  Blackburn (1996: 206).  Kant was not an empiricist as was David Hume that within (1779)(2004)  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, notes that for ‘ignorant ages’ persons including geniuses have ambitiously tried to produce new proofs and arguments for natural theology and God.  Hume (1779)(2004: 2).  Hume also reasoned that the supposed Supreme Being’s infinite divine attributes would be ‘totally incomprehensible’ and that human nature would not have ideas that would correspond to the attributes of this divine being.  Hume (1779)(2004: 21).  Hume’s degree of scepticism of God and natural theology and dependence on empiricism alone was not the same view as Kant.  Kant (1788)(1997: 11).  Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). 

[11] Kant was opposed to speculative views of indefensible rationalism.  Blackburn (1996: 206).  Cornelius Van Til suggests Kant reasons God is not a law giver to humanity, God cannot reveal himself through nature or human constitution with the image of God.  The intellect of human beings makes no positive assertions concerning God.  Kant rejects notions of theoretical knowledge of God and, instead, appeals to practical reason and faith.  Van Til (1977: 246-247).  Plantinga writes that it is suggested by many commentators Kant demonstrated there are insurmountable problems with the idea that the traditional Christian God exists.  Plantinga (2000: 7). 

[12] Kant called cognitions independent of all experience and the impressions of the senses a priori.  Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136). 

[13] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).

[14] Empirical experiences are called a posteriori.  A posteriori knowledge is empirical knowledge through experience.  Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 136). 

[15] Kant argued that inductive inference from data and experience was only possible based upon prior acceptance of  views of rational principles established independently.  Therefore experience does not validate these principles.  Smith (1930:  xxvii).  Ameriks suggests Kant rejected unjustifiable metaphysical claims in place of principles of theory which are the conditions by which persons orientate themselves within experience. These principles are ‘necessary and discoverable’ therefore defeating empiricism and scepticism concerning  reasonable metaphysical claims, and contrasting traditional rationalism and dogmatism.  Ameriks (1996: 399).   

[16] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2).           

[17] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[18] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).  Kant notes in ‘Critique of Practical Reason’ empiricism needs to be contrasted by the necessity of rational a priori principles.  Kant (1788)(1997: 11).

[19] Plantinga reasons that for Kant the intellectual problem is not that persons cannot think about God but that persons cannot come to speculative metaphysical knowledge of God.  Plantinga (2000: 9).

[20] John R. Franke suggests that ‘scientific’ knowledge within Kantian thought is limited to the realm of experience shaped by rational structures of the mind.  This means knowledge of God through pure reason is impossible.  Franke (2005: 58-59).

[21] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3). Ameriks writes, for Kant practical reason is that which determines rules for the faculty of desire and will as opposed to the faculty of cognition and feeling.  Ameriks (1996: 399).

[22] Ameriks (1996: 399).   

[23] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[24] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[25] Smith (1930: xxxvi).  Ameriks (1996: 400).

[26] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 43).  Smith (1930: xxxvi).  Blackburn (1996: 205).

[27] Walsh (1976: 6).

[28] Walsh (1976: 6). 

[29] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).  Guyer and Wood note that the phenomena realm is the category applied to appearances whereas things in themselves are the noumena realm, which might be thought of but not known.  Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 10).  The phenomena realm is that which appears and is therefore empirical.

[30] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).

[31] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 482).

[32] Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 393).

[33] John M. Frame suggests that within Kantian philosophy humanity replaces God as the ultimate source and interpreter of reality.  Frame deduces this based on the idea that the noumena realm is beyond human experience and is unknowable.  Frame (2002: 112).

[34] Derkson (2006: 9).  From Kant’s perspective I would reason that metaphysical doctrines could be questioned and not considered dogmatic truth, but would not necessarily be considered meaningless.  Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 3).

[35] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 3).

[36] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 26).

[37] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100).

[38] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100).

[39] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13).

[40] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13).

[41] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 13).  Ameriks (1996: 400).

[42] Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350). 

[43] Smith (1930:  413). Ameriks (1996: 400).

[44] Smith (1930:  413). Ameriks (1996: 400).

[45] Williams (1987: 149).

[46] Williams (1987: 150).

[47] Williams (1987: 151).

[48] Smith (1930:  413).

[49] Kant notes free submission of the human will to law combined with the restraints of law put upon human inclination by human reason, is respect for the law.  This law demands respect and inspires,  it is moral law.  Kant (1788)(1997: 68-69).  Lewis White Beck explains Kant theorized that human actions were both free and predictable.  He reasons, law can only obligate a really free being to act.  Human beings demonstrate free will through choice to obey or disobey law.  Beck (1963:  31-32). 

[50] Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 846).  Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14).  Beck explains that Kant postulated the existence of God in order that through such agency effect may be given to moral laws.  Beck (1963: 273).  Kant’s ethical system included associated human freedom with the potential for self control and self rule, and the need to think in terms of a just God sustaining moral order.  Blackburn (1996: 206).

[51] Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 14).

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AMERIKS, KARL (1999) ‘Kant, Immanuel’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

BECK, LEWIS WHITE (1963) A Commentary on Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  

DERKSEN, MARIO (2006) ‘Kant and the Question of Noumenal Ontology’, in Catholic Apologetics Information, North Strathfield, New South Wales, Australia, Catholic Apologetics Information. http://www.geocities.com/Athens/Rhodes/3543/kant.htm  

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium. http://www.thirdmill.org/files/english/html/th/TH.h.Frame.ProblemofEvil.htm  

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.  

GUYER, PAUL AND ALLEN W, in KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.  

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KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

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December 30, 2020: Comments

Scriptural Revelation in my view, is not to be considered a source of the concept of pure reason as discussed by Kant and reviewers. Scripture can be used as an historical, traditional and authoritative source. Revelation from God in Scripture and resulting claims made within could perhaps (and perhaps not) be tied to Kantian concepts and intuition arising from empirical sensations. This is not a difficulty for a Reformed and some other approaches to Christianity, which do not rely primarily on philosophical deductions, but in supernatural revelation of God through empirical sensations, such as prophets, Christ, the apostles and scribes. 

In disagreement with Kant, I reason that the infinite, eternal, necessary, first and primary cause, God, can communicate as in revelation, with his finite human creatures in a reasonable, understandable way, truths. This was done so in particular through revealed, divinely inspired scripture through human authors. But it could also be done by other methods, supernaturally and naturally.

Also in disagreement with Kant,  I do reason that theistic, philosophy of religion (or as some call it, natural theology), can with reasonable certainty, deduce within rationalism, certain knowledge and truths about God, including in a limited sense, divine nature and attributes.

While at the same time this knowledge and these truths are not being supernaturally revealed and do not provide salvific knowledge.

In a sense, I agree with Kant as he rejected concepts of positive noumena (noumena or noumenal is the non-empirical realm) based on pure reason. I can reasonably apply this to pure reason and theological doctrines which would require a personal knowledge of God. I can agree that God cannot be known (to use more evangelical language) personally by pure reason.

God would reveal self and theology and doctrines that more closely, than through reason alone and philosophy of religion, define his divine nature and attributes. For example, the theology of the cross, the atoning and resurrection work God the Son, Jesus Christ, for believing humanity, Ephesians 1-2, Revelation 13, in eternity. This theology and related doctrines could not be known by humanity through pure reason. As well, God would not likely be deduced as triune through pure reason.

Negative noumena, I reason, allows for God and theology to be deduced intuitively. I would apply that and state that if a finite human being can deduce the infinite, I also reason the infinite can demonstrate self and aspects of noumena to the finite both through creation (Romans 1, but non-personal) and revelation.