John S. Feinberg Sovereignty Theodicy/Defence: Eight Ways God Could Eliminate Evil (PhD Edit)

John S. Feinberg Sovereignty Theodicy/Defence: Eight Ways God Could Eliminate Evil (PhD Edit)

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Thursday, November 03, 2011 article reformatted and revised slightly for an entry on academia.edu, Saturday, May 6, 2023 

From 

Saturday, September 19, 2020-PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

A. Feinberg’s Eight Ways God Could Eliminate Evil

Feinberg lists eight ways that God could possibly eliminate the problem of evil from his creation,[1] but he states they would all create greater problems for God and humanity, and contradict the three basic claims of his sovereignty approach, which are (1) contradicting other plans God had in place, (2) negating and contradicting claims God made in Scripture, (3) performing actions that human beings would neither desire nor require God to do. I should point out that although his ideas and explanations are reasonable there is similarity between his points and explanations for them. His approach can be criticized as being too repetitive. In my view, the work should have been shortened.

First, God could eliminate the problem of evil by annihilating humankind.[2] Feinberg points out that this would contradict God’s intention to create humanity.[3] It seems if God did possess foreknowledge to know that humanity would fall, it would make more sense for him to plan to restore at least some of humanity rather than destroy it, since he had bothered to create human beings in the first place.[4] Pinnock points that God created the world with significant free creatures, and sustains the world in a way not to negate its character and structure.[5] From this idea God would not now destroy what he already made within his plans.[6] Erickson writes that God plans to eventually eliminate evil from the culminated Kingdom of God which will not contain sin or evil of any kind.[7] From a Reformed, Calvinistic perspective for this Kingdom to be inhabited by human beings as God created them there is first a period of time, the duration only known by God, for which the problem of evil exists. To destroy humanity would also end all of God’s plans for a completed Kingdom of God.[8] Norman Geisler (1999) writes in his article on ‘The problem of evil’ that some critics have suggested it would have been better for God not to create a world or humanity at all.[9] A non-existent world without humanity would not have a human problem of evil,[10] and neither would a world where humanity was destroyed.[11] Geisler writes that one cannot compare something to nothing or a world to a non-world.[12] Therefore with Geisler’s idea, if God annihilated humanity it would not be possible to know whether or not things would be better because although there would not be a problem of evil, there also would not be a potential for human good.[13] Jürgen Moltmann reasons that metaphysical atheism sees an unjust and absurd world where the problem of evil is triumphant.[14] The atheist does not view God as showing favour to the world,[15] but views reality as one of nothingness.[16] Moltmann explains that philosophical arguments for the existence of God will not convince these atheists because the devil is a more plausible cause of this evil world than is God.[17] Motlmann’s explanation of metaphysical atheism could challenge Feinberg’s claim that God would not annihilate the world because God has good ultimate purposes to fulfill.[18] These complaints tie in with Griffin’s idea that the Calvinist God would be immoral or amoral if he existed because of the evil within creation.[19] The atheistic critic may claim there is no evidence that God, contrary to Feinberg’s notion, has eventual good plans for his creation,[20] but Moltmann writes Christ in his work on the cross shows that God’s being is in suffering and suffering is in God’s being.[21] The idea that God is love is demonstrated through Christ’s work on the cross.[22] Moltmann makes a fine point as ultimately if Feinberg’s claim concerning God’s future good plans make any sense, God must be shown within his creation to have acted in a positive loving way[23] to rid the creation of the problem of evil and the atoning work of Christ, and the resurrection is reasonable explanation of God’s plans.

Second, Feinberg postulates that God could eliminate all objects of desire.[24] This would pertain to all physical things, including the human body and perhaps the mind,[25] because Feinberg views these as things that people could desire.[26] He concludes this could only be done by destroying all of creation.[27] It is unlikely human beings that possess free will and do not have desires, could please God.[28] These persons would have a self-realization that they were individual entities, and without any desire to follow God they could only obey him in a mechanical instinctive way, which would not consist of sincere love or a sense of wanting to follow and be like God. Alfred R. Mele (1996) in ‘Extrinsic Desire’ explains that there are two types of human desire, and these seem applicable here.[29] The first would be extrinsic desire, which is a desire for something conducive for obtaining something else a person desires.[30] An example would be to desire to own personal possessions that would lead to happiness.[31] Possessions would be desired in order that the greater desire of happiness could be fulfilled.[32] The second would be intrinsic desires which were the ultimate desires that the fulfillment of extrinsic desires accomplished.[33] For example, the ultimate goal of happiness achieved by owning some nice possessions would be intrinsic desire.[34] Kreeft and Tacelli approach desires in a similar way as they state that human beings have innate desire for natural things such as food and drink,[35] and external desires such as sports cars and political office.[36] Kreeft and Tacelli’s innate desires concept would somewhat correspond to Mele’s intrinsic ones as these would be the inner most human desires.[37] Kreeft and Tacelli’s external desires would be similar to Mele’s extrinsic desires,[38] which would be secondary desires fulfilled in order to fulfill the deepest human desires.[39]

