Limited Free Will (Brief)

South Wales-trekearth

FEATURED MY ASSURANCE: GOD IS IN CONTROL, PART 2

Cited

'God always gives His best to those He loves, but sometimes His will includes something you would never choose for yourself. How do you reconcile God's generous love with the pain and sorrow He allows? Dr. Stanley responds to those of us who wrestle with this question in part two of My Assurance: God is in Control.'

I found a significant Christian teacher that uses the term 'limited free will' in regard to humanity.

Dr. Charles Stanley of In Touch Ministries

My PhD term.

I rarely see the term used online and did not see it used by a significant teacher or writer in my academic research at Wales or prior to.

From

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

Cited

'In contrast, I deduce that God can have very specific intentions in every situation, while allowing significant limited free will, and this has been explained throughout this work.'

End

I wrote three posts on the weekend, the last two on my second blog:

Sovereignty Theodicy

False Story

Robust Enough

Wales, Lampeter-Trinity Saint David

Sovereignty Theodicy And Certainty (PhD Edit)

France-Facebook-Travel+Leisure

My third article today and I would reason that the 32 Celsius local heat and my inability to sleep well up in this basically third floor condo has something to do with it.

Thankfully shortly, I will be playing 'football' outside.

My other two posts from today are short and hopefully sweet: Satire And Theology

A post from the same material and more footnotes February 1 2011

A continuation of the theme of certainty:

Preface

A philosophy point to ponder on in light of progressive attempts to reinvent Christianity for the 21st Century and make human nature as it presently is more acceptable is that universal human death in this realm is a very strong cumulative point and indicator that God is not pleased with humanity in its current state (Genesis 1-3, Romans 1-6) and that the atoning and resurrection work of Christ is essential to be applied to a Christian believer (Hebrew 7-9, I Corinthians 15) for everlasting life with a perfected although still finite nature.

Sovereignty Theodicy And Certainty

A rejection by some within the Christian Church of the Reformed idea that God predestines with soft determinism individuals to salvation is important.[1]  This would work hand in hand with the rejection of the idea that God causes evil by allowing sin to exist. In both cases God’s divine sovereignty is downplayed, by Reformed standards. With free will theory God would be viewed as allowing the problem of evil for greater purposes, but not willing it.[2]  A praxis of free will theodicy would be that God can desire to save all persons, but cannot because human beings refuse to turn to God.[3]  Moral choices are not caused or uncaused by another being, but are self-caused.[4]  God therefore would be unable to save persons that freely reject him and they have made a moral choice to oppose God.[5]  In contrast to the sovereignty perspective, since God does not cause evil and does not predetermine human actions such as who shall believe in him,  human beings are a greater impediment to a culminated Kingdom of God with a free will theodicy than with a sovereignty one.[6]  This fits into Plantinga’s reasoning that in every situation transworld depravity will cause wrong human actions.[7]  Transworld depravity provides the concept that in any possible world, including our own, each person would make at least one wrong decision and the resulting bad action would lead to evil occurring within creation.[8]   It can be reasoned that the praxis related end goal of free will theodicy is for God within an incompatibilist, libertarian system to convince many human beings to accept Christ and turn from evil in order to fully establish the Kingdom of God.[9]

In contrast, with a compatibilistic sovereignty perspective, God is reasoned to transform and mould persons he chooses for salvation,[10] so that the culminated Kingdom takes place at God’s appointed time.[11]  Both free will and sovereignty perspectives accept the Biblical idea of the culminated Kingdom, but free will places much more emphasis on the individual freely deciding that this is for him/her, rather than being determined  in any way to do so.[12]  Free will advocates will understand the process as God making an offer and over time convincing persons to believe it.  A devotion to God can only be a good thing when persons freely accept it.[13]  Sovereignty perspectives reason that God alone makes the choice to begin a regeneration process that leads to salvation in a human being.  F.F. Bruce (1996) explains that because of the universal fact of human sin, there is no way to be accepted by God by human means.[14]  This divinely guided change in a person must occur in order for salvation to ever take place within a human being with a corrupted nature.[15] 

Free will theodicy, unlike soul-making theory, does not necessarily accept universalism[16] as part of its praxis and it could logically be argued that Plantinga’s transworld depravity would apply in all post-mortem situations.[17]  In my view, these are perils of a praxis that rejects compatibilism and soft determinism.  Even as traditional Christian free will theory would not accept universalism, it still reasons eventually those citizens saved by Christ would not sin within the culminated Kingdom. Those within the Kingdom will have been brought to God through Christ.[18]  The resurrection work would be reasoned to change the entire nature of saved persons to sinless and allow everlasting life, but without God also determining that sin would never again occur, I reason that transworld depravity could always be a concern.[19]

