Siduhe River Bridge, Yesanguanzhen, Hubei, China (HighestBridges.com)
September 24, 2011
A. Plantinga’s Free Will Defence
Incompatibilism
Plantinga, like Augustine,[1] is assuming a form of incompatibilism with his free will defence.[2] Augustine assumes God cannot be blamed for creating free creatures that have a choice to follow temporal or eternal laws, and then choose to disobey God by following temporal laws leading to evil.[3] Plantinga believes, for human beings to have significant freedom they must be able to commit or refrain from actions without the interference of any cause, including God.[4] So Plantinga did not see the concept in terms of laws but,[5] like Augustine, he saw the need for human beings to commit, or refrain from committing, actions in order to have the possibility to perform right or wrong actions that are in line with God's original intentions in creation.[6] Plantinga notes that an action is only morally significant when it can be understood whether an action is right or wrong, and this requires significant freedom in the area of thought.[7]
To Plantinga, God is not to blame for evil because no antecedent conditions or laws from an outside force, including God, can coerce, force or simultaneously determine human actions.[8] If this is done, significant freedom cannot exist.[9] Since this is the case,[10] the fact that God is omnipotent does not mean it is possible for God to create significantly free beings without at least the potential for rebellion.[11] Augustine states no true human goodness can be performed except by a free choice of the human will.[12] Plantinga concludes in a similar fashion significant free will is required for humanity because a world containing significantly free creatures that perform more good actions than evil ones, is more valuable to God than a world containing no free creatures.[13]
Definition of Plantinga’s Defence
Plantinga postulates since a world containing significantly free creatures where good outweighs evil is more valuable than a world with automatons or robots,[14] it is logically possible and plausible God could not have created free creatures and, at the same time, guarantee they would only commit right actions.[15] If God had done that, he would have eliminated the significant freedom within these creatures, and they would not be acting freely.[16] This idea is in line with Augustine’s view that a human being cannot act rightly unless he/she wills to do so.[17] Augustine thought if God had created creatures that only did right actions, then these creatures would not have the option to commit wrong actions against God’s will.[18] Thus their obedience to God would be meaningless and not truly righteous or, to Augustine, worthy of membership in the Kingdom of God.[19]
Plantinga believes it apparent some of the creatures God has created make wrong decisions and commit moral evil.[20] Sadly human freedom was misused.[21] To Plantinga, the fact this occurs, and free creatures sometimes do wrong actions,[22] is not to be counted against God, his omnipotence or his goodness.[23] God could only have avoided the possibility of moral evil by removing the possibility of moral good, and by removing significant freedom from the creatures.[24]
Plantinga speculates the problem of evil is unfortunate but worthwhile because it is possibly the only way God could create truly good creatures.[25] Without the use of significant freedom, creatures could not choose to be morally good and thus could not please God.[26]
Plantinga speculates the problem of evil is unfortunate but worthwhile because it is possibly the only way God could create truly good creatures.[25] Without the use of significant freedom, creatures could not choose to be morally good and thus could not please God.[26]
Antony Flew’s Objection
Plantinga, living some fifteen hundred years after Augustine, has a greater number of critics of free will approaches to deal with. Plantinga has dealt with Antony Flew’s atheistic objection,[27] but the criticism of Flew could be equally applied to Plantinga’s or Augustine’s approach.[28] Flew’s article from 1955 ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’ in New Essays within Philosophical Theology states it is reasonable God could have created free creatures who are free to do what is right or wrong, but are causally determined by God to do only what is right.[29] Persons could be constituted to always act uprightly.[30] Feinberg notes that for Flew, unconstrained determined free will is an option instead of incompatibilist free will.[31] Plantinga suggests Flew’s objection is utterly impossible,[32] and it is implausible for Flew to suppose God could make free creatures, and then cause and guarantee these persons only do what was right at all times.[33]
Andrew Eshleman (1997) in his article ‘Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence’ explains Flew’s arguments against free will incompatibilism[34] have merit, but it is not true that belief in God hangs in the balance.[35] In other words, even if Flew’s theory is true, atheism is not necessarily true by default.[36] Eshleman notes that if Flew is correct, the free will defence simply needs to become more robust.[37] It seems sensible there is room for greater depth with free will approaches,[38] particularly in light of the incompatibilism, compatibilism debate. I agree with Eshleman[39] that rejecting incompatibilism for compatibilism does not mean one should logically hold to atheism.
