Wittgenstein and certainty

Wittgenstein and certainty

Preface

Lego church: I considered attending, but frankly it was just too small for me.

This article from my PhD work, was originally published on August 8, 2009, prior to my finalized PhD thesis. This presentation will be edited in September 2023 for an entry on academia.edu.

Wittgenstein and certainty

Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote On Certainty which is a classic philosophical work on the subject from the twentieth century.[1] Wittgenstein (1889-1951)[2] is an Austrian philosopher.[3] On Certainty deals with philosophical skepticism by postulating that knowledge exists, in a sense, but that this knowledge is dispersed and not completely dependable.[4] He notes that ‘I make assertions about reality, assertions which have different degrees of assurance.’[5] It is often general knowledge that is not generally doubted.[6] Skepticism cannot be refuted by claiming certain propositions are certain.[7] Argumentation cannot completely express metaphysical truths in particular.[8] He uses the example of a child taught either to be a theist or atheist, and the child will be able to produce evidence for either position depending on which one he or she is instructed to believe.[9] He does admit that there is in a sense objective truth,[10] but something would be objectively true only within a system of reason and knowledge through the understanding of reasonable persons.[11] His view allows for the logical possibility that something considered objective truth in one system, is not objective truth in another.[12] Philosophy should, therefore, not be understood as primarily making discoveries, as much a reminding persons of the issues that need to be dealt with when one turns to unfamiliar and uncertain issues.[13] Wittgenstein does act with certainty, but it is his own.[14] This does not in his mind justify his view as objective truth to others, it is simply belief.[15] He reasons that ‘knowledge and certainty belong in different categories.’[15] Obtaining knowledge is very important, and more vital than having certitude.[17] Knowledge and certainty are two different mental states.[18]

[1] Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
[2] Blackburn (1996: 400). Sluga (1996: 859).
[3] Blackburn (1996: 400).
[4] Sluga (1996: 859). Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 66).
[5] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 66).
[6] Sluga (1996: 859).
[7] Sluga (1996: 859).
[8] Sluga (1996: 859).
[9] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 107). I agree. Regardless of the truthfulness of either position, a child can be guided to have arguments for a taught philosophical viewpoint.
[10] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108).
[11] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108).
[12] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108). This is reasonable. If the laws of science were not the same as this universe, in a vastly different realm, for example, then objective truth could be much different at several points.
[13] Blackburn (1996: 401).
[14] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 179).
[15] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 175).
[16] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308).
[17] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308).
[18] Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308). Knowledge and certainty are not the same thing for Wittgenstein.

My views on certainty

A definition of certainty which I would consider helpful would be along the lines of what I found in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Peter D. Klein describes the Cartesian account of certainty as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it. 

I embrace the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior. Therefore in regard to the Christian faith and philosophy, and its belief in Scripture inspired by God, the atoning work of Christ, the resurrection, and everlasting life, applied to believers, these things could be viewed as certain provided there are no legitimate counter arguments that are superior. I reason that evidence shows Christianity is philosophically certain in this sense. In other words, I do not reason that there are superior external (non-biblical) or internal (biblical) propositions, premises/conclusions that counter the Christian worldview.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EELLS, ELLERY (1996) 'Probability', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, pp. 649-650. Cambridge University Press.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co. http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1996) ‘Certainty’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1998, 2005). ‘Epistemology’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, Routledge.

SLUGA, HANS (1996) ‘Wittgenstein’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

 
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