Limited Free Will

Edited from a recent email

Human ability in conjunction with compatibilism

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will.

Middle Knowledge April 20, 2016

In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature and choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human thoughts, choice, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view.

An example:

I like theology by nature.

In my nature I pursue by choice, theology.

I do not have an alternative possibility as a secondary cause, to not like theology. This was determined by the primary cause.

The resulting choices to seek a PhD in Theology and related Philosophy of Religion, was not left to alternative possibility.

In regard to liking theology, we could also claim other secondary causes, like by hereditary (I am adopted, but perhaps someone biologically related liked theology?) but there is still a primary cause.

I do not have incompatibilist free will or a form of libertarian free will, to not like theology or not to pursue it. I have compatibilist free will and the term I coined as limited free will. During my British studies I looked for the term in texts and online and did not see it.  Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original.

I have significant moral responsibility in how I choose to deal with theology.

Limited Free Will June 29, 2015

God could have caused, willed and allowed me to not pursue my PhD, even though I like theology and then shown me the error of my ways. But I would have embraced the error as a secondary cause. I could understand the error at a later time and embrace the choice I should have made. But I am embracing my greatest desire at the time, so to speak.

As an adult, I did not initially pursue theological academia, but was eventually shown this to be error. I view it as not primarily a change of choice, but rather a divine molding of nature so I would pursue my natural interest in theology, as opposed to other interests, such as working and not being a student, being made more important. Within my soft determinism (not hard determinism) view, it was not that God gave me incompatibilist alternatives and I originally made an error; it was that God caused, willed and allowed my original view and then molded my nature in order that I would eventually, by nature, be different and therefore choose differently.

This is not to state that the sinful humanity both regenerate and unregenerate cannot have significant intellectual understanding of the alternative. I can very much understand by nature not liking theology. I can deduce a life without me studying theology. I know many that dislike theology, I can deduce it. I can deduce whether it is good or bad to be interested in theology. Therefore again, there is moral responsibility. As with Romans 1-3, a person can deduce truth about God without choosing or knowing God.

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.  

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

Deism & theism, atheism, agnosticism

Solva, Wales: trekearth.com

Theism and Deism: July 26 2008

Deism: April 17, 2007

My brief and former academic advisor at the University of Manchester, David. A. Pailin, defines deism as coming from the Latin word deus and parallels the Greek which is theos. Pailin (1999: 148).

In modern times deism is used to define a supreme being who is the ultimate source of reality, but does not intervene in the natural and historical processes through revelation or salvific acts. Pailin (1999: 148). Pailin writes that the common use of the term ‘theism’ does not carry the same negative implications. Pailin (1999: 148). He explains that historically deism is not so much a set of doctrines, but a movement, largely British, that became popular in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Pailin (1999: 148).

Many within deism will have doubts concerning concepts of supernatural religious doctrines, revelation and the authority of the Bible. Pailin (1999: 148). Pailin notes that some within deism desire to replace Christianity with a more ‘reasonable’ faith, and for others it is an attempt to produce a more ‘reasonable’ version of Christianity. Pailin (1999: 149).

William J. Wainwright explains that deism understands true religion as natural, as opposed to supernatural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). He writes that some self-styled Christian deists accept revelation although they argue that the content is the same as natural religion. Wainwright (1996: 188). Most deists reject revelation as fiction, but many reason that God has ordained that human happiness is possible through natural means that are universally available. Wainwright (1996: 188). Salvation therefore does not come via divine revelation. Wainwright (1996: 188).

Henry Clarence Thiessen writes that for deism God is present in his creation by his power and not in his being and nature. He has endowed creation with certain invariable laws that he oversees in general terms. Theissen (1956: 74). God has created creatures and left them under invariable laws to their own destiny. Thiessen (1956: 74).

For Thiessen, the Christian world-view rejects deism because it accepts that God has revealed himself in creation through divine revelation, has providential control and does at times use miracles within his creation. Thiessen (1956: 75). Thiessen opines, a deistic God is not much better than no God at all for humanity. Thiessen (1956: 75). Thiessen has an excellent point, if deistic approaches reject a God who intervenes within his creation, then it allows, practically speaking, for human beings to expect to have the same end in life as if there is no God. Basically the same end result as atheism.

Wainwright deduces that God has ordained human happiness to all universally, but ultimately how happy can human existence be when physical death is the end result for every person? However, the meaning of life, human life is not substantially meaningful, if permanently terminated. People lose their consciousness and life accomplishments without everlasting life, and therefore life loses ultimate meaning and happiness does not result.

