Monday, January 07, 2013

Sovereignty Approach Definition (PhD Edit)

Sovereignty Approach Definition (PhD Edit)

Preface 

Photo from a recent trip: Dublin at night, 20240405.  This article from my PhD originally published 20130107 with slight reformat for 20240518 and an entry on academic.edu


Sovereignty Approach Definition

John Calvin (1539)(1998) writes humanity has nothing on its own, but depends totally on God.[1]  God bestows on humanity what he wills.[2]  Arthur Pink (1968) defines God’s sovereignty as meaning that God is the almighty, the possessor of all power in heaven and earth, and no one can defeat his counsels.[3]  Norman Geisler explains the Bible teaches that God is in control of the entire universe, including human events.[4]  According to Jay Green (1971), in the ‘Forward’ of his book Five Points of Calvinism, many scholars within Christian theism, in particular those from Reformed[5] and Calvinist[6] positions, reason that God has sovereign control over his creation, and God’s ultimate plan is being accomplished throughout.[7]  Green explains that Calvinists do not necessarily see themselves as followers of John Calvin.[8]  They do recognize Calvin as a great exegete and one who systemized Scripture, and a vast number of the doctrines that came from Calvin’s work are within the system known as Calvinism.[9]   Calvinist Millard J. Erickson writes that sovereignty is a major tenent within Calvinism as God is considered the Lord of all things, and is free to do as he wills.[10]  Jonathan Edwards (1729)(2006) writes that God has the power to bestow upon anyone of his creatures good, evil, or indifference for the greater good.[11]  This sovereign control is accepted despite the obvious problem of evil occurring in God’s creation.[12]  Attempts to harmonize strong concepts of God’s divine control over his creation, with the apparent corrupt nature of what he has made in regard to the problem of evil, will be described within this thesis as sovereignty theodicy.[13]

David Ray Griffin vigorously challenges Calvinistic notions of sovereignty in regard to theodicy.[14]  Griffin claims that God cannot be shown to be perfectly moral for three reasons.[15]  One, God cannot be understood to be morally perfect because God is an alleged deity and his morality cannot be demonstrated.[16]  Two, since with a Calvininstic view God wills all things, including evil acts, God must be immoral.[17]  Three, since Calvinists believe that God bases all things on eternal decisions, God is not truly free and is therefore amoral.[18]  The Calvinist could reply to Griffin with the words of Calvin himself in The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, that God is moral and as evil human actions occur God is willing a good thing and the sinner another.[19]  This type of explanation needs to be presented in a logical and reasonable way,[20] and a central goal of this Chapter is to present a sovereignty theodicy that is philosophically reasonable.[21]

Pinnock explains that there is a tension in the Biblical text between God determining things and human freedom.[22]  Contrary to strongly Calvinistic or sovereignty orientated approaches,[23] there is within the Bible the idea that God has the power to create any possible universe, including ones with significantly free creatures.[24]  Such a universe would ultimately be under the sovereign control of God, but this does not mean that everything occurring is according to God’s intentions.[25]  Pinnock states that God did not create a world where he determines every detail,[26] and therefore the Biblical idea of God’s sovereignty is not as deterministic as the Calvinistic concept.  Pinnock’s idea is similar to Plantinga’s free will philosophy discussed in the previous Chapter,[27] the conclusion being that if God creates a world with significantly free creatures, the creatures will eventually commit wrong actions.[28]

John Sanders explains that general sovereignty is a concept in contrast to a Calvinistic specific sovereignty[29] that has God allowing general structures to be set up by which human significant freedom and resulting choices allows persons to input on how things turn out.[30]  With general sovereignty, God takes risks in governing the world,[31] but he does not take risks with the concept of specific sovereignty.[32]  Sanders deduces here that when God wants to bring about human acts within the general sovereignty framework he persuades people, whereas Sanders views specific sovereignty as using hard determinism to force people to commit acts.[33]   Bruce Reichenbach (1986) explains that the sovereign cannot compel his subjects to freely follow him.[34]  This understanding would be held by Feinberg,[35] and in general terms, accepted by most scholars that hold to theistic compatibilism  within a Reformed tradition.[36] 

