Thursday, January 20, 2022

PhD: Twitter quote 114/With special medical report

Photo: December 12, 2021, Facebook

PhD: Twitter quote 114

Twitter version I

Carson listed & discussed some Biblical examples of compatibilism: Genesis 50:19-20 describes the reactions of the formerly enslaved Joseph to his brothers who had sold him into slavery. 

Twitter version II

Carson stated: Joseph allays his brother's fears, & insists he does not want to put himself in the place of God. 

2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University.

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

From MPhil thesis, which was part I of my British, PhD program...

Carson listed and discussed some Biblical examples of compatibilism:

In Genesis 50:19-20 it describes the reactions of the formerly enslaved Joseph to his brothers who had sold him into slavery. Carson stated: Joseph allays their fears, and insists he does not want to put himself in the place of God. 

Then he looks back at the brutal incident when he was so badly treated, and comments, “You intended to harm me, but God intended it for good to accomplish what is now being done, the saving of many lives.” The parallelism is remarkable. Joseph does not say that his brothers maliciously sold him into slavery, and that God turned it around, after the fact, to make the story have a happy ending. How could that have been the case, if God’s intent was to bring forth the good of saving many lives? Nor does Joseph suggest that God planned to bring him down to Egypt with first-class treatment all the way, but unfortunately the brothers mucked up His plan somewhat, resulting in the slight hiatus of Joseph spending a decade and a half as a slave or in prison. The story does not read that way. 

The brothers took certain evil initiatives, and there is no prior mention of Joseph’s travel arrangements. As Joseph explains, God was working sovereignly in the event of his being sold into Egypt, but the brothers’ guilt is not thereby assuaged (they intended to harm Joseph); the brothers were responsible for this action, but God was not thereby reduced to a merely contingent role; and while the brothers were evil, God himself had only good intentions. Carson (1990: 205-206).

2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University. 

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CARSON, D.A. (1981) Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility, Atlanta, John Knox Press. 

CARSON, D.A. (1990) How Long, O Lord?, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books. 

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland. 

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.


With special medical report

1. I received my third pandemic injection today, Moderna for the third time. I suppose this is somewhat controversial in conservative and Christian circles. May my good friend, Charles Nelson Chuckles not have his stylish red dome explode as a result of COVID-19.

2. In regards to my sleep apnea, low carb (carbohydrates), low sugar, permanent diet plan, I am down to my lowest weight since I left England in 2001. I think I can still slim down more, but I am built like a tank. With all my working out with martial arts and martial arts weapons, weights and walking, God-willing, I shall continue to be youthful, like Chuck Norris, until the day I die and am in the presence of the Lord.

King James Version (KJV) Philippians 1:23 For I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better:

3. I had a new haircut today. There is no balding like with The Rage, Charles Nelson Chuckles, Sir Robin, Saint Zombie, and so on and so on and so on. All with way kool domes. 

See photos as proof. That 'missing piece' of hair, that centre 'chip' in front is something I have always had with a full set of hair. But if my hair is cut too short on the top, I may look a bit 'fake domeish'. Please see my portrait from when I was seven years old and the Zoom photo from today. 



 


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Wednesday, January 05, 2022

PhD: Twitter quote 113/After the last sermon, a friend at church asked me about free will

Photo: @vienna_austria fb d3021 places & people

PhD: Twitter quote 113/After the last sermon, a friend at church asked me about free will

Preface

A friend, I consider an amateur philosophical whiz, discussed free will with me last Sunday, after a related sermon. This article is an edited review with some new material.

I am a compatibilist within the Reformed, theological tradition and theistic, philosophy of religion.

Twitter version

After the last sermon, a friend at church asked me about free will.

Libertarian free will

Libertarian free will is usually viewed as a form of indeterminism. The concept in libertarian free will is that a person is able to perform another action in the place of one that has been committed. This action cannot be predetermined by any circumstance or desire. There cannot be another, predetermined, simultaneous cause in a theoretical chain within indeterminism.

Norman Geisler explains that indeterminism is defined as the idea that there are no antecedent (preceding conditions, my add) or simultaneous (at the same time, my add) causes of human actions. All human actions are free if a person could have done otherwise. Geisler (1996: 429).

