Knowledge and Certainty

Victoria: trekearth

Knowledge and Certainty

Preface

Pre-PhD website article published 20060803, revised with additions 20250816.

1 John 5:13

Those things I have written to you who believe in the name of the Son of God, in order that you may know that you have eternal life.[1]

1 John 5: 13 

Bible Hub: 1 John 5:13

εἰδῆτε

Cited

'1 John 5:13' 

Original word: εἴδω 

'GRK: ὑμῖν ἵνα εἰδῆτε ὅτι ζωὴν 

KJV: of God; that ye may know that ye have 

INT: to you that you might know that life'

Knowledge here is to have seen the gospel demonstrated through the life and work of Jesus Christ and to know the gospel. One is trusting in the applied atoning and resurrection of Jesus Christ, also known as God the Son, and therefore have everlasting life.

The primary Christian concepts of a belief in Jesus the Son of God, and his applied atoning and resurrection work for believers, and resulting everlasting life are presented in the verse.[2] Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible defines the Greek word ‘eido’ meaning know, as expressing the idea of being aware, to behold, consider, look, perceive, see, being sure, to tell and understand.[3] The idea of ‘eido’ here seems to be that Christians can be intellectually, reasonably certain that Christ was the actual historical Son of God, who was accurately portrayed in Scripture as atoning for the sins of humanity on the cross and being resurrected from the dead in order that those who believe in him can have everlasting life.

Bible Hub: 1492. εἴδω (eidó)

Cited

'Strong's Greek: 1492. εἴδω (eidó) — 319 Occurrences' 

Bible Hub: 1492. eidó

Cited

'Lexical Summary 

eidó: To see, to know, to perceive, to be aware 

Original Word: εἴδω 

Part of Speech: Verb Transliteration: eidó 

Pronunciation: ay'-do 

Phonetic Spelling: (i'-do) KJV: be aware, behold, X can (+ not tell), consider, (have) know(-ledge), look (on), perceive, see, be sure, tell, understand, wish, wot'

'Strong's Exhaustive Concordance 

be aware, behold, consider, perceive

A primary verb; used only in certain past tenses, the others being borrowed from the equivalent optanomai and horao; properly, to see (literally or figuratively); by implication, (in the perfect tense only) to know -- be aware, behold, X can (+ not tell), consider, (have) know(-ledge), look (on), perceive, see, be sure, tell, understand, wish, wot. Word Origin: [a primary verb]'

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Knowledge and Certainty

With my research of the problem of evil for my British MPhil and PhD dissertations, I have come across the idea from secular critics that Christians cannot know that the Christian faith is true, or certain, but rather that Christians should state that they believe Christianity is true. The question then arises, can we properly philosophically state that we know Christianity is true, and certain?

Prior to working on my British degrees, I was in agreement with my former theology professor at Trinity Western University that Christianity was certain; but we disagreed on exactly what this meant. He stated that we could know that the Christian faith was true and 100% certain. I disagreed with this point, not because I doubted the faith as true, or thought that any counter argument against Christianity was superior, but because I thought that 100% knowledge of anything, was solely within the attributes and intellectual ability of an infinite God. The secular critic of Christianity can correctly point out that one cannot be 100% certain that Christianity is true, but this is not a philosophical problem for a Christian because as a finite being, one can simply state that he/she has a finite ability to understand anything, even empirical events experienced by the senses. A finite ability to understand something does not make it an incorrect understanding. A finite understanding of knowledge also does not prohibit someone with God’s guidance from having limited but accurate understanding of various philosophies and believing in the ones that are true, in particular the Christian faith.

A definition of certainty which I would consider helpful would be along the lines of what I found in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Peter D. Klein describes the Cartesian account of certainty as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it.[4] I like the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior. Therefore in regard to the Christian faith, and its belief in Scripture inspired by God, the atoning work of Christ, the resurrection, and everlasting life, these things could be viewed as certain provided there are no legitimate counter arguments that are superior. I believe that evidence shows Christianity is philosophically certain in this sense. For this to be the case Christianity would have to be both internally and externally, consistent, reasonable and therefore true. Internally true would be premises and conclusions within a biblical, Christian worldview and externally true would be versus premises and conclusions of other worldviews. Obviously this short article does not deal with all these issues. I would state that my PhD/MPhil degrees and website work offers a more full explanation on various issues.