Providence

Oliver Boulnois (2002) defines providence as the manner by which God governs the world.[37]  In other words, providence would be the method that God uses to rule his creation in his sovereignty.[38]  It could be understood that providence would be the method by which God has sovereign control over his creation,[39] and as Calvin notes, God’s providence has him work through persons.[40]  Philip Edgcumbe Hughes (1990) explains that through God’s providence the world is dependent, [41] for if God did not maintain it, it would cease to exist.[42]  In Law of Nature, Edwards  (1731-1733)(2006) explains that providence is the means by which God governs the world as the supreme judge of the universe.[43]  Reichenbach notes that providence is how God guides and cares for his creation.[44]  He further reasons that God on one hand possesses wisdom in order to direct his creation within his plans, and on the other hand has the power by which he attempts to implement his plans.[45]  Reichenbach deduces that God’s providential plans allow for significant human freedom and choices to occur.[46]

Within ‘The Doctrine of Creation’ in Church Dogmatics, Volume III, Karl Barth defines God’s providence as dealing with the history of created beings, in the sense that in every way through this entire span of time, this providence takes place under the care of God the creator.[47]  This includes those that are in Christ in the covenant between God and humanity.[48]  It is God’s fatherly Lordship over the entire world.[49]  Natural events that take place are very personal for God.[50]  God’s providence includes the ‘superior dealings of the Creator with his creation, the wisdom, omnipotence and goodness with which He maintains and governs in time this distinct reality according to the council of his own will.’[51]  God knows all things appropriately and therefore acts in a proper way in relation to each and every creature.[52]  In the act of creation, God  associates himself with his creature as the ‘Lord of its history’[53]  and acts in the appropriate manner.[54]  Both the creator and creation possess types of freedom,[55] and this does not simply leave God’s creatures with a type of freedom[56] but causes the creature to share in the divine glory and the opportunity to serve God.[57]  God can provide his human creation with protection and guardianship along with human purpose and joy.[58]   Schelling, although not noted as a Christian theologian,  within Of Human Freedom states that all earthly creatures are dependent on God.[59]  If God ‘withdrew his power for an instant, man would cease to be.’[60]  There exists ‘nothing before or outside of God.’[61]  Shedd explains that God’s work of providence demonstrates he is the ‘most holy,’ ‘wise’ and ‘powerful’ as he governs his creatures and their actions.[62]  God works in the material universe with its nature and laws.[63]  Phillips explains that a Reformed view is that God has the freedom to act as he wants.[64]  This would be God’s sovereign providence, but Hume is skeptical of this concept.[65]  People throughout the world view certain evils, which may be rectified in other regions of the world or in the future, and understand these good events as being connected to general laws and the existence of a good deity.[66]  Hume suggests that these are superstitions,[67] and questions whether in many cases a ‘cause can be known but from its known effects?’[68]  The idea is then presented that if God is benevolent his providence should lead to a world without suffering and wickedness.[69]

Sanders writes that the Calvinist view on providence is meticulous providence that assumes nothing can stymie God’s will, and that God is in control of every detail.[70]  Compatibilists deny meticulous providence prohibits significant human free will,[71] but Sanders, as an incompatibilist, rejects the compatibilist argument concerning providence.[72]  He instead suggests that a risk model of providence is a better idea.[73]  Within the risk model, God does not control everything that happens, but controls many things.[74]  God alone is responsible for completing his divine plans and these will be completed in a general sense, but that does not mean every specific event is within his plans.[75]  Sander’s risk model is logical and well worth considering, but I question if there is a difficulty with the fact that he states God controls some things and not others.[76]  If God’s control of all things in a Calvinistic/Reformed model is rejected because it would force people to do things, according to Sanders,[77] then how can God control some things?[78]  Does God not influence significant human freedom at some specific points in time in order to bring about his ultimate plans, such as saving rebellious persons?  If God influences significant human freedom at some points in time in order to guarantee that his ultimate plans occur, such as a culminated Kingdom, is this not in the end a form of compatibilism?[79]


BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics,  The Doctrine of the Word of God: Volume 1, Part One, Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of Creation: Volumes 1 and 3.  Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of God: Volume 2, First Half -Volume, Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BERKOUWER, G.C. (1962) Man: The Image of God, Grand Rapids, W.M.B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

BOULNOIS, OLIVIER (2002) ‘The Concept of God After Theodicy’, in Communio, Volume 29, Number 3, pp. 444-468. Washington, Communio.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.  

