Best Possible World Versus Modified Rationalism

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Best Possible World Versus Modified Rationalism

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I was recently, as per usual, listening to an online preacher I learn from and deeply appreciate.

The pastor was presenting professional Biblical exposition on Ecclesiastes. I was however, once again reminded of the perils of a speaker not having some significant type of philosophical education while preaching. I reason the pastor correctly noted that King Solomon erred by largely seeking worldly things and worldly wisdom as opposed to seeking the Lord and divine wisdom and the Book of Ecclesiastes reflected this state. I readily admit the pastor knows the Bible, chapter and verse better than I do. But by listening I learn more.

But when this pastor opines into anything very theological or very philosophical, I often start to cringe and there are red flags that arise in my mind. The pastor stated (paraphrased) that looking at the Solomon example, therefore none of us today can possibly be happier or have more joy or peace than we presently have in Jesus Christ. In other words, if we trust is Jesus, Jesus, Jesus, as he stated (paraphrased), we will not have the ability to be any more happy, or have more joy or peace in Christ than we do presently, within the present realm.

This is false.

If the pastor had read and accepted related from philosophers Plantinga or Feinberg, for example, he would realize that there is no such thing as a best possible world.

Plantinga’s reasoning appears sound as any finite world God would create could always be better. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 34). Only an infinite world would be the best possible world, and it is debatable and unlikely God could create an infinite world. The fact that a world is created means it is not infinitely old or eternal, and so this would seemingly make the concept of a created infinite world untenable.

Within modified rationalism, the concept of a best possible world is denied in favour of the view that God chose to create the present world which was initially perfectly good. Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36).

The fact that the problem of evil exists would be seen within modified rationalism as a result of the free choice of human beings to rebel against God in both free will and sovereignty theodicy which both deny the notion of best possible world. Plantinga (1982: 167-189). Feinberg (1994: 36). 

Modified rationalism would oppose the best possible world concepts of Leibniz from the Enlightenment era, and Mackie from the modern era. Leibniz (1710)(1990). Mackie (1971) in Plantinga (1977)(2002: 32-33).

God has the best possible and maximal within his infinite and triune nature, but in the context of finite creation, there is no best possible anything or maximal anything. Everything is limited as finite.

Therefore, someone in Jesus Christ can be happier, and someone in Christ can also have more joy and peace as these things are never maximally reached in any best possible scenario.

There is no such thing as maximal happiness, joy or peace in a finite context.

There can be more love and success, etcetera.

There can be more finite human interaction with the infinite God.

Perhaps a progression in such is an aspect of everlasting life in the Kingdom of God.

I am not trying to be overly critical or negative, not at all, but instead am pointing out the need for robust education for those publicly presenting the gospel, those speaking in the context of religious studies and preaching.

As much as I deeply appreciate this pastor’s teaching, his fundamentalism and at times over-spiritualization seem to prohibit other perspectives within truth.

The need for a robust understanding within religious studies and philosophy/philosophy of religion is a reason I presently review texts on subjects such as symbolic logic on my Blogger blogs, in order to increase my own learning.

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ADAMS, ROBERT. M (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books. 

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Theodicy’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 375. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BOURKE, VERNON J. (1958) ‘Introduction’, in The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html 

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

CHADWICK, HENRY (1992) ‘Introduction’, in Confessions, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library. 

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University. 

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

JORDAN, MARK D. (1996) ‘Augustine’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, pp. 52-53. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KREEFT, PETER (1988) Fundamentals of the Faith, San Francisco, Ignatius Press.

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

LAFOLLETTE, HUGH (1980) ‘Plantinga on Free Will Defence’, in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 11, The Hague, Martimus Nijhoff Publishers. 

LEIBNIZ, G.W. (1710)(1998) Theodicy, Translated by E.M. Huggard Chicago, Open Court Classics. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MESLE, C. ROBERT (1986) ‘The Problem of Genuine Evil: A Critique of John Hick’s Theodicy’, in The Journal of Religion, Volume 66, Number 4, pp. 412-430. October, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 

MESLE, C. ROBERT (1991) John Hick’s Theodicy, New York, St. Martin’s Press. 

MESLE, C. ROBERT (2004) ‘Suffering, Meaning, and the Welfare of Children: What Do Theodicies Do?’, in American Journal of Theology & Philosophy, Volume 25, Number 3, September. Lamoni, Iowa, Graceland University.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN.C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

ROTH, JOHN K. ‘Introduction’ (1892-1907)(1969) in The Moral Philosophy of William James, John K. Roth (ed.), Thomas Y. Crowell Company, New York. 

