The importance of theodicy
This article was originally published on Blogger 20091111. I republished 20260226, with significant revisions and additions.
Photo is of Glasgow Cathedral: Glasgow-Cathedral-09 myhighlands.de
On the original posting, I mentioned a 2009 USA trip which tied into visiting Wales for my PhD Viva. Now in 2026, quite soon, I will be visiting the UK and France, including Glasgow. This will be my first walking tour of Glasgow, which I have wanted to do for some time. This section below was the basis for some PhD thesis work.
2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter
2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University
The importance of theodicy
Some dismiss theodicy entirely and some view it as only having limited value. Hille reasons that a satisfactory self-coherent answer to the question of the justice of God cannot be found in theology or philosophy. Hille (2004: 26). Ferraiolo explains that many critics of theism would claim the existence of gratuitous evil makes a theodicy a difficult thing to establish in our present world filled with evil. He concludes his article by noting it is not obvious that human suffering is reconcilable with theism. Ferraiolo (2005: 1). Pereboom writes that despite some important work within theodicy over the last thirty years, the problem of evil still remains the greatest challenge to theistic belief. Pereboom (2005: 33). Lindsley notes that many persons are unimpressed by Christian attempts at theodicy. He suggests that theodicy must be careful not to portray itself in a way that it is speaking for God. Lindsley (2003: 3). I fully admit and reason that theodicy is a speculative exercise to a degree, and any person writing on the subject should with humility approach it very carefully.
Marcel Sarot comments that many feminist theologians see theodicy as dominated by white males, and these feminists reject notions of God’s omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness. Sarot (1997: 29). An important point here is that it needs to be remembered that each writer of theodicy is approaching the subject from theological assumptions. Many theodicy views are written by men and some of these male writers may not adequately portray female and feminist perspectives on the problem of evil. Theologian Carl Henry writes that empirical and philosophical considerations devoid of revelation cannot vindicate God in this evil world. Henry (1983: 282). I can accept Henry’s point, as from a traditional Christian perspective, Biblical revelation is viewed as explaining God’s workings in his creation, although this revelation does not exhaustively discuss the problem of evil. Henri Blocher notes theodicy are failures in themselves and must have ideas within that square with Biblical revelation in order to be true and beneficial. Blocher (1994: 84). I do not agree that all theodicy are failures in themselves, but can grant a Christian theodicy needs the support of Scripture, which connects the reader to the salvific work of Christ.
It should be noted that a theodicy written from a sovereignty perspective, to be very valuable, needs to focus on how God’s divine plans and purposes are accomplished through the development of human beings. Erlandson explains that many theodicy are fatally flawed since they are too focused on the idea of God creating a world for the best possible state of human beings. Erlandson (1991: 1). The ideas of Erlandson are in line with sovereignty theodicy, which places greater emphasis on God’s perfect and holy plans in willingly allowing the problem of evil to exist in creation, than does free will theodicy.
Scudder comments that if the sovereignty of God is stressed, and evil is still considered to be reality, then this logically leads to the idea that God causes evil and it is part of a predetermined plan. Scudder (1940: 248). I agree with this notion, but Scudder deduces that a strong view of God willing evil for the greater good means evil could be understood as not really being evil. Scudder (1940: 248). I can understand how a scholar could come to such a conclusion, but a Reformed influenced sovereignty theodicy does not need to agree with this idea which is foreign to both traditional Reformed and conservative theology.
Robert H. Mounce explains that God directs the affairs in life, for those who love him, for the greater good. Mounce (1995: 187). C.E.B. Cranfield comments that although God can will grievous and evil things to occur, God in Christ works these things towards the greater good, in particular in the context of salvation for those that know Christ. Cranfield (1992: 204). Evil and sin are not to be confused with goodness and obedience within Reformed traditions, but as God willingly allows evil things to occur, his purposes and motives are pure.
David Ray Griffin critically disagrees with this concept of John Calvin and others, but correctly defines the idea that God’s will must be regarded as righteous, even when we as human beings cannot fully understand the rightness of his judgments, since God is the definition of righteousness. Griffin (1976: 129). Wright reasons the problem of evil can be solved in a straightforward manner by proposing that God predestines evils to occur for a particular purpose, and that persons do not have an answer back for God. Wright (1996: 197). This comment from Wright is accurate from a Reformed perspective. I can interject and state that academically solving the logical and gratuitous problems of evil by tying them back to God is an ultimate intellectual solution, but there are still practical ramifications to deal with, such as why certain evils occur. The fact that a sovereignty theodicy can logically and reasonable solve its problem of evil, does not mean that suffering often comes with an explanation.
Ultimately, Christ’s atoning work and resurrection leads to a culminated Kingdom of God (Revelation 21-22) with resurrected citizens. That is the solution to the problem of evil within the realm that God intended human beings to have dominion over.
A critic can rightly state that everlasting hell and therefore, in a sense, the problem of evil, will still exist. My reply is that an actual everlasting realm of hell, as a place of punishment is not intended for human beings to have dominion over and therefore there is no certain need for a remedy for evil within it.
