Showing posts sorted by relevance for query God is necessary. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query God is necessary. Sort by date Show all posts

Sunday, September 25, 2022

This eliminates the need for the ‘Who created God?’, question: God is/Necessary v Contingent

This eliminates the need for the ‘Who created God?’, question: God is/Necessary v Contingent

An article referencing edited website articles on September 25, 2022

Photo: May 23 2022, From Awesome world, Facebook 

Referenced from archives 


Necessary & Contingent (Brief From PhD)

An infinite eternal God can be understood as the first cause, therefore not requiring a cause.

Karl Barth explains within The Doctrine of Creation that the essence of God himself is eternal, he is before time, above time and after time. Barth (1932-1968: 67).

Note: This eliminates the need for the ‘Who created God?’, question. God is.

God’s essence is eternal and necessary (logically must exist), and the finite universe is temporal and contingent (not necessary). Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 191 Volume 1). God as a necessary being is therefore the cause of contingent creation.

Frame reasons God is the creator and the Lord of the beginning of history. This occurs within his eternal plans. Frame (2002: 389).

Within this view God is the implied first cause that exists necessarily prior to everything else. Pojman (1996: 596).

Saturday, November 07, 2020 The necessary is good II 

The necessary is good

Necessary v. Contingent 

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary.

3. God's plans are necessary. 

4. The contingent exist.

5. The necessary supersedes the contingent.

6. Human beings are contingent.

7. Human being's plans are contingent.

8. Human being's needs are contingent.

Therefore, the suffering of the contingent is permissible.

I am not stating that God by nature had to create anything, or anything finite. God does have significant free will within divine nature. His plans reflect nature. I am stating that God's plans must occur and therefore are necessary.

It could be stated that it is a weaker sense of necessity in point 3 than points 1 and 2.  

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary


Cited 

Absolute necessity might be defined as truth at absolutely all possible worlds without restriction. But we should be able to explain it without invoking possible worlds.

By my definition 1,2 are necessary in all possible worlds. 

3. God's plans are necessary. 

This could be explained as relative necessity.


Cited 

The standard account defines each kind of relative necessity by means of a necessitated or strict conditional, whose antecedent is a propositional constant for the body of assumptions relative to which the consequent is asserted to be necessary.

The relative necessity of (3) has as antecedent the absolute necessity of (1,2).

Further, God, within his infinite, eternal nature, would only be morally obligated to keep his revealed word, as in promises, in regard to contingent, human beings. These are documented in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament within a theistic, Christian worldview.

1. The necessary must exist. 

2. God is necessary. 

The necessary is good.
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1. The necessary must exist. 

2. God is necessary. 

3. The necessary is good.

Therefore, God is good.

Note, I am not using syllogism as arguments. Bibliographical reference 

Bob Hale, “What is Absolute Necessity?”, Philosophia Scientiæ, 16-2 | 2012, 117-148. 

Electronic reference

Bob Hale, “What is Absolute Necessity?”, Philosophia Scientiæ [Online], 16-2 | 2012, Online since 01 October 2015, connection on 26 September 2022. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/743; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.743 


Necessary v Sufficient 

Necessary versus Sufficient conditions Philosopher Blackburn explains... 'If p is a necessary condition of q, then q cannot be true unless p is true. If p is a sufficient condition of q, then given that p is true, q is so as well.' (73).

Blackburn provides the example: Steering well is a necessary condition of driving well... (73). But it is not sufficient, as one can steer well, but be an overall bad driver. (73). Perhaps, one steers very well, but is overly occupied by texting while driving. (My add, and not my practice) This concept from Blackburn with the use of symbolic logic, provides a level of complexity, yet consistent and logical at the same time. But providing a true example provides another level of difficulty. 

A solid/true example Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b). Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b), then infinite nature (b) cannot be true unless infinite attributes (a) are true. If infinite attributes (a) are a sufficient condition of infinite nature (b), then given that infinite attributes (a) are true, then infinite nature (b) is so as well. 

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of the Word of God: Volume 1, Part One, Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of Creation: Volumes 1 and 3, Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark.

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of God: Volume 2, First Half -Volume, Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.

Saturday, November 07, 2020

The necessary is good II

The necessary is good II

River Conwy from 2001

Preface

For whatever reason (I pray by God's leading) at about midnight this morning, my mind started pondering on my necessary versus contingent (necessity versus contingency) articles. My intent was bedtime and not writing. But, I had some ideas for clarity and there is online support for them within philosophy.