The deist can speculate that God can and perhaps shall provide everlasting life and ultimate continual meaning for life, but this is merely speculation devoid of any historically grounded revelation from God. Accepting that human nature is corrupt as described in Romans 1-3, it is very unlikely that the problem of evil would ever be solved but rather merely treated by humanity if deism is true. There would at no time be any solution for sin, death, and the problem of evil, since the infinite, omnipotent God would not interfere with his creation and regenerate and change individuals in order to eventually establish a Kingdom of God where the problem of evil does not exist. With a deistic universe seemingly sin, death, and the problem of evil continue to exist as long as humanity does. Deism seemingly does not offer any ultimate solution to the problem of evil.

Additional: February 18, 2017

This blog website entry is purposely limited in entry size. I have archived articles that support my view that the Hebrew Bible and New Testament are religious history inspired by God and without error in the original autographs. However, admittedly as I write philosophical theology and philosophy of religion, I am not a linguist and certainly not an archaeologist.

Manuscripts for New Testament: August 18, 2008

Encountering New Testament: August 21, 2013

Old Testament Apocrypha: July 15, 2014

Business Insider: November 21, 2015

Vicious Regress: October 2, 2006

Deism & theism, atheism, agnosticism

Problems related to first cause and vicious regress in my view are fatal flaws for non-theistic worldviews which in my mind make them untenable. I do not reason that atheism or agnosticism are the next most reasonable worldviews after Biblical Christianity, including the Hebrew Bible.

However, barring the gospel work of atonement, resurrection and restoration through the triune God, applied to those in Jesus Christ; the end result for humanity is most reasonably the same with deism and a related theism, as with atheistic or agnostic worldviews. That being postmortem human non-existence.

PAILIN, DAVID A. (1999) ‘Deism’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

WAINWRIGHT, WILLIAM J. (1996) ‘Deism’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Solva Wales: trekearth.com

War is substituted by sport?

Warlordgame.com: Computer games are another sport of sort.

Philosophical speculation

This type of philosophical (and psychological) speculation is admittedly presented in a limited sense. The idea is that there may be  connections, as opposed to presenting the idea of war being substituted by sport, as hard fact. Which it is not. Obviously, British soldiers in red coats did not directly become Manchester United. This entry is more speculative and less hard fact than most of my work on this website.

Societally and culturally, the brilliant colours of European and colonial warfare and competition, have perhaps been replaced by the brilliant colours of Western professional sports clubs in competition. In particular with UEFA football. Similarly, with European football, the tribalism of war have been replaced with the tribalism of supported clubs.

I am not the first of course to suggest such connections, but watching Knowledge Network and Rick Steves on PBS in regard to European history, has me pondering on possible connections. As war placed region versus region, professional sports places region versus region. There may be other societal and cultural areas of substitution as well.

Revolutionplayset.blogspot.com

The brilliant red coats of the United Kingdom versus the brilliant colonial blue coats of the American colonies, certainly comes to mind. The National Hockey League has the Columbus Blue Jackets, and I reason a Canadian franchise from Ontario named the Red Coats would be fascinating. But we do have the Canadiens, Maple Leafs and Canucks, three of the present seven Canadian clubs with synonymous names.
---

Taxology

At a Northview Community Church class last night the term taxology was used, which is a rarely referenced term in Religious Studies. In fact it is not referenced precisely in Oxford (1995). Rather the related term taxonomy is defined as 1 'the science of classification esp. of living and extinct organisms.' 2 'scheme of classification.' (1428). From research it appears taxology would be used synonymously.

This appears to be a primarily scientific term used in the context of Religious Studies and Christian missions within the class by the linguist professor. Similar terms used within theology and philosophy of religion contexts could be for example, classification and linguistically, genre.

A connection

Considering these two sections together, as a Christian philosopher and theologian, when I compare the British soldiers to American soldiers they would seemingly be classified as very similar. The Americans arising within the British. It makes me question whether a war between two groups so similar in classification should have ethically and morally occurred. Warfare is of course political and complicated, but I reason my point stands.

THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY (1995) Della Thompson (ed.), Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Momarewethereyet.net

Crucifixion & compatibilism

Mount Fuji: Google+

Edited from 

MPhil, Bangor University, 2003: The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives 

PhD, The University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, 2010: Theodicy and Practical Theology

The Romans with the help of the Jews, executed Christ and this was an evil and a sin. God did not force this but he foreknew this would occur and with this death worked out salvation for humanity, those chosen in Jesus Christ (Ephesians 1-2, Romans 8). It would, however, be too weak to say that God simply allowed the execution of Christ because as an infinite, omnipotent being, he had the power to prevent the execution as he has the power to prevent all sin. So, in this sense, God wills evil, but he does not force people to sin, nor does he sin himself.

God had perfect and holy motives in causing, willing and allowing the crucifixion which included through God the Son, the atonement, resurrection and eventual culminated kingdom of God for those in the Church.

The crucifixion is a key biblical example of compatibilism. Both God's sovereignty and significant human freedom are involved.

Compatibilism (soft determinism)

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596).

J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).

Incompatibilism

Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free.

Compatibilism would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions.

FEINBERG. JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.