In regard to the Kingdom of God, both types of desires[40] may be needed in order for a person to please God. For example, if the intrinsic desire[41] of followers of God was to glorify God and have ultimate happiness, then an extrinsic desire,[42] such as wanting to study Scripture and learn more about God, would be required to take place. The most inner desires of human beings would not occur unless secondary desires, the objects of desire, also occurred.[43] Feinberg’s point that eliminating desires would contradict God’s plan for creating human beings[44] seemingly is reasonable as people would need to desire to please, follow and learn more about their creator to make their existence useful to him in a relationship context.[45] 

Third, Feinberg’s next option for having God eliminate moral evil would be to eliminate desires.[46] Since Feinberg assumes desires lead to choice,[47] he believes that if God prevented human desires, no moral evil could exist.[48] Additionally, Feinberg notes that without desires human beings would not have the will to acquire things essential for life, and the human race would eventually cease to exist.[49] This, of course, would have contradicted God’s plans.[50] If human desire was eliminated completely[51] an important aspect of human freedom would vanish, that being the potential human desire to freely follow God. It seems reasonable that humanity would have to desire to freely return love to their creator, as it would be questionable whether or not true love could exist merely instinctively and without desire. C.A. Campbell (1951)(1973) notes there is no good reason to contemplate that a human being would choose any other course than their strongest desire.[52] The strongest desire notion is simply a reflection of the person’s character.[53] If human beings did not have desires then it would be impossible within a Calvinist Reformed model for God, with the use of compatibilism, to mould and persuade a person in character in such a way that God would be the strongest desire.[54] Alexandre Kojeve (1969) provides his personal concepts within his work on consciousness and desire[55] as he explains that the very being of a person, the self-consciousness, implies and presupposes desire.[56] From this perspective a human being without desire would be unable to understand self[57] or God[58] and would, therefore, not fit within God’s plans to create rational loving creatures. A human being must be able to understand the concept of I in order to have an understanding of reality.[59] Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831)[60] states within Philosophy of the Mind (1807)(2006) that a self-possessed and healthy person has a consciousness of the surrounding world which includes the ability to desire.[61] Without a conscious understanding of reality,[62] and the ability to desire anything including God, I cannot see how a human being can be open to following God. Feinberg is likely correct that it would contradict God’s plans to create a loving humanity by eliminating desire.[63] 

Fourth, Feinberg postulates God could have made human beings in such a way that they had desires, but never immoral ones.[64] He thought that for God to minimize human desires in this way would be damaging human individuality[65] and creating people that were stereotypical of each other.[66] Pinnock explains that God has backed off from dominating his human creatures and has given them the ability to live as they choose.[67] God’s lack of dominance over humanity would seemingly allow for human individual thought.[68] Feinberg theorized that for God to create human beings with no possibility of moral evil due to desires,[69] they would have to quite likely be superhuman possessing great moral and intellectual ability to limit themselves to desires within God’s will,[70] or God would have to supernaturally prevent immoral desires from taking place.[71] Feinberg states that if God created superhumans they would not be the same human beings in existence and it would contradict God’s plans.[72] It seems apparent that if God would somehow create superhuman beings with greater intellectual and moral ability,[73] one would think they would need at least the degree of freedom that human beings currently have, and it appears, with Feinberg’s scenario to prohibit the problem of evil, they would need to be limited by God and would have less freedom than human beings as we know them.[74] Also, if these superhuman beings were given significant freedom, and they did rebel against God, perhaps their potential for evil could be even more severe than the potential for evil in our current situation because of the greater intellect.[75] 

