Saturday, July 20, 2013

Dewi Zephaniah Phillips (PhD Edit)

Bac Son Valley, Vietnam-Google+

Although Professor Phillips and I had different perspectives in regard to much of Theology and Philosophy of Religion, what I respected about his writing, and what I enjoyed about his writing was that he refused to accept overly simplistic answers in regard to theodicy and the problem of evil.

I am the same, and that includes from the evangelical church.

I do not include the section on God’s omnipotence with Professor John Frame because that has been covered in the blog archives on this blog on more than one post. There is needed repetition on this blog, but then sometimes I reason it is not needed.

Thank you immensely for reading and supporting me in whatever way you can think of… 

Theodicy

Dewi Zephaniah Phillips[1] admits that ‘philosophizing about the problem of evil has become common place.’[2] There are ‘theories, theodicies and defences abound.’[3] These are all seeking to somehow justify God,[4] or to render the concept of God as untenable.[5]  Phillips rightly reasons that such work should be done with fear,[6] as approaches to the problem of evil in error could ‘betray the evils people have suffered.’[7]  Such explanation should never be overly simplistic, insensitive or ridiculous.[8]  Phillips warns that pro-religious philosophical presentations can often do more damage to the cause of theodicy than can the work of critics.[9]  Practical ‘existential’[10]  evils must be dealt with properly by theodicy.[11]  Philosophical presentations should not sidestep practical sufferings[12] in regard to evil, for it is by these problems it is known that there is a logical problem.[13] 

Restoration

As Phillips notes, ‘Theodicists want happy endings.’[14]  Feinberg admitted a difficulty with his approach because it defends God allowing the problem of evil in his creation for a time period that is unknown to human beings,[15] and at the same time claims that God would eventually restore his creation.[16]  He notes that free will and evolutionary theistic approaches to the problem of evil also assume that God would restore his creation, and so this was a common theistic assumption.[17] The fact that his sovereignty approach accepts restoration of the creation within it in no way makes his presentation internally inconsistent.[18]  Phillips explains that this general type of approach views God as compensating persons for the sufferings in life.[19]  Evil and suffering is therefore redeemed in some way.[20]  Evil and suffering would be worthwhile within a Christian world view where Christ prevails. Phillips warns that at its worst Christianity can push one to back the right supernatural force,[21] as in not backing Satan.[22]  Phillips suggests that no one wants to back a loser and so Christians should logically, within their worldview, back God and not Satan.[23] God becomes a means and not an end within this type of Christian approach.[24]  It should be interjected that Christianity should not be primarily about being on the winning side, rather it should be concerned, for the most part, with doing God’s will obediently in love.[25]  Phillips views it as problematic that Jesus stated his Kingdom was not of this world and yet in the Second Coming establishes his Kingdom on this earth.[26]

Feinberg thought it was not his objective to answer why God allowed the problem of evil and would eventually bring restoration, and I view this as a weakness.[27]  Rather, Feinberg believes he was successful in presenting an approach that showed God was good,[28] as was his creation.[29]  Calvin writes that God would begin anew in humanity by abolishing the fallen will, leaving the human will in its original state.[30]  God would turn evil to good, according to Calvin,[31] thus bringing a new humanity which was a new creation.[32] This human restoration and rebirth, Calvin (1552)(1995) notes,[33] would lead to the culmination of the Kingdom of God, and the ultimate blessing of immortality.[34] 

Providence

Phillips explains that a Reformed view is that God has the freedom to act as he wants.[35] This would be God’s sovereign providence, but Hume is skeptical of this concept.[36]  People throughout the world view certain evils, which may be rectified in other regions of the world or in the future, and understand these good events as being connected to general laws and the existence of a good deity.[37] Hume suggests that these are superstitions,[38] and questions whether in many cases a ‘cause can be known but from its known effects?’[39]  The idea is then presented that if God is benevolent his providence should lead to a world without suffering and wickedness.[40]

Soul-Building & Soul-Making

Phillips writes concerning this general type of approach on soul-building and that John Hick, that without the existence of evil, character development would not place.[41]  For Hick, the development that would take place in humanity was not one of gradual human improvement throughout generations,[42] but was instead an individual process in each and every person.[43] This type of approach allows God to mould human character.[44]  Phillips views a moral development theory as incoherent,[45] as it creates an immoral indulgence of human beings to self,[46] as in their own personal development.[47] Persons should instead be more concerned with other persons reasons Phillips.[48]

