Bertrand Russell: Very short advice on two points

 

Bertrand Russell:  Very short advice on two points 

(From 1959)

Bertrand Russell (1957)(1976)

Intellectual: Russell mentions that in any matter or philosophy, a person should only seek facts and truth. Do not be diverted by what could be socially effective, at the expense of facts and truth. In other words, within any life study, practical, academic, etcetera, objectivity should be pursued. For Russell, the pursuit of objectivity takes priority over ideas that are socially popular and even might be effective to a point. These are things that might socially work regardless, if whether they really contain much objective fact and truth.

I have noted on this website that British philosopher, Simon Blackburn explains that philosophically postmodernism, as the listed example, implies a mistrust in the views of modernity. Blackburn (1996: 294). Post-structuralists deny fixed meanings or correspondences between language and reality and fixed objective truth and fact. Blackburn (1996: 295). Truth is not so much objective, but there can be more or less accuracy. Blackburn (1996: 295).

Philosophically, I would reason for the finite mind there is no such thing as complete objectivity and there are always subjective aspects to reasoning. I reason the infinite, eternal, omniscient, God can see things perfectly and fully objectively and also sees the subjective. 

However, the Scripture does appear to make certain largely and primarily objective claims. For example, in John 14:6 where Jesus claims (from the NASB) that he is the way, the truth and the life, and that no one comes to the Father but through him. This appears to be an objective truth claim in regard to the nature of God and the nature of human salvation, when applied to persons.

Objective reasoning and thinking being views and/or approaches primarily based on the object, facts not feelings. This opposed to subjective thinking, which is subjective thoughts rather than objective thoughts on the issue in question. Subjective thinking and approach would therefore be more influenced by feelings than facts. Again, no one finite, is totally (infinitely) objective, but, there is a fixed meaning between the language of a text and reality. There can be claims of truth and fact. 

Moral: Russell explains that love is wise. Hatred is foolish. In other words, in western democracy, in particular, I can agree there should be toleration for various worldviews and ideas and overall a love for others within society. This within reasonable, law and order.

John 13 from the Gospel of John: John 13:34-35 New American Standard Bible (NASB) 34 A new commandment I give to you, that you love one another, even as I have loved you, that you also love one another. 35 By this all men will know that you are My disciples, if you have love for one another.”

I John 4:20 the Epistle 20 If someone says, “I love God,” and hates his brother, he is a liar; for the one who does not love his brother whom he has seen, cannot love God whom he has not seen.

Jesus Christ within the great commandment (Mathew 22, Mark 12, Luke 10, Paul-Galatians 5), mentions that the second commandment is to love all persons as neighbours as one loves self. The first commandment to love of God with the fullness in mind and spirit. This is the God of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament.  

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford, University, Press. 

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville. 

ELLIS, DAVID J. (1986) 'John' in F.F. Bruce (gen.ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/ Zondervan.

ELWELL, WALTER AND YARBROUGH, ROBERT W., Third Edition (2013) Encountering The New Testament, Grand Rapids, Baker Academic. 

GUNDRY, ROBERT (1981) A Survey of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

RUSSELL, BERTRAND (1957)(1976) Why I am not a Christian, Simon and Schuster Inc., in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers. 

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy,Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

---

This week...

Thursday, September 24, 2015 Bertrand Russell On Utopia (PhD Edit)

A fallacy of inconsistency: Premises should support the conclusion

A fallacy of inconsistency: Premises should support the conclusion

Photo: Civil Engineering Discoveries, LinkedIn, Germany, August 17, 2021

Original entry 

Monday, July 04, 2016 Conclusion which denies premises & fallacy of inconsistency

Pirie

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

A fallacy of inconsistency.

This is the conclusion that denies its own premises. (66).

Pire writes that this type of argument maintains one thing in the premises and then denies that same thing in the conclusion. (66).

This is a fallacy of inconsistency. (67).

From Elements of Reasoning

Validity in deductive arguments is a technical term in logic. Elements (1997: 33). The concept of true premises and false conclusion would be 'inconceivable in a valid argument'. Elements (1997: 33). In other words, (TF). Validity is a set of premises supporting a conclusion. Technically in logic the premises do not have to be true, simply valid. Elements (1997: 33). Therefore a valid deductive argument can have

False premises and a true conclusion (FT)

False premises and a false conclusion (FF)

True premises and a true conclusion (TT)

However

True premises and a false conclusion (TF) is invalid.

Valid arguments with all true premises are called sound arguments. These also have true conclusions.

