Tuesday, May 19, 2020

Reply to Miss Cia: Soft determinism, indeterminism, hard determinism, fatalism

Preface 

Edinburgh: 1995

I find a rare Jazz Fusion unofficial CD, featuring an artist I was looking for at a flea market. I explain this to the seller and he states. ‘It was fate’ with a strong Scottish accent.

‘Pardon’ I said, ‘It was fate’, he stated. I thought he had said ‘It was fiit’.

Reply to Miss Cia: Soft determinism, indeterminism, hard determinism, fatalism

My friend, Miss Cia, cited the article below on Facebook and made a request to me for a reply:

Eric W. Dolan May 18, 2020: PsyPost

Psy Post Cited

New research published in the Journal of Research in Personality provides evidence that belief in determinism plays an important role in right-wing authoritarianism.

Miss Cia cited 

Believing in "your life being predetermined by fate" causes individuals to believe in determinism and possibly more authoritarian governments. This appears similar to Presbyterian predestination theology. Russ Murray - I want to hear from your brain about this.

Of course, only God knows the inner views of persons, but I attended and was a member of a Presbyterian church in Vancouver for over a decade and I knew many of the leaders personally. I would deduce that generally most attendees, members and leaders were politically moderately left or moderately right. The church was respectfully, biblically Christian and embraced far from what could be philosophically reasoned as authoritarian theology, authoritarian philosophy, or authoritarian political views.

Within this Presbyterian Church, the bible was taken seriously, as the ultimate, inspired, spiritual authority for those within the Christian Church. The bible as the word of God.

As far as Presbyterian theology, overall, I would deduce that most Canadian, American and British devotees, within a Reformed worldview, hold to forms of democracy.

Archives, Definitions and Analysis

Wednesday, July 11, 2012 Fatalism Revisited 

Sunday, November 11, 2007 Fatalism

Compatibilism (Soft determinism)

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to the philosophical concepts of free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596).

John S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force (for there to be significant human moral accountability with human will and actions, my add), but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine, with the use of persuasion, that actions will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet these were committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

I personally embrace, what I named limited free willwithin compatibilism. Human beings through nature, consciousness, desire and will embrace as secondary causes, thoughts, acts and actions. Simultaneously, God, within theistic compatibilism, is the primary cause of all things, but with holy, pure and good motives.

Incompatibilism (Indeterminism)

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion, any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. This would include concepts of libertarian free will.

Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, concerning human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, human actions would never truly be free because God or another external force (non-deistic view) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being.

Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

Determinism (Hard determinism)

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137).

In other words, there are forms of determinism where human actions are significant.

Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281).

Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for actions determined, as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Fatalism

Fatalism should not be equated with compatibilism/soft determinism, but if fatalism states that no human actions can influence or cause events, and hard determinism holds that human beings do not cause actions or are morally responsible, there is clearly a similarity in definitions.

D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407).

In contrast to 'fate' or fatalism, biblical, theological determinism, has divine meaning.

Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism, in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186).

Compatibilism and soft determinism do hold that what God determines must happen by necessity, but within this view, rational beings with significant use of (limited) free will are not coerced or forced to commit acts, for which they are morally accountable, which must occur by necessity.

A person can hold to hard determinism and believe that God determined all events without the significant use of free will of rational creatures, and a fatalist can also believe that events are determined without the use of significant free will of rational creatures, and yet this is caused without any meaning, and without the understanding that God or any rational entity is behind these events.

Practical realities

Ph.D. Viva 

I was challenged on the similarities between fatalism and my view of determinism, which is soft-determinism/compatibilism in Wales in January 2009 at my Ph.D. Viva. I used the material from the 2007 post in the defence. I think I was successful. The reviewer noted that there are definite similarities in that both determinism and fatalism bring about events by necessity without libertarian free will from a secondary cause. Fair enough.

But I did note correctly that determinism was theistic, at least in the context discussed. In contrast, fatalism was not for certain, theistic (In our Christian context). Fatalism more likely exists in a naturalistic philosophical context.  Fatalism is not Christian philosophy, although fate and determinism are also aspects of Islam, which was beyond the scope of my thesis.

Edinburgh, 1995
BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 137. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Monday, May 18, 2020

White house versus black house

Lampeter, Wales
LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy). 