J.L. Mackie (1955)(1996) was discussed primarily in Chapter Two as a counter to free will theodicy, but his comments can be applied here.[76] Mackie writes that God being omnipotent could surely make persons in a way that they always did what was good.[77] Plantinga as an incompatibilist disagrees with this idea.[78] Feinberg as a compatibilist does not think Plantinga defeats Mackie on this point,[79] but rather Plantinga merely points out the differences between incompatibilism and compatibilism.[80] If Feinberg sees it reasonable God could have made human beings in a way that they were significantly free and yet always committed right actions,[81] could not God have created human beings that were significantly free but always had right desires and not immoral ones?[82]

Feinberg would appear to somewhat concede this point as a possibility[83] and remains theologically consistent, but he reasons that God would have to constantly interrupt human lives to prevent wrong desires.[84] He seems to overlook the possibility God could simply make free creatures that would never desire to do wrong things.[85] Feinberg deduces that if wrong moral desires were prohibited by God the human life would consist of a constant changing in direction and course ad infinitum,[86] because God would have to be constantly preventing persons from having wrong desires and these people would not progress as creatures.[87] My deduction would be that God could have made human beings that had significant freedom and would not have wrong desires.[88] It could be reasoned though that hypothetical human beings in that scenario are not within God’s plans.[89] 

Calvin writes that God bends and directs the soul,[90] and therefore by implication the desires of some towards God.[91] Rather than eliminating wrong desires completely in all of humanity,[92] perhaps God prefers with the use of soft determinism to mould and persuade persons via the Holy Spirit.[93] Erwin W. Lutzer (2000) writes that God being omnipotent could have created perfect human beings that did not have the desire to sin.[94] He then goes on to state that clearly God with all his power certainly would not create a universe in which something might happen contrary to his plans.[95] It appears that God from a Reformed, Calvinistic model created human beings, even though he knew they would at times have wrong desires that would lead to wrong actions.[96] 

Fifth, for this point Feinberg attempts to separate desires from intentions, noting that intentions are actions fueled by those desires.[97] Feinberg states that God could eliminate human intentions; however, eliminating the intentions, or restricting them, would be just as problematic as God eliminating desires.[98] However, the objection could be raised once again that within a compatibilistic system significantly free beings could be made in order not to have wrong intentions.[99] Feinberg reasons that prohibiting human intentions would greatly limit human freedom[100] and a race that had no intentions would not commit significantly free actions of value to God.[101] Reichenbach explains that God cannot control human behaviour without taking away the human freedom he has originally provided.[102] For God to control human intentions would perhaps stymie the ability of human beings to function as God would like.[103] Feinberg’s concept of intentions is similar to what Calvin described as human impulse.[104] Human impulses to Calvin appeared to be fueled by desires and led to human actions.[105] Calvin noted God had to reform the impulses of those outside of Christ in order that they could begin to be compliant with the impulses of the spirit of God.[106] A reformation of human impulses and resulting actions would, to Calvin,[107] be an aspect of God’s solution to human evil. Calvin did not believe that God would eliminate human impulse, but rather God would have the impulse of a person he desired subject to the spirit of God.[108] 

Sixth, Feinberg notes that God could only allow people to will good things and not bad things.[109] Feinberg then points out that the restrictions on human freedom would, once again, work against God’s plan.[110] Some may question God’s goodness by not creating human beings with less freedom,[111] as according to Mackie, God could have formed some type of beings that obeyed him without committing any wrong actions.[112] These types of beings would possibly be more preferable than human beings as we know them, which cause the problem of evil.[113] Griffin explains the Calvinistic God, being omnipotent could have simply prevented human wickedness and evil in the first place.[114] I do not doubt that both Mackie and Griffin are correct that God could have created a world where some type of human beings were not evil,[115] but I doubt it was God’s will to create such beings.