Again, I do not claim to be a classical philosopher, but rather a philosopher of religion and theologian. I do not use for example, symbolic logic as often as do many within classical philosophy. I am learning symbolic logic through my review of the Langer text, Symbolic Logic. Within philosophy, I have completed an extensive entry by entry review of Pirie's book on fallacies, and use British philosopher, Blackburn as a source, for example. But then again, most classical philosophers do not have a significant biblical studies background or doctrinal background.

Within academia, we all have our academic strengths and weaknesses. 

Revised archived articles 



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Necessary v. Contingent 

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary.

3. God's plans are necessary. 

4. The contingent exist.

5. The necessary supersedes the contingent.

6. Human beings are contingent.

7. Human being's plans are contingent.

8. Human being's needs are contingent.

Therefore, the suffering of the contingent is permissible.

God by infinite nature, is not obligated or compelled, to create anything finite. God does have significant free will within divine nature. His plans reflect divine nature. I am stating that God's plans must occur and therefore are necessary.

It could be stated that it is a weaker sense of necessity in point 3 than points 1 and 2.  

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary


Cited 

Absolute necessity might be defined as truth at absolutely all possible worlds without restriction. But we should be able to explain it without invoking possible worlds.

By my definition 1,2 are necessary in all possible worlds. In all possible realities.

3. God's plans are necessary. 

This could be explained as relative necessity.


Cited 

The standard account defines each kind of relative necessity by means of a necessitated or strict conditional, whose antecedent is a propositional constant for the body of assumptions relative to which the consequent is asserted to be necessary.

The relative necessity of (3) has as antecedent the absolute necessity of (1,2).

Further, God, within his infinite, eternal nature, would only be morally obligated to keep his revealed word, as in promises, in regard to contingent, human beings. These are documented in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament within a theistic, Christian worldview.

1. The necessary must exist. 

2. God is necessary. 

The necessary is good.
---

1. The necessary must exist. 

2. God is necessary. 

3. The necessary is good.

Therefore, God is good.

Note, I am not using syllogism as arguments. Bibliographical reference 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York. 

HALE, BOB (2015) Bob Hale, “What is Absolute Necessity?”, Philosophia Scientiæ, 16-2 | 2012, 117-148. 

Electronic reference

Bob Hale, “What is Absolute Necessity?”, Philosophia Scientiæ [Online], 16-2 | 2012, Online since 01 October 2015, connection on 26 September 2022. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/743; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.743 

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy). 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Saturday, November 02, 2019

The necessary is good

The necessary is good


I wrote:

Necessary v. Contingent 

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary.

3. God's plans are necessary. 

4. The contingent exist.

5. The necessary supersedes the contingent.

6. Human beings are contingent.

7. Human being's plans are contingent.

8. Human being's needs are contingent.

Therefore, the suffering of the contingent is permissible.

I am not stating that God by nature had to create anything, or anything finite. God does have significant free will within divine nature. His plans reflect nature. I am stating that God's plans must occur and therefore are necessary.

It could be stated that it is a weaker sense of necessity in point 3 than points 1 and 2.  

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary


Cited 

Absolute necessity might be defined as truth at absolutely all possible worlds without restriction. But we should be able to explain it without invoking possible worlds.

By my definition 1,2 are necessary in all possible worlds. 

3. God's plans are necessary. 

This could be explained as relative necessity.


Cited 

The standard account defines each kind of relative necessity by means of a necessitated or strict conditional, whose antecedent is a propositional constant for the body of assumptions relative to which the consequent is asserted to be necessary.

The relative necessity of (3) has as antecedent the absolute necessity of (1,2).

Further, God, within his infinite, eternal nature, would only be morally obligated to keep his revealed word, as in promises, in regard to contingent, human beings. These are documented in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament within a theistic, Christian worldview.

November 2 2019 

Blackburn writes that a proposition is necessary, if it could not have been false.(257). Admittedly, someone can and will always disagree with any provided proposition. But, I agree with the definition here from secular, British, philosopher Blackburn. Further he writes that the necessary, what is of necessity, is true is all possible worlds. (257)

I philosophically hold to a priori truths. Louis P. Pojman explains that the term a priori comes from the Latin “preceding” and is knowledge that is not based on sense experience but is innate or known to human beings by the meanings of words and definitions. Pojman (1996: 595). Arthur Pap defines a priori knowledge as being independent of experience. Pap (1973: 666).

Pojman writes that a posteriori comes the Latin “the later” and is knowledge that is obtained from human sense experience only, as in the five senses. Pojman (1996: 595). Blackburn reasons that something can be known a posteriori when it cannot be known a priori. Blackburn (1996: 21-22)

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Importantly, not all valid and sound argumentation holds to the classic three line syllogism. 