ROTH, JOHN K. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1990) ‘The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism’, in Adams and Adams (eds.), The Problem of Evil, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1994) ‘The Problem of No Best World’, Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 269-278. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1996) ‘Privation’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

ROWE, WILLIAM L. (1999) ‘The Problem of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 16, Number 1, January, pp. 98-101. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

Saturday, September 19, 2020: PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

Forms & Concepts

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LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

Chapter 1: The Study of forms (Continued)

Concepts

The process of attending to the forms of a thing or a situation and conveying the abstracted form is vital when moving from common sense to scientific thinking. (35). These abstracted forms are scientific concepts. (35). Analogies in nature can lead to systematized concepts knows as a science. (35).

Oscillation is used as an example where a rhythmic motion occurs 'to and fro'. (36). However, the various causes of oscillation can be different, such as 'swaying skyscraper' and 'vibrating violin string'.' (36).

The author explains there is a common property of these things gong to a fro, 'this property is the logical form of their motions, and so we may call all these motions diverse instances of the same form.' (36).

This is the 'concept of oscillation'. (36).

The scientific concept of oscillation.

Importantly, Langer writes that there are similar scientific concepts for 'gravity' and 'radiation'. (36).

Many things in nature exemplify relatively few forms, the same forms, and this allows information to be systematized within science and scientific concepts. Otherwise she reasons, there would be no science. (36).

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From Roger Crisp:

CRISP, ROGER (1996) ‘Form’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

'Form, in metaphysics, especially in Plato's and Aristotle's, the structure or essence of a thing as contrasted with its matter. (271).

Also noted:

'Kant saw form as the a priori aspect of experience. We are presented with phenomenological 'matter', which  has no meaning until the mind imposes some form upon it'. (271).

It can be reasoned that not only can the finite human mind impose form upon phenomenal experience and therefore empirical experience, but also the infinite mind of God as first cause (human beings as secondary causes) imposes meaning and form to these empirical human experiences through the human mind.

This would make empirical reading and transmission of inspired Biblical Scripture, for example, a method for God to pass on his spiritual Gospel message to finite human beings that could not know God personally, simply a priori, or through speculative philosophy alone, or within the noumenon realm as Kant described it.

Therefore, contrary to Kant, God may be known by the finite human being via divine revelation, apart from purely, intellectual intuition.

Further, it is not impossible or beyond the infinite to reach the finite, even as the finite will not know personally the infinite exhaustively.

I reason God can be 'known about' in a finite sense, but in a greater finite sense, God can be 'known personally in Jesus Christ' when supernaturally revealed and Scriptural revelation is the primary mode for this revelation. However, I would not rule exhaustively in every case historically other supernatural modes such as dreams, visions, appearances (Acts 9). The production of Scripture being dependant on supernatural interaction between writer and God.

John 1

New American Standard Bible (NASB)

The Deity of Jesus Christ

1 In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.
2 [a]He was in the beginning with God.
3 All things came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being.
4 In Him was life, and the life was the Light of men.
5 The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not [b]comprehend it.

Genetic Fallacy/Damning The Origin/Damning The Source

Vancouver

My new site URL and the 'first' post:

drrnm.blogspot.com

I have gone through Blogger, Facebook and Google+ and as far as I know all the links should have transferred over as far as main page and archived posts.
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Back to a review of the Pirie text.

At Northview Community Church in Abbotsford, Wednesday night, 'Genetic Fallacy' was mentioned several times by the two speakers working within Christian apologetics.

So, how is this fallacy reviewed by Pirie?

And I shall also cite Blackburn.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Pirie:

'The genetic fallacy has nothing to do with Darwin'... (116) But a great deal to do with not liking where an argument comes from. (116). People give less credence to views which emanate from those they detest, regardless of the actual merit of the views themselves. (116).

Note that this demonstrates a lack of objective thinking. Objective thinking being a view and/or approach primarily based on the object, facts not feelings.

Instead this fallacy shows the use of subjective thinking, which more so as a view or approach reflects the thoughts of the person thinking, subjectively, than objective thoughts on the issue in question. This view and/or approach would therefore be more influenced by feelings than facts.

To dismiss an argument based on source alone is to commit the genetic fallacy. (116) An example as potential sub-conscious and perhaps conscious thoughts:

I will not consider anything that Dr. Russell Norman Murray writes on his website,
because he is Christian and Canadian and I am non-religious and European.

Genetic fallacy is sometimes also known as 'damning the origin.' (116).

'Damning the source' would work as well as a term. My add, having read this elsewhere previously.

The author notes that the wicked can have good arguments and that saints can be silly. (116).

