PhD: Twitter quote 113/After the last sermon, a friend at church asked me about free will
Preface
A friend, I consider an amateur philosophical whiz, discussed free will with me last Sunday, after a related sermon. This article is an edited review with some new material.
I am a compatibilist within the Reformed, theological tradition and theistic, philosophy of religion.
Twitter version
After the last sermon, a friend at church asked me about free will.
Libertarian free will
Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. There cannot be another, predetermined, simultaneous cause in a theoretical chain within indeterminism.
Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions, my add) or simultaneous (at the same time, my add) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Geisler (1996: 429).
Incompatibilism/Indeterminism
Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Feinberg (1994: 60).
Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. Feinberg (1994: 60).
An entity that is forced or coerced into conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not morally responsible, where these are done without significant freedom. Of course, only the infinite God is an infinitely accurate, moral judge of guilt or not, in regards to the deeds of a finite entity. (God judges deeds, post-mortem, Revelation 20, also 21-22, 2 Corinthians 5, 2 Peter 3, as some key examples)
Significant free will (human in this context, my add) would be viewed an incompatible with any form of determinism.
Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324).
In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view, my add) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being.
The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory.
The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause.
David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46).
The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God.
Again to Norman Geisler, he describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75).
Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism.
Limited free will
This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view.
During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original.
I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced.
Compatibilism/Soft determinism
Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism. Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596).
It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example.
P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24).
Again with Feinberg, he writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).
W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).
Hard determinism
Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281).
Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).
Links
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