Fatalism

Edinburgh, Scotland (photo from trekearth.com)

Edinburgh: 1995

I find a rare Jazz Fusion unofficial CD, featuring an artist I was looking for at a flea market. I explain this to the seller and he states. ‘It was fate’ with a strong Scottish accent. ‘Pardon’ I said, ‘It was fate’, he stated. I thought he had said ‘It was fiit’.

Last week someone at church asked me if my views within my MPhil and PhD dissertations, which feature compatibilism, also known as soft determinism, are equated with fatalism. I reason that I do not hold to fatalism. Here is a comparison between compatibilism/soft determinism, fatalism and hard determinism. Thanks to Big D for the idea.

Compatibilism/soft determinism:

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Fatalism compared with hard determinism:

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Fatalism should not be equated with compatibilism/soft determinism, but if fatalism states that no human actions can influence or cause events, and hard determinism holds that human beings do not cause actions or are morally responsible, there is clearly a similarity in definitions. D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate, and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186). Compatibilism and soft determinism does hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but reasons that rational beings with a significant use of free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, which must occur by necessity. A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures, and a fatalist can also believe that events are determined without the use of significant free will of rational creatures, and yet this is caused without any meaning, and without the understanding that God or any rational entity is behind these events.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 137. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.
http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/gen2.html

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

http://satireandtheology.blogspot.com/2007/11/religious-album-covers-iii.html

Reply to Miss Cia: Soft determinism, indeterminism, hard determinism, fatalism

Preface 

Edinburgh: 1995

I find a rare Jazz Fusion unofficial CD, featuring an artist I was looking for at a flea market. I explain this to the seller and he states. ‘It was fate’ with a strong Scottish accent.

‘Pardon’ I said, ‘It was fate’, he stated. I thought he had said ‘It was fiit’.

Reply to Miss Cia: Soft determinism, indeterminism, hard determinism, fatalism

My friend, Miss Cia, cited the article below on Facebook and made a request to me for a reply:

Eric W. Dolan May 18, 2020: PsyPost

Psy Post Cited

New research published in the Journal of Research in Personality provides evidence that belief in determinism plays an important role in right-wing authoritarianism.

Miss Cia cited 

Believing in "your life being predetermined by fate" causes individuals to believe in determinism and possibly more authoritarian governments. This appears similar to Presbyterian predestination theology. Russ Murray - I want to hear from your brain about this.

Of course, only God knows the inner views of persons, but I attended and was a member of a Presbyterian church in Vancouver for over a decade and I knew many of the leaders personally. I would deduce that generally most attendees, members and leaders were politically moderately left or moderately right. The church was respectfully, biblically Christian and embraced far from what could be philosophically reasoned as authoritarian theology, authoritarian philosophy, or authoritarian political views.

Within this Presbyterian Church, the bible was taken seriously, as the ultimate, inspired, spiritual authority for those within the Christian Church. The bible as the word of God.

As far as Presbyterian theology, overall, I would deduce that most Canadian, American and British devotees, within a Reformed worldview, hold to forms of democracy.

Archives, Definitions and Analysis

Wednesday, July 11, 2012 Fatalism Revisited 

Sunday, November 11, 2007 Fatalism

Compatibilism (Soft determinism)

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to the philosophical concepts of free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596).

John S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force (for there to be significant human moral accountability with human will and actions, my add), but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine, with the use of persuasion, that actions will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet these were committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

I personally embrace, what I named limited free will, within compatibilism. Human beings through nature, consciousness, desire and will embrace as secondary causes, thoughts, acts and actions. Simultaneously, God, within theistic compatibilism, is the primary cause of all things, but with holy, pure and good motives.

Incompatibilism (Indeterminism)

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion, any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. This would include concepts of libertarian free will.

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, concerning human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, human actions would never truly be free because God or another external force (non-deistic view) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being.

Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Determinism (Hard determinism)

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137).

In other words, there are forms of determinism where human actions are significant.

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281).

Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for actions determined, as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Fatalism

Fatalism should not be equated with compatibilism/soft determinism, but if fatalism states that no human actions can influence or cause events, and hard determinism holds that human beings do not cause actions or are morally responsible, there is clearly a similarity in definitions.

