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That temperature is for Maple Ridge, not Vancouver at the time of writing, this afternoon.
That is 74 degrees Fahrenheit for what is technically still the end of winter in this region.
So, I have been spending more time outside on work breaks...
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The myth of the given
This is another new philosophical term for me.
Also known as the given (158).
In defining the given, secular philosopher, Blackburn writes that this is connected to foundationalism. (158). This idea is that foundationational epistemology (the study of learning and knowledge) and knowledge is based on certain accepted experienced and learned foundations. (145). Often knowledge is considered to be found from empiricism (senses) and rationalism (reason) as intellectual approaches. (145). One approach might be favoured over the other. (145).
Under The myth of the given entry (re: name adapted by Sellars), it is stated that this is a widely rejected view that sense experience (the senses-based, empiricism approach) gives persons and society points of certainty in knowledge that therefore serve as foundation for the whole of empirical knowledge and science. (253).
In other words, Sellars' critique is generally accepted as correct.
The Oxford Reference
Cited
myth of the given...
Name adopted by Sellars for the now widely-rejected view that sense experience gives us peculiar points of certainty, suitable to serve as foundations for the whole of empirical knowledge and science. The idea that empiricism, particularly in the hands of Locke and Hume, confuses moments of physical or causal impact on the senses with the arrival of individual ‘sense data’ in the mind, was a central criticism of it levelled by the British Idealists, especially Green and Joachim. See foundationalism, protocol statements, sense data.
Information philosopher
Cited
In his most famous work, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Sellars criticized the notion that perceptions of sense-data give immediate knowledge that can serve as the foundation of all empirical knowledge. He called this the "Myth of the Given." Sellar's criticism is similar to Immanuel Kant's idea that "intuitions/perceptions without concepts are blind" (Anschaungen ohne Begriffe sind blind), or as we might symmetrize the Kantian chiasmos, "concepts without percepts are empty, percepts without concepts are blind."
Quoting, Sellars:
VIII. DOES EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE HAVE A FOUNDATION?
32. One of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given is the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such that (a) each fact can not only be noninferentially known to be the case, but presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter of fact, or of general truths; and (b) such that the noninferential knowledge of facts belonging to this structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims -- particular and general -- about the world. It is important to note that I characterized the knowledge of fact belonging to this stratum as not only noninferential, but as presupposing no knowledge of other matter of fact, whether particular or general. It might be thought that this is a redundancy, that knowledge (not belief or conviction, but knowledge) which logically presupposes knowledge of other facts must be inferential. This, however, as I hope to show, is itself an episode in the Myth. (page 164).
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Non-inferential claims would not use inference and would not claim that an argument is true or provable. In other words, they are loose claims made.
This is quite complex topic for which like Blackburn, I am only dealing with non-exhaustively, however...
To presuppose that no other knowledge can be factual or true, other than non-inferential is problematic. I reason that knowledge can be obtained through the use of both empirical evidence, including science/scientific, and as well through disciplines within rationalism such philosophy (philosophy of religion), theology, psychology, biblical studies and others.
Both empirical knowledge and rational knowledge can be adapted over time with new premises and conclusions that are internally and externally superior to ones previously accepted. I therefore have very carefully accepted views within my worldview and these always need to be supported superior premises and conclusions that remain internally and externally more reasonable that counter premises and conclusions. I would not coin them 'given' (s). Of course I have faith and philosophy. Divinely guided, reasonable faith and philosophy.
I certainty rely on empirical data, and scientific data, but I realize that science does adapt to new data. In regard to empirical data, which Sellar's deals with in his critique, his critique seems reasonable.
Premises arising from the necessary/of necessity (philosophy of religion), the first cause (philosophy of religion), God, the creator (Hebrew Bible), God, the creator and the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (New Testament), The Trinity (Theology) and the Bible in context, are viewed as accepted by this writer, but they are maintained by reasonable certainty.
See Kant in this website's archives.
BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co.
KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
SELLARS, WILFRID (1995) Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, Edited in Hypertext by Andrew Chrucky, http://selfpace.uconn.edu/class/percep/SellarsEmpPhilMind.pdf
