David Hume (1711-1776) PhD Edit

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David Hume (1711-1776) PhD Edit

David Hume: Preface

Blackburn describes David Hume (1711-1776) the Scottish philosopher, historian and writer as the most influential modern naturalist. Blackburn (1996: 179). Hume would also be known as an empiricist and Blackburn correctly notes Hume as a key figure in the Enlightenment. Blackburn (1996: 179). The following is edited material where I dealt with Hume within my Doctorate. I add more material for this article.

David Hume on Theodicy

David Hume (1779)(2004) discusses the danger of traditional superstition in religious presentations, Hume (1779)(2004: 7) and doubtless a reasonable, open-minded, philosophical approach from a theist would be far more helpful within a theodicy. He also warns against theistic claims of being able to adequately understand the Supreme Being, if there is one. Hume (1779)(2004: 21-27). This Being’s attributes would be ‘incomprehensible and it basically impossible for the theist to understand the nature of this being. Hume (1779)(2004: 21). If Hume is correct, constructing a theodicy would be largely meaningless. To counter this problem, Biblical Revelation would be required in order that God reveals self in context of the issue of theodicy.

May 29, 2011

Within my PhD research Augustine’s free will approach to theodicy made use of Scripture and yet was also philosophical. Plantinga’s free will defence was philosophical. Feinberg’s sovereignty theodicy was both Biblical and philosophical as was my sovereignty approach which was not formally presented separately but was basically embedded within my work. My project with the use of exemplars and my own earned expertise did not fall prey to Hume’s criticisms of constructing largely meaningless theodicy. This is not a claim of intellectual perfection by any means.

David Hume on God’s Sovereignty

Phillips explains that a Reformed view is that God has the freedom to act as he wants. Phillips (2005: 22). This would be God’s sovereign providence, but Hume is skeptical of this concept. Hume (1779)(2004: 50). People throughout the world view certain evils, which may be rectified in other regions of the world or in the future, and understand these good events as being connected to general laws and the existence of a good deity. Hume suggests that these are superstitions, and questions whether in many cases a ‘cause can be known but from its known effects?’ The idea is then presented that if God is benevolent his providence should lead to a world without suffering and wickedness. Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

May 29, 2011

This is the logical problem of evil. ‘The idea is then presented that if God is benevolent his providence should lead to a world without suffering and wickedness’. Much of the problem of evil and theodicy discussion within my thesis concerning free will, sovereignty, and soul-making presentations and atheistic counters concerns the logical problem of evil and also the gratuitous problem of evil. Other theses, books and articles may deal with various approaches, perhaps of other religions and worldviews. For example, hypothetically, evil could be denied as a reality.

Below is edited from previous work, but is a good summary of the major views to briefly answer Hume:

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S. Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

Within On Free Choice of the Will, Augustine presents his free will theodicy, theodicy being an explanation for the problem of evil in a theistic universe. Augustine was somewhat influential on Alvin C. Plantinga’s free will defence in the 1970’s. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 26). Augustine reasons that God is not the cause of evil, but rather human beings create the problem when they choose to follow their own temporal ways rather than God’s. Augustine (388-395)(1964: 3). A possible problem with Augustine’s view is that he blames the problem of evil on human choice but at the same time places a heavy emphasis on God’s sovereignty in creation. Augustine’s view on human free will appears libertarian while, as John Feinberg points out, Augustine’s concept of God’s sovereignty would seemingly require some form of determinism. Feinberg (1994: 98).