Pirie explains that a conclusion must be consistent with the arguments present in support of it. (66).

A conclusion must be reasonably and legitimately supported by propositions/premises.

Based on certain religious argumentation presented in history, Pirie then states: 'But if everything must have a cause, how can there be such a thing as an uncaused cause?' (67). The author opines that throughout history, 'first cause' is an example of this fallacy. (67). To avoid this problem. he reasons, attempts have usually led to examples that  'beg the question' and 'subvert the argument', being used.

'Everything' is a key term in his example.

I do not see fallacious means as being required, such as circular reasoning or unreasonable assumption, or unreasonable avoidance. A key here is to eliminate the term 'everything' when discussing 'first cause'. To differ from the author's sceptical perspective, one could state with various propositions that the universe, time and matter are finite, the finite has origin. Therefore there is an infinite first cause.

This is not a fallacious or illogical argument.

A new concept is being introduced into the conclusion that is not 'everything' noted in Pirie's example. Of course the concepts are related as the propositions are supposed to support and prove the conclusion.

Further, hypothetically, based on the same propositions, the conclusion for example, could assume vicious regress, or that there is no cause and we have mystery. Pirie does not mention and avoids the issue of vicious regress in this entry. If there is not a first cause and instead there is a supposedly an implied, infinite regress of causes, it is a vicious regress (an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem). As I have noted in a recent post, there is debate on whether or not a vicious regress is illogical, but I state that it is certainly unreasonable, in this context, because it does not solve its own problem.

Appealing to mystery, may occur because of lack of significant cumulative evidences. It is often an intellectual cop-out as pointed out to me by Dr. William Kay, Wales, one of my United Kingdom, academic tutors. Mystery too, does not solve its own problem. I am not stating therefore that it is always error to state 'I do not know'.

I have discussed vicious regress on this site with the assistance of the work of Simon Blackburn and others. I reason this miss on this entry in the Pirie text, is a much larger philosophical problem than the misuse of the term 'everything' Pirie raised, although I appreciate this entry and the text, therefore the review. I have added a Vicious Regress section after this one.

Pirie seems critical that a divine being would be the exception to the rule, but 'everything' other than God in existence would be finite and God would be infinite, therefore to make a separation and distinction is not fallacious. I disagree with Pirie (67) and reason it is obviously true that an infinite, first cause, God, would be categorically different than everything finite in context. Even a non-theist could reason this theoretically without belief. I agree with the author that the universe is the universe (67), but it is finite. In significant contrast, God is infinite and eternal as transcendent as well as being immanent while being in sovereign control over finite creation.

From this entry, I can appreciate Pirie for making it apparent that in regard to this issue theists need to use clear and concise premises and arguments. These type of critiques are a reason secular philosophy and philosophy of religion are intellectually valuable academic disciplines. This type of reading was consistently required in my British MPhil and PhD research theses.

Vicious Regress 

My explanation  

A god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, is caused by a god, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. (In philosophy of religion, the first cause, can be considered what is necessary and exists by necessity. From a biblical perspective this is Almighty God, infinite and eternal.) 

A choice is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, is caused by a choice, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. (Human choice is traced back to human nature. Human nature is traced back to its creator, God, that has infinite, eternal nature and will/choice.) 

Time is caused by time, is caused by time, is caused by time, ad infinitum, is an infinite regress. It is a vicious regress, because it does not solve its own problem and requires a first cause, without a cause. (If there is an infinite distance between Maple Ridge and Vancouver, one will never arrive in Vancouver. There is no amount of time that will see this distance travelled.) 

Prime Time

Prime Time Sports was hosted by the intelligent Bob McCown.

January 16, 2017 (Paraphrased)

Caller: The baseball player mentioned, signed with a new agent. But how did he find that agent? Did he not need an agent to find that agent?

Host: The player knows the industry and player agents. If you are meaning that the player needed to find an agent to find an agent, then that agent would need to find an agent to infinitude.

Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy

In the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Simon Blackburn discusses ‘infinite regress’ and mentions that this occurs in a vicious way whenever a problem tries to solve itself and yet remains with the same problem it had previously. Blackburn (1996: 324) A vicious regress is an infinite regress that does not solve its own problem, while a benign regress is an infinite regress that does not fail to solve its own problem. Blackburn (1996: 324). Blackburn writes that there is frequently room for debate on what is a vicious regress or benign regress. Blackburn (1996: 324).

