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| Not a burning bush, but busy work month... |
Ontology August 2015
Below are my limited definitions of ontology from my doctorate.
T. Patrick Burke (1999) describes ontology as dealing with the doctrine of being. Burke (1999: 416).
Erickson (1994: 272) and philosopher R. Douglas Geivett (1993: 53) point out that the term ontology is also used in context of arguments for the existence of God.
From the August 2015 article, ‘Ontology.’
Ontology is from the Greek word for being, and is a 17th century term for the branch of metaphysics that is concerned with what exists. Blackburn (1996: 269).
The ontological argument is an a priori (non-empirical knowledge or speculation, my add) has been used by those such as Anselm and is noted as purely a priori as an attempt to prove the existence of God. Blackburn (1996: 269).
Blackburn writes that Aquinas did not accept the argument. Blackburn (1996: 269).
Blackburn mentions Plantinga as a modern philosopher that has stated a version of the ontological argument. Blackburn (1996: 269).
The view of Anselm is that God is something of which nothing greater can be conceived. Blackburn (1996: 269).
Plantinga uses the concept of possible worlds and that it is at least possible that a maximally great being exists in every possible world, if it exists in one possible world, it exists in all possible worlds. So, the maximally great being exists in every possible world. Blackburn (1996: 269). Plantinga (1977)(2002: 111-112).
It is an impossible proposition of the maximally great being in one possible world and every possible world, to not exist, therefore the being exists in the actual world. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 111-112).
Plantinga presents a version he reasons is valid and sound and he states that the argument does not prove the existence of God. His version, proves not the truth of theism, but that fact that the argument is rational; or its 'rational acceptability' as an argument. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 112).
This does read as reasonable and sound and true.
I have never used an ontological argument and likely never will.
The critic can state that he/she, because much of the argument rests on what a human being can reason in conception, can conceive of a being as great as the maximally great being.
I certainly believe in studying ontology and the ontological, but I side with Plantinga in questioning ontological arguments for the existence of God as very speculative.
I use arguments for God being philosophically and theologically the first cause and this parallels the Genesis (1-3) creation account without being explicitly biblical.
I do not wish to argue in terms of a greatest being or maximally great being one can conceive of (ontological arguments).
I do argue that the infinite first cause being must exist by necessity (first cause arguments).
This avoids a vicious regress, a regress that cannot solve its own problem.
This is a subtle but important difference.
A critic of ontological arguments can state that perhaps Thor is as maximally great as the biblical, Lord, God the Father or God the Son or God the Holy Spirit (trinity).
Whereas, my first cause argument allows for one infinite, first cause.
ANSELM (1962) Anselm's Basic Writings, translated by S.W. Deane, 2nd Ed., La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co.
AQUINAS, THOMAS (1981) Summa Theologica (1a Q2), "Whether the Existence of God is Self-Evident Thomas More Publishing.
BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BURKE, T. PATRICK (1999) ‘Ontology’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.
ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It? Grand Rapids, Zondervan.
GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