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

Within this text Feinberg presents a defence which could be labeled a sovereignty theodicy. My personal sovereignty theodicy is embedded within my MPhil and more so my PhD and is somewhat similar to Feinberg’s work. As well as presenting his own perspective Feinberg does a thorough job of reviewing various theistic and atheistic concepts on the problem of evil. He reasons that God does not presently eliminate the problem of evil because to do so would violate divine plans and human development. Feinberg (1994: 130). I found Feinberg’s explanation of this a bit repetitive and it would perhaps be good for him to have speculated on God’s reasons for willingly allowing evil in more specific terms as I have to some degree in my work.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

Plantinga successfully demonstrates that a free will defence is logical and reasonable. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 28). He speculates that the price of God creating a universe with significantly free creatures is that wrong actions will inevitably occur leading to the problem of evil. Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Plantinga’s free will approach is not primarily theological as is Augustine’s and therefore offers a different but somewhat related perspective. 

A question arises if Plantinga has really successfully answered the objection of theistic critics such as Feinberg, and atheists such as J.L. Mackie on why God could not simply create human beings who were significantly free and never committed wrong actions. I believe that God could have created significantly free human beings, or at least human-like creatures that only committed right actions. Perhaps God desired to create human beings that would ultimately posses a greater spiritual maturity than Adam and Eve prior to the fall because those restored in Christ would have experienced sin, the problem of evil, death and the atoning work and resurrection of Christ. Quite possibly restored human beings would ultimately be more spiritually mature and valuable to God than persons that never knew what it was like to disobey God and experience evil. I would also point out that Biblically speaking the angels that did not fall would seemingly be significantly free and have not committed wrong actions.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

Hick rejects Augustinian and Calvinistic views on theodicy, and instead supports what he views as the Irenean position. Hick (1970: 221). Ramsay (2004: 2). Hick also rejects conservative Christian doctrines and instead favours the idea of universalism. Hick (1970: 172). Hick (1970: 381). He reasons that human beings were made immature and capable of committing wrong human actions in order that God eventually can bring all persons to the creator through soul-making. Hick (1970: 292). I can accept that some type of soul-making is used by God in the development of believers, but without the atoning work of Christ and resurrection within a Christian tradition we do not have a revealed divine means of salvation and are left to speculate on how God should or could save persons, as Hick speculates.

David Hume on Consciousness

Consciousness is not a new intellectual subject, as David Hume writes in the article A Treatise of Human Nature’ that most philosophers think personal identity begins with consciousness, which is reflected thought or perception. Although the exact nature of human consciousness is not known, it does work with human thought and perception. Hume found no theory of consciousness provided him with intellectual satisfaction. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) in Conversation with Burman, defined consciousness as the possible internal source of knowledge concerning a person’s own thoughts or mental occurrences. To have consciousness was to be able to understand one’s own thoughts.

I dealt with more philosophical/scientific journals in my PhD in regard to consciousness for post-viva revisions and documented some of the work in this post below. From my reading, academically consciousness and the related subject of desires, still lacked much intellectual clarity even as they were being studied within the fields of philosophy, religion, psychology and psychiatry.

Saturday, September 19, 2020 PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD

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AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia. 

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books. 

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996)  Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,  Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOCHER, HENRI (1994) Evil and the Cross, Translated by David G. Preston, Leicester, InterVarsity Press.

DESCARTES, RENE (1648)(1996) Conversation with Burman, in Eric Lormand: University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan.

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, in David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

GIERER, ALFRED (2003)‘Brain, mind, and limitations of a scientific theory of human consciousness’, Preprint of a contribution to the symposium: Proteus im Spiegel-Kritische Theorie des Subjekts im 20, Tubingen, Max-Planck-Institute Biology, Tubingen.

GUTMANN, JAMES (1845)(1936) ‘Introduction’ in SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004) Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Lawrence, Kansas.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.), Atlanta, John Knox Press.

PHILLIPS, D.Z. (2005) The Problem of Evil and the Problem of God, Fortress Press, Minneapolis.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.