D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407).

In contrast to 'fate' or fatalism, biblical, theological determinism, has divine meaning.

Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism, in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186).

Compatibilism and soft determinism do hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but within this view, rational beings with significant use of (limited) free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, for which they are morally accountable, which must occur by necessity.

A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures, and a fatalist can also believe that events are determined without the use of significant free will of rational creatures, and yet this is caused without any meaning, and without the understanding that God or any rational entity is behind these events.

Practical realities

Ph.D. Viva 

I was challenged on the similarities between fatalism and my view of determinism, which is soft-determinism/compatibilism in Wales in January 2009 at my Ph.D. Viva. I used the material from the 2007 post in the defence. I think I was successful. The reviewer noted that there are definite similarities in that both determinism and fatalism bring about events by necessity without libertarian free will from a secondary cause. Fair enough.

But I did note correctly that determinism was theistic, at least in the context discussed. In contrast, fatalism was not for certain, theistic (In our Christian context). Fatalism more likely exists in a naturalistic philosophical context.  Fatalism is not Christian philosophy, although fate and determinism are also aspects of Islam, which was beyond the scope of my thesis.

Edinburgh, 1995

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 137. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Fatalism Revisited

Edinburgh Castle (trekearth)

Nov 2007 Fatalism

Newly presented and updated:

Edinburgh: 1995

I find a rare Jazz Fusion unofficial CD, featuring an artist I was looking for at a flea market. I explain this to the seller and he states. ‘It was fate’ with a strong Scottish accent. ‘Pardon’ I said, ‘It was fate’, he stated. I thought he had said ‘It was fiit’.

Compatibilism/soft determinism:

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Fatalism compared with hard determinism:

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Fatalism should not be equated with compatibilism/soft determinism, but if fatalism states that no human actions can influence or cause events, and hard determinism holds that human beings do not cause actions or are morally responsible, there is clearly a similarity in definitions. D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate, and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186). Compatibilism and soft determinism does hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but reasons that rational beings with a significant use of free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, which must occur by necessity. A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures, and a fatalist can also believe that events are determined without the use of significant free will of rational creatures, and yet this is caused without any meaning, and without the understanding that God or any rational entity is behind these events.

PhD Viva

I was challenged on the similarities between fatalism and my view of determinism, which is soft-determinism/compatibilism in Wales in January 2009 at my PhD Viva. I used the material from the 2007 post in the defence. I think I was successful. The reviewer noted that there are definite similarities in that both determinism and fatalism bring about events by necessity without libertarian free will from a secondary cause, but I did note correctly that determinism was theistic, at least in the context discussed and fatalism not for certain, it could, for example, exist in a naturalistic philosophical context.

(Fate and determinism are aspects of Islam, but this was beyond the scope of my work)

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 137. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Edinburgh Castle (Google Images)


Edinburgh, The Path (trekearth)


Edinburgh, 1995 trip


Giants Causeway, Northern Ireland 1995 trip


Cliffs of Moher, Irish Republic 1995 trip

Prayer & Determinism (s)

Paris-Facebook-Travel+Leisure

At church this Sunday the subject of prayer and determinism was discussed in regard to Luke 1 and the Biblical fact that Zacharias' 'petition has been heard' (13) by God in regard to the birth of John.

It had been determined by God after many years of petition and yet was still an answer to prayer.

A brief review of two types of determinism philosophically and theologically,

Determinism also known as Hard Determinism

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281).

Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

With determinism and hard determinism, it is philosophically and theologically far more difficult to view human prayer as philosophically reasonable, because within the model only cause1, which would be God causing significant thoughts, acts and actions, would occur.

Certainly, at least thoughts, acts and actions, one could be held morally responsible for with significant freedom.

Soft-Determinism and Compatibilism

Compatibilism and soft determinism does hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but reasons that contingent rational beings with a significant use of free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, which must occur by necessity.

A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures.

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1).

Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596).

J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24).

Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Soft-determinism and compatibilism with the understanding of limited human free will present a model which has cause1 with God as first cause and cause2 with human beings as secondary causes of thoughts, acts and actions.