An example of a benign regress is infinite numbers both plus and minus, as they in reality represent conceptualized things as opposed to being real things. 'Problem' solved. Therefore: Based on my philosophical reading and Blackburn's explanation, it can be deduced that philosophers would debate whether a particular vicious regress is illogical and whether it is using a logical fallacy. Further: An argument can be logical and not sound, as sound arguments are not the only valid arguments but are those where 'all the premises are true'. (1997: 35). 

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy

Whether or not a particular vicious regress, and the examples I raised, are illogical and using a logical fallacy in the sense of invalid argument is of secondary importance. It is of primary importance when a vicious regress is not reasonable and does not solve its own problem and is fallacious as in faulty reasoning. That is the case with my three examples, I reason. Bradley (371) mentions that it is not illogical, and not a vicious regress that each act of free choice is caused by another act of free choice. I agree that it is not necessarily illogical, but disagree that the argument as described is not a vicious regress. A vicious regress can be stopped by stating as premise that a particular agent is sufficient.

Also within The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, William Tolhurst writes that a vicious regress is in some way unacceptable as it would include an infinite series of items dependent on prior items. A vicious regress may be impossible to hold to philosophically, or it may be inconsistent. Tolhurst (1996: 835). 

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Regress’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York.

CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE, (1991)(2006) ‘The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe’,Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991) 85-96. http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html pp. 1-18.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas.http://www.jonathanedwards.com

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. 

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

SLICK, MATTHEW J. (2006) 'A logical proof that Mormonism is false', Meridian, Idaho, Christian Apologetics and Research Ministry, http://www.carm.org/lds/infinity.htm 

SMITH, JOSEPH (1844)(2006) ‘Sermon by the Prophet-The Christian Godhead-Plurality of Gods’, History of the Church, Vol. 6, p. 473-479. http://www.utlm.org 

TOLHURST, TOLHURST, WILLIAM (1996) 'Vicious Regress', in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

It is true love to allow someone you love, to reject you

Photo: Instagram.com, Aurish Sopot, Poland

At the last Bible study of the semester, for our Zoom church group, one of the questions discussed (paraphrased) was how God could willingly allow many human beings to reject him forever in hell (re: Matthew 7 and Luke 13)?

(Paraphrased)

I opined that...

In God's love he allows some of his loved humanity, to reject him forever. 

I also stated that...

It is true love to allow someone you love, to reject you.

Website archives: Matthew 7

Sunday, July 29, 2007 Universalism 

From the second link with edits for this article...

In Matthew 7:13-14, Jesus uses an illustration relating to the ultimate destiny of individuals and explains that few persons enter by the narrow gate, and the wide and broad way of destruction is found by many. William Barclay points out, that Luke 13:24 is presenting a similar idea which may have come from the same original source, but reached the author of Luke from a different tradition. Barclay (1975: 97). In Luke, Jesus explains that many will strive to enter by the narrow gate, but shall not be able to. Barclay (1975: 97). This idea from Jesus would fit with a compatibilistic theology where God uses soft determinism to elect individuals to salvation. From this perspective, human beings with the use of free will alone cannot choose God. Within a sovereignty perspective, God will choose whom he wills to be present in his culminated Kingdom, and those he elects shall believe and follow him without being forced or coerced to do so. I reason that as God regenerates  (John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1) an individual by the Holy Spirit, he simultaneously determines that the person shall freely with the use of a limited, but significant free will, believe in Christ. Sentimentally, universalism is humanly more comforting, but it appears that Jesus disagreed with Hick on universalism. 

Laurence E. Porter describes a scenario in Luke 13:24-28 where some religious persons are rejected by God. Porter (1986: 1211). Jesus did not accept the theology that a sincere religious devotion alone would lead one to God’s presence in the culminated Kingdom of God. Let me point out that everlasting existence apart from God is absolutely and positively, not my hope for any individual person, but my theological findings are driven by research and not sentiment. I see no good reason to believe that human beings that have rejected the Biblical God throughout their lives with a corrupt nature and the resulting sinful thoughts and actions would ever in post-mortem existence come to Christ, unless determined to do so by God. Biblically, there appears to be no salvation for those outside of Christ upon death. 

ALLEN, C. LESLIE (1986) 'Romans' in F.F. Bruce (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

ANKERBERG, JOHN AND JOHN WELDON (1999) Encyclopedia of Cults and New Religions, Eugene, Oregon, Harvest House Publishers. 

ANSELM (1962) Anselm's Basic Writings, translated by S.W. Deane, 2nd Ed., La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co. 