University of Kentucky

Quote

'argument

An Argument is a group of statements including one or more premises and one and only one conclusion. The point of an argument is to give the receiver of the argument good reason to believe new information. assumption a premise that is implied, or is necessary for the argument to be valid, but is unstated.'

University of Windsor

Cited

'G.C. GODDU Department of Philosophy University of Richmond'

'ABSTRACT: Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at least a plausible case can be made for the possibility of zero premise arguments.'

'How many premises can an argument have?'

'If what I have argued here is correct, then everyone should accept the possibility of infinite premise arguments. On the other hand, whether we should accept zero-premise arguments seems to depend upon the resolution of other highly controversial options in argumentation theory such as—does every argument need a corresponding act of arguing? Does defining argument require an appeal to function? Trying to resolve these issues is a project for another time. At the very least, however, I hope that I have sketched out a position according to which it is straightforwardly possible for there to be zero-premise arguments.'
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I reason...

1. In every possible world, the necessary exists.

2. The necessary is good.

3. The contingent exists.

4. God, as the first cause of the contingent, is necessary.

Therefore, God is good.

---

Further, philosophically, what is of necessity would certainly be what is good, and what is perfectly good. Anything contingent, opposed to that good, the perfectly good, would be evil.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BONJOUR, LAURENCE. (1996) ‘A Priori’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Note, I am not using syllogism as arguments 


Saturday, November 22, 2025

Panentheism Revisited

Panentheism Revisited

Preface

London, Greenwich (trekearth.com

Panentheism 

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

Process theism approaches are sometimes referred to as being panentheistic.[1] The two approaches are not identical but process theism moves in the direction of panentheism.[2] David H. Nikkel (2003) defines panentheism as from the Greek meaning ‘all is in God.’[3] Both God’s transcendence and immanence are accepted, as the world and matter is in God, and God is ‘all-encompassing with respect to being.’[4] Panentheism is not identical to pantheism which postulates that ‘God is identical with everything’[5] or that God is in everything and that God and the universe are one.[6] The difference being that panentheism understands ‘God is in all things’[7] but not identical with all things as with pantheism.[8] As example, God in pantheism may be considered to be equal with a tree. God in panentheism may be considered beyond the tree, but the vital force within it, where as in my traditional Christian theistic understanding God is beyond a tree and sustains it, but is not the vital force within it.[9] Panentheism attempts to ‘avoid the pitfalls’ of traditional theism.[10] God is prohibited from having a true and genuine relationship with matter and the universe because of traditional theistic views such as that God is immutable, impassible, and eternal and timeless.[11] Panentheism is an intellectual compromise between traditional theism and pantheism.[12] God is more than just the material universe, as there is an unchanging aspect to God’s being and also a dynamic aspect to God as the divine being changes as matter and the universe do.[13] German philosopher, F.W. J. Schelling [14] (1845)(1936) reasons: ‘As there is nothing before or outside of God, he must contain within himself the ground of his existence.’[15] He reasons God’s nature is inseparable from God and yet can be distinguished.[16] Panentheism can reasonably be understood as an overarching view within many process theism approaches[17] which I have contrasted with my own views.[18] 

________________

[1] Geisler (1975: 153).

[2] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 142). I am not stating that this is the case in every documented view of process theism, but it is generally true that the two views are closely related.

[3] Nikkel (2003: 1).

[4] Nikkel (2003: 1).

[5] Martinich (1996: 556).

[6] Blackburn (1996: 276). Blackburn also explains Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677) is noted for this view within Western philosophy

[7] Martinich (1996: 556). The doctrine that all things exist in God. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[8] Martinich (1996: 556).

[9] This is my example based on Erickson’s presentation. Erickson (1994: 303-307).

[10] Nikkel (2003: 1). Many modern theologians and philosophers now question the concept of an eternal God. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[11] Nikkel (2003: 1). God is not eternal within this view. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[12] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[13] Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

[14] Schelling lived (1775-1854). Blackburn (1996: 341).

[15] Schelling (1845)(1936: 32).

[16] Schelling (1845)(1936: 32). Schelling sought to deflect criticisms that he was a pantheist. ‘Unity is of essence, but so is diversity.’ Gutmann (1845)(1936: xxxi). However, his comments make it possible that he had views which were perhaps panentheistic. Material things are dependent on God and yet independent.

[17] Including that of Whitehead. Nikkel (2003: 2-3). Grenz and Olsen (1992: 142).

[18] My views are Reformed but not strictly within a certain camp such as Presbyterian or Baptist. I have primarily come to my Reformed views through MPhil and PhD research.