20260226: Compatibilism v Incompatibilism
The revealed biblical Scripture through God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, presented via inspired biblical authors is the ultimate and final authority on religious matters, including human salvation, theodicy and problems of evil. But this in no way prohibits God's truth from being found within philosophical theology and theistic philosophy of religion. Especially within Reformed theology and compatiblist positions, coherent, reasonable solutions in regards to theodicy and problems of evil can be found.
A key example is the insights on incompatiblism versus compatiblism through philosophical means which can be extremely insightful when understood correctly with an open-mind. Another key example is how a Reformed, compatibilistic, perspective can effectively deal with the issue of gratuitous evil.
Compatibilism (Soft determinism)
Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling define compatibilism as the theory that human free will is compatible with God’s sovereign prerogative to determine or will all events. Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 28). P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to the philosophical concepts of free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596).
John S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force (for there to be significant human moral accountability with human will and actions, my add), but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine, with the use of persuasion, that actions will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24).
Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet these were committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).
W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).
I personally embrace, what I named limited free will, within compatibilism. Human beings through nature, consciousness, desire and will embrace as secondary causes, thoughts, acts and actions. Simultaneously, God, within theistic compatibilism, is the primary cause of all things, but with holy, pure and good motives. Limited free will is compatibilistic, not incompatibilistic, it is not to be confused with libertarian free will.
Incompatibilism (Indeterminism)
Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion, any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. This would include concepts of libertarian free will.
Blackburn explains free will theory requires autonomous beings that are able to perform free actions without any significant influence upon their will. He describes autonomy as the ability of agents to govern themselves, and for this to occur autonomous agents must commit actions which are truly their own. Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324).
Norman Geisler (1986) describes a form of incompatibilism which he calls self-determinism. Geisler (1986: 75). Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Geisler (1986: 75). Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. Ferre (1973)(1976: 35). Geisler (1986: 75). Mawson (1999: 324). An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Ferre (1973)(1976: 35). Geisler (1986: 75). Mawson (1999: 324).
Determinism (Hard determinism)
Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). In other words, there are forms of determinism where human actions are significant.
D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). In contrast to 'fate' or fatalism, biblical, theological determinism, has divine meaning. Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism, in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186).
Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for actions determined, as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).
In contrast, the compatibilist, soft-deterministic God of Reformed theology allows significant human freedom with the embracing of human thoughts, acts and action via human nature, desires and limited free will. The human ability with significant freedom to embrace thoughts, acts and actions as a secondary cause, philosophically and theologically eliminates God as forcing or coercing human thoughts, acts and actions where there is human, moral, accountability.
I reason God at times, does force or coerce events in regard to humanity, in those cases, there is not significant human moral accountability. For example, a person unwillingly becomes an amputee. This is against the nature, desires and will. A person does not sin by rejecting the amputation with nature, desires and will.
20260226: Gratuitous evil
I also dealt within theodicy with the issue of evidential issue or gratuitous evil for my PhD thesis. The evidential problem was considered less solved than the logical problem; I rejected this idea and documented why this was the case. I reason a sovereignty theodicy/approach can reasonably state that as an infinite, omnipotent God can use all evil for the greater good, no amount of evil is too much or gratuitous. God remains perfectly good and holy in the process. God's plans achieved means the evil he willfully allows is not gratuitous.
Romans 8:28 (New American Standard Bible)
New American Standard Bible (NASB)
Copyright © 1960, 1962, 1963, 1968, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1975, 1977, 1995 by The Lockman Foundation
28And we know that [a]God causes (A)all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are (B)called according to His purpose.
However, from our human perspective much evil often remains unexplainable and very painful.
Gratuitous evil is also known as the evidential argument for evil and has been presented by atheistic philosopher William Rowe on more than one occasion. He presents an argument for gratuitous evil in ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’ in The Problem of Evil.
Rowe’s evidential argument for evil, states the following propositions: Rowe (1990: 1).
(1) God, an omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good being exists.
(2) Gratuitous evil exists.
(3) A perfectly good being would always eliminate gratuitous evil as far as it can.
(4) There are no limits to what an omnipotent being can do. Rowe (1990: 3).
Rowe concludes that there is no good state of affairs where an omnipotent, omniscient being would be justified in allowing evils where no possible good can arise from them taking place; he also calls these inscrutable evils, which are evils that cannot be understood. Rowe (1990: 3). Rowe’s proposition (1) and those like, seem reasonable from a traditional Christian perspective. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 89-99). Proposition (2) is debatable because it assumes that concepts of those within sovereignty and soul-making theodicy are incorrect and that an infinite, omnipotent God cannot use all wrong actions by creatures for the greater good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). Hick (1970: 292). Proposition (2) really does not prove anything, but simply states a disagreement between Rowe and many within Christian theism on whether or not God’s purposes are being fulfilled, even when horrendous evils occur. Rowe states that there is too much evil that does not make sense in existence. Rowe (1990: 3). Numerous theists would answer that although finite human beings cannot know the purposes of evil, God has a purpose. In my view, the human being is therefore unable to truly judge if too much evil exists.