D.Z. Phillips (2001) criticizes Hick’s view that evolution will continue within humanity after death, noting this implies that the earthly process obviously failed.[49]  Phillips strongly disagrees with Hick’s position calling it horrendous that human beings should be expected to trust in the idea that death is an actual state and everything will work out for the best.[50]  John K. Roth (2001) provides a similar objection when he states that Hick’s progressive theodicy is just too good to be true.[51]  Although, in general terms, I do accept a concept of divine soul-making, both of the above objections[52] are serious ones. Phillips critique seems correct.[53]  It is apparent in many cases soul-making fails in certain individuals this side of the grave.[54]  This being the case, why should critics necessarily believe that God will redeem all post-mortem souls?[55]  If there was little or no evidence from an individual’s life of a disposition towards God while they were alive,[56] then why should it be accepted that there will be a change in attitude after death?[57] 

The philosophical assumption of universalism appears very speculative on Hick’s part.[58]  Phillips correctly points out that life after death is not scientific fact and Hick is trusting in a hypothetical state for the eventual demise of the problem of evil.[59]  Hick is resting his theodicy on the idea that if this state actually exists, persons that previously had rejected God would eventually change their ways bringing about a Kingdom of God without rebellion.[60]  Phillips, correctly in my view, points out that Hick ‘does not treat human life seriously enough.’61]

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books. 

DAVIS, STEPHEN T. (1981)(ed.), Encountering Evil, Atlanta, John Knox Press.FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Lawrence, Kansas.PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.),  Atlanta, John Knox Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005)  The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.




[1] Unfortunately Phillips died within the time frame of writing this thesis (1934-2006).

[2] Phillips (2005: xi).

[3] Phillips (2005: xi).

[4] Phillips (2005: xi). 

[5] Phillips (2005: xi). Most often atheistic attempts, or those critical of Christian thought.

[6] Phillips (2005: xi). 

[7] Phillips (2005: xi). 

[8] Phillips (2005: xi).  I can agree with this point in general terms, but there will certainly be disagreement between writers on the negative and positive aspects of various theodicy.

[9] Phillips (2005: xi). 

[10] Phillips (2005: xii).

[11] Phillips (2005: xii).

[12] And therefore practical theology should not be overlooked.

[13] Phillips (2005: xii). An insightful point, I agree.

[14] Phillips (2005: 247). 

[15] Feinberg (1994: 141). 

[16] Feinberg (1994: 141). Phillips doubts a notion of life after death makes sense.  He uses as example comparing death to being asleep or unconscious.  Phillips (2005: 85). 

[17] Feinberg (1994: 141).

[18] Feinberg (1994: 141).

[19] Phillips (2005: 81).

[20] Phillips (2005: 81).

[21] Phillips (2005: 247).

[22] Phillips (2005: 247).

[23] Phillips (2005: 247).   decent point is made, however, in light of Reformed views on compatibilism, Christians are not going to primarily choose God, but are chosen by God.

[24] Phillips (2005: 247).

[25] For example, Matthew 22 and Mark 12 has Christ instructing the reader to love God first and foremost, and others as much as self.  Jesus in John 15 tells his disciples to love one another just as he loved them. 

[26] Phillips (2005: 247).  esus’ Kingdom is not of this temporal world, not of this present realm. The world shall be changed and restored.  Mounce (1990: 368-397).

[27] Feinberg (1994: 141). 

[28] Feinberg (1994: 141). 

[29] Feinberg (1994: 141).  

[30] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 3, 6).

[31] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 3, 6).

[32] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 3, 6).

[33] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 3, 6).

[34] Calvin (1552)(1995: 13).

[35] Phillips (2005: 22).

[36] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[37] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[38] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[39] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[40] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[41] Phillips (2005: 56).

[42] Hick (1970: 292). 

[43] Hick (1970: 292).

[44] Phillips (2005: 56).

[45] Phillips (2005: 58).

[46] Phillips (2005: 58).

[47] Phillips (2005: 58).

[48] Phillips (2005: 58).  In support of Hick and my own theories of human development, I reason that spiritual building need not be necessarily only self focused. For example, in Matthew 22 and Mark 12 Jesus tells the listener to love others as self.  Within spiritual development one could and should seek to love and assist others.

[49] Phillips in Davis (2001: 56). Phillips (2005: 87).

[50] Phillips in Davis (2001: 58).

[51] Roth in Davis (2001: 62). Hick’s theodicy is too speculative and sentimental.

[52] Phillips in Davis (2001: 58). Roth in Davis (2001: 62).

[53] Phillips in Davis (2001: 58). 

[54] Phillips in Davis (2001: 56).

[55] Phillips in Davis (2001: 58).

[56] Phillips in Davis (2001: 58).

[57] Phillips in Davis (2001: 58).

[58] Hick in Davis (2001: 51). 

[59] Phillips in Davis (2001: 58).

[60] Hick (1970: 252-253). Phillips is skeptical that the human race will morally improve as Hicks understands it. Phillips (2005: 89). 

[61] Phillips (2005: 89). Hick does not treat the empirical temporal life seriously enough.