Sovereignty Approach Definition (PhD Edit)

Sovereignty Approach Definition (PhD Edit)

Preface 

Photo from a recent trip: Dublin at night, 20240405.  This article from my PhD originally published 20130107 with slight reformat for 20240518 and an entry on academic.edu

Saturday, September 19, 2020:PhD Full Version PDF: Theodicy and Practical Theology 2010, Wales TSD 

Sovereignty Approach Definition

John Calvin (1539)(1998) writes humanity has nothing on its own, but depends totally on God.[1]  God bestows on humanity what he wills.[2]  Arthur Pink (1968) defines God’s sovereignty as meaning that God is the almighty, the possessor of all power in heaven and earth, and no one can defeat his counsels.[3]  Norman Geisler explains the Bible teaches that God is in control of the entire universe, including human events.[4]  According to Jay Green (1971), in the ‘Forward’ of his book Five Points of Calvinism, many scholars within Christian theism, in particular those from Reformed[5] and Calvinist[6] positions, reason that God has sovereign control over his creation, and God’s ultimate plan is being accomplished throughout.[7]  Green explains that Calvinists do not necessarily see themselves as followers of John Calvin.[8]  They do recognize Calvin as a great exegete and one who systemized Scripture, and a vast number of the doctrines that came from Calvin’s work are within the system known as Calvinism.[9]   Calvinist Millard J. Erickson writes that sovereignty is a major tenent within Calvinism as God is considered the Lord of all things, and is free to do as he wills.[10]  Jonathan Edwards (1729)(2006) writes that God has the power to bestow upon anyone of his creatures good, evil, or indifference for the greater good.[11]  This sovereign control is accepted despite the obvious problem of evil occurring in God’s creation.[12]  Attempts to harmonize strong concepts of God’s divine control over his creation, with the apparent corrupt nature of what he has made in regard to the problem of evil, will be described within this thesis as sovereignty theodicy.[13]

David Ray Griffin vigorously challenges Calvinistic notions of sovereignty in regard to theodicy.[14]  Griffin claims that God cannot be shown to be perfectly moral for three reasons.[15]  One, God cannot be understood to be morally perfect because God is an alleged deity and his morality cannot be demonstrated.[16]  Two, since with a Calvininstic view God wills all things, including evil acts, God must be immoral.[17]  Three, since Calvinists believe that God bases all things on eternal decisions, God is not truly free and is therefore amoral.[18]  The Calvinist could reply to Griffin with the words of Calvin himself in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, that God is moral and as evil human actions occur God is willing a good thing and the sinner another.[19]  This type of explanation needs to be presented in a logical and reasonable way,[20] and a central goal of this Chapter is to present a sovereignty theodicy that is philosophically reasonable.[21]

Pinnock explains that there is a tension in the Biblical text between God determining things and human freedom.[22]  Contrary to strongly Calvinistic or sovereignty orientated approaches,[23] there is within the Bible the idea that God has the power to create any possible universe, including ones with significantly free creatures.[24]  Such a universe would ultimately be under the sovereign control of God, but this does not mean that everything occurring is according to God’s intentions.[25]  Pinnock states that God did not create a world where he determines every detail,[26] and therefore the Biblical idea of God’s sovereignty is not as deterministic as the Calvinistic concept.  Pinnock’s idea is similar to Plantinga’s free will philosophy discussed in the previous Chapter,[27] the conclusion being that if God creates a world with significantly free creatures, the creatures will eventually commit wrong actions.[28]

John Sanders explains that general sovereignty is a concept in contrast to a Calvinistic specific sovereignty[29] that has God allowing general structures to be set up by which human significant freedom and resulting choices allows persons to input on how things turn out.[30]  With general sovereignty, God takes risks in governing the world,[31] but he does not take risks with the concept of specific sovereignty.[32]  Sanders deduces here that when God wants to bring about human acts within the general sovereignty framework he persuades people, whereas Sanders views specific sovereignty as using hard determinism to force people to commit acts.[33]   Bruce Reichenbach (1986) explains that the sovereign cannot compel his subjects to freely follow him.[34]  This understanding would be held by Feinberg,[35] and in general terms, accepted by most scholars that hold to theistic compatibilism  within a Reformed tradition.[36] 