Proposition (3) is questionable because it builds upon the debatable proposition (2). It assumes that God cannot use all evil towards the greater good, and since gratuitous evil would exist, it implies that God likely is not a perfectly good being. Proposition (4) can be challenged by the theist because although God technically could rid the world of evil, both Feinberg and Hick for example, have provided good reasons why the creator would allow preventable evil. Feinberg states that eliminating evil would prohibit other divine plans for the greater good, Feinberg (1994: 130). Hick writes that God must allow a hostile imperfect environment in order for soul-making to occur. Hick (1970: 292).
Rowe has written a logical argument, but it is not necessarily true because theists can debate proposition (2) and claim the infinite, perfectly good God can always use the evil actions of his finite creations for the greater good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). It also can be stated concerning proposition (3) that as Calvin noted, God’s motives would remain pure even while horrendous evils take place, and God need not be less than perfectly good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 40). This would seem reasonable and possible for an infinite deity to accomplish as he is dealing with finite creatures that could never match him in morality, power, and knowledge.
Frances and Daniel Howard-Snyder reason that a way to deny premise (3) is to state that there is no such thing as a minimum amount of suffering that God must allow in order for the greater good to be accomplished. Howard-Snyder (1999: 129). This idea would not accept the critic’s notion that there is a minimum amount of evil and suffering that God must allow in a situation, and if he goes beyond that amount, gratuitous evil has occurred and God therefore does not exist. Howard-Snyder (1999: 129). Jeff Jordon disagrees and argues that the no minimum of suffering claim is false or implausible, because for any distribution of evil for divine purposes there is always a less painful distribution that would accomplish the same purposes. Jordon (2003: 238).
Rowe has written a logical argument, but it is not necessarily true because theists can debate proposition (2) and claim the infinite, perfectly good God can always use the evil actions of his finite creations for the greater good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). It also can be stated concerning proposition (3) that as Calvin noted, God’s motives would remain pure even while horrendous evils take place, and God need not be less than perfectly good. Calvin (1543)(1996: 40). This would seem reasonable and possible for an infinite deity to accomplish as he is dealing with finite creatures that could never match him in morality, power, and knowledge.
Frances and Daniel Howard-Snyder reason that a way to deny premise (3) is to state that there is no such thing as a minimum amount of suffering that God must allow in order for the greater good to be accomplished. Howard-Snyder (1999: 129). This idea would not accept the critic’s notion that there is a minimum amount of evil and suffering that God must allow in a situation, and if he goes beyond that amount, gratuitous evil has occurred and God therefore does not exist. Howard-Snyder (1999: 129). Jeff Jordon disagrees and argues that the no minimum of suffering claim is false or implausible, because for any distribution of evil for divine purposes there is always a less painful distribution that would accomplish the same purposes. Jordon (2003: 238).
I think it more likely that for each varying amount of suffering that God willingly allows there are resulting amounts of greater good or evil that occur. There is also the possibility that if God allows a certain amount of suffering in a given situation that the greater good will not occur and therefore God would not allow this amount of suffering to take place. Since the amount of suffering is largely related to the amount of greater good, it is not likely that a smaller amount of suffering could accomplish the same results as a greater amount, either good or bad. I therefore, doubt Jordon’s claim that a less painful distribution of evil would accomplish the exact same purposes. Jordon (2003: 238).
A critic may state that Jesus could have simply atoned for sins by dying with a much less brutal death. Christ could have been beaten less, not been crucified, died in a less painful way, and still died for sins, but I reason that the exact purposes of God would not have been accomplished through less suffering. I conclude that in the case of the death of Christ, a less painful distribution of evil would not have accomplished the exact same purposes.
A critic may state that Jesus could have simply atoned for sins by dying with a much less brutal death. Christ could have been beaten less, not been crucified, died in a less painful way, and still died for sins, but I reason that the exact purposes of God would not have been accomplished through less suffering. I conclude that in the case of the death of Christ, a less painful distribution of evil would not have accomplished the exact same purposes.
Unfortunately from our human perspective, what we may often view as gratuitous unnecessary evil, is in a sense, God accomplishing his purposes in a situation. I can certainly relate on a personal level, with the atheist and non-Christian that deems this as wrong and unfair, but as human beings we are in no position to judge God’s motives and plans in working in his creation in regard to the problem of evil. I have determined that my sufferings which are often very annoying, do not provide me with a strong enough intellectual argument to overcome the Biblical, theological and philosophical evidence for God's existence.
My suffering, and the suffering of others, is certainly very difficult and often unappreciated, but from Job 40:1-2, from the New American Standard Bible, it states.
Then the Lord said to Job,
‘Will the faultfinder contend with the Almighty? Let him who reproves God answer it.’
Then the Lord said to Job,
‘Will the faultfinder contend with the Almighty? Let him who reproves God answer it.’
---
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