In contrast, Thiessen from an incompatibilist position writes that God does not want to create automaton type beings with no choice in whether or not they would glorify God.[116] For Thiessen, humanity can only truly glorify God by choosing to do so while still having the opportunity to choose not to glorify God in disobedience.[117] This concept appears on the surface to be primarily in line with noted incompatibilism and free will approaches almost verbatim.[118] However, within a compatibilistic, type sovereignty approach, God cannot truly be glorified by the devotion of his creatures unless it is significantly and freely willed as a secondary cause by these persons.[119] For the compatibilist and those like-minded before the modern term was used,[120] true human devotion to God does not come through compulsion as Calvin admits,[121] stating that although he does not use the term free will in order to avoid confusion, he maintains that choice is free if opposed to coercion.[122] 

Compatibilist approaches would not view a human automaton[123] as being able to bring acceptable glory to God.[124] Christopher Miles Coope (2001) speculates that the Bible teaches the trustworthiness of God,[125] and human ideas of what goodness is could be faulty,[126] and thus God may be correct in how he is dealing with the problem of evil.[127] God as infinite, omnipotent and omniscient, could reasonably know how to properly deal with the problem of evil caused by his finite creations.[128] It is possible God understands the imperfect human beings that presently exist are more valuable creations than the hypothetical ones that would have never rebelled against him.[129] The development and ultimate restoration of a number of these imperfect human beings may be worth the problem of evil in God’s estimation.[130] 

Seventh, God could prohibit bodily movements that lead to immoral actions being committed.[131] This could be done by natural or supernatural means.[132] In other words, human beings would have built within their bodies the inability to do actions that lead to immorality,[133] or God could simply intervene supernaturally and prevent wrong actions from occurring.[134] Martin Luther writes, in his commentary on Romans, that the body through corruption has been changed from its original use so that it now dishonoured God.[135] He states that each human being is either under the control of a corrupt nature or God’s spirit.[136] Clearly to Luther, bodily movements that lead to immoral actions could only begin to be halted through God’s grace,[137] but Luther did not claim that this would be done immediately by God, and noted that a person needed to flee from sinful bodily movements through devout prayer.[138] 

The notions of Feinberg and Luther take a spiritual approach that strongly connects the mind and body in unity;[139] however, there are secular approaches with different perspectives from Reformed, Calvinistic thinking.[140] According to John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (1976) there is a debate within the scientific community whether or not human beings are wholly physical.[141] I readily admit that the existence of the human spirit is not empirically verifiable,[142] and its existence from a Christian perspective would primarily rely on Scripture.[143] Burr and Goldinger correctly point out if it can be scientifically demonstrated that human beings are nothing more than machines, then a view of persons having immaterial souls must be given up.[144] With this secular approach,[145] contrary to Reformed and Calvinistic thought,[146] there would be no spiritual way to overcome the body’s movements that lead to wrong actions. Richard Taylor (1969)(1976) writes that the idea of an immortal soul cannot be seen as necessarily false.[147] However, he reasons that if there is difficulty explaining how the body can do certain things,[148] it would be no less difficult explaining how a soul could do certain things.[149] This idea has merit since even if the idea of a human soul/spirit unity with a body is granted, bodily actions leading to wrong actions cannot be separated from the spiritual condition[150] that leads to these actions. Even if Feinberg is correct and God could prohibit wrong bodily actions and does not,[151] the mere prevention of bodily movement would be an indicator of deeper spiritual problems indicated.[152] Taylor is correct that the physical body is perhaps easier to understand than a hypothetical soul/spirit, and is certainly empirically easier to comprehend.[153] I do not deny that science and philosophy should look at solving the problem of evil on physical levels as well, with issues such as the cures for diseases.

Eighth, Feinberg notes that God could supernaturally prohibit wrong human actions.[154] This would greatly change life as it is known. This could cause fear in people not knowing if the acts they were about to commit or not, would be prohibited by God. Feinberg thought this could leave the world non-functional, and not a better world than the one in existence, and he deduces that if God did have to miraculously intervene to prohibit all human immorality, God would seem unwise. It would seem unwise God would create people that he had to constantly supernaturally forcefully determine to commit right actions,[155] and the value of these types of beings to God would be questionable. Kreeft and Tacelli note if God did not allow human beings the option to misuse their freedom, they would not be human but animal or machine[156] having less value than creatures that had the potential to be persuaded by God to follow him, and turn from wrong doing.[157] Again Griffin’s objection[158] is reasonable, as it must be considered why within the Reformed, Calvinistic system God did not create people in such a way that supernatural intervention would not be needed to prevent evil.[159] If God is omnipotent it remains within the realm of possibility that he could create human beings who were not like animals or machine,[160] but still did not commit evil actions. Feinberg’s redundant stock answer for this objection is that it would contradict God’s plans.[161] Feinberg explains that God could remove evil, but further problems would arise.[162] 

