Prayer & Determinism (s)

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At church this Sunday the subject of prayer and determinism was discussed in regard to Luke 1 and the Biblical fact that Zacharias' 'petition has been heard' (13) by God in regard to the birth of John.

It had been determined by God after many years of petition and yet was still an answer to prayer.

A brief review of two types of determinism philosophically and theologically,

Determinism also known as Hard Determinism

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281).

Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

With determinism and hard determinism, it is philosophically and theologically far more difficult to view human prayer as philosophically reasonable, because within the model only cause1, which would be God causing significant thoughts, acts and actions, would occur.

Certainly, at least thoughts, acts and actions, one could be held morally responsible for with significant freedom.

Soft-Determinism and Compatibilism

Compatibilism and soft determinism does hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but reasons that contingent rational beings with a significant use of free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, which must occur by necessity.

A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures.

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1).

Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596).

J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24).

Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Soft-determinism and compatibilism with the understanding of limited human free will present a model which has cause1 with God as first cause and cause2 with human beings as secondary causes of thoughts, acts and actions.

This could in cases include prayer; and would in cases include prayer.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.