Edward Gettier has argued in ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ that believing something is true does not make it knowledge because the person lacks sufficient conditions for knowing a proposition.[5] In other words, many true propositions would have been deduced as true, not by knowledge but by felicitous (fortunate) coincidence.[6] I can agree that finite human beings can deduce that something is true without really knowing it. As well, with the human lack of 100% knowledge of anything, it does mean that it is also possible that there could be conditions in existence not known and that a proposition that is held as true is really false. However, I do not think that Gettier’s argument should trouble those who view the Christian faith as certain because Klein points out concerning Gettier’s view that to many thinkers felicitous coincidence can be avoided if the reasons which justify belief are such that they cannot be defeated by further truths.[7]

Klein’s certainty concept in regard to felicitous coincidence is similar to the one described earlier from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. In other words, if views are reasoned by deduction and evidence, they can be considered knowledge provided they are not countered by superior arguments. This does not require 100% certainty of anything, but rather an accurate understanding of conditions that would lead to the formation of propositions and arguments.

[1] New American Standard Bible (1981: 1394).
[2] The Greek word ‘aionios’ can be defined as either eternal or everlasting according to Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible. Strong (1986: 8). Eternal would be defined as having no beginning and no end, and everlasting would be defined as having a beginning and no end. Technically speaking in my view, only God is eternal and therefore alone has eternal life. However, some may view believers as sharing in God’s eternal life and therefore possessing eternal life, but I think it is more accurate to translate the verse with the idea that we know that we have everlasting life.
[3] Strong (1986: 31).
[4] Klein (1996: 113).
[5] Gettier (1997)(1963: 3).
[6] Klein (2005)(1998: 2-3).
[7] Klein (2005)(1998: 2-3)

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 

GETTIER, EDMUND L. (1997)(1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, in Analysis 23, 1963, 121-123, Nottingham, England. Analysis 23.
http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan. http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~ppp/cpr/toc.html. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co. http://philosophy.eserver.org/kant/critique-of-practical-reaso.txt 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

KLEIN, PETER D. (1996) ‘Certainty’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1998, 2005). ‘Epistemology’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, Routledge.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

STRONG, J. (1986) Strong’s Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Pickering, Ontario, Welch Publishing Company.

THE NEW AMERICAN STANDARD VERSION BIBLE (1984), Iowa Falls, Iowa, World Bible Publishers.

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

The First Cause argument

The First Cause argument

July 17, 2006 article edited on June 9, 2023.

Castle Conwy, Wales

The picture is of a friend and I back in 2001.

The First Cause argument

Introduction

This is not a review of Aquinas’ cosmological argument, but a look at the related idea of first cause, using William Lane Craig’s kalam[1] cosmological argument as a guide.

William Lane Craig

He presents the kalam cosmological argument.

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.
2. The universe began to exist.
2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.
2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of an actual infinite by successive
addition.
2.21 A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite.
2.22 The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.[2]

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause of its existence.

Randomness

Metaphysical intuition states that something cannot come out of nothing.[3] Craig deduces that in regard to the universe, if there were originally nothing, including no God, the universe could not come into existence. However, with the existence of an eternal God, the creator could have brought about creation and matter ex nhilio (out of nothing).[4]

Victor Gijsbers in contrast states scientifically that many events in nature are random, including quantum[5] processes. He notes that it is difficult to prove cause and effect.[6] For clarity, I wish to provide a scientific definition of randomness. Lawrence Sklar in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy defines randomness within the philosophy of science. He describes the intuitive distinction between a sequence that is random and one that is orderly and how they play a role in the probability theory of dynamic systems.[7] Sklar also writes that there are subjectivist definitions of randomness which focus on the inability of an agent to determine, by knowledge, future occurrence in a sequence, and there are objectivist definitions of randomness which seek to describe it without reference to any agent.[8]

I am not a scientist, but philosophically speaking it seems reasonable to deduce that apparent randomness or disorder could occur within matter that has previously been caused in an orderly way. After a cause brings about the process that produces matter, apparent randomness and disorder could occur. However, it seems questionable and contradictory to state that initial randomness and disorder could lead to complex processes. I can see disorder occurring in material that was previously ordered, but it is much more difficult to deduce that matter in disorder can structure itself in any kind of complex form. 