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BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GRENZ, STANLEY J. AND ROGER E. OLSON (1992) Twentieth Century Theology, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GUTMANN, JAMES (1845)(1936) ‘Introduction’ in SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 

KREEFT, PETER and RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

MARTINICH, A.P. (1999) ‘Pantheism’ in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

NIKKEL, DAVID H. (2003) ‘Panentheism’, in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, MacMillan Reference USA, New York. 

SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.

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Process Theism: Alfred North Whitehead

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

David Viney (2008) suggests that Edgar Sheffield Brightman is one of the twentieth century proponents of Process theism.[1] Although Brightman’s views were primarily independently made, process theism refers to a general group of theological concepts attributed to Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947)[2] and Charles Hartshorne (1897-2000).[3]

Whitehead is the more preeminent exemplar and within Process and Reality (1927-1929)(1957) explains he desired to complete an account of humanity and its experience in relation to philosophical problems.[4] In Religion In The Making (1926) Whitehead explains it is legitimate to attempt with a more definite knowledge of metaphysics, to interpret human experience, but these general principles must be amplified and adapted into one general system of truth.[5]

Whitehead disagreed with a traditional view of a ‘transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being, and whose imposed will it obeys.’[6] The nature of God needed to be philosophically constructed anew.[7] A balance is sought between God’s immanence and transcendence, and a concept of static transcendence is rejected as instead God is understood to have a evolutionary transcendence. God and the physical realm are immanent with each other and God’s transcendence means their realities are not identical and not always determined by each other.[8] God is fully reasoned to be involved and influenced by temporal events and processes.[9] These processes unfold as sequences of events over time. God, contrary to classic and traditional Christian theism is finite, temporal, changeable and experiences intense emotion, pain and sadness. Whitehead explains that ‘It is not true that God is on all respects infinite.’[10] Process theology is a philosophical approach that does not rely on any kind of divine revelation.[11] Instead it relies on a process of change over time as a theory of metaphysics.[12] God’s actual concrete nature is responsive and influenced by the processes that take in the world, and therefore God is limited. Some things are unknowable for God, that he only can realize as they happen, and as these new things develop God’s knowledge processes over time. Divine sovereignty is questionable and certainly no longer absolute within this system.

Whitehead, a mathematician and philosopher, established a speculative philosophy of metaphysics within a scientific non-metaphysical reality.[13] This system is an attempt to adequately explain all individual beings in existence, including God.[14] Basically a system of metaphysics needed to be developed that would work with modern scientific theories and reality, and therefore God was not a ‘static essence’ but a process.[15] The ‘actual entities’[16] that make up this process are non-permanent and transient and each action and activity is dipolar having a physical pole of the past and a mental pole which is a possibility that can be achieved.[17] The physical pole feels the physical reality of actual entity, while the mental pole feels or prehends as Whitehead calls it, the eternal objects by which actual entities have conceptual definiteness.[18] These physical and mental poles are an aspect of every real being/actual entities although they are not real things themselves.[19]

Prehends is the feeling of grasping the physical and conceptual information concerning actual entities.[20] This will occur within a stream and series of occasions.[21] All occurrences take place within the process of these actual entities.[22] Each event is partially self-created and partially influenced by other occasions and entities.[23] God is also dipolar[24] and his nontemporal pole is where God conceives the infinite variety of external objects and sees the possibilities and provides the opportunity for the process of becoming. God is an actual entity and being.[25] God has a primordial nature and consequent nature, with the primordial being conceptual, while the consequent nature is God as conscious.[26] Whitehead explains that the ‘consequent nature is the weaving of God’s physical feelings upon his primordial concepts.’[27] God’s primordial conceptual nature is infinite and does not have negative prehension/feelings, and is eternal and unconscious.[28] This nature is permanent as God works out endless possibilities.[29] God in his vision can determine every possibility and adjust details where needed.[30] The consequent nature of God originates with physical experience with the material temporal world and it is integrated with the primordial conceptual nature.[31] The consequent nature as conscious is determined, finite and incomplete.[32] These two aspects of God’s deity can be distinguished but are inseparable.[33] This consequent conscious nature had God constantly acquiring new experiences.[34]

A problem arises that if God’s primordial nature is eternal and unconscious[35] it precedes the consequent nature that is temporal and has consciousness. I question whether an unconscious deity would in any way proceed to a conscious temporal reality. Where did God’s consciousness come from? I reason consciousness would have to exist eternally to lead to a finite reality of consciousness.

________________

[1] Viney (2008: 35).

[2] Viney (2008: 1).

[3] Viney (2008: 1).

[4] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: vi).

[5] Whitehead (1926: 149).

[6] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 404).

[7] Whitehead (1926: 150).

[8] Viney (2008: 10).

[9] Viney (2008: 1).