Providence

Oliver Boulnois (2002) defines providence as the manner by which God governs the world.[37]  In other words, providence would be the method that God uses to rule his creation in his sovereignty.[38]  It could be understood that providence would be the method by which God has sovereign control over his creation,[39] and as Calvin notes, God’s providence has him work through persons.[40]  Philip Edgcumbe Hughes (1990) explains that through God’s providence the world is dependent, [41] for if God did not maintain it, it would cease to exist.[42]  In Law of Nature, Edwards  (1731-1733)(2006) explains that providence is the means by which God governs the world as the supreme judge of the universe.[43]  Reichenbach notes that providence is how God guides and cares for his creation.[44]  He further reasons that God on one hand possesses wisdom in order to direct his creation within his plans, and on the other hand has the power by which he attempts to implement his plans.[45]  Reichenbach deduces that God’s providential plans allow for significant human freedom and choices to occur.[46]

Within ‘The Doctrine of Creation’ in Church Dogmatics, Volume III, Karl Barth defines God’s providence as dealing with the history of created beings, in the sense that in every way through this entire span of time, this providence takes place under the care of God the creator.[47]  This includes those that are in Christ in the covenant between God and humanity.[48]  It is God’s fatherly Lordship over the entire world.[49]  Natural events that take place are very personal for God.[50]  God’s providence includes the ‘superior dealings of the Creator with his creation, the wisdom, omnipotence and goodness with which He maintains and governs in time this distinct reality according to the council of his own will.’[51]  God knows all things appropriately and therefore acts in a proper way in relation to each and every creature.[52]  In the act of creation, God  associates himself with his creature as the ‘Lord of its history’[53]  and acts in the appropriate manner.[54]  Both the creator and creation possess types of freedom,[55] and this does not simply leave God’s creatures with a type of freedom[56] but causes the creature to share in the divine glory and the opportunity to serve God.[57]  God can provide his human creation with protection and guardianship along with human purpose and joy.[58]   Schelling, although not noted as a Christian theologian,  within Of Human Freedom states that all earthly creatures are dependent on God.[59]  If God ‘withdrew his power for an instant, man would cease to be.’[60]  There exists ‘nothing before or outside of God.’[61]  Shedd explains that God’s work of providence demonstrates he is the ‘most holy,’ ‘wise’ and ‘powerful’ as he governs his creatures and their actions.[62]  God works in the material universe with its nature and laws.[63]  Phillips explains that a Reformed view is that God has the freedom to act as he wants.[64]  This would be God’s sovereign providence, but Hume is skeptical of this concept.[65]  People throughout the world view certain evils, which may be rectified in other regions of the world or in the future, and understand these good events as being connected to general laws and the existence of a good deity.[66]  Hume suggests that these are superstitions,[67] and questions whether in many cases a ‘cause can be known but from its known effects?’[68]  The idea is then presented that if God is benevolent his providence should lead to a world without suffering and wickedness.[69]

Sanders writes that the Calvinist view on providence is meticulous providence that assumes nothing can stymie God’s will, and that God is in control of every detail.[70]  Compatibilists deny meticulous providence prohibits significant human free will,[71] but Sanders, as an incompatibilist, rejects the compatibilist argument concerning providence.[72]  He instead suggests that a risk model of providence is a better idea.[73]  Within the risk model, God does not control everything that happens, but controls many things.[74]  God alone is responsible for completing his divine plans and these will be completed in a general sense, but that does not mean every specific event is within his plans.[75]  Sander’s risk model is logical and well worth considering, but I question if there is a difficulty with the fact that he states God controls some things and not others.[76]  If God’s control of all things in a Calvinistic/Reformed model is rejected because it would force people to do things, according to Sanders,[77] then how can God control some things?[78]  Does God not influence significant human freedom at some specific points in time in order to bring about his ultimate plans, such as saving rebellious persons?  If God influences significant human freedom at some points in time in order to guarantee that his ultimate plans occur, such as a culminated Kingdom, is this not in the end a form of compatibilism?[79]

