Very Brief On Vicious Regress

I hope the extra wave effect, intentionally provided, is appreciated...

A Vicious Regress October 2 2006

Very Brief On Vicious Regress

I have been in a few recent discussions in regard to vicious regress and infinite regress.

To state:

A god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause.

A choice is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause.

Time is caused by time, is caused by time, is caused by time, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause.

In the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn discusses ‘infinite regress’ and mentions that this occurs in a vicious way whenever a problem tries to solve itself and yet remains with the same problem it had previously. Blackburn (1996: 324). A vicious regress is an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem, while a benign regress is an infinite regress that does not fail to solve its own problem. Blackburn (1996: 324). Blackburn writes that there is frequently room for debate on what is a vicious regress or benign regress. Blackburn (1996: 324).

An example of a benign regress is infinite numbers both plus and minus, as they in reality represent conceptualized things as opposed to being real things. 'Problem' solved.

Therefore:

Based on my philosophical reading and Blackburn's explanation, it can be deduced that philosophers would debate whether a particular vicious regress is illogical and whether it is using a logical fallacy.

Further:

An argument can be logical and not sound, as sound arguments are not the only valid arguments but are those where 'all the premises are true'. (1997: 35).

Whether or not a particular vicious regress, and the examples I raised, are illogical and using a logical fallacy in the sense of invalid argument is of secondary importance. It is of primary importance when a vicious regress is not reasonable and does not solve its own problem and is fallacious as in faulty reasoning. That is the case with my three examples, I reason.

Bradley mentions that it is not illogical, and not a vicious regress that each act of free choice is caused by another act of free choice. I agree that it is not necessarily illogical, but disagree that the argument as described is not a vicious regress.

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Regress’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

A fine Bulgarian gift from Dean and Anjela a few years ago. Note, I am neither a communist, socialist, nor a smoker. I still do not know what I did to earn this lovely Bulgarian medal...

I did drive Anjela and Sophia to the mall once when Dean was away on work travel.

Ambiguous Language

Poland: trekearth

Back to a review of the Langer text on Symbolic Logic, after a break since March as I was facilitating on a local church course and posting related articles.

The previous Langer post needs to be restated for context:

Chapter 2: The Essentials Of Logical Structure 

Langer provides further equations continued from the Chapter: pages 53-54

1. I played bridge with my three cousins

2. I played chess with my three cousins (53)

A=Speaker

B, C, D=Three cousins (54)

A br B, C, D (54)

If in chess each player was played separately

A ch B
A ch C
A ch D
A ch (B-C-D)* (54)

*The hyphen which could also be a + expresses an operation when the two terms are united as one. (54)

So this could be A ch (B+C+D)

I take it here the author means uniting B-C-D, as she explains this will be explained more later and must at this point be taken in faith. (54)

It is actually three terms, but I take the point and she means two or more.

---

'When a relation-symbol stands in a construct, the number of terms grouped with it reveals the degree of the relation. But when it is not actually used, but merely spoken of, it is sometimes convenient to have some way of denoting its degree. This may be done by adding a numerical subscript; for example, "kd2" means that "killing" is dyadic (a pair), "bt3" that "between" is triadic.' (55).

The examples of different degrees are provided:

ch2
br4 (55)

The author states that two beings named 'John' are not likely to be treated as the same in the language of discourse (56). It is made apparent in context that there is this John and that John. (56).

Symbolic logic provides a new medium of such expression. (57).

For example the following

John a

John b

Are a symbolic way of differentiating between two different persons named John using arbitrary symbols as Langer calls them. (58). Although the example is mine.

Langer writes natural language has a tendency to let one word have and embody many meanings and this leads to in philosophical terms fallacious argumentation and reasoning. (55).

In fact, twisted arguments can be created. (55).

A reason for the use of symbolic logic and reasoning as alternative within philosophy.

In a religious context, philosophy of religion crosses over with theology and there are at times theological arguments that are presented both in natural language and with symbolic logic, and so therefore learning both modes of argumentation is beneficial.

---

Continued

Ambiguous Language

Langer explains 'Our linguistic means of conveying relations are highly ambiguous. But the expression of relations is the chief purpose of language. If we were interested only in things and not in their arrangement and connection, we could express ourselves with our forefingers.' (56).

An interesting author example, and the idea of supposed human communication as ape-like creatures within the concept of Darwinian Evolution comes to mind. Assuming that at one point evolving 'humanity' perhaps did communicate by such methods.

This being the case, if indeed one would accept such views over explanations that include both reasonable scientific induction and deduction and a literal view and not mythological view of the historical religious history of Genesis and Scripture. This reasonable approach that can include both plain literal and figurative literal biblical interpretations based on what biblical language and context dictates.

But I digress.

The author explains that in the example, the two John's are not likely to be confused. This is because these relations can be explicitly known in discourse. (56).