This could in cases include prayer; and would in cases include prayer.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

PhD passed

PhD passed

Update: January 23, 2009: My revisions list was waiting for me in my email as I arrived back to the Vancouver area today. I reason I have a few months of work and therefore blogging will be lighter than usual. I am going to lose another academic work year and need to work on the revisions as much as possible. I will post some of my findings. Si, Ruth and family, thanks for hosting me! Thanks as well to Mr. X and LX for putting me up for a couple of days! 

Additional

The subject of fatalism came up in my PhD viva/defence. Here are some comments I have from an older article. I do not hold to fatalism. Edinburgh: 1995 I find a rare Jazz Fusion unofficial CD, featuring an artist I was looking for at a flea market. I explain this to the seller and he states. ‘It was fate’ with a strong Scottish accent. ‘Pardon’ I said, ‘It was fate’, he stated. I thought he had said ‘It was fiit’. 

Compatibilism/soft determinism

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). 

Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). 

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Fatalism compared with hard determinism

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137).

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586). Fatalism should not be equated with compatibilism/soft determinism, but if fatalism states that no human actions can influence or cause events, and hard determinism holds that human beings do not cause actions or are morally responsible, there is clearly a similarity in definitions. 

D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). 

Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate, and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186). Compatibilism and soft determinism does hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but reasons that rational beings with a significant use of free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, which must occur by necessity. 

A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures, and a fatalist can also believe that events are determined without the use of significant free will of rational creatures, and yet this is caused without any meaning, and without the understanding that God or any rational entity is behind these events. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 137. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books. 

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/gen2.html 

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers. 

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

Update: January 20, 2009

I visited this church today with Mr. X and LX. Original foundations are 1300-1400 years old. The University of Wales, Lampeter Greetings from a public library in Manchester. Please note I do not have any books here from my library and so do not expect my usual Wales inspired citation fest. I was just eating at one of my favourite restaurants, Cafe Rouge, which is an English attempt at French food. It has very good food in my opinion, but offers small portions. 

In some ways, by God's grace I am intellectual, but not all that cultured by European standards, perhaps. I asked the restaurant manager/server for more water for my tea pot and she asked puzzled, 'With the same tea bag?' I explained to her that took place in Canadian restaurants. She insisted on giving me a new pot of tea on the house. My viva examiners and the chairperson stated seemed to be very fine persons, and noted I did very well on my viva. They were impressed. They agreed with my comment at the end that I was able to answer all their questions. In fact the examiners respected me and seemed to like it when I set them straight concerning some of their assumptions concerning my sovereignty theodicy and compatiblism.;) 

The examiners indicated that my viva defence basically answered the objections they had with the thesis and therefore I should have no difficulty with the revisions. There was in their opinion, a disconnect with how I presented my work in person and how it was presented in the thesis. I reason that their objections could have all been answered within the thesis, but it would be impossible for either myself, or my advisers Mark and Rob to anticipate all of the potential objections. The examiners reasoned that without the viva I did not sufficiently defend my worldview and assumptions. I very much disagree having dealt with atheism in the thesis (and on my blogs). I dealt with atheistic objections concerning the three theodicy and included an atheistic praxis in the Afterword. 

The examiners wanted me to have examined other approaches to the nature of God. Well, this could have been done easily within the text and will be done in the revisions. To take this type of objection too far is to basically require a different thesis and this is always a danger. I was reviewing writers and their assumptions primarily! I was not directed to write a Reformed apologetic. My advisor Rob agreed with me that if after these revisions we brought in two more reviewers, they would have another set of revisions. I admit that my reviewers and every advisor I have had is in some way academically ahead of me, but I state humbly, but with confidence that my Biblically and Reformed based sovereignty theodicy still remains seriously unchallenged after development for ten years and challenges from academics, friends, and on-line bloggers. 

I am not trying to be egotistical, but I remain even more convinced of this after the viva. Well, the external examiner is an Anglican systematic theologian, that stated he was non-Reformed when I asked him. The internal examiner is a systematic theologian and is Roman Catholic. Predictably they both had difficulties intellectual accepting my Reformed views. I will write more on this later, but I am running out of time on this computer. 