Incompatibilism/Indeterminism

Indeterminism is also equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. Feinberg (1994: 60). 

Compatibilism, which I hold to, would agree with incompatibilism that God or any other being cannot cause by force or coercion any significantly free human action, but contrary to incompatibilism thinks that God can simultaneously will significantly free human actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). 

An entity that is forced or coerced into conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions is not morally responsible, where these are done without significant freedom. Of course, only the infinite God is an infinitely accurate, moral judge of guilt or not, in regards to the deeds of a finite entity. (God judges deeds, post-mortem, Revelation 20, also 21-22, 2 Corinthians 5, 2 Peter 3, as some key examples)

Significant free will (human in this context, my add) would be viewed an incompatible with any form of determinism. Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism or libertarian free will, in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324). 

In other words, no external force must cause a legitimate and truly free act of the human will. Within incompatibilist theory, a human action would never truly be free because God or an another external force (non-deistic view, my add) would have willed and determined it, before being simultaneously willed to a given person. Mawson (1999: 324). Pre-determined before committed by the human being. The external force could hypothetically be a first cause within non-theistic theory. The Biblical concept theologically being that God is infinite and is therefore limitless; God is eternal and therefore has always existed (Genesis 1). This concept is connected to philosophical views of first cause. 

David M. Ciocchi describes the incompatibilist idea as being God can determine that an agent commit action x, but he cannot determine that an agent commit action x freely. Ciocchi (2002: 46). The theory is that significantly free human will and actions cannot be caused by an external force. This would include a first cause. This would include God. 

Again to Norman Geisler, he describes a form of incompatibilism which he, calls self-determinism. Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Geisler (1986: 75). 

Feinberg, who has written extensively on the concepts of free will and determinism, explains incompatibilism is defined as the idea within free will approaches that a person is free in regard to an action if he or she is free to either commit, or refrain from committing the action. Feinberg (1994: 64). There can be no antecedent (there can be no prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). Feinberg importantly writes that just as the incompatibilist does not claim that all actions are significantly free, the compatibilist also does not attach significant freedom to all acts. Feinberg (2001: 637). Feinberg then admits that it is difficult for compatibilists to determine intellectually if certain acts were done by an individual with significant freedom, or with the use of some type of compulsion. Feinberg (2001: 637). He then states that this intellectual difficulty does not disprove compatibilism. 

Limited free will

This is not the ability to choose otherwise, as in middle knowledge and versions of libertarian free will. In my compatibilistic model, at least, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, a person embraces as secondary cause, what was caused, willed and allowed by the primary cause. This in regard to human conscious thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions. This first cause would be God in a biblical view. 

During my British studies I looked for the term limited free will in texts and online and did not see it. Eventually I heard, Dr. Charles Stanley also use it. I highly doubt I invented it, but at least it is somewhat original. I/we have significant moral responsibility in my/our conscious, thoughts, will, choices, acts and actions, that are not significantly forced or coerced.         

Compatibilism/Soft determinism

Significant free will (human in this context) would be viewed as compatible with at least some forms of soft determinism. Louis P. Pojman explains the difference between determinism, which is also known as hard determinism, and compatibilism, which is also known as soft determinism. Pojman (1996: 596). Within determinism or hard determinism, God (or an external force) causes an act and no created being is responsible for his or her moral actions, while for compatibilism or soft determinism, although God causes actions, created beings are responsible where they act voluntarily. Pojman (1996: 596). 

It could be stated that human secondary causes, through a theoretical chain of human nature, human will and human choice, embrace what has been caused and chosen by God, the first and primary cause, directly or indirectly. The human being could also be influenced by other secondary causes, such as other persons and angelic beings, for example.

P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman, defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596). J.S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force, but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine with the use of persuasion, that an action will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24). 

Again with Feinberg, he writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).

W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30). 

Hard determinism

Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). 

Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for determined actions as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).

Links

References

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter 

2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University. 

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall. 