[10] Whitehead (1926: 153). Whitehead claims that if God was infinite in all ways this would make him as infinitely evil as he is good. I doubt logically and reasonably that an infinitely holy and good God could at the same time be infinitely evil and so I can grant Whitehead half a point here. However, God could still be infinite completely in nature and willingly allow evil to exist within his creation. I definitely agree with Whitehead that an infinitely good and evil God would be a God of nothingness. Whitehead (1926: 153). I doubt this being could logically exist.

[11] Viney (2008: 1).

[12] Viney (2008: 1).

[13] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 135).

[14] Diehl (1996: 881).

[15] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 135).

[16] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 135).

[17] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 136).

[18] Diehl (1996: 881). Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[19] Viney (2008: 8).

[20] Diehl (1996: 881). Viney (2008: 9).

[21] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 136).

[22] Diehl (1996: 881).

[23] Diehl (1996: 881).

[24] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[25] Viney (2008: 9).

[26] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[27] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[28] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[29] Viney (2008: 9).

[30] Whitehead (1926: 153-154).

[31] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[32] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[33] Viney (2008: 9).

[34] Viney (2008: 9).

[35] Whitehead (1927-1929)(1957: 407).

[36] Grenz and Olsen (1992: 142). I am not stating that this is the case in every documented view of process theism, but it is generally true that the two views are closely related.

[37] Nikkel (2003: 1).

[38] Nikkel (2003: 1).

[39] Blackburn (1996: 276). Blackburn also explains Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677) is noted for this view within Western philosophy

[40] Nikkel (2003: 1).

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BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

DIEHL, DAVID W. (1996) ‘Process Theology’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GRENZ, STANLEY J. AND ROGER E. OLSON (1992) Twentieth Century Theology, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

NIKKEL, DAVID H. (2003) ‘Panentheism’, in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, MacMillan Reference USA, New York.

VINEY, DAVID (2008) ‘Process Theism’, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Palo Alto, California, Stanford University.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1926) Religion in the Making, New York, The MacMillan Company.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1927-1929)(1957) Process and Reality, New York, The Free Press/MacMillan Publishing Company, Incorporated.

WHITEHEAD, ALFRED NORTH (1967)(1986) ‘Adventures of Ideas’, in Forest Wood JR., Whiteheadian Thought as a Basis for a Philosophy of Religion, University of Southern Mississippi, Hattiesburg, University Press of America, Inc.

20251121

'God in pantheism may be considered to be equal with a tree. God in panentheism may be considered beyond the tree, but the vital force within it, where as in my traditional Christian theistic understanding God is beyond a tree and sustains it, but is not the vital force within it.'

Pantheism is a form of monism, as in reasoning the theistic is of a single substance, nature and entity. This is error as God is infinite, eternal and necessary, in contrast to created things which are finite, non-eternal, potentially everlasting, contingent, entities. 

Panentheism views God in all things, but not identical with all things. It understands the existence of both the infinite/necessary and finite/contingent within reality and within God. God therefore, within panentheism would be understood as having both a necessary aspect and a contingent aspect. From my Reformed theological, worldview, I view this as contradictory as the finite is not divine and cannot be divine. Note that the classic understanding of the incarnation of Jesus Christ is that his divine (infinite) nature and human (finite) nature cannot logically mix, and do not mix.

My Reformed theological perspective views the infinite, eternal God as creating and sustaining the finite. God is not the vital, infinite, force within the finite, but is the vital, infinite force sustaining the finite.

'Whitehead explains that ‘It is not true that God is on all respects infinite.’[10]'  '[10] Whitehead (1926: 153). Whitehead claims that if God was infinite in all ways this would make him as infinitely evil as he is good. I doubt logically and reasonably that an infinitely holy and good God could at the same time be infinitely evil and so I can grant Whitehead half a point here. However, God could still be infinite completely in nature and willingly allow evil to exist within his creation. I definitely agree with Whitehead that an infinitely good and evil God would be a God of nothingness. Whitehead (1926: 153). I doubt this being could logically exist.'

God is in all respects, infinite. God is at the same time, in all respects logical. God is not contradictory within infinity. God is perfectly good and not evil. Everything God causes is for the good, with good motives, even when evil is secondarily caused. 

A classic example is the death of Jesus Christ on the cross and the resulting atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ applied to believers. The triune God, as the primary cause, had perfectly good motives for the gospel. Secondary causes include, Satan that had evil motives in persuading Judas to betray Jesus Christ. Satan desired his own worship, see Matthew 4 and Luke 4, even from Jesus Christ himself. The Jewish and Roman authorities, crucified him with evil motives, which based on the New Testament could be reasoned were primarily religious/political in the first case and political in the second case.

Links

Friday, January 01, 2010 Does God evolve? 