AQUINAS, THOMAS (1981) Summa Theologica (1a Q2), "Whether the Existence of God is Self-Evident Thomas More Publishing. 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books. 

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BARCLAY, WILLIAM (1975) Introduction to the First Three Gospels, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press.

BAUER, WALTER (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BROWNING, W.R.F. (1997) Dictionary of the Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BRUCE, F.F. (1987) Romans, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

BURKE, T. PATRICK (1999) ‘Ontology’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

COAD, F. ROY (1986) 'Galatians' in F.F. Bruce (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville.

CRAIGIE, P.C. (1996) 'Idolatry', in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

DAVIS, STEPHEN T. (1981)(ed.), Encountering Evil, Atlanta, John Knox Press.FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

DUNN, JAMES D.G. (1988) Romans, Dallas, Word Books. 

ELLER, D.B. (1996) ‘Universalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, p. 1128-1130. Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (2003) What Does God Know and When Does He Know It?, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press. 

GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press. 

GUNDRY, ROBERT (1981) A Survey of the New Testament, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

HARPUR, GEORGE (1986) 'Ephesians' in The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1989) God, Time, and Knowledge, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1993) ‘C. Robert Mesle, John Hick’s Theodicy: A Process Humanist Critique’, in Philosophy of Religion, Volume 34, Number 1, pp. 55-56. Dordrecht, Netherlands, Philosophy of Religion.

HASKER, WILLIAM (1994) ‘Can Philosophy Defend Theology?’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 11, Number 2, April, pp. 272-278.  Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2000) ‘The Problem of Evil in Process Theism and Classical Free Will Theism’, in Process Studies, Volume. 29, Number 2, Fall-Winter, pp. 194-208. Claremont, California, Religion Online.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Counterfactuals and Evil’, in Philosophia Christi, Volume 5, Number 1, pp. 235-249. La Mirada, California, Biola University.

HASKER, WILLIAM (2003) ‘Is Free-Will Theism Religiously Inadequate? A Reply to Ciocchi’, in Religious Studies, Volume 39, Number 4, December, pp. 431-440. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (2007) ‘Peter van Inwagen, The Problem of Evil’, in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, Notre Dame, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University. 

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press. 

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press. 

HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Lawrence, Kansas.

KREEFT, PETER and RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

MARTIN, R.P. (1987) 'Philippians', in Leon Canon Morris (gen. ed.), Tyndale New Testament Commentary, Leicester/Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press/William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers.

ORR, R.W. (1986) I John, in F.F. Bruce (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan. 

PETERSON, MICHAEL, WILLIAM HASKER, BRUCE REICHENBACH, AND DAVID BASINGER (1996)(eds.), ‘Introduction: Saint Augustine: Evil is Privation of Good’, in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PORTER, LAURENCE.E. (1986) ‘Luke’, in F.F. Bruce (gen.ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/ Zondervan.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.

THE GREEK NEW TESTAMENT (1993) Stuttgart, United Bible Societies.

THE ORTHDOXO STUDY BIBLE, NEW TESTAMENT AND PSALMS (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy, Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

WENHAM, J.W. (1991) The Elements of New Testament Greek, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

WOODS, B.W. (1974) Christians in Pain, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

Theism & Deism: Non-exhaustively

Theism & Deism: Non-exhaustively

Photo, Agassiz, BC area 

Preface

Within academia, because of manuscript evidence, historical Scripture, the Church Fathers' writings and witness, biblical studies, theology, philosophy of religion, history and as well, premises from other disciplines, I hold to biblical Christianity, within the Reformed tradition, as a worldview and my faith and philosophy.

Biblically, a legitimate faith is revealed via the triune God. God the Father that sends God the Son and God the Holy Spirit. God the Son that completes the atonement and resurrection imputed to humanity and too sends God the Holy Spirit and the Holy Spirit that regenerates (John 3, Titus 3, 1 Peter 1). Those chosen in Jesus Christ that are justified and saved by grace through faith, alone (Ephesians 1-2, Romans, Galatians, Hebrews, as some key examples). 

I have read and heard the intellectual criticism, that biblical Christians are closed-minded in regards to an alternate, possibly correct, worldview. Based on reason, theoretically, my second preferred worldview would be some type of theism, perhaps with similarities to deism, heavily influenced by theistic philosophy of religion. If the biblical revelation was denied (to be clear, absolutely, not my view), I would still hold to many of the philosophical premises, within philosophy of religion which support the existence of an infinite, eternal, first cause, primary cause, necessary (of necessity), God. 