I am RUSHED. Please leave comments, but I do not wish to attempt to force or coerce you...;) I reason much of their revisions are based on a misunderstanding of my work and the fact that we are coming from different traditions, and the fact that I was simply following the advice to the letter of my very qualified advisers within the British system, Mark and then Rob. Thank you very much Mark Cartlege and Rob Warner for your fine professional assistance. Mark, thanks as well to you and your family for hosting me for a drink/meal on more than one occasion. Mark is a fine empirical theologian and scholar. Rob, thanks for taking over for Mark when he left and the additions you provided were important in the development of the work. Rob is the department head and also a fine empirical theologian and scholar and gave me excellent advice.

Neither of these men would agree with some of the things I state on this blog, but the same can be stated for my regular readers and commenters and so what is new?;) Thank you to Dr. William Kay for helping me with my MPhil thesis which passed without revisions. Dr. Kay has two PhDs and is a fine academic. Please comment if you wish and keep posted. This post is not finished. Russ:) Thanks Simon for taking me to this match! Even though you support Arsenal! January 14, 2009 Manchester 

United 1 Wigan Athletic 0

 

Thanks Jeff! Very good. There is no message here, just a Luthor group.

W.T. Stace (PhD Edit)

W.T. Stace (PhD Edit) 

Preface

Stace was cited limitedly within my PhD thesis, but I have quoted this source often because it is so accurate and useful.

W.T Stace: Determinism & Soft determinism

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). If human actions were coerced or forced with hard determinism, persons could not be held morally responsible. Pojman (1996: 596). 

At the same time, if human beings are not at least a secondary cause (Stace (1952)(1976: 30)), of actions primarily caused by God, then human actions would be morally insignificant. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). If one reasons that human actions are random and uncaused, and there is no primary or secondary cause to human actions, meaning neither determinism/hard determinism or compatibilism/soft determinism exists, this would make human actions amoral and morally irrelevant and insignificant.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

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W.T. Stace (1886-1967): Works

Works by W.T.Stace

Cited 

The Philosophy of Hegel (1924) 

The Teachings of the Mystics (1960) 

Mysticism and Philosophy (1960) 

A Critical History of Greek Philosophy (1920)

Religion and the Modern Mind (1952) 

The Concept of Morals (1937) 

Time and Eternity (1952) 

The Theory of Knowledge and Existence (1932)

The Destiny of Western Man (1942) 

The Meaning of Beauty (1929) 

Man against darkness, and other essays 

Critical History of Greek Philosophy (Papermacs) (1967) 

Hegel Üzerine (2019) 

Mysticism and Philosophy by W. T. Stace (1960-06-01) 

A History of Greek Philosophy (2018) 

The Philosophy of Hegel by Walter Terence Stace (1955-06-26) 

Mysticism and human reason 

The Nature of the World: An Essay in Phenomenalist Metaphysics (1969) 

HEGEL ÜSTÜNE 

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Incompatibilism/Indeterminism

Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Feinberg (1994: 60). Compatibilism (soft determinism), which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism states that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). God as the primary cause can cause a human action that is not significantly free, but there is only significant moral human responsibility when there is significant free human action as a secondary cause.

An entity that is forced or coerced into conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not morally responsible, where these are done without significant freedom. Of course, only the infinite God is an infinitely accurate, moral judge of guilt or not, in regards to the deeds of a finite entity. (God judges deeds, post-mortem, Revelation 20, also 21-22, 2 Corinthians 5, 2 Peter 3, as some key examples) Significant, human free will, of any kind, would be viewed an incompatible with any form of hard determinism. 

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, states that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view, my add) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being. The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory. The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause. 

David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God. For Norman Geisler, he describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75). 

Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism. 

Compatibilism/Soft determinism 

Significant, limited free will (limited free will, my term and human, limited free will, in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism. Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596). It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example. 

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Again with Feinberg, he writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637). 

Limited free will 

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view. During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced. 

Note that human nature, leading to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not only finite, but is also corrupted and sinfully imperfect due to a human fall (see Genesis 1-3, Romans, Hebrews, as some key examples). According to the New Testament, the post-mortem fix of sin and sinfulness is resurrection (1 Corinthians 15, Revelation 20-22, as examples) within the salvation process, as the atoning and resurrection work of God the Son, Jesus Christ is applied to those in Christ. The spiritually regenerate (John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1) are enlightened, and convinced of salvation, justified and sanctified, leading to eventual post-mortem resurrection. The human nature remains everlastingly finite, but also everlastingly sinless.