However, Langer expresses the idea that terms and concepts not explained clearly through discourse need to be explained when obscurity in communication occurs. (57). In order to escape error 'another sort of discourse' is required. (57).

This being symbolic logic. (57).

A more precise symbolism can bring logic out of language. (57).

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

Populum, Argumentum Ad

Recent

This fallacy is a particular irritant and was as well, before I was an academic. But I will attempt objectivity.

Quote

'The argumentum ad populum appeals to popular attitudes instead of presenting relevant material. In other words, it is based on prejudice. It exploits the known propensity of people to accept that which fits in comfortably with their preconceptions. The popular prejudices may or may not be justified, but the speaker who makes his case depend solely upon them is guilty of an ad populum fallacy. Pirie (165).

I am reasoning it should state 'depending'. I do this humbly as I have my share of technical errors, being my own proofreader! I edit when I am aware it is needed.

Further, the author explains that this fallacy can inflame passions and prejudices more appropriate to mass hysteria than to rational discourse. (165).

Those that use this fallacy 'take the easy way out'. (165).

This relates to my philosophical complaint in regard to lazy thinking and cop-out thinking.

Not that any human being has perfect thinking, but at times corrective reasoning should be pursued.

Playing on the emotions of the multitude. (165). Or, trusting in that fallacious type of thinking in regard to personal preferences and convictions, as opposed to researching and asking God for truth, even if that is uncomfortable truth.

Blackburn agrees with Pirie, basically, stating that this fallacy is 'appealing to the prejudices of the people.' (24).

Relevant and obviously non-exhaustive examples:

Significantly accepting the views of a known teacher over a critiques of a less known teacher, because the known teacher is more popular. Not primarily because of the merits of argumentation.

Considering one person in a romantic context over another significantly because it is more socially and culturally acceptable, not mainly based on character and other positive attributes.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Mark Final Study: Robots?

May 11

Christianity Explored

My friend 'Chucky' and the rumoured computer chip installed in his brain. Is he a possible robot candidate and within his hyper-Mennonite upbringing, a classic victim of hard determinism?

Mark Final Study: Robots?

During the Christianity Explored, Gospel of Mark course, finale, a 'seeker', now with a Bible, asked (paraphrased):

Why does God not just create people that believe in Jesus Christ?

An excellent question and actually I view it and its ramifications as a serious objection to a classic libertarian free will defence and incompatibilism.

There are both non-Christian and Reformed objections to libertarian free will views; please see bibliography, in particular Mackie, Flew, Plantinga and Feinberg.

Please also see this site archives.

A kind Roman Catholic, evangelical answered with the classic and typical evangelical church answer (paraphrased):

People could not love God without the option of free will and the option to not to love God; otherwise people were robots.

I respectfully answered that within a Reformed tradition there was a better answer, although her answer had some truth to it. I replied along the lines as I have written in my PhD and on my academic sites which I will present again in a more complex form than in the course:

God could inevitably bring about, through the use of the regeneration and the resurrection of elected human persons, the end of human corruption, and even Plantinga’s concept of transworld depravity. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53). If God willed and created a finalized Kingdom of restored persons that had experienced the problem of evil and were saved from it, then it could be reasoned that with God’s constant persuasion through the Holy Spirit and human experience and maturity, transworld depravity would never take place again.

No human wrong decision would need to occur as God always determines otherwise, without force and coercion; restored human beings do not lack experience as did the first humans (Adam and Eve) who rebelled against God causing corruption.

I speculate that theological praxis of sovereignty theodicy is more certain and comforting than free will theodicy, as transworld depravity is overcome by taking the primary choice (secondary human choice remains as simultaneously caused by God) of human belief in God away from corrupted human beings. Augustine (421)(1998: Chapter 13: 8). Plantinga (1982: 184-189). Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 2, 7). Luther (1516)(1968: 31). Feinberg (1994: 126-127).

It is placed in the hands of a sovereign God.

I have also written on the issue of God being perfectly able to create significantly free creatures that do not sin:

Greg Welty And Christ As Sinless Human Being (PhD Edit) March 10, 2014

The church table leader kindly attempted to shed light on the discussion by stating I was Reformed and did not believe in free will, but I stated that I do not believe in libertarian free will, but limited free will. I had stated earlier in the conversation that I was a soft determinist.

I realize many incompatibilists will not accept the soft determinism/hard determinism distinction, intellectually preferring a blanket 'determinism' term; but academically, theologically and philosophically, a significant distinction remains:

Significant human will or human free will is removed from a hard determinism model.

Significant human will or limited free will or like (freely) remains within many Reformed models, including mine and that of John S. Feinberg in 'The Many Faces of Evil'.

Some hyper-Calvinists may rightly be considered hard determinists.

Another recent article:

Middle Knowledge Revisited April 20 2016

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