For example, the human body has the appearance of being structured and ordered, but there can be apparently random events that take place within it, or corruption and disorder that takes place because of disease or injury. In contrast, I would deduce that a disordered mass of human material could never produce any actual person; there would always be a need for a cause and order for an actual human being to exist. Cause and effect seem a reasonable conclusion in regard to the existence of a complex material being, as matter and the universe seemingly require a cause to exist, and the effects can be seen in the development process, which could include certain events taking place which seem apparently random, but likely have some type of cause which may not as of yet been observed. 

A new born baby may have not been scientifically planned in a laboratory, but seemingly it has a genetic code that makes it specifically human so that it would not have likely developed by a random process from disorder. The order and structure of a new born baby assures that it will not be a new born ape, for example. However, within the genetic structure of a new born human being, there may very well be apparently random events that take place, or there may be planned events that are simply beyond complete human scientific comprehension.

Who created God?

An objection arises, who created God? Gijsbers states that even if the first cause argument is valid, then God would have to have a cause as well.[9] However, many theists including myself, would disagree with this observation, because God would be viewed as infinite, and eternal, in contrast to matter, time and space which would be viewed as finite, and created. Peter Kreeft notes that the first cause argument does not use the premise that everything needs a cause, only that everything in motion, everything dependent needs a cause.[10] God would be viewed as infinite, eternal and immutable (unchangeable), and would not need a cause.

I would add that everything finite, needs a cause.

2. The universe began to exist.

2.1 Argument based on the impossibility of an actual infinite.
2.11 An actual infinite cannot exist.
2.12 An infinite temporal regress of events is an actual infinite.
2.13 Therefore, an infinite temporal regress of events cannot exist.
2.2 Argument based on the impossibility of the formation of actual infinite by successive addition.
2.21. A collection formed by successive addition cannot be actually infinite
2.22 The temporal series of past events is a collection formed by successive addition.
2.23 Therefore, the temporal series of past events cannot be actually infinite.

Infinite Regression

An actual infinite cannot exist because of the problem of infinite regression. I would deduce as others have, that if there was an infinite, limitless past, we would never have arrived at the present. Therefore 2.11 is correct, as we cannot have an actual infinite (past), nor can we have an infinite temporal regress as described in 2.12, because that would equal an actual infinite as Craig would put it. 2.13 is therefore reasonable and rather than reality consisting of an infinite past, it consists of a finite past that had a beginning.

Simon Blackburn points out a potential problem with deducing that each event requires a preceding event would mean that the first cause also requires a preceding event. Blackburn correctly states that the preceding natural events must be distinguished from an initial supernatural event to avoid this problem, the supernatural event would need no cause.[11]

With 2.21, Craig notes that one cannot have an actual infinite collection of things by simple addition.[12] This means that a proposed infinite past could not be reached as the formation of an actual infinite would not be reached whether one proceeds to or from infinity.[13] The events described in 2.2 would therefore be finite and not infinite in agreement with 2.23.The Big Bang

Craig writes that scientifically the big bang theory seems to require that the universe began and was created out of nothing.[14] By nothing, it is meant that it was not created by pre-existent matter.
Time and space would also be finite creations.

The following question is posed to a NASA Astrophysicist

The Question
(Submitted November 08, 1997)

What is the big bang theory? What do you believe?

The Answer

'The big bang theory is the theory that the universe started from a single point, and has been expanding ever since.

This has been well-established by observations, such as the apparent movement of galaxies away from us, and the cosmic microwave background radiation believed to be the leftover light from the big bang.

The evidence for a big bang having taken place about 15 to 20 billion years ago is overwhelming, so I naturally believe that it is the case.

However, if your real question is "why did the big bang happen in the first place?" then that ceases to be an astronomical question, but a religious one.

Some astronomers, who are religious, argue that the big bang theory confirms the existence of God and the basic elements of the creation story as told in the Bible. First came light, then the heavens, then the Earth ...

However, many other scientists do not. Scientists, like people in most any profession, have a vast diversity of religious beliefs. Some of us attend houses of worship, others do not. Some of us consider ourselves very religious, others consider ourselves staunch atheists. Just because we study astronomy does not mean we have any more agreement as to the “why'' questions than anyone else.