The review continues:

Key symbols

≡df = Equivalence by definition
: = Equal (s)
ε = Epsilon and means is
⊃ = Is the same as
⊨ is Entails
˜ = Not
∃ = There exists
∃! = There exists
∴ = Therefore
. = Therefore
< = Is included
v = a logical inclusive disjunction (disjunction is the relationship between two distinct alternatives)
x = variable
. = Conjunction meaning And
0 = Null class
cls = Class
int = Interpretation
∧ = Logical conjunction
---

White house versus black house

This book review of sorts, since 2016, has now advanced to Chapter X: Abstraction and Interpretation. Philosopher Langer explains that logic is the study of forms and these forms are derived within systems from common human experiences, reality and life. (240). This is done by abstraction. (240).

She further explains that the science of logic is a continued progression from the concrete to the abstract. (240). That would be concrete ideas and things to abstract symbolic logic.

'From contents with certain forms to those forms without contents, from instances to kinds, from examples to concepts.' (240).

Langer explains that the first step is to the replacement of individual elements by formalized elements of variable meaning. (240). These are formalized elements, as in symbols within symbolic logic. The meaning of these elements is 'presently fixed.' (240). Not to be interpreted by their original terms. (240). Langer states that the symbolic logic has them interpreted in 'an entirely new way.' (240).

From Langer's explanation, what the symbolic logic provides is through quantifiers, are the old elements (which set meanings in contexts, my add), by new terms, which are general terms. (240). Symbolic logic provides a degree of formation from specific elements to quantified variables that are general terms. (240).

Encyclopaedia Brittanica

Cited

Quantification, in logic, the attachment of signs of quantity to the predicate or subject of a proposition.
---

Langer continues by explaining that it has been established in her text (and my reviews) that K =int as houses. (241). K (a, b, c, d...etc) is various types of houses. (241). At the same time, in her text (and my reviews) nt =interpretation as north of. (241).

It could be written that:

wh= White house

bh= Black house

wh ˜ ⊃ bh

The white house is not the same as the black house.

(wh) ˜ ⊃ (bh)

The white house is not the same as the black house.

(wh) . nt (bh)

The white house is therefore north of the black house.

(bh) ˜ nt (wh)

The black house is not north of the white house.

(bh) ˜ ⊨ (wh)

The black house does not entail the white house.

Practical philosophy

Ten Chapters and over four years into this textbook review:

Positive: Philosophically, the book assists the reader to better understand the technical differences between logic and truth, the logical and the true.

I now have a greater familiarity with the terms and symbols. I can decently read the equations in Langer's textbook, correctly. Potentially reading symbolic logic, more than the limited amount I read for my MPhil/Ph.D. work, in philosophical journals and books was a reason I bought the Langer textbook for review.

Negative: It is quite clear that most commonly for typical readers, academics, and most philosophers, written prose and standard language is generally a more clear, reasonable and proficient method for presenting concepts, premises and conclusions than is symbolic logic.

Langer states that the symbolic logic has them interpreted in 'an entirely new way.' (240).

Many times in everyday writing and in academia, explaining the concrete reasonably and in truth is more beneficial for most readers than creating an abstraction with its own internal rules that requires significant new learning from the reader. I reason that symbolic logic does have its merits at some technical points.

Laurel Bern photoshop via online websites. There is nothing
 politically intended by me as it just fits this section of the Langer text.

Sunday, May 17, 2020

Dear Ralph from 'Herr' Frankenstein

Ralph: Wonderland in Vaughan, Ontario, features 
the Yukon Striker, the world's tallest, longest and  
fastest Dive Coaster via Facebook
Good afternoon, 'Herr' Frankenstein (Frankenstein, pandemic era, Hair), here once again...

Satire Und Theology, my second Blogger website, is still blocked by Facebook from being posted and linked on my Facebook business page, Russell Norman Murray, PhD.

I have explained to Facebook by email several times, that I reason this is in error. I am willing to discuss this issue Facebook created. No reply. Prayers appreciated.

Therefore, I post this entry on my original Blogger website, Dr. Russell Norman Murray, as well, to be linked via my Facebook business page.

As I was out pandemic era shopping today, I had a thought.

I have zero interest in 'tats' whatsoever, but perhaps some genius should design a facial tattoo that looks like a medical face mask.

Just a suggestion...

(That I would never pursue or embrace myself)

Saturday, May 16, 2020

Deism and the distrust of the clergy

Wasdale: The Lake District (trekearth)
Deism and the distrust of the clergy

Preface

I have noted this first section from William J. Wainright below in previous articles, linked. Again, I do not think that I need to 'reinvent the wheel' with all my work. It is fine to present work more than once.

