 |
As exciting as watching a chess match (PhD Edit)
Thank you to Mike for hosting the Euro 2016 matches this morning and this afternoon. Croatia, the team below with the table cloth uniforms, took part in a match against Portugal with both clubs combining for two shots on goal in 120 minutes. This was as exciting as watching a chess match, but Mike and I had good conversation. Team chessboard, lost.
Mike kindly mentioned he read some of my website articles but provided a reasonable critique that perhaps I should explain some of the more technical terms in typical English. I do not desire my writing to read as exciting as watching a chess match...
The following is an attempt to provide clarity in regard to language with a key PhD subject:
Incompatibilism versus Compatibilism
Incompatibilism
Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed an incompatible with any form of determinism.
Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being.
The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory.
The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause.
David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46).
The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God.
Norman Geisler describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75).
J.S. Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism.
I agree that it does not disprove compatibilism, but the fact that both compatibilists and incompatibilists admit that some actions are not significantly free would make the self-deterministic notions unlikely. If some actions are determined and caused by God then a system that generally adopts a strong view of God’s sovereignty and limited significant human freedom is preferable. This as opposed to libertarian free will. If to both compatibilists and incompatibilists, human beings at times can be forced to commit actions against their will, it is ever more likely that the human will is not the primary cause in human actions, but the secondary cause if it is allowed to be a secondary determining factor by the primary cause. These actions would be done without significant human freedom and therefore it would be intellectually untenable to attach human moral responsibility to such actions.
Compatibilism
Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism.
Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596).
Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596).
It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a chain of human nature and human will, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example.
W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused at all by the human nature and will, then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).
I agree.
Within hard determinism God or an external force, would be the only cause of human actions, while with soft determinism and compatibilism, God or an external force, would be the primary cause of human actions and persons the secondary cause.
CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.
 |
| Thank you for hosting, Mike. |