On the other hand, it is safe to say that as scientists we can agree on an approach to learning about nature and the universe. This approach is one of using observations to test theories. And when a theory has been tested as much as the big bang theory, with each test reconfirming its validity, then we believe that it likely true -- at least more true than those theories which have failed the observational tests.

Good luck on your quest for the truth.

Jonathan Keohane for Ask an Astrophysicist[15]

There are many in the scientific community who believe in the big bang theory, so it is at least a reasonable theory for the theist to consider.

3. Therefore, the universe has a cause of its existence.'

The Christian God?

If the first cause argument is valid, does it prove the Christian God? No. I think that God needs to reveal himself supernaturally to be understood as a personal being. However, does the idea of a first cause seem to agree with the concept of God in the Bible? Yes, in general terms. God is shown in Genesis to have been a living reality before creation, and therefore can be deduced as existing before matter, time or space or anything that human beings can empirically measure. Perhaps angelic beings existed before the creation of matter, but the deduction is that at one point God created time and the angels as well. 

A critic could argue that in limitless eternity, there could be many Gods and there is no reason to believe in one God. However, I would think that the infinite/limitless nature of the first cause would mean that there would only be one God, since two or more limitless Gods would be a logical contradiction. I would state that a hypothetical infinite array of Gods that could have existed before time in an eternal state would far more likely actually be one infinite God of one substance. I have also read critics that suggest that God within the first cause argument could have been some type of creature and not the benevolent God of Christianity. 

Since physical matter, time and space has a beginning and is not eternal, I have great difficulty thinking it a reasonable possibility that the first cause was a unicorn, or horrific monster, rather than a non-physical being. As far as God’s benevolence, I think the primary evidence for his nature and character would come via revelation. In Scripture God is called the Alpha and Omega (Isaiah and Revelation), the beginning and the end, and this concept seems to be in line with that of first cause. The idea being God was present from the beginning of creation, and will be present forever.[16] However, as God is uncaused and necessary and of necessity; God as first cause, is by default the good. If anything is good, it would be that which is necessary, infinite and external.

[1] In Arabic tradition, speech or discourse used to discuss speculative theology.[2] Craig (1991)(2006: 2).[3] Craig (1991)(2006: 12).[4] Craig (1991)(2006: 12-13).[5] The fundamental unit of electromagnetic energy.[6] Gijsbers, Victor (2006: 1).[7] Sklar (1996: 615).[8] Sklar (1996: 615).[9] Gijsbers, Victor (2006: 1).[10] Kreeft, Peter (2006: 4).[11] Blackburn (1996: 140).[12] Craig (1991)(2006: 7).[13] Craig (1991)(2006: 7).[14] Craig (1991)(2006: 10).[15] Keohane (1997: 1).[16] Browning, W.R.F. (1997: 12).

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Vicious Regress

(If there is an infinite distance between Vancouver and Calgary, one will never arrive in Calgary)

In the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn discusses ‘infinite regress’ and mentions that this occurs in a vicious way whenever a problem tries to solve itself and yet remains with the same problem it had previously. Blackburn (1996: 324) A vicious regress is an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem, while a benign regress is an infinite regress that does not fail to solve its own problem. Blackburn (1996: 324). Blackburn writes that there is frequently room for debate on what is a vicious regress or benign regress. Blackburn (1996: 324).

Bradley mentions that a vicious regress is not illogical, and that it is not vicious regress to state that each act of free choice is caused by another act of free choice. I agree that it is not necessarily illogical, but disagree that the argument as described is not a vicious regress.

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) 'First Cause Argument', in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Regress’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

BROWNING, W. R. F. (1997) 'Alpha', in Oxford Dictionary of The Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE, (1991)(2006) ‘The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe’,Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991) 85-96. 

http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html

pp. 1-18.

GIJSBERS, VICTOR, (2006) ‘Theistic Arguments: First Cause’

http://positiveatheism.org/faq/firstcause.htm
pp. 1-2.

KEOHANE, JONATHAN, (1997) ‘Big Bang Theory’

http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/answers/971108a.html
p. 1.

KREEFT, PETER, (2006) ‘The First Cause Argument’ excerpted from Fundamentals of Faith.

http://catholiceducation.org/articles/apologetics/ap0168.html
pp. 1-5.