If Flew’s theory is correct, it would simply disprove most incompatibilist free will approaches;[40] however, there would still be compatibilist theodicy approaches to review before totally disregarding theism, not to overlook other types of theistic theodicy.[41] Plantinga’s criticism of Flew seems plausible,[42] but if Flew is stating that God with the use of soft determinism[43] can create people in a way they always act freely without being forced or coerced, then I view his understanding as tenable.[44] God could seemingly create beings that freely always did what was right,[45] but if by causally determining people to do what is right Flew’s system requires God to use force or coercion, then clearly human actions will not have been done freely. Flew’s objection is seemingly outright contradiction if he uses hard determinism,[46] which would see God as the only cause of human actions.[47] His atheistic determinism would not be in line with much of theistic compatibilism,[48] which would view God as the cause of circumstances and events by which the human will would be determined, but without compulsion.[49] Flew (1983)(1996) within his view, does not grant that God is guiding humanity.[50] On the contrary, he reasons, the idea of God’s divine work cannot be demonstrated in any convincing way and is meaningless.[51] He states concepts such as God having a plan, or God having created the world,[52] are mere assertions that are unlikely to succeed in becoming orthodox or effective because they cannot be proven empirically true or false.[53] Flew’s concept which has God determining no human beings commit a wrong act at any time,[54] is not reasonable according to Plantinga;[55] however, my objection to Flew would come if he uses a form of hard determinism[56] and yet claims human beings would still act freely.[57] This seemingly would require God to have human beings commit actions without the use of any type of free will.[58]
Michael Peterson supports Plantinga’s view against Flew’s compatibilism.[59] Peterson states Flew’s concept produces an illogical, impossible state of affairs, which is not reasonable.[60] If Plantinga and Peterson are correct, then Flew’s compatibilism is not really compatibilism at all, but simply hard determinism.[61] Flew’s view would be a nonsensical[62] equivalent of stating that God can have people non-freely, freely do what he wants them to, avoiding wrong actions.
J. L. Mackie and the Best Possible World Objection
The next objection Plantinga deals with is Mackie’s atheistic compatibilism[63] which, in part, assumes a perfectly good God[64] should have created, if he exists, a best possible world.[65] Leibniz believes God had an infinite number of worlds to choose from to create, and chose the best possible world.[66] Mackie’s ‘Evil and Omnipotence’ in Mind (1971) removes the possibility of hard determinism and postulates God could have made free creatures that only do what is right.[67] They do not have to be determined because God could have made people in a way they freely always chose what was right[68] even though, unlike Flew’s determinism,[69] wrong actions would be a technical possibility.[70] Plantinga admits it is logically possible, in a broad sense, there could be a world containing creatures that only do what is right.[71] Plantinga explains and rejects Mackie’s concept of possible worlds and does this with two main objections.[72] First, no matter how wonderful a world appears to be, no matter how many incredibly happy people there are, it is always possible there is an even better world containing more people who are even happier.[73] Plantinga’s reasoning appears sound as any finite world God would create could always be better.[74] Only an infinite world would be the best possible world, and it is debatable and unlikely God could create an infinite world. The fact that a world is created means it is not infinitely old or eternal, and so this would seemingly make the concept of a created infinite world untenable.
Plantinga’s second objection to Mackie’s best possible world idea concerns the concept of human free choice.[75] Plantinga describes Paul (1) accepting an offer, or (2) rejecting an offer.[76] Whichever choice Paul makes, either (1) or (2), God would not be able to actualize that world.[77] If Paul would make a wrong choice at any point, the problem of evil would occur, and the world would no longer be the best possible as Mackie describes.[78] To Plantinga, the result of God creating significantly free creatures is that their decisions did impact which type of world God created, and how much evil it would contain.[79] God’s omnipotence, to Plantinga, could not guarantee a best possible world free from evil, because there is always a possibility of human decisions that are contrary to what God would have desired.[80] Since significantly free creatures exist, it is never up to God alone in regard to which world is actualized.[81]
Augustine, like Plantinga, seemingly did assume free creatures will eventually make one wrong decision, this making Mackie’s idea that human beings could always freely choose the right seem untenable to these free will proponents.[82] At the same time, both Augustine and Plantinga would reject Mackie’s notion that if God is understood and accepted, as in traditional Christian theism, he should have created a best possible world filled with perfect creatures that never do wrong actions,[83] and because God did not do this atheism would be the preferred philosophy to adopt. Both free will advocates have stated that significantly free creatures by definition could not be guaranteed by God to avoid wrong actions,[84] and thus when wrong actions occur it is because of the human abuse of free will only.[85] God is not to be blamed for creating a good thing, that being free will, which is willfully turned towards something evil by his human creation.[86]
[1] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33).