BEROFSKY, BERNARD (1996) ‘Determinism’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Reductio ad Absurdum’, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

BAUER, WALTER. (1979) A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, Translated by Eric H. Wahlstrom, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html 

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CIOCCHI, DAVID M. (2002) ‘The Religious Adequacy of Free-Will Theism’, in Religious Studies, Volume 38, pp. 45-61. Cambridge.

CLINES, DAVID, J. A. (1986), 2 Corinthians, The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Zondervan.

COURSON, JON (2005) Application Commentary, Thomas Nelson, Nashville.

CRANFIELD, C.E.B. (1992) Romans: A Shorter Commentary, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University. 

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com. http://www.jonathanedwards.com 

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press. 

FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.

FOULKES, FRANCIS (1989) Ephesians, Grand Rapids, Inter-Varsity Press.

FLEW, ANTONY, R.M. HARE, AND BASIL MITCHELL (1996) ‘The Debate on the Rationality of Religious Belief’, in L.P. Pojman (ed.), Philosophy, The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

FLEW, ANTONY AND A.MACINTRYE (1999) ‘Philosophy of Religion’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press Ltd. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House. 

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland. http://www.philosophy.umd.edu/Faculty/PGreenspan/Res/gen2.html

GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI and CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press. 

HASKER, WILLIAM (1996) ‘Middle Knowledge’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

HUGHES, P.E. (1996) ‘Grace’ in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books. 

KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1955)(1996) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in Mind, in Michael Peterson, William Hasker, Bruce Reichenbach, and David Basinger (eds.), Philosophy of Religion, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

MACKIE, J.L. (1971)(1977)(2002) ‘Evil and Omnipotence’, in The Philosophy of Religion, in Alvin C. Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

MOUNCE, ROBERT H. (1990) The Book of Revelation, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

MOUNCE, R.H. (1995) The New American Commentary: Romans, Nashville, Broadman & Holman Publishers. 

PAYNE. DAVID F.(1986) ‘2 Peter’, in F.F. Bruce, (ed.), The International Bible Commentary, Grand Rapids, Marshall Pickering/Zondervan.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. 

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

REED, HOLLY (2004) ‘Jonathan Edwards’, in The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology, Boston, The Boston Collaborative Encyclopedia of Modern Western Theology. 

STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.

STORMS, SAM (2006) 'Jonathan Edwards on the Will', Kansas City, Missouri. Enjoying God Ministries. Enjoyinggodministries.com http://www.enjoyinggodministries.com/article.asp?id=368 

STRONG, J. (1890)(1986) Strong's Exhaustive Concordance of the Bible, Burlington, Welch Publishing Company.

TCHIVIDJIAN, W. TULLIAN, (2001) ‘Reflections on Jonathan Edwards’ View of Free Will, in IIIM Magazine Online, Volume 3, Number 51, December 17 to December 23, Fern Park, Florida, IIIM Magazine Online.

The Orthodox Study Bible, New Testament and Psalms, (1993) Saint Athanasius Orthodox Academy,Thomas Nelson Publishers, Nashville, Tennessee.

THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.   

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Wednesday, December 29, 2021

PhD: Twitter quote 112

PhD: Twitter quote 112

Photo: Granada, Spain, Planet Earth, December 22, 2021 

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter 


Twitter version I 

Mill theorized of a God that resembled the ‘Platonic Demiurge'. Carey (2002: 116).

Twitter version II

In The Utility of Religion from 1874, Mill explains that Christianity offers rewards in the next life for good conduct...

Twitter version III

In contrast, the Religion of Humanity would be superior as human virtue would exist for unselfish reasons. Mill (1874)(2002: 16).

Twitter version IV\

A demiurge is a Greek term meaning ‘artisan’, ‘craftsman.’ It is a deity that develops the material world from ‘preexisting chaos.

From PhD

A demiurge is a Greek term meaning ‘artisan’, ‘craftsman.’ It is a deity that develops the material world from ‘preexisting chaos.’ Plato introduced the concept and term in his text Timaeus. The perfectly good demiurge wishes to present his goodness and shapes the chaos as best he can, and the present world results. Wainwright (1996: 188). The demiurge is a limited, non-omnipotent God, that did not create original matter. Wainwright (1996: 188). Blackburn (1996: 98). 

