Abusive Analogy

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Abusive Analogy

Preface

A section of the entry by entry review of the Pirie text. Originally published on Blogger 20151029, revised on Blogger 20250601 for a version on academia.edu.

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

Abusive Analogy

From Pirie

'The fallacy of abusive analogy is a highly specialized version of the ad hominem argument. Instead of the arguer being insulted directly, an analogy is drawn which is calculated to bring him into scorn or disrepute. The opponent or his behaviour is compared with something which will elicit an unfavourable response toward him from the audience.' (29).

Pirie provides the example:

'If science admits no certainties, then a scientist has no more certain knowledge of the universe than does a Hottentot running through the bush.' (29).

'(This is true, but is intended as abuse so that the hearer will be more sympathetic to the possibility of certain knowledge.) (29).'

This statement is not necessarily true, it is using hyperbole. Theoretically, a scientist could speculate on the existence of outer space, without being certain, while the Khoekhoe (more accurate term) may or may not, have an understanding of the concept of outer space, but also without certainty.

In other words, with Pirie's explanation, science using inductive reasoning, testing and empirical research may not claim certainty, at least in some cases, but there is still considerable, significant knowledge that has been obtained through the scientific method. A lack of certainty with inductive scientific reasoning, does not for example, by default make certain deductive philosophical and theological reasoning certain.

An analogy is not effective here as inductive and deductive reasoning succeeds or fails based on the trueness of premises and conclusions presented.

Blackburn explains that arguing by analogy is stating that since things are alike in some ways they will 'probably' (14) be alike in others. (14). The use of 'probably' here is key. Often arguing by analogy produces some similarities and some differences rendering the argument unsound.

If such an argument is used comparing only the things certainly alike it is reasonable.

However, Blackburn cites Wittgenstein, noting it can be irresponsible to generalize one case. (14).

In other words, generalizing by argument of analogy can be irresponsible. 

Wittgenstein 

Wittgenstein’s Generalisations About Generalisations: Medium-Dec 12, 2019

Paul Austin Murphy 

Cites

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1912-1978) Ludwig Wittgenstein's Blue Book, University of Pittsburgh (depositor), University of Pittsburgh.

https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735061817932

Digital Library

“Our craving for generality has [as one] source … our preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and, in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.” 

'I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is ‘purely descriptive’.”'

A philosophical problem here, potentially at least, as this is just a small section of Wittgenstein's work and explanation, is of consistency. Wittgenstein is explaining something. He is not simply providing a description, but is offering an opinion. 

However, generalization within abusive analogy is fallacious because an ad hominem, personal attack, analogy, is concerned with attacking a person making the statement or premise (s) with a conclusion. When in contrast, what is important for accuracy is the trueness of a statement, or premise (s) and conclusion presented. Using an analogy with a generalization stating 'If science admits no certainties, then a scientist has no more certain knowledge of the universe than does a Hottentot running through the bush.' (29); this is generalizing the knowledge of the scientist within analogy. A lack of certainty does not equate to lack of knowledge, in the case of the scientist. The scientist may hold to many ideas as probably right, that may or may not, one day may be shown to be certainly right.

Wittgenstein: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive-Spring 2025 Edition 

By

Anat Biletzki 

Anat Matar

Cited 

'It is here that Wittgenstein’s rejection of general explanations, and definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions, is best pronounced. Instead of these symptoms of the philosopher’s “craving for generality,” he points to ‘family resemblance’ as the more suitable analogy for the means of connecting particular uses of the same word. There is no reason to look, as we have done traditionally—and dogmatically—for one, essential core in which the meaning of a word is located and which is, therefore, common to all uses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the word’s uses through “a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing” (PI 66). Family resemblance also serves to exhibit the lack of boundaries and the distance from exactness that characterize different uses of the same concept. Such boundaries and exactness are the definitive traits of form—be it Platonic form, Aristotelian form, or the general form of a proposition adumbrated in the Tractatus. It is from such forms that applications of concepts can be deduced, but this is precisely what Wittgenstein now eschews in favor of appeal to similarity of a kind with family resemblance.'  

Generalities lead to error when they produce reasoning that fails to embrace true statements and or true premise (s) and conclusion. Better to specifically review and produce statements and or premise (s) and conclusion for accuracy in truth.

In regards to Wittgenstein rejecting definitions based on sufficient and necessary conditions: 

Texas State University/Department of Philosphy Confusion of Necessary with a Sufficient Condition 

Cited 

'A causal fallacy you commit this fallacy when you assume that a necessary condition of an event is sufficient for the event to occur. A necessary condition is a condition that must be present for an event to occur. A sufficient condition is a condition or set of conditions that will produce the event. A necessary condition must be there, but it alone does not provide sufficient cause for the occurrence of the event. Only the sufficient grounds can do this. In other words, all of the necessary elements must be there.' 

'Department of Philosophy

Dr. Craig Hanks, Chair'

I reason

Sufficient conditions mean all of the necessary conditions exist for an event

Wittgenstein: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive-Spring 2025 Edition 

My add below (PI):

• Philosophical Investigations, 1953, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.
• Philosophical Investigations (PI), 4th edition, 2009, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (eds. and trans.), Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
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Primary sources noted on Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive 

Ludwig Wittgenstein

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Bibliography

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy).

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1912-1978) Ludwig Wittgenstein's Blue Book, University of Pittsburgh (depositor), University of Pittsburgh.

https://digital.library.pitt.edu/islandora/object/pitt%3A31735061817932

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.

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