Sunday, November 01, 2009

Edgar Sheffield Brightman and the finite god


Bosphorus Bridge, Istanbul, Turkey

Europe on the left, Asia on the right.

This will be my first attempt at date publishing an article in the month after actually posting. So it is October 27 and I will place the date as November 1. Blogger only recently has allowed the dates of my articles to be moved ahead. I tried previously on several occasions.

This is good for me as I will have to go away to Arizona and California in November or December and I still want a consistent two postings per blog per month.

Edgar Sheffield Brightman (1884-1953) is a philosopher and theologian noted for believing in a finite God. Lavely (2007: 121). John H. Lavely (2007) explains that Brightman ‘carved out’ a concept of ‘theistic finitism.’ Lavely (2007: 121). Brightman within A Philosophy of Religion (1940) calls God the ‘finite-infinite controller of the given.’ Brightman (1940: 336). Lavely (2007: 122). He developed an original view on the finite God different than John Stuart Mill, William James (both discussed in earlier posts on this blog) and Alfred North Whitehead. His view features a shift from traditional theism, but this is not a rejection of the Christian faith from his perspective. He offers from this perspective, a true Christian expression within a more reasonable approach to traditional supernaturalism. Lavely (2007: 124). Doubts concerning concepts of God within Christian theism need to be contemplated and discussed. Brightman (1930: 9).

Brightman explains in The Problem of God (1930) the new concept of God has not confined the divine creative work to a single week, and God does not cease to produce and maintain newer life forms. Brightman (1930: 68). As there is scientific evolution and progression in the material realm, he reasons there can be expansion with God as in more far reaching goals and development for the physical realm than persons had previously realized. Brightman (1930: 68). He reasons that God is not fixed but is still growing and expanding. Brightman (1930: 70). He questions traditional concepts that God is a metaphysical unity that is perfectly at peace with self, as in no struggle, instead God may not be so separate from the physical world and the struggles that go with it. Brightman (1930: 94). Brightman reasons there are struggles within the divine being and God has genuine problems to deal with in the physical realm as a finite and limited God. Brightman (1930: 94). The expansion of God means he must lack some knowledge and power, and this view contradicts those within theology that place a strong emphasis on God’s sovereignty, as does Calvinism. Brightman (1930: 102).

According to Gordon Clark (1959) Brightman is also a noted empiricist and works out philosophy of religion along these lines. Clark (1959: 34). However, philosophical interpretations should be reasonably understood within human experience and should never be under the subordination of logic or empiricism. Every item of experience properly understood should point a person toward God and is evidence for the existence of God. Brightman (1930: 62). Persons were not to follow the logic of the rationalists, but a reasonable approach is to follow a set of empirical principles and concepts by which human beings organize their experience within the universe. Brightman subscribes to a view of ‘personalism’ as in the term referring to the ‘ultimate and irreducible unit of reality,’ and there exists no realities other than persons. Lavely (2007: 124). James Richmond (1999) notes it is the philosophical viewpoint which views human personality as the starting point, and this may include a personal God as a key to understanding the nature of the world. Richmond (1999: 443). Everything that is in existence, exists in the mind of a person, of some sort, on some level. Brightman (1958: 135). The concept of ‘person’ was a ‘concrete universal.’ Lavely (2007: 124). God was the uncreated creator of humanity, ‘the ground of all being’ and the one that sustains the universe. Lavely (2007: 124). God was also person. Personalism would include God’s creations and reality is a community of persons sustained by God, the Supreme Person. Lavely (2007: 124). The total view of human experience leads one to a belief in some sort of Supreme Being, who is also supremely good, beautiful and of reason. Brightman (1930: 63). Creation did not come ex nihilo from the hand of God, and matter is not something external from God. Lavely (2007: 124). Matter and the physical world is therefore not completely separate from God, and in a sense nature is a representation of the divine creator. God, in fact was capable of growth and can accomplish more within reality than he has presently.

Lavely reasons that Brightman’s view on omnipotence is ‘ambiguous’ and is difficult to explain within his overall description and understanding of God. Lavely (2007: 132). This is a reasonable point. Omnipotence may literally describe the quality of everything to God, in other words God is omnipotent, not in a traditional sense but rather God has all the power there is, and all the power that is available. Lavely (2007: 132). God is omnitemporal as opposed to unchanging. God is all-powerful in a sense, only within the finite realm and not beyond it, and God can also change and expand within that realm. God is ‘creative, supreme, and personal’ yet is limited and there are experiences which are eternally existent which he does not create. Nevertheless, God can control the experiences that he did not create. Any understanding of God as omnipotent would be ‘derived predominantly from abstract thought’ as the view and theory cannot be based on experience alone, although humanity does experience the power of God.

I view the finite God as logically possible but would still leave the need for the infinite first cause. Ultimately I reason that even if human beings were created by a finite God, the ultimate first cause is the one that human beings should ultimately appeal to as this being could overrule the lesser deity. I would make any appeal for everlasting life to the most powerful good being in existence.

Brightman's finite god is logically possible.

A finite god is not Biblical. Otto Weber suggests God has unlimited capacity and unrestricted will. Weber (1955)(1981: 440). God is unrestricted in what he determines within self and outside of self. Presbyterian theologian John M. Frame admits the term omnipotence is not in Scripture, but reasons the concept is Biblical. He deduces that based on the Bible, it is impossible for anything to occur outside of what God has willed to happen. Frame (2002: 518). Also Weber (1955)(1981: 440).

Genesis 1 begins with God that existed prior to his material creation. He therefore has power over finite creation and in that sense, at least it can be reasoned, is omnipotent and infinite.

It can be reasoned God existed prior to the creation of finite angelic creatures, and once again can be reasoned as omnipotent and infinite.

Brightman’s god is hyper-speculative.

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD (1930) The Problem of God, New York, The Abingdon Press.

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD (1940) A Philosophy of Religion, New York, Prentice-Hall.

BRIGHTMAN, EDGAR SHEFFIELD (1958) Person and Reality, New York, Ronald Press.

CLARK, GORDON C. (1959) ‘Special Divine Revelation as Rational’, in Carl F.H. Henry (ed.), Revelation and the Bible: Contemporary Evangelical Thought, London, The Tyndale Press.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.

LAVELY, JOHN H. (2007) ‘Good-and Evil and Finite-Infinite God’, in The Boston Personalist Tradition in Philosophy, Social Ethics, and Theology, Macon, Georgia, Macon University Press.

RICHMOND, JAMES (1999) ‘Personalism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology. Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

WEBER, OTTO (1955)(1981) Foundations of Dogmatics,Volumes 1 and 2, Translated and annotated by Darrell L. Guder, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Here is an article somewhat related to this one from satire and theology:

atheistic praxis and other