BARNHART, J.E. (1977) ‘Theodicy and the Free Will Defence: Response to Plantinga and Flew’, Abstract in Religious Studies, 13, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BEEBE, JAMES R. (2006) ‘The Logical Problem of Evil’, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Buffalo, University at Buffalo.
ESHLEMAN, ANDREW (1997) ‘Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence’, in Religious Studies, Volume 33, pp. 267-286. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
HOWARD-SNYDER, DANIEL AND JOHN O’LEARY-HAWTHORNE (1998) ‘Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 44, Number 1, August, Springer, Netherlands, Publisher International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers.
MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982) Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
[2] Plantinga (1982)(166-167). Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 1). J.E. Barnhart mentions that even as Plantinga is from a Reformed tradition, he does not write a Calvinistic theodicy. Barnhart (1977: 2). In my view, Plantinga’s presentation is not Reformed in a classic sense, but has more in common with modern evangelical free will perspectives. I reason this is demonstrated with questionnaire results.
[3] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33).
[5] Plantinga took a more philosophical perspective.
[6] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 29-30).
[7] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 29-30).
[8] Plantinga (1982: 166-167).
[9] Plantinga (1982: 166-167).
[10] Plantinga (1982: 166-167).
[11] Plantinga (1982: 167). Moral evil must exist in order for moral good to exist. LaFollette (1980: 1)
[12] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 78).
[14] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).
[15] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Significant incompatibilist freedom requires that there are no prior/antecedent conditions that an action will or will not be performed. Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 3).
[17] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).
[18] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30).
[19] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 78).
[20] Plantinga (1982: 167).
[26] Plantinga (1982: 167). Without significant human freedom, God would remove the possibility of moral good. Howard-Snyder and O’Leary-Hawthorne (1998: 3).
[27] Geivett notes Flew questions the existence of an infinitely good God and his divine omnipotence in light of the problem of evil. Geivett (1993: 9).
[28] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31).
[29] Flew (1955: 150-153). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31). Human nature is somewhat determined in order that freedom does not lead to random actions. Geivett (1993: 189).
[30] Geivett (1993: 159).
[31] Feinberg (1994: 61). Flew holds to a type of determinism, as a human being is only free within certain parameters. Geivett (1993: 189).
[32] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[33] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32). The view being God could guarantee persons always act freely and rightly. Geivett (1993: 189).
[34] Flew (1955: 150-153).
[35] Eshleman (1997: 286). There are compatibilistic sovereignty theodicy approaches in existence, such as Feinberg’s presentation.
[36] Eshleman (1997: 286).
[37] Eshleman (1997: 286).
[38] Eshleman (1997: 286).
[39] Eshleman (1997: 286).
[40] This would make Plantinga’s free will approach very likely untrue.
[41] Besides sovereignty approaches, there are also soul making perspectives like that of John Hick. I also acknowledge there are non-Christian attempts at theodicy.
[42] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[43] Pojman (1996: 256).
[44] There have been intellectual attempts to understand how determinism may work with human free will. Blackburn (1996: 102). This is a reasonable intellectual pursuit.
[45] Flew (1955: 150-153).
[46] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[47] Pojman (1996: 256). Therefore denying the possibility of a human secondary cause in human actions.
[48] Or most Reformed perspectives which use compatibilism.
[49] Pojman (1996: 256).
[50] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).
[51] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).
[52] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).
[53] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).
[54] Flew (1955: 150-153).
[55] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31-32).
[56] Pojman (1996: 256).
[57] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31-32).
[58] Peterson (1982: 104).
[59] Peterson (1982: 104).
[60] Peterson (1982: 104).
[61] Peterson (1982: 104). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[62] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[63] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-34).
[67] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).
[69] Flew (1955: 150-153). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 31).
[70] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).
[71] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32).
[72] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-64).
[73] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).
[74] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34).
[76] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 40-42). There are possible worlds that God cannot actualize. LaFollette (1980: 3).
[77] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).
[78] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 42).