Although I reason Christians should do what is good and right, just because it is good and right, and not primarily for a possible reward, Mill does not demonstrate in my mind a conclusive argument in how human beings, as they are, can or will ever operate with completely unselfish motives. Is all selfishness wrong, or does some degree of human self-concern and a desire for self-benefit remain an integral part of how God intended humanity to be? 

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of Creation: Volumes 1 and 3. Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BARTH, KARL (1932-1968) Church Dogmatics, The Doctrine of God: Volume 2, First Half –Volume, Translated by J.W. Edwards, Rev. O. Bussey, and Rev. Harold Knight, Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark. 

BAVINCK, HERMAN (1918)(2006) Reformed Dogmatics Volume 2: God and Creation, John Bolt (gen.ed.), Translated by John Vriend, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids.

BAVINCK, HERMAN (1918)(2006) Reformed Dogmatics Volume 3: Sin and Salvation in Christ, John Bolt (gen.ed.), Translated by John Vriend, Baker Academic, Grand Rapids. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CAREY, GEORGE W. (2002) ‘The Authoritarian Secularism of John Stuart Mill’, in On Raeder’s Mill and the Religion of Humanity, Volume 15, Number 1, Columbia, University of Missouri Press. 

FRAME, JOHN M. (2002) The Doctrine of God, P and R Publishing, Phillipsburg, New Jersey. 

GORDON, DAVID (2000) ‘John Stuart Mill on Liberty and Control’, in The Mises Review, Volume 6, Number 1, Auburn, Alabama, Ludwig Von Mises Institute. 

MILL, JOHN STUART (1789-1861)(2003) Utilitarianism and On Liberty, Mary Warnock (ed.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford. 

MILL, JOHN STUART (1825-1868)(1984) Essays on Equality, Law, and Education, John M. Robson (ed.), University of Toronto Press, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 

MILL, JOHN STUART (1833)(1985)(2009) Theism: John Stuart Mill The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume X - Essays on Ethics, Religion, and Society, Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 

MILL, JOHN STUART (1874)(2002) The Utility of Religion, London, Longman, Green, and Reader. 

MILL, JOHN STUART (1874)(1885) Nature the Utility of Religion and Theism, London, Longmans, Green and Co. 

MILLBANK, JOHN, CATHERINE PICKSTOCK, and GRAHAM WARD (2001) Radical Orthodoxy, London, Routledge. 

PLATO (360 B.C.)(1982) ‘Timaeus’, in Process Studies, Volume. 12, Number 4, Winter, pp.243-251. Claremont, California, Process Studies. http://www.religion-online.org/showarticle.asp?title=2514

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 1, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

SHEDD, WILLIAM G.T. (1874-1890)(1980) Dogmatic Theology, Volume 2, Nashville, Thomas Nelson Publishers. 

WAINWRIGHT, WILLIAM J. (1996) ’Demiurge’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

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Wednesday, December 22, 2021

Metaphysics v Positivism

Metaphysics v Positivism

Lights covering trees in Riverview, N.B. Global News, December 21, 2021 

Preface


I edited and reformatted the 2012 article Metaphysics and placed it on Facebook (image lead) and my Facebook Business Page, yesterday.

I received some good feedback, including: 

Gina Leanne Cia: Great read! (end)

There is some material I can add. But first, some background from the 2012 article.

Defining Metaphysics

Louis P. Pojman defines metaphysics as beyond physics. The study of ultimate reality, which is not accessible/available through empirical senses. He lists free will, causality, the nature of matter, immortality and the existence of God as being within the study of metaphysics. Pojman (1995: 598). 

Simon Blackburn explains the term was used for three books from Aristotle after 'Physics' and is a term that raises enquiry about questions that cannot be answered by science and its empirical methods. Blackburn (1996: 240). 