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics,  The Doctrine of the Word of God: Volume 1, Part One, Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of Creation: Volumes 1 and 3.  Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of God: Volume 2, First Half -Volume, Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BERKOUWER, G.C. (1962) Man: The Image of God, Grand Rapids, W.M.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

BOULNOIS, OLIVIER (2002) ‘The Concept of God After Theodicy’, in Communio, Volume 29, Number 3, pp. 444-468. Washington, Communio.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.  

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids,  Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books. 

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.  

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GREEN, JAY (1971) Five Points of Calvinism, ‘Forward’, Grand Rapids, Sovereign Grace Publishers. 

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING  (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press. 

GRIFFIN, DAVID RAY (1976) God, Power, and Evil, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press. 

HUGHES, PHILIP, EDGCUMBE (1990) A Commentary On The Epistle To The Hebrews, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press. 

HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004)  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Digireads.com/Neeland Media LLC, Lawrence, Kansas.  

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

PINK, ARTHUR W. (1968)  The Sovereignty of God, London, The Banner of Truth Trust.  

PINNOCK, CLARK (1986)  Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

REICHENBACH, BRUCE (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

SANDERS, JOHN (2003) ‘Open Theism: A Radical Revision or Minuscule Modification of Arminianism?’,  in Wesleyan Theological Journal, Volume 38, Number 2, Fall, pp. 69-102.  Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.   

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.   

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[1] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 1: 2).

[2] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 1: 2).

[3] Pink (1968: 20).

[4] Geisler (1986: 63).

[5] Jay Green explains that Reformed theology was not attempting to replace previous Christian theology, but instead was clarifying the Biblical doctrines of the Church Fathers and the Scriptures.  Green (1971: 7).  The Reformed theological movement went from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries and was a break from Roman Catholic leadership and teaching.  Divine sovereignty was an important emphasis of this movement.  Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 101).

[6] Calvinism is a system which attempts to use Scripture to understand God’s divine theological plan for the ages. Green (1971: 7).  This system stems from the work of John Calvin (1509-1564).  Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 23).

[7] Green (1971: 7).

[8] Green (1971: ii).

[9] Green (1971: ii).

[10] Erickson (1994: 915).

[11] Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).

[12] Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).

[13] Feinberg (1994: 124-143).

[14] Griffin (1976: 116-130).

[15] Griffin (1976: 130).

[16] Griffin (1976: 130).

[17] Griffin (1976: 130).

[18] Griffin (1976: 130).

[19] Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

[20] While at the same time seriously examining criticisms of the view.

[21] And to also test this approach empirically.

[22] Pinnock (1986: 143).

[23] Pinnock (1986: 143).

[24] Pinnock (1986: 145).

[25] Pinnock (1986: 145).

[26] Pinnock (1986: 145).

[27] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).

[28] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).

[29] Sanders (1998: 212).

[30] Sanders (1998: 213).

[31] Sanders (1998: 213-214).

[32] Sanders (1998: 213-214).

[33] Sanders (1998: 214).

[34] Reichenbach (1986: 105).

[35] Feinberg, would deny that God would force persons to commit acts, instead it is God’s sovereign plan that certain unconstrained actions should occur.  Feinberg (2001: 637).

[36] Feinberg (2001: 637).  Frame (2002: 153).  Berkouwer (1962: 333).  Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

[37] Boulnois (2002: 444).

[38] Boulnois (2002: 444).  God uses his providence as he ‘transcends temporal categories.’  Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 108).

[39] Boulnois (2002: 444). 

[40] Calvin (1543)(1996: 36).

[41] Hughes (1990: 45).

[42] Hughes (1990: 45).

