Calvin on Augustine (PhD Edit)
Preface
An interesting and somewhat controversial section from my PhD thesis below. I have noted previously I have found Augustine, at least translated into English, how I read him, difficult to read and quite repetitive to work through. I am not doubting his historical greatness as a philosopher and theologian, but I think my point stands.
The confusion for the better part of 2, 000 years whether or not Augustine is a compatibilist like Calvin, Feinberg and me and many in the Reformed camp that hold to a very strong view on God's sovereignty, or is an incompatiblist like Plantinga and many evangelicals that hold to various forms of libertarian free will demonstrates this confusion.
It should be pointed out that there is a good amount of agreement with these views on some points that could add to the confusion at times. This is because they are both, even though one uses compatibilism and the other incompatibilism, within Christian Biblical/theological orthodoxy, whereas John Hick's theodicy, for example, primarily would not be.
Definition of Incompatibilism/Compatibilism
Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions) or simultaneous (at the same time) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.
Calvin on Augustine
I include this section because as Augustine is listed as a forefather of free will theodicy,[1] as his ancient view would be considered incompatibilistic according to modern philosophy.[2] Calvin, however, throughout The Bondage and Liberation of the Will claims that Augustine supports his case for a free will theory in which human beings are in bondage to sin, unable to follow God on their own.[3] As an academic I cannot, in good conscience, use both Augustine and Calvin in this thesis without dealing with this matter.[4] As Augustine wrote a free will theodicy,[5] which included the idea that human beings require the ability to freely choose or reject God, in order to please the Almighty.[6]
A.N.S. Lane (1996) notes that one problem with Calvin and his use of Augustine was Calvin rejected the use of the term free choice.[7] Calvin did state that although he rejected the term,[8] he believed his views to be in line with Augustine on human free will, that the will was free in the sense that it was not coerced but voluntary and self-determined.[9] Lane states that after centuries of debates between Catholic and Protestant scholars, many concluded Calvin correctly understood Augustine.[10]
When reading Augustine’s theodicy, it appears to be supporting incompatibilism as human beings are noted to have the ability to freely choose or reject God.[11] He states that a human being could not act rightly unless he/she willed to do so,[12] and to do that the person must have free will in order to act rightly.[13] Calvin notes that this concept of free choice by Augustine would not be applicable to a fallen will, and could only be applied to Adam and Eve before the fall in Genesis occurred.[14] This point by Calvin, however, was never clearly demonstrated in Augustine’s writings; instead, Augustine has been viewed historically as a theologian who held to free will theory[15] within incompatibilist freedom in modern terms, and a strong view of God’s sovereignty.[16]
Feinberg believes that Augustine was not the ancient equivalent of a modern compatibilist,[17] but made the error of writing a theodicy, which featured free will and incompatibilist thought, and yet held to a theory of God’s sovereignty, which would necessitate some type of determinism.[18] It would seem Augustine either made a logical error in accepting the ancient equivalents of incompatibilist human free choice and compatibilist sovereignty for God,[19] or he simply failed to adequately explain the connection in particular whether or not his free will theodicy applied equally to pre-fall and post-fall humanity.[20] Lane points out that Calvin, in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, lacked the library resources needed and loosely quoted Augustine.[21] Calvin was familiar with Augustine’s traditionally strong view of God’s sovereignty,[22] and perhaps he rightly or wrongly interpreted that sovereignty as applying to Augustine’s concept of free will.[23] I would postulate in agreement with Feinberg that Augustine’s free will theodicy appears to be incompatibilistic in regard to human free will and is likely compatibilistic in regard to God’s sovereignty.[24] The connection between the two concepts seems not to be adequately explained by Augustine.[25]
Rowan A. Greer states that it was realized by Augustine there was a difficulty holding to free will theodicy and a strong view of God’s sovereignty.[26] Greer concluded that Augustine always maintained a free will approach,[27] and held that God had sovereign control in the universe to punish evildoers.[28] Greer thought Augustine’s solution to the problem that his free will theodicy perhaps contradicted his views on sovereignty, would be to restrict the concept of free will to Adam and Eve before the fall.[29] It should be pointed out that this is Greer’s assumption[30] and, although it agrees with Calvin’s idea,[31] Greer speculates that Augustine viewed his free will idea as appropriate for Adam and Eve before the fall, and not for humanity after it.[32] Greer however, like Calvin,[33] was not able to produce a distinct Augustine reference that stated this, and so in my mind this supports the idea that it is still unknown whether or not Augustine, when discussing this idea of human freedom, was including post-fall humanity in that concept.[34] It is therefore reasonable to deduce that Augustine quite possibly held that fallen humanity still had some ability to freely choose and reject God,[35] which would place him in the incompatibilism camp in regard to human free choice.[36]
Regardless of Calvin’s views,[37] in modern scholarship Augustine and his free will theodicy are primarily reviewed within incompatibilist camp.[38]
AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.
CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
GREER, ROWAN A. (1996) ‘Augustine’s Transformation of The Free Will Defence’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 13, Number 4, October, pp. 471-486. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.
LANE, A.N.S. (1543)(1996) ‘Introduction’, in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, by John Calvin, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
MCCANN, HUGH J. (2001) ‘Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 18, Number 1, January, pp. 110-116. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.
PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, AND DAVID BASINGER (1996)(eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
[1] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).
[2] McCann (2001: 115). Geisler (1986: 75).
[3] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95-96).
[4] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95-96).
[5] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).
[6] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 37).
[7] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xix).
[8] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xix). Calvin (1543)(1996: 103).
[9] Calvin (1543)(1996: 103).
[10] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiv).
[11] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).
[12] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).
[13] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 36).
[14] Calvin (1543)(1996: 95).
[15] Peterson, Hasker, Reichenbach, and Basinger (1996: 231).
[16] Feinberg (1994: 98).
[17] Feinberg (1994: 98).
[18] Feinberg (1994: 98).
[19] Feinberg (1994: 98).
[20] Feinberg (1994: 98).
[21] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).
[22] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). Greer (1996: 481).
[23] Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).
[24] Feinberg (1994: 98).
[25] Feinberg (1994: 98). Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).
[26] Greer (1996: 481).
[27] Greer (1996: 481).
[28] Greer (1996: 481).
[29] Greer (1996: 481).
[30] Greer (1996: 481).
[31] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).
[32] Greer (1996: 481). Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).
[33] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).
[34] Greer (1996: 481). Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).
[35] Feinberg (1994: 98). Lane in Calvin (1543)(1996: xxiii).
[36] Feinberg (1994: 98).
[37] Calvin (1543)(1996: 96).
[38] Therefore Augustine is primarily reviewed as such.
