Philosopher Frederick Ferre: Incompatibilism (PhD Edit)

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Frederick Ferre (1973)(1976) presents an incompatibilist view called self-determinism.[1]  Ferre reasons that, although there are external conditions relevant for every action, the outcomes of these actions are not fixed by any causal chain.[2]  Ferre here is suggesting that for some events there is not a prior determined cause.[3] Therefore, within this theory some human actions would not be caused or simultaneously determined by God or any external force,[4] and some human actions could be considered self-determined.[5] 

Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will theodicy that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action.[6]  There can be no antecedent[7] conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed.[8] 

Compatibilism, like incompatibilism, holds to free will but in a limited form.[9]  P.S. Greenspan (1998) writes compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible.[10]  Feinberg, a noted compatibilist, describes compatibilism as stating certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions in conjunction with human free will performing these actions.[11]  Feinberg (2001) explains that with this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed.[12] 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996)  Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,  Oxford, Oxford University Press.

FERRE, FREDERICK (1952)(1976) ‘Self-Determinism’, in American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 10, Number 3, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), in Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids,  Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.  

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[1] Ferre (1973)(1976: 31-44).

[2] Ferre (1973)(1976: 35).

[3] Ferre (1973)(1976: 35).

[4] Ferre (1973)(1976: 35).

[5] Ferre (1973)(1976: 35).

[6] Feinberg (1994: 64).

[7] In his article entitled ‘Conditional’ Simon Blackburn writes that an antecedent exists if  p causes  q.  P  is the antecedent or prior cause of  q  which is the conditional and the consequence.  Blackburn (1996: 73-74).

[8] Feinberg (1994: 64).

[9] Pojman (1996: 596).

[10] Greenspan (1998: 1).

[11] Feinberg (1994: 60).

[12] Feinberg (2001: 637).