Arguments need to be considered objectively for soundness and not subjectively scorned because of source. Another example that comes to mind is a debate with a critic and friend from a few months ago.

The critic stated (paraphrased):

The academic work of Biblical scholars cannot be trusted because they are all Christians.

However:

Biblical scholars presenting academic work are Christians and non-Christians.

(There are for example, Jewish and Hebrew, Hebrew Bible scholars and some non-religious, Biblical scholars presenting academic work).

Christian scholars can have objectivity.

(The terms Christian and Biblical scholar are not mutually exclusive. By definition to be a scholar, recognized at a Masters and/or Doctoral level with a degree by a significant University, requires at least a significant level of objectivity. To work at a significant academic institution requires at least a significant level of objectivity, to have an academic book or work published by a significant publisher requires at least a significant level of objectivity).

Therefore the critic used the genetic fallacy and damned the origin and damned the source.

Interestingly, philosopher Blackburn again, as with elsewhere in his text, uses the word 'alleged' in regard to the subject of fallacy and in this case genetic fallacy.

'The alleged mistake of arguing that something is to be rejected because of its suspicious origins.' (155).

A useful entry for balance:

'More widely, any mistake of inferring something about the nature of some topic from a proposition about its origins. Frequently such reasoning is, actually quite appropriate, as when one uses the make of an automobile as an indicator of its likely quality.' (155).

Without disagreeing with the speakers or Pirie and the documented academic fallacy, I also once again can appreciate Blackburn's cautious and balanced academic approach as reasonable.

Vancouver 

Fear Of Abstraction?

Vancouver 2015

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

Chapter 1: The Study of forms (Continued from two previous articles)

'The consideration of a form, which several analogous things may have in common, apart from any contents, or "concrete integuments," is abstraction. (33). To speak of for example a set of twins or pair of gloves, these forms are abstracted as two in numerosity. (33). To write or speak of the form of a couple or two without respect to its content is a form of abstracto. (33).

The author states:

'Most people shy at the very word "abstraction." It suggests to them the incomprehensible, misleading, difficult, the great intellectual void of empty words. But as a matter of fact, abstract thinking is the quickest and most powerful kind of thinking, as even an elementary study of symbolic logic tends to show. The reason people are afraid of abstraction is simply that they do not know how to handle it. They have not learned to make correct abstractions, and therefore become lost among the empty forms, or worse yet, among the mere words for such forms, which they call " empty words" with an air of disgust. It is not the fault of abstraction that few people can really think abstractly, any more than it is the fault of mathematics that not many people are good mathematicians.' (34).

This reads philosophically accurate in regard to academics and education.

Further, Langer writes:

'There is nothing in our educational curriculum that would teach anyone to deal in abstracted forms.' (34).

Interestingly for years I have commented on the lack of formal philosophical education (theology and religious studies included) for most in Western society and that it is a continual issue in regard to developing and understanding worldview.

For the most part those that take and study abstract type philosophical thinking are at a college or University level.

Langer explains that the one form of abstraction taught 'is that empty form of arithmetic which is called algebra'. (34) It seems implied this is a notable abstraction taught within the Western world grade school system and she writes that even some philosophers and almost all laymen 'believe abstraction to be vicious and intrinsically false'. (34).

She reasons there is lack of logical insight and related training. (34). There is nothing abstruse, esoteric or "unreal" about abstract thinking. (35). Rather the knowledge of these logical forms needs to made explicit, conscious, and familiar. (35).

The author asks what the opposite of abstraction is. (44). It is important within education to make the abstract: explicit, conscious, familiar, clear, concise, and understandable.

This would significantly alleviate the abstraction problem academically.

Some academic study is by nature abstract. For example, studying this text and the Pirie philosophical text on fallacies I am also blogging on.

Previously, I had to study eschatology and Revelation during my teaching internship at Trinity Western University and the work was abstract because of figurative literal language and imagery in Scripture with very few scholars in that field of study.

My United Kingdom problem of evil and theodicy theses work also contained several abstractions which I had to work through.

I had to read through and evaluate Immanuel Kant, in regard to 'pure reason' which was abstract for my extensive, required Doctoral, Philosophy of Religion additions.

Overall, I can agree that there needs to be academic and educational simplification but also an understanding of the complex and abstract is needed at times.

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This post is from my Facebook Blog Page with live link that I use primarily to promote my Blogger blogs. It received far more 'people reached' than usual and perhaps demonstrates what I need to present to be more popular...

Not that popularity is my main focus.

Here was was my eye-catching header:

For you Star Wars nerds (certain friendly neighbours, for example).

May the farce be with you?

Russell Norman Murray Facebook Blog Page