Feinberg concludes that God could not both create a utopia and, at the same time, human beings as they are presently in a good world without constraining persons.[163] However, some critics such as Bertrand Russell, would deny that God will ever bring about a utopia,[164] and would deny that the world is a just place presently.[165] Bertrand Russell (1957)(1976) states that since the universe often lacks justice presently there is no good scientific reason to believe that God would eventually bring about justice.[166] To Feinberg, if God had used any of the eight methods described, the world would not be as good as it is presently.[167] God in his sovereignty has dealt with his creation in the correct manner, including with the problem of evil.[168] There is within Feinberg’s theodicy the assumption that God has brought about a good, worthwhile world despite the problem of evil.[169] Feinberg, unlike Russell,[170] assumes that the world contains a level of goodness and justice that makes the idea of the Christian God as creator reasonable.[171]

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BURR, JOHN, R. AND MILTON GOLDINGER (1976) (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

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COOPE, CHRISTOPHER MILES (2001) ‘Good-bye to the Problem of Evil, Hello to the Problem of Veracity’, in Religious Studies, Volume 37, pp. 373-396. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

DAVIS, STEPHEN T. (1981)(ed.), Encountering Evil, Atlanta, John Knox Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FLEW, ANTONY (1955) ‘Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom’, in Antony Flew and A. MacIntrye (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology, London, SCM, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GRIFFIN, DAVID RAY (1976) God, Power, and Evil, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.

HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1807)(2006) Philosophy of the Mind, Translated by William Wallace, Munich, Hegel.Net.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HOUGHTON, JOHN (1995) The Search for God, Can Science Help?, Lion Publishing, Oxford.

KOJEVE, ALEXANDRE (1969) Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, New York, Basic Books.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1516)(1968) Commentary On The Epistle To The Romans, Translated by J.Theodore Mueller, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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[1] Feinberg (1994: 130).

[2] Feinberg (1994: 130).

[3] Feinberg (1994: 131). In light of the criticisms of Flew and Mackie, the critic could suggest that God need not annihilate humanity but could have simply created it differently or even now caused persons to act differently as in a far more moral fashion, more of the time.

[4] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[5] Pinnock (1986: 144).

[6] Pinnock (1986: 144).

[7] Mounce (1990: 368-397). Erickson (1994: 1228). Phillips rejects this idea noting that ‘Those who are crushed by life’s afflictions are not going to enter a state where all this is to be put right.’ Phillips (2005: 273).

[8] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[9] Geisler (1999: 2).

[10] Geisler (1999: 2).

[11] Geisler (1999: 2).

[12] Geisler (1999: 2).

[13] Geisler (1999: 2).

[14] Moltmann (1993: 219-220). Suffering is not undone. Phillips (2005: 273).

[15] Moltmann (1993: 219-220). Phillips (2005: 273).

[16] Moltmann (1993: 219-220).

[17] Moltmann (1993: 220-221). And because these arguments are not empirically based. Flew (1983)(1996: 92).

[18] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[19] Griffin (1976: 116-130).

[20] Flew (1983)(1996: 92).

[21] Moltmann (1993: 227).

[22] Moltmann (1993: 227).

[23] Moltmann (1993: 227).

[24] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[25] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[26] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[27] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[28] The assumption being that God desires a passionate love from his creation.

[29] Mele (1996: 259).

[30] Mele (1996: 259).

[31] Mele (1996: 259).

[32] Mele (1996: 259).

[33] Mele (1996: 259).

[34] Mele (1996: 259).

[35] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 78).

[36] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 78).

[37] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 78).

[38] Mele (1996: 259).

[39] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 78).

[40] Mele (1996: 259).

[41] Mele (1996: 259).

[42] Mele (1996: 259).

[43] Mele (1996: 259). Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 78).

[44] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[45] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[46] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[47] Feinberg (1994: 132). As discussed there is a debate on how human consciousness works in regard to desires. Ordunez, Badillo, and Peon (2008: 2). Houghton (1995: 210). Feinberg’s views here are quite speculative in regard to desires in light of scientific and philosophical research.

[48] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[49] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[50] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[51] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[52] Campbell (1951)(1973: 79).

[53] Campbell (1951)(1973: 79).

[54] Without desire a human being could be determined with hard determinism to have certain thoughts and commit certain actions.