[43] Edwards (1731-1733)(2006: 553).

[44] Reichenbach (1986: 115).

[45] Reichenbach (1986: 115).

[46] Reichenbach (1986: 118).

[47] Barth (1932-1968: 3).  We cannot escape from God, he is everywhere.  Frame (2002: 102).

[48] Barth (1932-1968: 3).

[49] Barth (1932-1968: 28).  God’s providence demonstrates ‘preservation and government.’  Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 527 Volume 1).  

[50] Frame (2002: 52).

[51] Barth (1932-1968: 3).  God always accomplishes what he sets out to do.  Frame (2002: 47).

[52] Barth (1932-1968: 5).

[53] Barth (1932-1968: 12).

[54] Barth (1932-1968: 12).

[55] Barth (1932-1968: 12).  The human being has freedom, but participates within the life of God.  Schelling (1845)(1936: 11).  G.C. Berkouwer reasons that God wants a free man, not a mechanical tool or creature than can be maneuvered as the Almighty sees fit.  Berkouwer (1962: 333).   I reason human freedom always operates within the framework of God’s sovereignty and providence.

[56] God governs and maintains the creation, in order that it exists by means of its own ‘inherent properties and laws.’ Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 528 Volume 1).

[57] Barth (1932-1968: 12).   

[58] Barth (1932-1968: 13).

[59] Schelling (1845)(1936: 11).

[60] Schelling (1845)(1936: 11).  Schelling is noted within the ‘Introduction’ to believe in a divine personality and denied that God’s personality was incomprehensible.  Schelling did reason wisdom could be found in God.  Gutmann (1845)(1936: xxv).

[61] Schelling (1845)(1936: 32).

[62] Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 527 Volume 1).  Frame (2002: 274).

[63] Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 528 Volume 1).

[64] Phillips (2005: 22).

[65] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[66] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[67] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[68] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[69] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).

[70] Sanders (1998: 212).  Frame would agree as God is thought to ‘direct the entire universe.’ Frame (2002: 274).

[71] Frame explains that the freedom is not libertarian, but persons make significantly free choices within divine causation.  Frame (2002: 153).

[72] Sanders (1998: 212).

[73] Sanders (1998: 215).

[74] Sanders (1998: 215).

[75] Sanders (1998: 215-217).

[76] Sanders (1998: 215).

[77] Sanders (1998: 212).  The concept of God forcing and/or coercing  persons to commit actions would be denied by many within Reformed theology.  Frame (2002: 153).  Berkouwer (1962: 333).   Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

[78] Would God only control the most vital events that must occur in order for his Kingdom to culminate?  If so, what happens to concepts of incompatibilistic free will in these cases?

[79] God can interject in human affairs and influence human decisions. 

Cliffs+Google Images

20240518: Note 

The lead photo from the original 20130107 article posting. Cliffs, possibly British Isles

[71] Frame explains that the freedom is not libertarian, but persons make significantly free choices within divine causation. 

Excellent point, I agree...

Incompatibilism is from my research often viewed synonymously with libertarian free will. In other words, the view is that any significant, libertarian, human freedom is incompatible with God (or anything) significantly causing human thoughts, desires, will, acts and actions. 

In contrast, compatibilism, my version coined limited free will, is a view that, as God is infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; God therefore must logically cause and will all things as the primary cause. This is true whether God causes something directly or allows it more so indirectly. Human nature, consciousness, thoughts, desires, will, acts and actions are a secondary cause in what humanly occurs. This human chain of limited free will has significant compatibilist freedom when it is not forced or coerced by the primary cause (God) (or anything) or any other secondary cause (human, angelic and demonic beings as examples). If a human being within human nature is forced in thoughts, desires, will, acts and actions, this is not compatibilism or soft determinism, but is rather hard determinism (sometimes called determinism). In other words, significant human freedom only exists when the secondary cause can significantly embrace what is caused by the primary cause.