A praxis of sovereignty theodicy would be that, from start to finish, salvation is primarily the goal directed[20] plan of God.  Human beings are not brought to Christ through compulsion, but when predestined in election shall be convinced to accept the offer of salvation.  Praxis shifts from the incompatibilism of free will that assumes God desires to save all persons, but can only save those who are eventually persuaded to believe, to an understanding that whom God desires to save shall be regenerated and placed in a process of salvation.[21]  The problem of evil is therefore not primarily subject to, and in existence, because human sin is stalling the culmination of God’s plans.  I do not doubt that human beings do often oppose God’s plans, but God being almighty can overcome the problem of evil, and is working through this process slowly in history.  Within a sovereignty perspective human sin does oppose God, but God will use sin for his purposes and regenerate and mould those he chooses towards salvation.  As long as one can accept the idea that a perfectly moral God wills and allows evil within his plans for the greater good,[22] there is a degree of intellectual certainty with sovereignty theodicy that free will theodicy lacks.  God could inevitably bring about, through the use of the regeneration and the resurrection of elected human persons,  the end of human corruption,  and even Plantinga’s concept of transworld depravity.[23]  If God willed and created a finalized Kingdom of restored persons that had experienced the problem of evil and were saved from it, then it could be reasoned that with God’s constant persuasion through the Holy Spirit and human experience and maturity, transworld depravity would never take place again.  

No human wrong decision[24] would need to occur as God always determines otherwise, and restored human beings do not lack experience as did the first humans who rebelled against God causing corruption.  I speculate that theological praxis of sovereignty theodicy is more certain and comforting than free will theodicy, as transworld depravity is overcome by taking the primary choice of human belief in God away from corrupted human beings and placing it in the hands of a sovereign God.

AUGUSTINE (388-395)(1964) On Free Choice of the Will, Translated by Anna S.Benjamin and L.H. Hackstaff, Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

           

AUGUSTINE (398-399)(1992) Confessions, Translated by Henry Chadwick, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

AUGUSTINE (400-416)(1987)(2004) On the Trinity, Translated by Reverend Arthur West Haddan, in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, Series One, Volume 3, Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/130104.htm

AUGUSTINE (421)(1998) Enchiridion, Translated by J.F. Shaw,  Denver, The Catholic Encyclopedia.

http://www.knight.org/advent

AUGUSTINE (426)(1958) The City of God, Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, Garden City, New York, Image Books.

AUGUSTINE (427)(1997) On Christian Doctrine, Translated by D.W. Robertson Jr., Upper Saddle River, N.J., Prentice Hall.

AUGUSTINE (427b)(1997) On Christian Teaching, Translated by R.P.H. Green, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BLOESCH, DONALD G. (1987) Freedom for Obedience, San Francisco, Harper and Rowe Publishers.

BLOESCH, DONALD G. (1996) ‘Sin, The Biblical Understanding of Sin’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book II, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College.

http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids,

Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1729)(2006) Sovereignty of God, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1731-1733)(2006) Law of Nature, New Haven, Connecticut, Jonathan Edwards Center, Yale University.

EDWARDS, JONATHAN (1754)(2006) Freedom of the Will, Flower Mound, Texas. Jonathanedwards.com.
http://www.jonathanedwards.com

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1975) Philosophy of Religion, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1978) The Roots of Evil, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1986) Predestination and Free Will, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

GEISLER, NORMAN L. (1996) ‘Freedom, Free Will, and Determinism’, in Walter A. Elwell (ed.), Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

GEISLER, NORMAN, L (1999) ‘The Problem of Evil’, in Baker Encyclopedia of Apologetics, Grand Rapids, Baker Books.

HICK, JOHN (1970) Evil and The God of Love, London, The Fontana Library.

HICK, JOHN (1978) ‘Present and Future Life’, Harvard Theological Review, Volume 71, Number 1-2, January-April, Harvard University.

HICK, JOHN (1981) Encountering Evil, Stephen T. Davis (ed.),  Atlanta, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993)  ‘Afterword’ in GEIVETT, R. DOUGLAS (1993) Evil and the Evidence for God, Philadelphia, Temple University Press.

HICK, JOHN (1993) The Metaphor of God Incarnate, Louisville, Kentucky, John Know Press.

HICK, JOHN (1994) Death and Eternal Life, Louisville, Kentucky, John Knox Press.

HICK, JOHN (1999) ‘Life after Death’, in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds.), A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, Kent, SCM Press.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1516)(1968) Commentary On The Epistle To The Romans, Translated by J.Theodore Mueller, Grand Rapids, Zondervan Publishing House.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1518)(1989) ‘Heidelberg Disputation’, in Timothy F. Lull (ed.), Martin Luther’s Basic Theological Writings,  Minneapolis, Fortress Press.

LUTHER, MARTIN. (1525)(1972) ‘The Bondage of the Will’, in F.W. Strothmann and Frederick W. Locke (eds.), Erasmus-Luther: Discourse on Free Will, New York, Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., INC.

MCCANN, HUGH J. (2001) ‘Sovereignty and Freedom: A Reply to Rowe’, in Faith and Philosophy, Volume 18, Number 1, January, pp. 110-116. Wilmore, Kentucky, Asbury College.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1977)(2002) God, Freedom, and Evil, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (1982) The Nature of Necessity, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

PLANTINGA, ALVIN C. (2000) Warranted Christian Belief, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

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[1] For some, non-determinism alone allows for significant human freedom.  Geisler (1986: 75). 

[2] Geisler (1986: 75).  McCann (2001: 115).

[3] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33). 