[55] Kojeve (1969: 1).

[56] Kojeve (1969: 1).

[57] Kojeve (1969: 1).

[58] Kojeve (1969: 1).

[59] Kojeve (1969: 1).

[60] Blackburn (1996: 168).

[61] Hegel (1807)(2006: 408).

[62] Hegel (1807)(2006: 408).

[63] Feinberg (1994: 132). Although God cannot reasonably eliminate significant desires and maintain significantly free creatures, it still is a reasonable question why at times does not God alter a human desire to prevent a particular evil from taking place. Phillips suggests that God could curtail certain human freedoms at times when it is obviously needed. Phillips (2005: 106). I reason that God does do as Phillip’s suggests through circumstances often, but this does not fully explain situations where human evil is allowed to greatly flourish.

[64] Feinberg (1994; 132).

[65] Feinberg (1994; 132).

[66] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[67] Pinnock (1986: 151).

[68] Pinnock (1986: 151). This relates to the concept of epistemic distance that will be discussed in Chapter Four. Hick in Davis (2001: 48). Phillips (2005: 164).

[69] Feinberg (1994: 132-133).

[70] Feinberg (1994: 132-133).

[71] Feinberg (1994: 132-133).

[72] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[73] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[74] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[75] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[76] Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[77] Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-251). Or as noted significantly free human beings as exist presently can be prohibited from committing certain evil acts. Phillips (2005: 106). Human desires can fully exist but be stymied by God and evil acts not allowed to occur.

[78] Plantinga (1982: 189).

[79] Feinberg (1994: 64-65).

[80] Feinberg (1994: 64-65).

[81] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[82] Feinberg (1994: 133). Flew and Mackie too could rightly raise this objection based on their views. Flew (1955: 150-153). Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253).

[83] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[84] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[85] This would be consistent with compatibilism.

[86] This term is from the Latin, meaning to infinity. Blackburn (1996: 7).

[87] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[88] They could be determined through nature and God’s Holy Spirit not to ever sin and become corrupted in nature.

[89] Feinberg (1994: 130).

[90] Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).

[91] Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).

[92] Feinberg (1994: 132).

[93] Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).

[94] Lutzer (2000: 143).

[95] Lutzer (2000: 144).

[96] Lutzer (2000: 144).

[97] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[98] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[99] In light of Flew and Mackie’s compatibilistic criticisms discussed Flew (1955: 150-153) Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-253). I would reason that God could create significantly free human beings with only good intentions, in the same way persons could be formed to only have good desires and do good actions. God knowingly created beings that he knew would freely fall and planned to save some through the atoning and resurrection work of Christ. Feinberg’s lack of clarity concerning the issues of desire and intentions are a weakness with his theodicy, although not devastating to his primary concepts in regard to presenting a logical and reasonable sovereignty theodicy.

[100] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[101] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[102] Reichenbach (1986: 105).

[103] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[104] Calvin (1543)(1996: 225).

[105] Calvin (1543)(1996: 225).

[106] Calvin (1543)(1996: 225).

[107] Calvin (1543)(1996: 225).

[108] Calvin (1543)(1996: 225).

[109] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[110] Feinberg (1994: 133). Feinberg’s arguments in my view become somewhat redundant at this point.

[111] Or as noted, limiting human freedom at certain key points to avoid horrendous evil. Phillips (2005: 106).

[112] Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-251).

[113] Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-251).

[114] Griffin (1976: 122).

[115] Griffin (1976: 122). Mackie (1955)(1996: 250-251).

[116] Thiessen (1956: 248).

[117] Thiessen (1956: 248).

[118] Geisler (1986: 76-77).

[119] Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

[120] Such as John Calvin and many within the Reformed camp.

[121] Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

[122] Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

[123] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Thiessen (1956: 248).

[124] Although views that espouse hard determinism may see the good actions of non-significantly free human creatures as pleasing to God. I disagree reasoning God made human beings and likely angelic beings to have significant freedom in order to glorify God. Animals, for example, may still to a lesser degree glorify God even without the use of significant freedom within God’s plans for these creatures.

[125] Coope (2001: 385).

[126] Coope (2001: 385).

[127] Coope (2001: 385).

[128] Coope (2001: 385).

[129] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[130] Feinberg (1994: 131).

[131] Feinberg (1994: 133-134).

[132] Feinberg (1994: 133-134).

