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Carson demonstrated that with compatibilism there is philosophical tension between God's sovereignty & human moral responsibility.
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My MPhil thesis was part one of my PhD program from the University of Wales.
Carson provided an important chapter on compatibilism that discussed the tension between God’s sovereignty and human moral responsibility. This is the most complicated chapter of his text. He demonstrated that both these ideas are Scriptural and philosophically sound, although there exists a tension which means that how the two concepts coexist is not completely humanly understood.
2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University.
Carson noted that compatibilism being true means God stands behind good and evil, but in different ways. To put it bluntly, God stands behind evil in such a way that not even evil takes place outside the bounds of his sovereignty, yet the evil is not morally chargeable to him: it is always chargeable to secondary agents, to secondary causes. On the other hand, God stands behind good in such a way that it not only takes place within the bounds of his sovereignty, but it is always chargeable to him, and only derivatively to secondary agents. In other words, if I sin, I cannot possibly do so outside the bounds of God’s sovereignty (or the many texts already cited have no meaning), but I alone am responsible for that sin–or perhaps I and those who tempted me, led me astray and the like. God is not to be blamed. Carson (1990: 213).
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Definitions
From my MPhil/PhD research work and thesis (1999-2010) and website research work (2004-Present)
2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter
Edited
Compatibilism (Soft determinism)
Grenz, Guretzki and Nordling define compatibilism as the theory that human free will is compatible with God’s sovereign prerogative to determine or will all events. Grenz, Guretzki, and Nordling (1999: 28). P.S. Greenspan writes that compatibilism holds to the philosophical concepts of free will and determinism being compatible. Greenspan (1998: 1). Louis P. Pojman defines compatibilism as the concept that an act can be entirely determined and yet be free in the sense that it was done voluntarily and without compulsion. Pojman (1996: 596).
John S. Feinberg explains that compatibilism does not allow for coercion or force (for there to be significant human moral accountability with human will and actions, my add), but holds that God, or some outside force, can simultaneously determine, with the use of persuasion, that actions will or will not take place. Feinberg (1986: 24).
Feinberg writes that certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions, in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (1994: 60). With this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating that God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet these were committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).
W.T. Stace (1952)(1976) explains that moral responsibility is consistent with determinism in the context of soft determinism and requires it. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). If human actions are uncaused then reward or punishment would be unjustified. Stace (1952)(1976: 29). Stace reasons that there must be at least some human cause within human actions to make them morally responsible acts. Stace (1952)(1976: 30).
I personally embrace, what I named limited free will, within compatibilism. Human beings through nature, consciousness, desire and will embrace as secondary causes, thoughts, acts and actions. Simultaneously, God, within theistic compatibilism, is the primary cause of all things, but with holy, pure and good motives.
Incompatibilism (Indeterminism)
Indeterminism is equated with incompatibilism which states that God, or any other being, cannot cause by force or coercion, any human action, nor can any action be simultaneously willed by God or any other being, for the human action to remain significantly free. This would include concepts of libertarian free will.
Blackburn explains free will theory requires autonomous beings that are able to perform free actions without any significant influence upon their will. He describes autonomy as the ability of agents to govern themselves, and for this to occur autonomous agents must commit actions which are truly their own. Philosopher Tim Mawson reasons that incompatibilism, which is also known as libertarianism in regard to human free will, believes that true human free will must be uncaused by preceding states. Mawson (1999: 324).
Norman Geisler (1986) describes a form of incompatibilism which he calls self-determinism. Geisler (1986: 75). Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused. Geisler (1986: 75). Incompatibilists, therefore, do not deny there are outside forces that influence significantly free human actions; however, they do not accept any notion that a free act can be caused in a determined sense by one being upon another and remain a significantly free act. Ferre (1973)(1976: 35). Geisler (1986: 75). Mawson (1999: 324). An act cannot be determined or simultaneously determined and remain truly free within incompatibilism. Ferre (1973)(1976: 35). Geisler (1986: 75). Mawson (1999: 324).
Determinism (Hard determinism)
Simon Blackburn comments that this is the doctrine that human action has no influence on events. Blackburn (1996: 137). Blackburn gives the opinion that fatalism is wrongly confused with determinism, which by itself carries no implications that human actions have no effect. Blackburn (1996: 137). In other words, there are forms of determinism where human actions are significant.
D.G. Bloesch explains that fate is not chance, but instead is cosmic determinism that has no meaning or purpose. Bloesch (1996: 407). He writes that fate/fatalism would differ from a Christian idea of divine providence and its implied use of determinism, in that fatalism is impersonal and irrational, whereas providence is personal and rational. Bloesch (1996: 407). In contrast to 'fate' or fatalism, biblical, theological determinism, has divine meaning. Thiessen comments that fatalism is not determinism because fatalism holds that all events are caused by fate and not natural causes, and nothing can change these events. Determinism, in contrast, holds that all events occur by necessity. Thiessen (1956: 186).
Tomis Kapitan notes that determinism is usually understood as meaning that whatever occurs is determined by antecedent (preceding cause) conditions. Kapitan (1999: 281). Pojman states that hard determinism holds that every event is caused and no one is responsible for actions, whereas soft determinism holds that rational creatures can be held responsible for actions determined, as long as they are done voluntarily and without force or coercion. Pojman (1996: 586).
In contrast, the compatibilist, soft-deterministic God of Reformed theology allows significant human freedom with the embracing of human thoughts, acts and action via human nature, desires and limited free will. The human ability with significant freedom to embrace thoughts, acts and actions as a secondary cause, philosophically and theologically eliminates God as forcing or coercing human thoughts, acts and actions where there is human, moral, accountability.
I reason God at times, does force or coerce events in regard to humanity, in those cases, there is not significant human moral accountability. For example, a person unwillingly becomes an amputee. This is against the nature, desires and will. A person does not sin by rejecting the amputation with nature, desires and will.
BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘Fatalism’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
BLOESCH, D. (1996) ‘Fate, Fatalism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
CARSON, D.A. (1981) Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility, Atlanta, John Knox Press.
CARSON, D.A. (1990) How Long, O Lord?, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, David Basinger and Randall Basinger (eds.), Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (1994) The Many Faces of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
FERRE, FREDERICK (1952)(1976) ‘Self-Determinism’, in American Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 10, Number 3, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds.), in Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.
FEINBERG, JOHN S. (2001) No One Like Him, John S. Feinberg (gen.ed.), Wheaton, Illinois, Crossway Books.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.
GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.
GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books
GREENSPAN, P.S. (1998) Free Will and Genetic Determinism: Locating the Problem (s), Maryland, University of Maryland.
GRENZ, STANLEY J., DAVID GURETZKI AND CHERITH FEE NORDLING (1999) Pocket Dictionary of Theological Terms, Downers Grove, Ill., InterVarsity Press.
KAPITAN, TOMIS (1996) ‘Free Will Problem’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
MAWSON, TIM (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil and Moral Indifference’, in Religious Studies, Volume 35, pp. 323-345. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.
STACE, W.T. (1952)(1976) Religion and the Modern Mind, in John R. Burr and Milton Goldinger (eds), Philosophy and Contemporary Issues, London, Collier Macmillan Publishers.
THIESSEN, HENRY C. (1956) Introductory Lectures in Systematic Theology, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.
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