Hard determinism 

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137).

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586). Hard determinism denies secondary causation.

Bibliography   

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

        

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw,  Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BEROFSKY, BERNARD (1996) ‘Determinism’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. http://www.jonathanedwards.com 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/gen2.html

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278.  Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

HUGHES, PHILIP, EDGCUMBE (1990) A Commentary On The Epistle To The Hebrews, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

HUGHES, PHILIP, EDGCUMBE (1996) ‘Grace’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MOUNCE, R.H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers. 

PAYNE. DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan.

PETERSON, MICHAEL (1982) Evil and the Christian God, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

PETERSON, MICHAEL (1998) God and Evil, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press.

PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, AND DAVID BASINGER (1996)(eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology. 

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368 

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.

TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy,Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.   

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Photo 1: Sunset At Cabo San Lucas Beach, Mexico g+ 

Photo 2: Rheinstein Castle, Rhineland-Palatinate, Germany-Amz Places g+

Philosopher Simon Blackburn (PhD Edit)

Windsor Walkway, London:

Philosopher Simon Blackburn (PhD Edit)

Preface

Philosopher Simon Blackburn's work has been very helpful within my academic career, especially in regard to philosophy and philosophy of religion.

His Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy has provided many educational entries. Professor Blackburn explains philosophical entries in a rational and clear manner and yet with the intellectual depth required. This has allowed me to interact with his text and learn from it, even with various amounts of agreement and disagreement on theological and philosophical issues.

Wikipedia: Simon Blackburn

Cited

'As a patron of the British Humanist Association, he has argued against the existence of God, preferring to describe himself as an "infidel" rather than an "atheist".[5] He was one of 55 public figures to sign an open letter published in The Guardian in September 2010, stating their opposition to Pope Benedict XVI's state visit to the UK,[6] and has argued that religionists should have less influence in political affairs.[5] At the same time, he has also argued, in a televised debate, against the claim of "New Atheist" Sam Harris that morality can be derived from science.[7]'

Professor Blackburn's unique personal website

Simon Blackburn

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Philosopher Simon Blackburn (PhD Edit)

From my PhD thesis

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

I will document the more important thesis entries in regard to theodicy and the problem of evil.

Theodicy 

Simon Blackburn (1996) writes that theodicy is the part of theology concerned with defending the omnibenevolence and omnipotence of God while suffering and evil exists in the world. Blackburn (1996: 375).

A reasonable definition of theodicy is the explanation of how the infinite, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, all loving God accomplishes his plans within his creation where the problem of evil exists.

The unlimited and unfixed. Blackburn (1996: 193).  In my reasoning, God is considered infinite and his creation finite and therefore limited. Humanist Simon Blackburn, from a non-theistic critical perspective, reasons there are difficulties with the concept of an omnipotent God not being able to make a stone so heavy he could not lift it, as this would make God possibly contradictory Blackburn (1996: 268), but does explain that the classic explanation is that God cannot commit the logically impossible. Blackburn (1996: 268).

William T. Shedd explains that God cannot do what is ‘absurd and self-contradictory’. Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 359 Volume 1).  D.Z. Phillips raised similar objections in (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God.  I also dealt with Phillips' interesting work in the PhD thesis and on this site. (March 12, 2016). In my view, this is an answered objection by those such as Shedd. I reason God cannot commit the logically impossible, and God as infinite does not have finite attributes; although God can without contradiction, incarnate himself. In the case of Jesus Christ, his infinite and finite natures do not mix.

Freewill 

Blackburn explains free will theory requires autonomous beings that are able to perform free actions without any significant influence upon their will. Blackburn (1996: 31). He describes autonomy as the ability of agents to govern themselves, and for this to occur autonomous agents must commit actions which are truly their own. Blackburn (1996: 31). Autonomy cannot occur when an outside force is coercing or forcing a will to act. Blackburn (1996: 31).