Importantly for this particular entry: My conclusion differs, for example, from many in ex-Christian movements that conclude that once Christianity and the Scripture is debunked in his/her mind, that therefore, atheism is the most reasonable worldview to embrace. My church bible study leader actually assumed that atheism was the default, most likely worldview for many, if not most, within the Western world, if Christianity was untrue. But, whether that deduction in regards to the opinions of many is true or not, that is not my view.

Deism or a related theism, in my mind is a far more likely alternative to Christianity than a non-theistic view, although, again, I fully believe in the Biblical texts. Deism, and related theisms, do not accept a God that reveals self, but still, generally at least, accept the God of first cause. First cause (primary cause) provides premises which prove, philosophically and theologically, in a sense, the existence of God. God, as infinite, eternal and omnipotent. The deduced first and sufficient cause of all that is finite. God would also be conscious and within Judaism and Christianity, personal.

Theism 

John S. Feinberg states that theism is literally the belief in the existence of God. The term may be recent and a counter to the seventeenth century terms deism and deistic and is used as the opposite of atheist. Feinberg (1996: 1080). Feinberg writes the term theist is used for religious believers and those who hold to certain philosophical and theological positions without necessarily being religious. Feinberg (1996: 1080). 

Richard G. Swinburne explains that theism is the idea that there exists a God that is personal, without a body, omnipotent, omniscient, free, and the creator of the universe. Christians, Jews, and Muslims are all theists. Swinburne (1999: 562). Swinburne states that God is personal in theism as he acts intentionally to bring about purposes and has knowledge of all things. Swinburne (1999: 562-563). 

Deism 

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Anthony Collins is discussed.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Anthony Collins First published Mon Aug 25, 2003; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020, William Uzgalis

Cited

'Anthony Collins (1676–1729) was a wealthy English free-thinker, deist and materialist who in his later years became a country squire and local government official in Essex.'

Cited

'Collins was a friend of John Locke in Locke’s old age and Locke was one important formative influence on his philosophical views.'

Cited 

'Collins rejects Revelation. (Stanford). Collins clearly rejects theism based on revelation. But one could also be a theist based on arguments from natural religion. (Stanford).' 'In A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion, 1724, Collins attacks the basis of Christianity as a revealed religion. (Stanford).'

John Locke is discussed.

'Samuel Hefelbower in The Relation of John Locke to English Deism remarks that among the progressives—theologians, philosophers and deists—all accepted a rationalistic religion. The question then becomes what exactly is the role of reason vis à vis revelation.' (Stanford). 'Locke holds that reason is responsible for determining what counts as a genuine revelation. Locke also holds the view that there is revelation that tells us about things above reason but not contrary to it.' (Stanford).

I can agree with Locke, in the sense that God will move the human mind to grasp divine revelation. I also agree that divine revelation is rational and reasonable. I would add, true. The Hebrew Bible and New Testament are both religious history and provide, documented, manuscript evidence. Church history, theology and theistic, philosophy of religion also provide reasonable evidences for Christian faith and philosophy.

Other sources

M.H. Macdonald writes that deism describes an unorthodox religious view expressed among readers in the first half of the seventeenth century, most notably Lord Herbert of Cherbury. Macdonald (1996: 304). Deism is from the Latin for deus in contrast to theos (θεός my add) from the Greek. Macdonald (1999: 304). 

Deism is different than theism and is connected to natural religion that thinks religious knowledge is gained through reason and not revelation or church doctrines. Macdonald (1996: 304). There is a belief in a supreme being, but this being is not directly involved in the affairs of his creation. Macdonald (1996: 304). Therefore, the revelation of the Hebrew Bible and New Testament would be denied as actually occurring, and the gospel and related doctrines would be denied. In agreement with Christianity, would be an understanding of God as first cause and the creator of universal laws. Macdonald (1996: 305). 

David A. Pailin, my brief former academic advisor, writes that deism is often in parallel to theism. Pailin (1999: 148). In modern times deism is used to define a supreme being who is the ultimate source of reality, but does not intervene in the natural and historical processes through revelation or salvific acts. Pailin (1999: 148). Pailin writes that the common use of the term ‘theism’ does not carry the same negative implications. Pailin (1999: 148). He explains that historically deism is not so much a set of doctrines, but a movement, largely British, that became popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pailin (1999: 148). Many within deism will have doubts concerning concepts of supernatural religious doctrines, revelation and the authority of the Bible. Pailin (1999: 148). Pailin notes that some within deism desire to replace Christianity with a more ‘reasonable’ faith, and for others it is an attempt to produce a more ‘reasonable’ version of Christianity. Pailin (1999: 149). 