[79] Plantinga (1982: 180-181). Therefore, for Plantinga some worlds cannot be actualized. LaFollette (1980: 4).
[81] Geivett (1993: 196).
[82] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3).
[83] Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).
[84] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).
[85] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 189).
[86] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). Plantinga (1982: 170-171). The free will theist that reasons evil is adequately explained is left with the religious problem of individual suffering, according to LaFollette. LaFollette (1980: 1).
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
BARNHART, J.E. (1977) ‘Theodicy and the Free Will Defence: Response to Plantinga and Flew’, Abstract in Religious Studies, 13, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
BEEBE, JAMES R. (2006) ‘The Logical Problem of Evil’, in The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Buffalo, University at Buffalo.
ESHLEMAN, ANDREW (1997) ‘Alternative Possibilities and the Free Will Defence’, in Religious Studies, Volume 33, pp. 267-286. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
HOWARD-SNYDER, DANIEL AND JOHN O’LEARY-HAWTHORNE (1998) ‘Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Volume 44, Number 1, August, Springer, Netherlands, Publisher International Journal for Philosophy of Religion.
LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers.
MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982) Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.
PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
Baluarte Bridge,Puente Baluarte, El Palmito, Sinaloa, Mexico (HighestBridges.com)
Millau Viaduct, Viaduc Millau, Midi-Pyrénées, France (HighestBridges.com)
Russ,
ReplyDeleteMade a comment, it seemed to disappear, so I will make it again and hope you don't get it twice, which would be redundant.
Your posts always make my mind think, which is what a good teacher should do.
Now I will mull over these arguments.
Larry
Thank you, Larry.
ReplyDeleteI hope you and family are well.
Yes a topic to ponder on.
I cannot believe that the top universities are worth several billions of dollars, who would have thought??
ReplyDelete-Money & Mind-
Operation Repo...I wonder how strong Matt is?? He could be in the WWE!
ReplyDelete-Boy Blunder-
'Anonymous said...
ReplyDeleteI cannot believe that the top universities are worth several billions of dollars, who would have thought??
-Money & Mind-'
When we took a canal tour of Cambridge University in 1995 the tour guide informed us that Cambridge owned large parts of Manhattan.
'Anonymous said...
ReplyDeleteOperation Repo...I wonder how strong Matt is?? He could be in the WWE!
-Boy Blunder-'
Both are theatrical...
Through Birmingham by canal.
ReplyDeleteThe last section (from about the 7 minute mark to the end) looks similar to a memorable Birmingham canal tour with commmentary undertaken by myself and the blogmeister back in 1995.
The guide back in 1995 was a 'working class bloke' and a very good guide. His tour was one of the highlights of the trip. I would like to take his tour again.
ReplyDeleteC'mon Lou, that's your special truck,
ReplyDeleteget in there and fight for it, don't let it get squished!
-Repo Recked-
No worries it is all scripted.
ReplyDeleteThe God Delusion Debate (Dawkins-Lennox)
ReplyDeleteMr. Jenkins,
ReplyDeleteThank you for the information.:)
Happy Sunday
Thanks a lot for your comments and for wishing me luck with my test, I hope it'll go well :)
ReplyDeleteYou seem to be a very wise man for the things that you write about...
Ari.
Welcome. I followed your blog, and I will keep an eye on it, nice to meet you, Ariadne.
ReplyDeleteRuss:)
The Land Of Israel (13 min video)
ReplyDeleteThanks, Jeff.
ReplyDeleteI will post on Facebook. Not what I would consider a particularly academic presentation but still interesting.
Happy Canadian Thanksgiving.
Just looking at some of those long bridges makes me feel woozy.
ReplyDeleteInteresting video, Jeff.
I wonder where the "Arab spring" will lead? Tensions are rising between Iran and Saudi Arabia - maybe leading to another Sunni-Shi'ite war?
Differences between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims
ReplyDeleteSummary: Shi'ite Muslims believe in leadership by privilege of birth, and live in countries with violent histories, e.g. Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain. Sunni Muslims believe in elected leadership, and live in countries with more openness to western counties, e.g. Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia.
'Tensions are rising between Iran and Saudi Arabia -'
ReplyDeleteI saw this today on CNN Cable.
U.S. official: 'Multiple' sources strengthen case against Iran
'"Multiple" sources have corroborated the report about an alleged plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States, a scheme the administration is alleging is tied to Iran's military, a U.S. official told CNN Thursday.'