But I do prayerfully attempt to present new writing through research and analysis.

Archives

William J. Wainwright explains that deism understands true religion as natural, as opposed to supernatural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). He writes that some self-styled Christian deists accept revelation although they argue that the content is the same as natural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). Most deists reject revelation as fiction, but many reason that God has ordained that human happiness is possible through natural means that are universally available. Wainwright (1996: 188). Salvation, therefore, does not come via divine revelation. Wainwright (1996: 188).

Deism and the distrust of the clergy

May 16, 2020

However, there is further interesting material from his entry:

Wainwright writes that within deism, true religion is viewed as an expression of a universal human nature that has essence in reason. (188).  Christianity and Islam, in contrast, are within deistic thought stated to present 'credulity, political tyranny and priestcraft, which corrupt reason and overlay natural religion with impurities.' (188).

Wainwright then states that 'Deism is largely a seventeenth and eighteenth-century phenomenon and was more prominent in England.' (188). Further, deism became a vague term of abuse. (188). By the late eighteenth century, the term deism was connected to a belief in an 'absentee God', that creates the world, creates and maintains laws and 'leaves it to its own devices.' (188).

Theological opinion

One of my thesis tutors at the University of Wales, early in the process for my MPhil thesis, told me (paraphrased) that in Britain and Europe there was a distrust of the clergy. Researching this idea, I found that this distrust in the clergy gained much momentum in the enlightenment era and continues to the 21st century.

It seems to me, deism was in part, not in its totality, an enlightenment era philosophical/religious negative response to the former, or at least declining, European and British, church-state (philosophically) (church-kingdoms in context especially the Christian era to that time) religious systems, which unfortunately were a politicized version of Christianity. This politicized Christianity, although technically holding to certain central biblical tenants; as a Kingdom concept, was not in agreement with the New Testament gospel established by Jesus Christ, his disciples and apostles.

For those within the middle-ages (roughly the 5th to 15th centuries) and even the following renaissance era (roughly the 15th and 16th centuries), the various religious, political unions within Christendom in much of Europe, took priority over a citizen's and resident's own conscience, and philosophical views. This would include persons that had a primary religious commitment to the New Testament, Kingdom of God (John 18, 18:36), in a proper context, or persons embracing differing worldviews from the church-state.

As the clergy enforced the religious aspect of these church-state unions, the historical mistrust of them by many is philosophically and practically understandable.

John 18: 33 English Standard Version (ESV)

33 So Pilate entered his headquarters again and called Jesus and said to him, “Are you the King of the Jews?” 34 Jesus answered, “Do you say this of your own accord, or did others say it to you about me?” 35 Pilate answered, “Am I a Jew? Your own nation and the chief priests have delivered you over to me. What have you done?” 36 Jesus answered, “My kingdom is not of this world. If my kingdom were of this world, my servants would have been fighting, that I might not be delivered over to the Jews. But my kingdom is not from the world.” 37 Then Pilate said to him, “So you are a king?” Jesus answered, “You say that I am a king. For this purpose I was born and for this purpose I have come into the world—to bear witness to the truth. Everyone who is of the truth listens to my voice.” 38 Pilate said to him, “What is truth?”

'36 Jesus answered, “My kingdom is not of this world.'

Christ did represent the Kingdom in the first coming (Luke 17).

The Kingdom of God as culminated was and is not of this present realm, but rather a future realm with a restored creation, heaven and earth (Revelation 20-22), and therefore a church-state Christian model was not New Testament theology. This theology, adequately presented within manuscript evidence in support of New Testament texts.

Of course, Church history indeed eventually included politicization, which did lead to legitimate negative critiques of aspects of Christendom, both within the Church and outside of it, but the original New Testament gospel and theology remain extant.

Encountering the New Testament, page 10.

ELWELL, WALTER AND YARBROUGH, ROBERT W., Third Edition (2013) Encountering The New Testament, Grand Rapids, Baker Academic.

WAINWRIGHT, WILLIAM J. (1996) ‘Deism’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Related archived articles

Tuesday, April 17, 2007, Deism

Saturday, July 26, 2008, Theism and Deism

Wednesday, June 27, 2012 A Problem of Suffering

Saturday, February 18, 2017, Deism & theism, atheism, agnosticism

Saturday, November 24, 2018, Brief ponderings on Christianity, Theism, Deism, Atheism