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PhD text and original Blogger article
Theodicy and Practical Theology (2010), The University of Wales, Trinity
Saint David.
Welty rejects Plantinga’s idea that God cannot create a world containing
moral good and no moral evil,[1] and
raises the objection that God brought Christ into the world as a sinless human
being.[2] Welty’s
point here is that every human being could have therefore been sinless[3] and
the world could contain good and no evil with significantly free human beings
that would not commit wrong actions.[4] I have a similar objection to Welty’s,[5] which
was discussed in Chapters Two and Three of my PhD thesis. Within my
theodicy, I reason that God could have, if he wished, made significantly free
human beings, or human like beings who would have been perfectly morally good
and would not commit wrong actions.[6] God’s
choice not to create such beings, in my mind is not a sign of a lack of power,
or moral failure, but rather the use of his own perfect and significantly free
will for good purposes.
December 4, 2017
I reason that Welty's argument is very strong for compatibilism versus incompatibilism. Jesus Christ as incarnate was both infinite God and finite man. As finite man he lived in sinless life and yet had significant freedom. Christ completed his atoning and resurrection work for those in Christ, via a divine gospel plan with persons as is within this present realm.
Further
The angels that did not fall (Revelation 12) are non-physical beings reasoned to have remained sinless and yet have significant freedom, as they are judged (1 Corinthians 6, fallen angels in Revelation 20). The divine judgement for thoughts and actions of a secondary cause requires moral accountability, otherwise this is hard determinism, where only God the primary cause would be morally responsible, although with perfect and holy motives. This is not soft-determinism/compatibilism.
God, as infinite and eternal has never contradicted his divine nature (logically cannot) and sinned and yet has significant freedom.
In the cases of the human nature of Jesus Christ, the finite nature of angels that stayed true to God and the infinite nature of God, there is a significant, reasonable understanding of evil (God's being infinite) but not an ontological/nature requirement of embracing evil and sin as an option. If one's nature is perfectly good, finitely or infinitely, it is logically possible and reasonable to stay in that nature while understanding evil.
WELTY, GREG (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Greg Welty PhD, Fort Worth, Texas. Philosophy Department, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary.
http://www.ccir.ed.ac.uk/~jad/welty/probevil.htm
I reason that Welty's argument is very strong for compatibilism versus incompatibilism. Jesus Christ as incarnate was both infinite God and finite man. As finite man he lived in sinless life and yet had significant freedom. Christ completed his atoning and resurrection work for those in Christ, via a divine gospel plan with persons as is within this present realm.
Further
The angels that did not fall (Revelation 12) are non-physical beings reasoned to have remained sinless and yet have significant freedom, as they are judged (1 Corinthians 6, fallen angels in Revelation 20). The divine judgement for thoughts and actions of a secondary cause requires moral accountability, otherwise this is hard determinism, where only God the primary cause would be morally responsible, although with perfect and holy motives. This is not soft-determinism/compatibilism.
God, as infinite and eternal has never contradicted his divine nature (logically cannot) and sinned and yet has significant freedom.
In the cases of the human nature of Jesus Christ, the finite nature of angels that stayed true to God and the infinite nature of God, there is a significant, reasonable understanding of evil (God's being infinite) but not an ontological/nature requirement of embracing evil and sin as an option. If one's nature is perfectly good, finitely or infinitely, it is logically possible and reasonable to stay in that nature while understanding evil.
WELTY, GREG (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Greg Welty PhD, Fort Worth, Texas. Philosophy Department, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary.
[1] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 30). Welty
(1999: 1).
[2] Welty (1999: 1).
[3] Welty (1999: 1).
[4] Welty (1999: 1).
[5] Welty (1999: 1).
[6] This is an aspect of compatibilism, which
shall be primarily defined and discussed in Chapters Two and Three.
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