This definition relates to incompatibilism and related views:

I hold to a Reformed compatibilist view:

If to both compatibilists and incompatibilists, human beings at times can be forced to commit actions against their will, Pojman (1996: 596), it is ever more likely that the human will is not the primary cause in human actions, but the secondary cause if it is allowed to be a secondary determining factor by the primary cause. Pojman (1996: 596).

This concept is describing soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596).

If human beings are forced or coerced to commit human actions, this is hard and not soft determinism.

Therefore

These actions would be done without significant human freedom and therefore it would be intellectually untenable to attach human moral responsibility to such actions.

Within compatibilism human freedom is considered to be analogous to God’s freedom but not equal with it; human freedom is considered limited while God’s is absolute. Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 28).

Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will theodicy that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64).

There can be no antecedent conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions) or simultaneous causes of human actions.

Indeterminism and libertarian free will are related terms to incompatibilism. At times used synonymously.

Soft determinism is a related term to compatibilism, at times used synonymously. 

This is contrasted with hard determinism or determinism:

Pojman (1996) explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596).

Within determinism or hard determinism, God causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596).

This could be an outside force, as well, that is not God. An atheist may be a compatibilist and/or an incompatibilist, or one could hold to hard determinism.

Schelling suggests that ‘absolute causal power in one being leaves nothing but unconditional passivity for all the rest.’ Schelling (1845)(1936: 11).

This would be a difficulty with accepting hard determinism.

In his article entitled ‘Conditional’ Simon Blackburn writes that an antecedent exists if p causes q. P is the antecedent or prior cause of q which is the conditional and the consequence. Blackburn (1996: 73-74).

Compatibilism, like incompatibilism, holds to free will but in a limited form. Pojman (1996: 596).

Feinberg, a noted compatibilist, describes compatibilism as stating certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). Feinberg (2001) explains that with this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (1994: 60).

Human Nature

Blackburn writes that some forms of metaphysical libertarianism, postulates that free choice is not causally determined, but is also not random. Blackburn (1996: 218). It is suggested that an agency situated outside of human nature, in regard to making human choice, is possible but likely ‘fantasy.’ Blackburn (1996: 218).

It appears human choice should be traced back to human nature. Edwards (1754)(2006 2.1: 1-1-2). Blackburn (1996: 218). It appears Blackburn is discussing a human agency. I agree with the use of the term ‘fantasy’ in context as human will is traced back to human nature, in agreement with Edwards. 

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BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. http://www.jonathanedwards.com

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press. 

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers

As exciting as watching a chess match (PhD Edit)

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As exciting as watching a chess match (PhD Edit)

Thank you to Mike for hosting the Euro 2016 matches this morning and this afternoon. Croatia, the team below with the table cloth uniforms, took part in a match against Portugal with both clubs combining for two shots on goal in 120 minutes. This was as exciting as watching a chess match, but Mike and I had good conversation. Team chessboard, lost.

Mike kindly mentioned he read some of my website articles but provided a reasonable critique that perhaps I should explain some of the more technical terms in typical English. I do not desire my writing to read as exciting as watching a chess match...

The following is an attempt to provide clarity in regard to language with a key PhD subject:

Incompatibilism versus Compatibilism

Incompatibilism

Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed an incompatible with any form of determinism.

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being.

The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory.

The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause.

David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46).

The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God.

Norman Geisler describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75).

J.S. Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism.

I agree that it does not disprove compatibilism, but the fact that both compatibilists and incompatibilists admit that some actions are not significantly free would make the self-deterministic notions unlikely. If some actions are determined and caused by God then a system that generally adopts a strong view of God’s sovereignty and limited significant human freedom is preferable. This as opposed to libertarian free will. If to both compatibilists and incompatibilists, human beings at times can be forced to commit actions against their will, it is ever more likely that the human will is not the primary cause in human actions, but the secondary cause if it is allowed to be a secondary determining factor by the primary cause. These actions would be done without significant human freedom and therefore it would be intellectually untenable to attach human moral responsibility to such actions.

Compatibilism

Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism.

Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596).

Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596).

It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a chain of human nature and human will, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example.

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused at all by the human nature and will, then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

I agree.

Within hard determinism God or an external force, would be the only cause of human actions, while with soft determinism and compatibilism, God or an external force, would be the primary cause of human actions and persons the secondary cause.

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Thank you for hosting, Mike.