SKLAR, LAWRENCE, (1996) ‘Philosophy of Science’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Audio teaching sites

Conwy, Wales

The following are some web sites with audio teaching that I have found helpful. Reading is essential in learning, but I think audio recordings have a place in gaining knowledge as well. I am not a devotee of any of these speakers, but I think they have truth to share.

http://www.ankerberg.com/
Contemporary Christian apologetics with a large site from Dr. John Ankerberg

http://www.garyhabermas.com/
Dr. Habermas is a philosopher and an expert on the resurrection of Jesus Christ.

http://www.waltermartin.org/realaudio.html
A little dated since Dr. Walter Martin passed on in 1989, but a good site for dealing with pseudo-Christian cults and the occult

http://www.albertmohler.com/radio_list.php
Dr. Mohler is a theologian and the president of The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

http://www.monergism.com/thethreshold/articles/bio/johnpiper.html
Dr. Piper has an insightful and balanced approach to the Bible and theology.

http://www.oneplace.com/ministries/Let_My_People_Think/
Dr. Ravi Zacharias provides philosophical insight with much passion.

Arminianism and Free Will

Arminianism and Free Will

Edited with significant material added on August 4, 2022.

Preface

Vancouver, BC, trekearth

Within my MPhil and PhD theoretical work on theodicy, sovereignty, free will, and determinism, I have dealt with free will perspectives from Lewis, Augustine and Plantinga, but not Arminianism. A friend of mine, Varun, asked me about Arminianism. The following is a brief discussion of Arminianism and free will, prior to completing my PhD work. Arminianism was not a main focus of my MPhil/PhD work and this article is brief and non-exhaustive. Pelagianism was also, not a major MPhil/PhD work focus.

Total Depravity

A definition of total depravity that I used in my MPhil...The concept of total depravity does not mean (1) that depraved people cannot or do not perform actions that are good in either man's or God's sight. But no such action can gain favor with God for salvation. Neither does it mean (2) that fallen man has no conscience which judges between good and evil for him. But that conscience has been effected by the fall so that it cannot be a safe and reliable guide. Neither does it mean (3) that people indulge in every form of sin or in any sin to the greatest extent possible. Positively total depravity means that the corruption has extended to all aspects of man's nature, to his being: and total depravity means that because of that corruption there is nothing man can do to merit saving favour with God. Ryrie (1996: 312).

Pelagianism

It must be noted that Arminianism is not Pelagianism. Pelagianism believes that human beings can achieve salvation from their own powers. It is believed that human beings can choose in free will, good or evil. Original sin was a bad example, and not inherited. Yarnold (1999: 435).

Cited from

New Advent: Life and writings of Pelagius

'Transcription. This article was transcribed for New Advent by Anthony A. Killeen. Aeterna non caduca. Ecclesiastical approbation. Nihil Obstat. February 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor. Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.'

'Apart from the chief episodes of the Pelagian controversy, little or nothing is known about the personal career of Pelagius. It is only after he bade a lasting farewell to Rome in A.D. 411 that the sources become more abundant; but from 418 on history is again silent about his person. As St. Augustine (De peccat. orig., xxiv) testifies that he lived in Rome "for a very long time", we may presume that he resided there at least since the reign of Pope Anastasius (398-401). But about his long life prior to the year 400 and above all about his youth, we are left wholly in the dark. Even the country of his birth is disputed. While the most trustworthy witnesses, such as Augustine, Orosius, Prosper, and Marius Mercator, are quite explicit in assigning Britain as his native country, as is apparent from his cognomen of Brito or Britannicus, Jerome (Praef. in Jerem., lib. I and III) ridicules him as a "Scot" (loc. cit., "habet enim progeniem Scoticae gentis de Britannorum vicinia"), who being "stuffed with Scottish porridge" (Scotorum pultibus proegravatus) suffers from a weak memory. 

