Saturday, November 02, 2019

The necessary is good

The necessary is good

Edited for reference for an entry on academia.edu on November 11, 2022 

December 8 2018

I wrote:

Necessary v. Contingent 

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary.

3. God's plans are necessary. 

4. The contingent exist.

5. The necessary supersedes the contingent.

6. Human beings are contingent.

7. Human being's plans are contingent.

8. Human being's needs are contingent.

Therefore, the suffering of the contingent is permissible.

I am not stating that God by nature had to create anything, or anything finite. God does have significant free will within divine nature. His plans reflect nature. I am stating that God's plans must occur and therefore are necessary.

It could be stated that it is a weaker sense of necessity in point 3 than points 1 and 2.  

1. The necessary must exist.

2. God is necessary


Cited 

Absolute necessity might be defined as truth at absolutely all possible worlds without restriction. But we should be able to explain it without invoking possible worlds.

By my definition 1,2 are necessary in all possible worlds. 

3. God's plans are necessary. 

This could be explained as relative necessity.


Cited 

The standard account defines each kind of relative necessity by means of a necessitated or strict conditional, whose antecedent is a propositional constant for the body of assumptions relative to which the consequent is asserted to be necessary.

The relative necessity of (3) has as antecedent the absolute necessity of (1,2).

Further, God, within his infinite, eternal nature, would only be morally obligated to keep his revealed word, as in promises, in regard to contingent, human beings. These are documented in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament within a theistic, Christian worldview.

November 2 2019 

Blackburn writes that a proposition is necessary, if it could not have been false.(257). Admittedly, someone can and will always disagree with any provided proposition. But, I agree with the definition here from secular, British, philosopher Blackburn. Further he writes that the necessary, what is of necessity, is true is all possible worlds. (257)

I philosophically hold to a priori truths. Louis P. Pojman explains that the term a priori comes from the Latin “preceding” and is knowledge that is not based on sense experience but is innate or known to human beings by the meanings of words and definitions. Pojman (1996: 595). Arthur Pap defines a priori knowledge as being independent of experience. Pap (1973: 666).

Pojman writes that a posteriori comes the Latin “the later” and is knowledge that is obtained from human sense experience only, as in the five senses. Pojman (1996: 595). Blackburn reasons that something can be known a posteriori when it cannot be known a priori. Blackburn (1996: 21-22)

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Importantly, not all valid and sound argumentation holds to the classic three line syllogism. 

University of Kentucky

Quote

'argument

An Argument is a group of statements including one or more premises and one and only one conclusion. The point of an argument is to give the receiver of the argument good reason to believe new information. assumption a premise that is implied, or is necessary for the argument to be valid, but is unstated.'

University of Windsor

Cited

'G.C. GODDU Department of Philosophy University of Richmond'

'ABSTRACT: Is it possible for an argument to have either zero premises or an infinite number of premises? I shall argue that regardless of how you conceive of arguments you should accept that an argument could have an infinite number of premises. The zero case is more complicated since the matter seems to depend not only on the metaphysics of arguments, but also the nature and function of arguing. I shall argue that at least a plausible case can be made for the possibility of zero premise arguments.'

'How many premises can an argument have?'

'If what I have argued here is correct, then everyone should accept the possibility of infinite premise arguments. On the other hand, whether we should accept zero-premise arguments seems to depend upon the resolution of other highly controversial options in argumentation theory such as—does every argument need a corresponding act of arguing? Does defining argument require an appeal to function? Trying to resolve these issues is a project for another time. At the very least, however, I hope that I have sketched out a position according to which it is straightforwardly possible for there to be zero-premise arguments.'
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I reason...

1. In every possible world, the necessary exists.

2. The necessary is good.

3. The contingent exists.

4. God, as the first cause of the contingent, is necessary.

Therefore, God is good.

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Further, philosophically, what is of necessity would certainly be what is good, and what is perfectly good. Anything contingent, opposed to that good, the perfectly good, would be evil.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BONJOUR, LAURENCE. (1996) ‘A Priori’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

Note, I am not using syllogism as arguments 


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