[133] Feinberg (1994: 133-134).

[134] Feinberg (1994: 133-134).

[135] Luther (1516)(1968: 31).

[136] Luther (1516)(1968: 31).

[137] Luther (1516)(1968: 31).

[138] Luther (1516)(1968: 31).

[139] Feinberg (1994: 133-134). Luther (1516)(1968: 31).

[140] As can be seen with the review of consciousness within scientific and philosophical literature there is a question concerning whether a non-physical human consciousness is required. Novin (2004: 1-2).

[141] Burr and Goldinger (1976: 319).

[142] Novin (2004: 1-2). Burr and Goldinger (1976: 319).

[143] Thiessen (1956: 227).

[144] Burr and Goldinger (1976: 319).

[145] Burr and Goldinger (1976: 319).

[146] Feinberg (1994: 133-134). Luther (1516)(1968: 31).

[147] Taylor (1969)(1976: 334-336).

[148] Taylor (1969)(1976: 334-336).

[149] Taylor (1969)(1976: 334-336).

[150] That of assumed corruption and imperfection. Luther (1516)(1968: 31). Calvin (1543)(1996: 26). Augustine (426)(1958: 254-255).

[151] Feinberg (1994: 133).

[152] Luther (1516)(1968: 31). Calvin (1543)(1996: 26). Augustine (426)(1958: 254-255).

[153] Taylor (1969)(1976: 336).

[154] Feinberg (1994: 134).

[155] Feinberg (1994: 135).

[156] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 138).

[157] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 138). This assumes incompatibilism but it is true that human beings would be vastly different with significantly less freedom due to divine determining factors.

[158] Griffin (1976: 122).

[159] Griffin (1976: 122).

[160] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 138).

[161] Feinberg (1994: 136).

[162] Feinberg (1994: 136).

[163] Feinberg (1994: 136).

[164] Russell (1957)(1976: 120).

[165] Russell (1957)(1976: 120).

[166] Russell (1957)(1976: 120).

[167] Feinberg (1994: 136).

[168] Feinberg (1994: 136). Augustine, Plantinga and Hick as well would reason God was good in these dealings. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Plantinga (1982: 167). Hick (1970: 217).

[169] Feinberg (1994: 136).

[170] Russell (1957)(1976: 120).

[171] Feinberg (1994: 136).

---

B. Book Under review: HASKER, WILLIAM (2008) The Triumph of God over Evil, Downers Grover, IVP Academic.

Barcelona, Bages, Spain (Google Images)

IVP asked me to review this text.

References from Philosopher William Hasker I used in my Wales PhD:

A useful philosophical source.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Preface

The book combines a philosophical approach with a theological response to the problem of evil and theodicy. (p. 9-10). God’s triumph over evil is also discussed in the text as very important. (p. 9-10). This is the similar approach taken by me in my Wales’ MPhil and PhD work and my Doctorate was titled ‘Theodicy and Practical Theology’.

Saturday, September 19, 2020-PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Hasker explains the difference between theodicy and defence (p. 10) which was also discussed by Plantinga and Feinberg and mentioned in my Doctorate. I like Hasker, am willing to use the word Theodicy. From my PhD:

‘Feinberg described his sovereignty approach as a defence and not a theodicy. Like Plantinga and the free will defence, Feinberg with his sovereignty approach prefers the term defence to describe his undertaking because it is a less dogmatic term than is theodicy. However, Feinberg’s defence, in my mind, would be no more speculative if he wrote a theodicy and it seems fair and scholarly to review this defence under the umbrella of sovereignty theodicy.'

Hasker prefers open theism to divine determinism. (p. 12). Here we differ as although I am not a hard determinist, I am a soft-determinist/compatibilist within the Reformed position.

Open theism

Hasker writes that according to classical theism, a perfect divine being must be unchangeable. (p. 27). This being is outside of time and space as well. (p. 27). God is also considered impassible as in his creatures cannot affect him in any way. (p. 27). However, God knows everything about these creatures. (p. 27). Open theism rejects these ideas (p. 27) even while accepting the idea that God is supremely perfect in power, understanding and goodness. (p. 27). God is considered temporal, not timeless, God is considered everlasting (p. 27). Frankly, I see no good compelling Biblical, theological or philosophical reason to see God as everlasting as opposed to eternal. In Genesis 1, he exists before the beginning of physical matter. What can be deduced as existing before that? Spiritual created angelic beings? These too would have been created by God and would be finite. This would leave God as the first-cause and eternal (no beginning no end) not everlasting (a beginning, no end).