Rightly arguing that the "Scots" of those days were really the Irish, H. Zimmer ("Pelagius in Ireland", p. 20, Berlin, 1901) has advanced weighty reasons for the hypothesis that the true home of Pelagius must be sought in Ireland, and that he journeyed through the southwest of Britain to Rome. Tall in stature and portly in appearance (Jerome, loc. cit., "grandis et corpulentus"), Pelagius was highly educated, spoke and wrote Latin as well as Greek with great fluency and was well versed in theology. Though a monk and consequently devoted to practical asceticism, he never was a cleric; for both Orosius and Pope Zosimus simply call him a "layman". In Rome itself he enjoyed the reputation of austerity, while St. Augustine called him even a "saintly man", vir sanctus: with St. Paulinus of Nola (405) and other prominent bishops, he kept up an edifying correspondence, which he used later for his personal defence.'

Pelagius and Luther

Cited

'A closer examination of this work, so suddenly become famous, brought to light the fact that it contained the fundamental ideas which the Church afterwards condemned as "Pelagian heresy". In it Pelagius denied the primitive state in paradise and original sin (cf. P.L., XXX, 678, "Insaniunt, qui de Adam per traducem asserunt ad nos venire peccatum"), insisted on the naturalness of concupiscence and the death of the body, and ascribed the actual existence and universality of sin to the bad example which Adam set by his first sin. As all his ideas were chiefly rooted in the old, pagan philosophy, especially in the popular system of the Stoics, rather than in Christianity, he regarded the moral strength of man's will (liberum arbitrium), when steeled by asceticism, as sufficient in itself to desire and to attain the loftiest ideal of virtue. The value of Christ's redemption was, in his opinion, limited mainly to instruction (doctrina) and example (exemplum), which the Saviour threw into the balance as a counterweight against Adam's wicked example, so that nature retains the ability to conquer sin and to gain eternal life even without the aid of grace. 

By justification we are indeed cleansed of our personal sins through faith alone (loc. cit., 663, "per solam fidem justificat Deus impium convertendum"), but this pardon (gratia remissionis) implies no interior renovation of sanctification of the soul. How far the sola-fides doctrine "had no stouter champion before Luther than Pelagius" and whether, in particular, the Protestant conception of fiducial faith dawned upon him many centuries before Luther, as Loofs ("Realencyklopädies fur protest. Theologie", XV, 753, Leipzig, 1904) assumes, probably needs more careful investigation. For the rest, Pelagius would have announced nothing new by this doctrine, since the Antinomists of the early Apostolic Church were already familiar with "justification by faith alone" (cf. JUSTIFICATION); on the other hand, Luther's boast of having been the first to proclaim the doctrine of abiding faith, might well arouse opposition. However, Pelagius insists expressly (loc. cit. 812), "Ceterum sine operibus fidei, non legis, mortua est fides". But the commentary on St. Paul is silent on one chief point of doctrine, i.e. the significance of infant baptism, which supposed that the faithful were even then clearly conscious of the existence of original sin in children.' (End citation)

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In 1525, Luther wrote The Bondage of the Will, which was a debate with a Catholic scholar named Desiderius Erasmus (ca.1466-1536), that was an advocate of a free will theory. Cairns (1981: 263). Luther reasons that since human beings were fallen and abandoned God, they could not will good but only turned in the direction of their own desires. Luther (1525)(1972: 128-130). He comments that human beings were perverted and evil, Luther (1525)(1972: 128-130), but this can be used by God for his purposes, although people can do nothing but oppose God by the use of their own will. Luther (1525)(1972: 128-130). He dogmatically assumes that there is no middle way between God’s grace and human free will, Luther (1525)(1972: 130-133), and postulates that human free will should be theologically denied and everything should be ascribed to God. Luther (1525)(1972: 133).

When New Advent states in regards to Pelagius:

'By justification we are indeed cleansed of our personal sins through faith alone (loc. cit., 663, "per solam fidem justificat Deus impium convertendum"), but this pardon (gratia remissionis) implies no interior renovation of sanctification of the soul.'  

I will counter that true, New Testament, legal justification and as well sanctification, requires the applied atoning and resurrection work of God the Son, God incarnate, Jesus Christ, to believers through regeneration (John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1). The soul is renovated, even as by grace through faith (Ephesians 1-2, Romans).

Luther in Commentary On The Epistle To The Romans reasoned that the righteousness of God was contrary to the human righteousness of works, Luther (1516)(1968: 25), instead when a human being received justification by God the person could then commit truly good works. Luther (1516)(1968: 25).

