Thursday, December 19, 2019

Limited Free Will III

xmas-2928142_960_720
From 2003

The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University 

MPhil 2003 

Statement thirty-four: This statement stated: Human beings will not seek God, unless God calls them to himself. I believe if one thinks human beings have a sinful nature, then that nature makes it impossible for individuals to choose God autonomously.

God, through his Spirit, must first reach out to the individual making a belief and trust in God possible. My point here is that because of human sinful nature, which leads to sinful choices against God, humanity is unable to save itself from the problem of evil.

Humanly speaking, nations and many special interest groups desire to rid the world of evil, and I do not doubt that their motives are sincere, and at times some evil is prevented. However, I believe that the human position is one of dependency on God for deliverance and eventual restoration from personal sin, fallen creation and the problem of evil. With this point, 60% of Anglicans agreed, with 28% being not certain, and 12% disagreeing. With the Baptists, 76% agreed, 8% were not certain, and 16% disagreed.

December 19 2019

Based on my formal  academic work and website work, I firmly hold to a compatibilist (soft determinism) position. Some definitions...

Incompatibilism, Compatibilism (Soft Determinism), Hard Determinism

Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed an incompatible with any form of determinism. Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324).

In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being.

The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory. The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause and primary cause..

David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God.

Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64).

Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637).

In my view, significant human moral accountability requires significant freedom to embrace one's own nature, desires, thoughts acts and actions, without force or coercion by an outside agent.

Feinberg then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism. I agree that it does not disprove compatibilism, but the fact that both compatibilists and incompatibilists admit that some actions are not significantly free would make the self-deterministic notions unlikely. If some actions are determined and caused by God then a system that generally adopts a strong view of God’s sovereignty and limited significant human freedom is preferable. This as opposed to libertarian free will. My semi-original term is limited free will, within compatibilism.

Within a Reformed theology and philosophical compatibilism, God as primary cause, regenerates (Titus 3) and in a sense, makes 'born again' (John 3) the chosen in Jesus Christ (Romans 8-9, Ephesians 1). God the Son's atoning and resurrection work is applied to believers through divinely given grace through faith (Ephesians 2). Not by human works, but for good works, believing humanity, embraces the gospel, being saved by grace alone, through faith alone. (Ephesians 2).

Those outside of the gospel, with limited free will, embrace corrupted human nature, sinful nature and a rejection of the triune God and the atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ. Therefore, at the same time, rejecting the everlasting life within the Kingdom of God.

These results remain post-mortem (Revelation 20-22).

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Problems of suffering 2: Free will, simplified version: August 5 2019:

Limited Free Will: February 23 2017

As exciting as watching a chess match (PhD Edit): June 25 2016

Limited Free Will (Brief): June 29 2015