Physics Aristotle


Cited 

The Physics (Greek: Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις Phusike akroasis; Latin: Physica, or Naturales Auscultationes, possibly meaning "lectures on nature") is a named text, written in ancient Greek, collated from a collection of surviving manuscripts known as the Corpus Aristotelicum, attributed to the 4th-century BC philosopher Aristotle. 

I will cite two versions of this work as cited sources.

Versus Metaphysics

Blackburn mentions the hostility to metaphysics throughout modern times especially as David Hume mentioned having it 'committed to the flames' in 'Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding' book xii Pt 3. Hume (1748) Blackburn (1996: 240). It is assumed by some naturalists that the scientific method would be the only way to answer any real questions that would arise within metaphysics. Blackburn (1996: 240). 

Panayot Butcharov defines it generally as the philosophical investigation of nature, and its reality, in how it is constituted. The study of non-physical entities, for example God, would be addressed. Butcharov (1996: 489). Metaphysics would be rejected by positivism on the basis of being meaningless. Since it is not empirically viable. Butcharov (1996: 489). 

Positivism being a form of empiricism viewing empirical science as the means of gaining knowledge and metaphysics, theology, and even aspects of philosophy as being viewed as questionable in obtaining knowledge. 

Positivism

Referencing 


John Kent states positivism is a philosophical position belonging to the empirical view according to which humankind can have no knowledge of anything but phenomena, and that is only what is apprehended by the senses empirically. Kent (1999: 454). The concept would be that positive knowledge is associated in particular with the sciences as in things must be observed and there is no questioning of knowledge beyond. Kent (1999: 454). Therefore other fields such as theology and metaphysics would be regarded as speculation. Kent (1999: 454). 

The term 'positivism' was introduced by French socialist Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and noted by his student Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Both of these men rejected traditional Christianity and its working with the existing social system. Kent (1999: 454). Comte held that the highest or only form of knowledge is the description of sensory phenomena. Blackburn (1996: 294). This being the empirical. He held to three stages of human belief the theological, the metaphysical and the positive. It is a version of traditional empiricism. Blackburn (1996: 294). 

Paul Weirich writes that Comte was influenced by Kant and held that the causes of the phenomena (or that phenomena realm one could state, my add) in themselves are not knowable. Comte was critical of speculation on such matters. It is stated that he went beyond many empiricists by denying knowledge other than from observable objects. Weirich (1996: 147). In other words he was a strict empiricist.


Comments 

Positivism appears to me to at least risk at times to be what Blackburn describes related to the pejorative term of ‘scientism’ which categorizes things in the natural sciences as the only proper form of academic inquiry. Blackburn (1996: 344). In other words, positivism risks being a form of scientism. (please see archives)

Back to Pojman, he lists free will, causality, the nature of matter, immortality and the existence of God, as being within metaphysics. Positivism, a strict use of empirical senses, can measure problems of suffering, physical and mental, to degrees. For example, if a person jumps from a burning building, the physical damage to that person can be measured through empirical, medical science and data. But, the academic disciplines of philosophy, philosophy of religion, theology, psychology as examples, are required to deal with worldview issues associated with problems of suffering and problems of evil.

As I have noted previously, the existence of God, cannot be adequately dealt with empirically. John 4: 24 from the New American Standard Bible (NASB) states:

24 God is [a]spirit, and those who worship Him must worship in spirit and truth.”  Footnotes John 4:24 Or Spirit

It is intellectually and academically, wrong-headed, to attempt, or expect to, empirically prove the existence of the infinite, eternal, first cause, that existed before finite, time, space and matter. This entity is the creator of all finite and physical realities. According to the New Testament, God is spirit and cannot be measured empirically as God is not physical.


Biblical Studies, biblical, divine revelation, theology and philosophy of religion serve as the main academic disciplines and practical means by providing proofs for the existence of God.

ARISTOTLE (1936) Physics, Translated by Apostle, Hippocrates G. (with Commentaries and Glossary). Oxford: University Press.

ARISTOTLE (2018). Physics,  Translated by Reeve, C. D. C. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘A priori/A posteriori’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 21-22. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BONJOUR, LAURENCE. (1996) ‘A Priori’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

BUTCHAROV, PANAYOT (1996) ‘Metaphysics’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

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