Wednesday, August 10, 2016 The Trinity: Panentheism & Pantheism

Saturday, July 25, 2020 Pantheism, Panentheism, The Trinity II: Non-exhaustive 


Tuesday, March 01, 2022

Contradictory premises/Pulling the carpet II

Photo: January 17, 2022, NASA

Contradictory premises/Pulling the carpet II

Part II of a posting from 2016.

Thursday, August 04, 2016: Contradictory premises: Pull the carpet...

Contradictory premises 

From

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London. 

'The problem with contradictory premises is that they cannot both be true. If one is true, the other must be false, and vice versa. In other words, we can be certain that at least one of them must be false, and cannot generate a sound argument.' (69). We do not need to see the conclusion here, we already reasonably know, that at least the premises are contradictory. One premise might be true, but not both. A valid argument can have a false premise. (69). As long as the premise (s) are not true and the conclusion false, it is logically possible to have a valid argument. 

Premise-Conclusion

TT, FF, FT, TF 

A true premise (s) and false conclusion (TF) from these combinations, cannot possibly be logically valid. However, as Pire recognizes, a sound (true) argument has all true premises. (69). It has a true conclusion. 

The classic 'the moon is made of green cheese' (69), is documented as a valid premise, but not a premise in a sound (true) argument. It is not reasonable from empirical, scientific evidence that the moon is made of green cheese, but it is not an illogical premise as such. 

I have suggested to my friends that in arguments, when one disagrees with the conclusion, deny a premise first, if that can be reasonably, truthfully done. This pulls the carpet. It prohibits one from being dragged into accepting a questionable conclusion after hastily accepting premises and then having to philosophically backtrack... 

Here is a common, paraphrased, psychological, motivational, premise and conclusion.

Premise

You are the main creator of your life.

Conclusion

Therefore, if it is going to be, it is up to you.
---

I deny the premise and pull the carpet, by stating:

God is infinite.

God is necessary.

God is the primary cause of all things.

A human being is finite.

A human being is contingent (dependent on what is necessary as the sufficient cause).

A human being is a secondary cause (of some things).
---

I also deny the conclusion, simultaneously. If it is going to be, it is secondarily up to you.


Cited 

Confusion of Necessary with a Sufficient Condition 

A causal fallacy you commit this fallacy when you assume that a necessary condition of an event is sufficient for the event to occur. A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur. A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event. A necessary condition must be there, but it alone does not provide sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. Only the sufficient grounds can do this. In other words, all of the necessary elements must be there. 

Cited 

I don't know why the car won't run; I just filled the gas tank. 

A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event.

The vehicle needs to be started too. A missing premise.

I reason that as God is the necessary cause of all things, directly or indirectly, God is also the sufficient cause of all things. As a theistic philosopher of religion and theologian within the Reformed tradition, everything that occurs is caused by God, either directly willed, or indirectly willed, which could also be called, allowed.


Necessary versus Sufficient conditions

Philosopher Blackburn explains... 

'If p is a necessary condition of q, then q cannot be true unless p is true. If p is a sufficient condition of q, then given that p is true, q is so as well.' (73). Blackburn provides the example: Steering well is a necessary condition of driving well... (73). But it is not sufficient, as one can steer well, but be an overall bad driver. (73). Perhaps, one steers very well, but is overly occupied by texting while driving. (My add, and not my practice) 

This concept from Blackburn with the use of symbolic logic, provides a level of complexity, yet consistent and logical at the same time. But providing a true example provides another level of difficulty. 

A solid/true example

Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b). 

Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b), then infinite nature (b) cannot be true unless infinite attributes (a) are true. If infinite attributes (a) are a sufficient condition of infinite nature (b), then given that infinite attributes (a) are true, then infinite nature (b) is so as well. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London. 

Saturday, December 08, 2018

Brief on 2 Peter 3: options

Brief on 2 Peter 3: options

Necessary v. Contingent

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary.

3. God's plans are necessary.

4. The contingent exist.

5. The necessary supersedes the contingent.

6. Human beings are contingent.

7. Human being's plans are contingent.

8. Human being's needs are contingent. 

Therefore, the suffering of the contingent is permissible.

It could be stated that it is a weaker sense of necessity in point 3 than points 1 and 2.  

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary


Cited 

Absolute necessity might be defined as truth at absolutely all possible worlds without restriction. But we should be able to explain it without invoking possible worlds.

By my definition 1,2 are necessary in all possible worlds. 

3. God's plans are necessary. 

This could be explained as relative necessity.


Cited 

The standard account defines each kind of relative necessity by means of a necessitated or strict conditional, whose antecedent is a propositional constant for the body of assumptions relative to which the consequent is asserted to be necessary.