Arminianism, original sin, and prevenient grace

According to J.K. Grider, Arminianism is the theological view originating from quote 'James Arminius'. Grider (1996: 80). The name is in the original Dutch, Jakob Hermanszoon (1560-1609) Grider (1996: 80). His views were similar to quote 'pre-Augustinian fathers' Grider (1996: 79), as well as later, John Wesley. Grider (1996: 79).  Quote: 'In several ways it differs from the Augustine-Luther-Calvin tradition.' Grider (1996: 79). 

Grider explains that a key work from Arminius was Examination of Perkins' Pamphlet, and Declaration of Sentiments. Grider (1996: 79). On page 20 from the online version: The Works of James Arminius, Volume 3, Arminius states:  'From which we infer (of this we will speak hereafter) that the decree to leave man to the decision of his own destiny, and to permit the fall, does not belong to the decree of reprobation, since it is prior to and more ancient than the decree of predestination.'  Arminius (The Works of James Arminius, Volume 3: 20 (A)). 

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God is the first cause and primary cause of all things. Simultaneously, in eternal existence, God willed, within his infinite nature, as omnipotent and omniscient, all things. There is no divine, reasoning and pondering time in infinity and eternity, although all things, in regards to the human realm, will eventually take place in time. There is no such order, within the nature and will of God, as assumed here by Arminius. God willed the fall (Genesis 1-3), predestination (Ephesians 1-2, Romans 9, as examples) and that some would be chosen and predestined in Jesus Christ.

Christ is the lamb slain from the foundations of the world (Revelation 13: 8).  

Also within Ephesians 1:3-4: New American Standard Bible (NASB) 3 Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has blessed us with every spiritual blessing in the heavenly places in Christ, 4 just as He chose us in Him before the foundation of the world, that we would be holy and blameless before [a]Him. In love Footnotes: (a) Ephesians 1:4 Or Him, in love

Does prevenient grace work?

Arminianism holds to original sin and human corruption and that people are not able to do good without prevenient grace. Grider (1996: 80). Prevenient grace could be explained as preceding grace.

Arminians generally believe that God's grace is not irresistible, and that believers can fall away from God. Grider (1996: 80). A problem I see here is although Arminians believe in original sin, and total depravity, they state that people can reject God's salvific grace. Grider (1996: 80). I would think an understanding of original sin and the resulting fallen human nature, as described by Paul in Romans 1-3, for example, would view God's salvific grace to those who are totally depraved and corrupt, as having to be in a sense irresistible, although not forced or coerced. God would instead persuade and mould human beings he has predestined in order that they freely believe. God would have to change a human being that previously could not believe, so that he/she would follow God and Christ. 

In other words, from my Biblical perspective, human beings with a fallen human nature that were totally depraved would always reject God's prevenient grace, so for the Arminian to say that sometimes the grace is accepted and sometimes it is not, is to assume that the fallen human being has the ability to accept God's grace, despite total depravity. 

From my perspective this Arminian view does not present a fallen nature incapable of following God, but one that could possibly follow God if God provided prevenient (preceding) grace. So, an Arminian view is not Pelagian, but it presents a less than perfect nature that is seen as totally depraved, but still able to accept Christ with the help of God's grace. This idea was expressed by my Arminian influenced, Mennonite, Book of Romans professor who did not believe in a sinful nature, but that all human beings of less than perfect nature eventually took a sinful position against God. P.E. Hughes explains that prevenient grace precedes all human decision. Hughes (1996: 480). It sees God as taking the initiative. Hughes (1996: 480).

I am not in disagreement with this aspect of prevenient grace, but as Erickson states, Arminians recognizing the human inability to respond to the gospel introduced the idea of prevenient grace. Erickson (1994: 925). Erickson explains that there is no clear and adequate basis in Scripture for this concept of universal enablement to believe. Erickson (1994: 925). I agree with Erickson that prevenient grace is an appealing concept. Erickson (1994: 925). However, I reason that Biblically when God predestines someone as in Ephesians 1, he regenerates a person that shall believe. God simultaneously has the individual person, with a limited human free will, willingly accept the gospel message in the regeneration process.

Sin nature?

As noted, Arminians hold to a belief in original sin, and total depravity. Grider (1996: 80). But a minority may not hold to a belief in a sin nature, although Grider points out that James Arminius himself viewed persons as fallen and unable to do any good thing on their own. Grider (1996: 80).