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids,  Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN.S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books. 

FRAME, JOHN M. (1999) ‘The Bible on the Problem of Evil: Insights from Romans 3:1-8,21-26; 5:1-5; 8:28-39’, IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 1, Number 33, October 11 to October 17, Fern Park, Florida, Third Millennium.  

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GREEN, JAY (1971) Five Points of Calvinism, ‘Forward’, Grand Rapids, Sovereign Grace Publishers. 

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING  (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press. 

GRIFFIN, DAVID RAY (1976) God, Power, and Evil, Philadelphia, The Westminster Press. 

HUGHES, PHILIP, EDGCUMBE (1990) A Commentary On The Epistle To The Hebrews, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

HUME, DAVID (1739-1740)(1973) ‘A Treatise of Human Nature’, in Paul Edwards and Arthur Pap (eds.), A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press. 

HUME, DAVID (1779)(2004)  Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Digireads.com/Neeland Media LLC, Lawrence, Kansas.  

KREEFT, PETER AND RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

PINK, ARTHUR W. (1968)  The Sovereignty of God, London, The Banner of Truth Trust.  

PINNOCK, CLARK (1986)  Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

REICHENBACH, BRUCE (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

SANDERS, JOHN (2003) ‘Open Theism: A Radical Revision or Minuscule Modification of Arminianism?’,  in Wesleyan Theological Journal, Volume 38, Number 2, Fall, pp. 69-102.  Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College. 

SCHELLING, F.W.J. (1845)(1936) Schelling, Of Human Freedom, Translated by James Gutmann, The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.   

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology,  Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers.   