The relative necessity of (3) has as antecedent the absolute necessity of (1,2).

Further, God, within his infinite, eternal nature, would only be morally obligated to keep his revealed word, as in promises, in regard to contingent, human beings. These are documented in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament within a theistic, Christian worldview.

In contrast, some may view God’s plans as contingent as opposed to necessary. If God’s plans for humanity are contingent, because he could have done otherwise, the fact these contingent plans come from a necessary being would still have them supersede the plans and needs of the contingent.
---

Further, God, within his infinite, eternal nature, would only be morally obligated to keep his revealed word, as in promises, in regard to contingent, human beings. These are documented in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament within a theistic, Christian worldview.

December 8, 2018

The necessary, what exists by necessity, to parallel this philosophical concept with that which is biblical, has plans that exist within the contingency of finite creation, in the context of the material universe and as well with the existence of finite angelic and demonic beings.

Biblically and based on theological and philosophical reason:

God, as what is necessary can complete divine plans with options, however, as they take place within a contingent reality...

I see two options:

1. Perfect will

Direct cause

2. Permissible will

Indirect cause

Allowing
---

2 Peter 2: 3 8

But do not let this one fact escape your notice, beloved, that with the Lord one day is like a thousand years, and a thousand years like one day. 9 The Lord is not slow about His promise, as some count slowness, but is patient toward you, not wishing for any to perish but for all to come to repentance.

New American Standard Bible (NASB)

As I read in Erickson, that is a Calvinist theologian, taking his idea (paraphrased) as a reasonable theological possibility (361).

God's perfect will is that all are saved. (2 Peter 3).

God's permissible will is only those chosen are saved. (Ephesians 1-2, Romans 8-9).

There is also a reasonable objection that it is theologically possible that it is God's perfect will that occurs, at least in regard to human salvation and the citizenship of those within the culminated Kingdom of God. In that case, 2 Peter 3, is not discussing salvation but the repentance of those in Jesus Christ. The 'you' being those already covered by the atoning and resurrection work of Jesus Christ. Those in the Christian Church reading the scripture.

As my mentor at Columbia Bible taught me, sometimes we live with theological tension. Add biblical and philosophical tension, in this case.

BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1976) The Letters of James and Peter, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BONJOUR, LAURENCE. (1996) ‘A Priori’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

MARSHALL, ALFRED (1975)(1996) The Interlinear KJV-NIV, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

PAYNE. DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.

Friday, March 29, 2024

Vicious sports regress

January 16, 2017
Vicious sports regress

Preface

This posting was published January 16, 2017, and was revised March 29, 2024. 

Some related articles




Prime Time Sports 

This was hosted by Bob McCown on Sportsnet at the time. (Paraphrased conversation)

Prime Time

Caller: The baseball player mentioned, signed with a new agent. But how did he find that agent? Did he not need an agent to find that agent?

Host: The player knows the industry and player agents. If you are meaning that the player needed to find an agent to find an agent, then that agent would need to find an agent to infinitude.
---

Blackburn on Vicious Regress

In the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn discusses ‘infinite regress’ and mentions that this occurs in a vicious way whenever a problem tries to solve itself and yet remains with the same problem it had previously. Blackburn (1996: 324) A vicious regress is an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem, while a benign regress is an infinite regress that does not fail to solve its own problem. Blackburn (1996: 324). Blackburn writes that there is frequently room for debate on what is a vicious regress or benign regress. Blackburn (1996: 324). An example of a benign regress is infinite numbers both plus and minus, as they in reality represent conceptualized things as opposed to being real things. 'Problem' solved. 

Therefore: Based on my philosophical reading and Blackburn's explanation, it can be deduced that philosophers would debate whether a particular vicious regress is illogical and whether it is using a logical fallacy. A formal fallacy is concerned with presenting a logical form to avoid being fallacious, and an informal fallacy occurs when there are errors in reasoning with a premise (s) and conclusion. The vicious regress is considered by some an informal fallacy. The fact that it is debated is a clue that it is not a matter of formal, logical, form.

Further: An argument can be logical and not sound, as sound arguments are not the only valid arguments but are those where 'all the premises are true'. Elements (1997: 35). Whether or not a particular vicious regress, and the examples I raised, are illogical and using a logical fallacy in the sense of invalid argument is of secondary importance. It is of primary importance when a vicious regress is not reasonable and does not solve its own problem and is fallacious as in presenting faulty reasoning. I reason. 

Bradley (371) opines that it is not illogical, and not a vicious regress that each act of free choice is caused by another act of free choice. I agree that it is not necessarily illogical, but disagree that the argument as described is not a vicious regress. Bradley mentions that overall, a vicious regress is not necessarily illogical. This point is debated by philosophers. But, I reason a vicious regress is not philosophically reasonable.