Arminius quote:

'The whole of this sin, however, is not peculiar to our first parents, but is common to the entire race and to all their posterity, who, at the time when this sin was committed, were in their loins, and who have since descended from them by the natural mode of propagation, according to the primitive benediction: For in Adam ‘all have sinned’ (Rom. v,12). Wherefore, whatever punishment was brought down upon our first parents, has likewise pervaded and yet pursues all their posterity.' Arminius (Works, 2:156. (B)) (End citation)

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A sin nature may seem too negative for those that want to believe that the human being can choose God with divine help, but it may be that some hold to theology that is both Arminian and Pelagian in nature. This may have been the case with my Mennonite professors who claimed to be Arminian, but preferred the concept of sin position over the idea of sin nature in regard to humanity.

My view would require God to enlighten, persuade and mould an enslaved will, but without the use of force or coercion. This enslaved will would prior to salvation not be free to choose God and commit good actions pleasing to God in regard to salvation, but simultaneously in the salvation process the limited free will of a fallen human being would be enlightened, persuaded and moulded to believe in Christ. There must be a limited free will present in the salvation process or else hard determinism is taking place that is force or coercion. My view requires a sinful corrupt human nature, which is totally depraved, as in unable to freely choose God as is, without a divine spiritual alteration, whereas the Arminian view requires human beings to have sinned and be less than perfect, but to have the ability within their nature to accept God's prevenient grace with the use of free will.

My view sees limited free will as allowing God to restore the elect to him by salvation via an alteration of the person, but is not libertarian free will which through prevenient grace allows people to choose or reject Christ. In my understanding the fallen human being has a limited free will that freely rejects God, and through the salvation process God enables the believer to freely follow Christ. By limited free will I accept the idea that a fallen human being is free in the sense that he/she can be restored by God if elected, but not free in a way the he/she could be saved through prevenient grace.

John Calvin in my view held to a concept of free will similar to my own, and he has influenced my theology. He wrote in 1543 in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will.

If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

For Calvin although God must elect and restore an individual for salvation to occur, it is not done by force or coercion, but through the use of soft determinism as human beings are converted to a belief in Christ through the Holy Spirit. I would think a moderate sovereignty or Calvinistic view on human free will, especially in regard to salvation, provides the Christian with a good, Biblical, basic comprehension of something which is not completely understandable by the human mind. God predestines believers as shown in Ephesians 1, and is always the primary mover in human salvation. God has a perfect free will by which he chooses an individual which has far less than a perfect free will, and corrupted human nature.

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ARMINIUS. JAMES (Jakob Hermanszoon) (1560: 1609)The Works of James Arminius, Volume 3. (A)

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ARMINIUS. JAMES (Jakob Hermanszoon) (1560: 1609) The Works of James Arminius, 3 Vols, trans. James Nichols (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1825), 1:545, in McGonigle, Arminius and Wesley on Original Sin. (B)

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PELAGIUS (British Monk) (354-418) Note on Pelagius 

Cited 

Of his surviving works, only few are known in full. 

These are: 

De fide Trinitatis libri III ("On Faith in the Trinity: Three Books") 

Eclogarum ex divinis Scripturis liber primus ("Excerpts out of Divine Scriptures: Book One") 

Commentarii in epistolas S. Pauli ("Commentary on the Epistles of Saint Paul") 

Unfortunately, most of his work survives only in the quotations of his opponents. Only in the past century have works attributable to Pelagius been identified as such. Other writings include On Nature, parts of which are quoted in Augustine's On Nature and Grace, and Defense of the Freedom of the Will, quoted in Augustine's On the Grace of Christ. Also surviving are his letter to Demetrias, along with fragments of other letters, and the written statement of faith which was received by Pope Zosimus.

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Transcription. This article was transcribed for New Advent by Anthony A. Killeen. Aeterna non caduca. Ecclesiastical approbation. Nihil Obstat. February 1, 1911. Remy Lafort, S.T.D., Censor. Imprimatur. +John Cardinal Farley, Archbishop of New York.

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YARNOLD, E.J. (1999) 'Pelagianism', in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

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Tuesday, January 10, 2006 MPhil Wales 2003