Although, I do not reason that God’s essential nature ever changes, so God is immutable, I do not reason God is impassible, at least in any hard sense. God responds to and considers the prayers of his people, and hears all prayers. From a Biblical compatibilistic perspective he can will that persons pray to him in relationship and he can then act when these persons pray. So, I can agree at least somewhat with Hasker that God has shown his sympathy to human beings through the incarnation which in my mind would seem to negate against a theology of some type of hard impassibility. God is not impassible in any way that would make God changeable in basic nature and substance, however.

Hasker states that open theists refuse to believe that God’s goodness is radically different than human goodness. (p. 29). Every finite human being outside of Christ has been tainted by sin. Even if human beings were of perfect finite moral goodness, God being infinite would still have perfect infinite moral goodness. Therefore there is always the possibility he can have inside knowledge and make decisions based on this extra knowledge and even moral superiority.

Hasker also holds to libertarian incompatibilist free will (p. 29), which I have of course disagreed with on my websites, especially this one on many posts and in my PhD and MPhil.

John Roth

Hasker deals with the work of John K. Roth and his theodicy of protest (pages 30-41). A discussion of theodicy in light of the Holocaust.

I also discussed Roth's theodicy work in my PhD.

Please see website archives.

Also 

Saturday, September 19, 2020-PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD 

D. Z. Phillips

Hasker mentions Phillips' objections to God's omnipotence (p. 43), which I dealt with here.

Please see archives

Also

Saturday, September 19, 2020-PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD 

Hasker explains the theory of middle knowledge (pages 65-69). Blackburn writes it is God's way of knowing about future events, reconciling his present knowledge of them and allowing the real possibility of open free choices for creatures involved. A person is given the grace to freely believe or reject something as opposed to being determined to believe or reject something. Blackburn (1996: 343). Hasker states that many philosophers would not find 'this reasoning compelling' (pages 67). Not surprising from my compatibilistic perspective. I have dealt with middle knowledge in archives:

Archived posts sorted by relevance for query middle knowledge

Natural Evil

This is discussed in the Chapter 'Is The Word Cruel'? Hasker points out this evil is not a result of moral human fault. (p. 101). Naturals evil from my archives:

Arhived posts sorted by relevance for query natural evils

Compatibilism

On page 151, Hasker claims that a compatibilistic view on free will combined with an absolute view on divine sovereignty and predestination means God is pleased with the world as is and would not alter it in any respect. He states the conclusion is inescapable. He then hopes those who hold to divine determinism will be persuaded by this 'direct assault'. (p. 151).

Here there is some philosophical disagreement. God has willed and caused the world as it is. Yes. God is pleased with it in the sense of fulfilling plan and purpose. Yes. However, this world does include the problem of evil and sin, which is clearly contrary to the culminated Kingdom of God (Revelation 21-22 as key example).It would be very wrong to imply or indicate that God is pleased with it, as in a sense of perfect will simply because he has willed and caused it as it is presently. Holding to compatibilism does allow God to develop his creatures through the problem of evil which is what occurs. John Calvin dealt with issues concerning the divine motives of God willing evils in his texts the Institutes and The Bondage and Liberation of The Will.When God would will evils for the greater good it would please him in a sense, yes and it would be the world God desires at that point, but it is part of a process, as God's motives remain pure and he works for the betterment of the believer in the good (Romans 8: 28-30) and his eventual culminated Kingdom.

I think the Biblical story of the cross and crucifixion could also serve as an example where God willed something that according to Hasker's words would be an aspect of a world where God would be pleased with and would not alter in any way. This would be in the sense of permissible will for his divine purposes, but God certainly was using these events for greater plans within a compatibilist framework in order to eventually fulfill God's perfect will.

'For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another. For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgements (judgments) to execution.' Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

Since the problem of evil does include a process in this realm, I should close by stating that I reason that with the use of compatibilistic limited free will, again I am not a hard determinist, in prayer, human beings, in particular Christians, can pray to God and can perhaps alter in persuasion some of the things that God is willing...

God can of course cause this to take place as the first cause and persons would be the second cause and so there is no philosophical contradiction.

Fini