This regress can be stopped by stating as premise that a particular agent is sufficient.

Necessary/Sufficient


Department of Philosophy Dr. Craig Hanks

Cited 

Confusion of Necessary with a Sufficient Condition 

A causal fallacy you commit this fallacy when you assume that a necessary condition of an event is sufficient for the event to occur. A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur. A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event. A necessary condition must be there, but it alone does not provide sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. Only the sufficient grounds can do this. In other words, all of the necessary elements must be there. 

Cited 

I don't know why the car won't run; I just filled the gas tank. 

A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event.

The vehicle needs to be started too. A missing premise.

I reason that as God is the necessary cause of all things, directly or indirectly, God is also the sufficient cause of all things. As a theistic philosopher of religion and theologian within the Reformed tradition, everything that occurs is caused by God, either directly willed, or indirectly willed, which could also be called, allowed. The necessary cause exists, but contingent caused things only exist when the necessary cause is the sufficient cause.

Blackburn on Necessary/Sufficient conditions

Philosopher Blackburn explains... 'If p is a necessary condition of q, then q cannot be true unless p is true. If p is a sufficient condition of q, then given that p is true, q is so as well.' (73). Blackburn provides the example: Steering well is a necessary condition of driving well... (73). But it is not sufficient, as one can steer well, but be an overall bad driver. (73). Perhaps, one steers very well, but is overly occupied by texting while driving. (My add, and not my practice) 

This concept from Blackburn with the use of symbolic logic, provides a level of complexity, yet consistent and logical at the same time. But providing a true example provides another level of difficulty. 

A solid/true example

Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b). Infinite attributes (a) are a necessary condition of infinite nature (b), then infinite nature (b) cannot be true unless infinite attributes (a) are true. If infinite attributes (a) are a sufficient condition of infinite nature (b), then given that infinite attributes (a) are true, then infinite nature (b) is so as well.

Based on a 2017 phone conversation, with additions

In a 2017 phone conversation, paraphrased, I referenced in brief, the three examples of a vicious regress, below. 

A god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. 

In answer

From a theistic philosophy of religion, perspective, the first cause, can be considered what is necessary and exists by necessity. The necessary is infinite and eternal. The sufficient cause. The contingent is finite, and at best, everlasting.

From a biblical perspective this is Almighty God, infinite and eternal. Finite creations are contingent. God created the finite...


ESV (English Standard Version) 

12 It is he who made the earth by his power, who established the world by his wisdom, and by his understanding stretched out the heavens.


NASB (New American Standard Bible) 

12 It is He who made the earth by His power, Who established the world by His wisdom; And by His understanding He has stretched out the heavens. 


King James Version (KJV) 

12 He hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdom, and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion.

I am not a linguist, but a fellow scholar from church mentioned Jerimiah 10:12 to me and I reason it works here. The English versions I chose appear to reasonably match the Hebrew translation to English.



























---

A choice is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. 

In answer

Human choice is traced back to human nature. Human nature is traced back to its creator, God, that has infinite, eternal nature and will/choice. God simply is. Existing outside of time eternally, and creating finite, time, matter, energy, space, outside of eternity.

Time is caused by time, is caused by time, is caused by time, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. 

In answer

It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. 

If time is infinitely past, how do we arrive at the present time?

(We do not)

If there is an infinite distance between Maple Ridge and Vancouver, how do we arrive in Vancouver? 

(We do not)

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE, (1991)(2006) ‘The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe’,Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991) 85-96. http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html pp. 1-18. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. http://edwards.yale.edu/archive/documents/page?document_id=10817&search_id=&source_type=edited&pagenumber=1

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas.http://www.jonathanedwards.com 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GIJSBERS, VICTOR, (2006) ‘Theistic Arguments: First Cause’ http://positiveatheism.org/faq/firstcause.htm pp. 1-2. 

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy). 

MARTIN, WALTER (2006) 'The Mormon Doctrine of God', San Juan Capistrano, Walter Martin.org. http://www.waltermartin.org/mormon.html#mormdoc 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology. 

SLICK, MATTHEW J. (2006) A logical proof that Mormonism is false, Meridian, Idaho, Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry. http://www.carm.org/lds/infinity.htm 

SMITH, JOSEPH (1844)(2006) ‘Sermon by the Prophet-The Christian Godhead-Plurality of Gods’, History of the Church, Vol. 6, p. 473-479. http://www.utlm.org 

STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368 

TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online. 

TOLHURST, WILLIAM (1996) 'Vicious Regress', in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.