From:
ReplyDeleteIslam: BBC
'Introduction
Sunni and Shi'a
The words Sunni and Shi'a appear regularly in stories about the Muslim world but few people know what they really mean. Religion permeates every aspect of life in Muslim countries and understanding Sunni and Shi'a beliefs is important in understanding the modern Muslim world.
Introduction
The division between Sunnis and Shi'as is the largest and oldest in the history of Islam.
They both agree on the fundamentals of Islam and share the same Holy Book (The Qur'an), but there are differences mostly derived from their different historical experiences, political and social developments, as well as ethnic composition.
These differences originate from the question of who would succeed the Prophet Muhammad as leader of the emerging Muslim community after his death. To understand them, we need to know a bit about the Prophet's life and political and spiritual legacy.
The Prophet Muhammad
When the Prophet died in the early 7th century he left not only the religion of Islam but also a community of about one hundred thousand Muslims organised as an Islamic state on the Arabian Peninsula. It was the question of who should succeed the Prophet and lead the fledgling Islamic state that created the divide.
The larger group of Muslims chose Abu Bakr, a close Companion of the Prophet, as the Caliph (politico-social leader) and he was accepted as such by much of the community which saw the succession in political and not spiritual terms. However another smaller group, which also included some of the senior Companions, believed that the Prophet's son-in-law and cousin, Ali, should be Caliph. They understood that the Prophet had appointed him as the sole interpreter of his legacy, in both political and spiritual terms. In the end Abu Bakr was appointed First Caliph.
Leadership claims
Both Shi'as and Sunnis have good evidence to support their understanding of the succession. Sunnis argue that the Prophet chose Abu Bakr to lead the congregational prayers as he lay on his deathbed, thus suggesting that the Prophet was naming Abu Bakr as the next leader. The Shi'as' evidence is that Muhammad stood up in front of his Companions on the way back from his last Hajj, and proclaimed Ali the spiritual guide and master of all believers. Shi'a reports say he took Ali's hand and said that anyone who followed Muhammad should follow Ali.
Muslims who believe that Abu Bakr should have been the Prophet's successor have come to be known as Sunni Muslims. Those who believe Ali should have been the Prophet's successor are now known as Shi'a Muslims. It was only later that these terms came into use. Sunni means 'one who follows the Sunnah' (what the Prophet said, did, agreed to or condemned). Shi'a is a contraction of the phrase 'Shiat Ali', meaning 'partisans of Ali'.
The use of the word "successor" should not be confused to mean that those leaders that came after the Prophet Muhammad were also prophets - both Shi'a and Sunni agree that Muhammad was the final prophet.'
Brother practical joke
ReplyDeleteouch!
'Anonymous said...
ReplyDeleteBrother practical joke
ouch!'
I do not willingly put on blindfolds...
What a prank, I hope these brothers can laugh this one off together!
ReplyDelete-Bored Boomer-
'Anonymous said...
ReplyDeleteWhat a prank, I hope these brothers can laugh this one off together!
-Bored Boomer-'
I would not find it funny, if it happened to me, but I would not have put the blindfold on.
New tech:
ReplyDeleteMini Flying Sphere
It looks like a high-tech spying device.
ReplyDeleteHey Russ..
ReplyDeleteI watch operation repo occasionally but had never seen those episodes.. Matt went a little crazy on the car huh!! lol! Things can get pretty "heated" on that show..
Tammy :)
Hi Tammy,
ReplyDeleteI noticed on a recent episode that the red tow truck had a couple of Bible verses on it. Although staged supposedly from actual events the show is quite entertaining. The show can be hilarious.
Cheers.:)
There are many thoughts from some pretty big thinkers here on free will. Lots to take in and absorb...thank you. I like one of the points made in your article which states "a world containing significantly free creatures that perform more good actions than evil ones, is more valuable to God than a world containing no free creatures."
ReplyDeleteIt seems from this point of view that God values our freedom and our goodness.
-Blogger Frogger-
'Anonymous said...
ReplyDeleteThere are many thoughts from some pretty big thinkers here on free will. Lots to take in and absorb...thank you. I like one of the points made in your article which states "a world containing significantly free creatures that perform more good actions than evil ones, is more valuable to God than a world containing no free creatures."
It seems from this point of view that God values our freedom and our goodness.
-Blogger Frogger-'
Reasonable, but I do not take this as an endorsement of free will theodicy. Thanks.