[1] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 1: 2).
[2] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 1: 2).
[3] Pink (1968: 20).
[4] Geisler (1986: 63).
[5] Jay Green explains that Reformed theology was not attempting to replace previous Christian theology, but instead was clarifying the Biblical doctrines of the Church Fathers and the Scriptures.  Green (1971: 7).  The Reformed theological movement went from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries and was a break from Roman Catholic leadership and teaching.  Divine sovereignty was an important emphasis of this movement.  Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 101).
[6] Calvinism is a system which attempts to use Scripture to understand God’s divine theological plan for the ages. Green (1971: 7).  This system stems from the work of John Calvin (1509-1564).  Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 23).
[7] Green (1971: 7).
[8] Green (1971: ii).
[9] Green (1971: ii).
[10] Erickson (1994: 915).
[11] Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).
[12] Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).
[13] Feinberg (1994: 124-143).
[14] Griffin (1976: 116-130).
[15] Griffin (1976: 130).
[16] Griffin (1976: 130).
[17] Griffin (1976: 130).
[18] Griffin (1976: 130).
[19] Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).
[20] While at the same time seriously examining criticisms of the view.
[21] And to also test this approach empirically.
[22] Pinnock (1986: 143).
[23] Pinnock (1986: 143).
[24] Pinnock (1986: 145).
[25] Pinnock (1986: 145).
[26] Pinnock (1986: 145).
[27] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[28] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).
[29] Sanders (1998: 212).
[30] Sanders (1998: 213).
[31] Sanders (1998: 213-214).
[32] Sanders (1998: 213-214).
[33] Sanders (1998: 214).
[34] Reichenbach (1986: 105).
[35] Feinberg, would deny that God would force persons to commit acts, instead it is God’s sovereign plan that certain unconstrained actions should occur.  Feinberg (2001: 637).
[36] Feinberg (2001: 637).  Frame (2002: 153).  Berkouwer (1962: 333).  Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).
[37] Boulnois (2002: 444).
[38] Boulnois (2002: 444).  God uses his providence as he ‘transcends temporal categories.’  Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 108).
[39] Boulnois (2002: 444). 
[40] Calvin (1543)(1996: 36).
[41] Hughes (1990: 45).
[42] Hughes (1990: 45).
[43] Edwards (1731-1733)(2006: 553).
[44] Reichenbach (1986: 115).
[45] Reichenbach (1986: 115).
[46] Reichenbach (1986: 118).
[47] Barth (1932-1968: 3).  We cannot escape from God, he is everywhere.  Frame (2002: 102).
[48] Barth (1932-1968: 3).
[49] Barth (1932-1968: 28).  God’s providence demonstrates ‘preservation and government.’  Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 527 Volume 1).  
[50] Frame (2002: 52).
[51] Barth (1932-1968: 3).  God always accomplishes what he sets out to do.  Frame (2002: 47).
[52] Barth (1932-1968: 5).
[53] Barth (1932-1968: 12).
[54] Barth (1932-1968: 12).
[55] Barth (1932-1968: 12).  The human being has freedom, but participates within the life of God.  Schelling (1845)(1936: 11).  G.C. Berkouwer reasons that God wants a free man, not a mechanical tool or creature than can be maneuvered as the Almighty sees fit.  Berkouwer (1962: 333).   I reason human freedom always operates within the framework of God’s sovereignty and providence.
[56] God governs and maintains the creation, in order that it exists by means of its own ‘inherent properties and laws.’ Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 528 Volume 1).
[57] Barth (1932-1968: 12).   
[58] Barth (1932-1968: 13).
[59] Schelling (1845)(1936: 11).
[60] Schelling (1845)(1936: 11).  Schelling is noted within the ‘Introduction’ to believe in a divine personality and denied that God’s personality was incomprehensible.  Schelling did reason wisdom could be found in God.  Gutmann (1845)(1936: xxv).
[61] Schelling (1845)(1936: 32).
[62] Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 527 Volume 1).  Frame (2002: 274).
[63] Shedd (1874-1890)(1980: 528 Volume 1).
[64] Phillips (2005: 22).
[65] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).
[66] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).
[67] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).
[68] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).
[69] Hume (1779)(2004: 50).
[70] Sanders (1998: 212).  Frame would agree as God is thought to ‘direct the entire universe.’ Frame (2002: 274).
[71] Frame explains that the freedom is not libertarian, but persons make significantly free choices within divine causation.  Frame (2002: 153).
[72] Sanders (1998: 212).
[73] Sanders (1998: 215).
[74] Sanders (1998: 215).
[75] Sanders (1998: 215-217).
[76] Sanders (1998: 215).
[77] Sanders (1998: 212).  The concept of God forcing and/or coercing  persons to commit actions would be denied by many within Reformed theology.  Frame (2002: 153).  Berkouwer (1962: 333).   Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).
[78] Would God only control the most vital events that must occur in order for his Kingdom to culminate?  If so, what happens to concepts of incompatibilistic free will in these cases?
[79] God can interject in human affairs and influence human decisions. 

Cliffs+Google Images
20240518: Note 

The lead photo from the original 20130107 article posting. Cliffs, possibly British Isles

[71] Frame explains that the freedom is not libertarian, but persons make significantly free choices within divine causation. 

Excellent point, I agree...

Incompatibilism is from my research often viewed synonymously with libertarian free will. In other words, the view is that any significant, libertarian, human freedom is incompatible with God (or anything) significantly causing human thoughts, desires, will, acts and actions. 

In contrast, compatibilism, my version coined limited free will, is a view that, as God is infinite, omnipotent and omniscient; God therefore must logically cause and will all things as the primary cause. This is true whether God causes something directly or allows it more so indirectly. Human nature, consciousness, thoughts, desires, will, acts and actions are a secondary cause in what humanly occurs. This human chain of limited free will has significant compatibilist freedom when it is not forced or coerced by the primary cause (God) (or anything) or any other secondary cause (human, angelic and demonic beings as examples). If a human being within human nature is forced in thoughts, desires, will, acts and actions, this is not compatibilism or soft determinism, but is rather hard determinism (sometimes called determinism). In other words, significant human freedom only exists when the secondary cause can significantly embrace what is caused by the primary cause.