God and two wills

Millard Erickson writes that God’s perfect will, will 1 as he calls it, is God’s general intention and what pleases him most. Erickson (1994: 361). God’s will 2, is God’s specific intention in every given situation and what God actually decides will occur. Erickson (1994: 361). This is permissible will. Erickson explains that there are many times when evil and sin occur that God, in his perfect will, does not wish these events to take place, but permits them. Erickson (1994: 361). Erickson explains that with will 2, since God does not intervene to prevent particular evil and sin, he permissibly wills it. Erickson (1994: 361). Therefore, Biblically and theologically, in one sense, God causes evil, and this was a key question within my problem of evil questionnaire. When God does not intervene and prevent evil and sin, he therefore willingly allows it and is the cause of it, in a sense. Erickson points out that God never tells someone to commit evil or sin. Erickson (1994: 361). Since God is infinite (limitless), omnipotent (almighty, all-powerful), and omniscient (all-knowing) when he does not follow his perfect will causing only good and, instead, follows his permissible will, which at times causes evil and sin, he therefore, theologically, is the cause of evil. It needs to be stated that by God permissibly and willingly allowing evil does not make him evil and sinful in nature. John Calvin reasons that God’s motives remain pure in the simultaneous willing of human actions that are evil and sin. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). Calvin’s idea is that free human actions were first willed and determined by God. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40). God’s motives in willing an action were always pure, working toward the greater good even while human beings freely sinned. (1543)(1996: 37-40). I submit that the problem of evil occurs for God's greater purposes within his permissible will.

In both theology and philosophy, compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism, states that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions, which are not committed under compulsion. Feinberg (1986: 24). Feinberg (1994: 60). Within this type of model, there is a primary force that determines all actions and human beings will and commit these actions with significant freedom, secondarily. Pojman (1996: 596). Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Thiessen reasons that God’s decrees are what the creator either efficaciously (the desired effect) or permissively wills to pass. Thiessen (1956: 147). Thiessen explains that human freedom and motives are not eliminated from human actions. Thiessen (1956: 147). Both Thiessen and Calvin state that God is not the author of sin. Thiessen (1956: 147) Calvin (1543)(1996: 40). I deduce that the reasoning here is that although God and humanity both will sinful human actions, God's motives are never sinful, while human motives are. Therefore God is actually the author of good intentions through sin, while human beings are the authors of sinful intentions through sin. I should state that God would work through the evil deeds of demonic beings in a similar way.

Job 1:8 And the Lord said to Satan, "Have you considered My servant Job?"

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Willl, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG. J.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, J.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.