William J. Wainwright explains that deism understands true religion as natural, as opposed to supernatural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). He writes that some self-styled Christian deists accept revelation although they argue that the content is the same as natural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). Most deists reject revelation as fiction, but many reason that God has ordained that human happiness is possible through natural means that are universally available. Wainwright (1996: 188). Salvation therefore does not come via divine revelation. Wainwright (1996: 188).

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1996) ‘Theism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

MACDONALD, M.H. (1996) ‘Deism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PAILIN, DAVID A. (1999) ‘Deism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

SWINBURNE, Richard G. (1999) ‘Theism’. in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press. 

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis. 

WAINWRIGHT, WILLIAM J. (1996) ‘Deism’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

Referenced archived articles 

Thursday, October 24, 2019: Sufficient cause?

Saturday, November 24, 2018 Brief ponderings on Christianity, Theism, Deism, Atheism

Deism: archives  

Listed from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Anthony Collins First published Mon Aug 25, 2003; substantive revision Thu Oct 8, 2020, William Uzgalis

Primary references

An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason, 1707 

Collins contributions to the Clarke Collins controversy: A Letter to Mr. Dodwell, 1706 

A Reply to Mr. Clarke’s Defence of His Letter to Mr. Dodwell 

Reflections on Mr. Clarke’s Second Defence of His Letter to Mr. Dodwell 

An Answer to Mr. Clarke’s Third Defence of His Letter to Mr. Dodwell, 1708 

Priestcraft In Perfection 1710 A Vindication of the Divine Attributes, in some Remarks on His Grace the Archbishop of Dublin’s sermon intitled “Divine Predestination Consistent with the Freedom of Man’s Will”, 1710 

A Discourse of Free-Thinking, 1713 Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, 1717 

A Discourse on the Grounds and Reasons of the Christian Religion, 1724 

An Historical and Critical Essay on the Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of England, 1724 

The Scheme of Literal Prophecy Considered, 1726 

A Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing, 1729

Collins, Anthony, 1707 [1984], An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason and A Discourse of Free Thinking, Peter Schouls (ed.), 1707; republished New York: Garland Press, 1984. A republication of Collins’ first book and his 1713 book on free thinking, both in their original eighteenth century type. 

1707 [1976], Determinism and Free Will, introduction by James O’Higgins, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Provides the facsimile text of Collins’ A Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Freedom along with annotations and a useful introduction that discusses Collins’ place in the debate over free will and determinism and provides an analysis of the text.

1729 [1970], A Discourse concerning Ridicule and Irony in Writing, Edward A. Bloom and Lillian D. Bloom (eds.); republished, Los Angeles: The William Andrews Memorial Clarke Library, No. 142, 1970. A republication of Collins’ last book with an interesting introduction and notes.

Locke, John, 1690 [1975], An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Peter Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Locke’s magnum opus had a considerable influence on Collins both in respect to his epistemological views and in respect to particular issues such as whether matter can think. This is currently the standard edition of Locke’s Essay.

1989, The Correspondence of John Locke, volume 8, E. S. De Beer (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. Contains Locke’s letters to Collins during the period of their eighteen month friendship. It is thus a major source for the study of their relationship.

Secondary references

Colie, Rosalie L., 1959, “Spinoza and the Early English Deists”, Journal of the History of Ideas, 20(1): 23–46. doi:10.2307/2707965 Develops the political dimension of early English Deism. Colie claims that Collins was the least political of the early English Deists. She discusses the relation of Collins’ views on necessity and the problem of evil to those of Spinoza.

Edwards, Paul, 2009, God and the Philosophers, Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. Puts Collins in the context of a brief history of Deism.

Hefelbower, Samuel Gring, 1918, The Relation of John Locke to English Deism, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. An effort to characterize the defining features of English Deism

Mossner, Ernest Campbell, 1967, two articles in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, volume 2, Paul Edwards (ed.), New York: Macmillan. 1967a, “Anthony Collins”, pp. 144–146. Provides a good account of Collins, though significantly shorter and less detailed than the one provided here. 1967b, “Deism”, pp. 326–336. Provides a fine overview of Deism both in England and on the continent with brief biographies of both major and minor figures.

Stephen, Leslie, 1936, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, London: Watts & Co. Gives a detailed history of English Deism in both the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and on the continent. There are several chapters devoted to Deism and one of these to Collins.