[4] Geisler (1986: 75).

[5] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 33).  Geisler (1986: 75).

[6] An atheist and critic could reasonably and rightly suggest that persons use free will to such a corrupt degree that God will never be able to culminate a Kingdom where significantly free creatures do not continue to at times commit horrendous evils.

[7] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).

[8] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).

[9] This assumes that human beings by grace through faith can be convinced into belief in Christ and then regenerated and indwelled by the Holy Spirit.

[10] Luther (1525)(1972: 133).  Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).

[11] Calvin (1539)(1998: Book II, Chapter 3, 6).  Calvin (1552)(1995: 13).

[12] Geisler (1986: 75).  McCann (2001: 115).

[13] Augustine (388-395)(1964: 78).

[14] Bruce (1996: 93).

[15] Bruce (1996: 93).

[16] Contrary to Hick.  Hick (1970: 381).

[17] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).

[18] Augustine viewed the atoning work of Christ as a means by which humanity can be brought back to a proper relationship with God.  Augustine (398-399)(1992: 178).  Christ would mediate humanity back to God.  Augustine (398-399)(1992: 219).

[19] Without compatibilism in my view, incompatibilism and free will theory is left with the problem of explaining how human corruption and Plantinga’s transworld depravity will not prevent the salvation of persons and the completed and finalized Kingdom of God.

[20] Teleological.  Bloesch (1987: 19).

[21] Calvin (1543)(1996: 204).

[22] Calvin (1543)(1996: 37-40).  Edwards (1729)(2006: 414).

[23] Plantinga (1977)(2002: 53).

[24] Moral wrong decisions is meant here.  A lack of infinite knowledge could still lead to a human being making a non-moral mistake, for example, not playing a perfect game.  

Absolute Certainty

Facebook: Europe I presume

Absolute Certainty

Preface

Originally published, June 6, 2015 and revised for an entry on academia.edu on October 7, 2023.

Absolute Certainty

Back in 2015, an interesting discussion took place after main business hours at work where I emphasized that not all knowledge was empirical knowledge.

We also discussed certainty.

The person I was discussing and debating with claimed that one cannot be sure that God exists or that Christianity was certain.

I stated that only the first cause God, being the only infinite being, can have one hundred percent certain knowledge, one hundred percent certainty. Only God can have absolute certainty.

Now to be fair to my friend, even a Professor and mentor of mine at Trinity Western University, and a very intelligent theologian, incorrectly in my view, reasoned a Christian could hold to Christianity and the Gospel as one hundred percent certain as a worldview. Rather, I view the worldview as externally and internally reasonably certain against all counter arguments.

Therefore, the person I was discussing and debating with had at least some intellectual merit in stating that Christians were too certain that they were right. But I disagreed with his conclusion that certainty necessarily led to fundamentalism and intolerance, as in radical Islam. He eventually admitted that I was certain of my Christian faith and philosophy and yet remained tolerant and open-minded.

Probability

Ellery Eells explains probability is a numerical value that can be attached to items of various events, and kinds of events and measures the degree to which this may or should be expected. Eells (1996: 649). Eells reasons there are multiple interpretations of probability and there are abstract formal calculi and interpretations of the calculi. Eells (1996: 649).

Blackburn writes that 'probability is a non-negative, additive set function whose maximum value is unity'. Blackburn (1996: 304). Applying probability in the real world is more difficult and the first application is statistical. Blackburn (1996: 304). Statistical as in the tossing of the coin, heads versus tails and the frequency of a particular outcome and then calculating the probability of the outcome. Blackburn (1996: 304).

One account of probability is therefore known as 'frequency theory', as in the probability of an event with frequency of occurrence. Blackburn (1996: 304).

A second account of probability is described as 'an hypothesis as probable when the evidence bears a favoured relationship to it'. Blackburn (1996: 304). These are not empirical measures of frequencies. Basically they would be based on philosophical deductions based in reason.

A third approach is sometimes referred to as subjectivism or personalism. Basically not an objective or real evaluation of the world, but rather a subjective evaluation of personal reality. Blackburn (1996: 304). However, Blackburn does write that one should not be governed by empirical frequencies and not by 'licentious thinking' (without restraint). Blackburn (1996: 304).

Certainty

Edward Gettier has argued in ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’ that believing something is true does not make it knowledge because the person lacks sufficient conditions for knowing a proposition. Gettier (1997)(1963: 3). In other words, many true propositions would have been deduced as true, not by knowledge but by felicitous (fortunate) coincidence. Klein (2005)(1998: 2-3).

I can agree that finite human beings can deduce that something is true without really knowing it. As well, with the human lack of 100% knowledge of anything (only the infinite God has 100% knowledge), it does mean that it is also possible that there could be conditions in existence not known and that a proposition that is held as true is really false. However, I do not think that Gettier’s argument should trouble those who view the Christian faith as certain because Klein points out concerning Gettier’s view that to many thinkers felicitous coincidence can be avoided if the reasons which justify belief are such that they cannot be defeated by further truths. Klein (2005)(1998: 2-3). Klein’s certainty concept in regard to felicitous coincidence is similar to the one described below from The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy.

In other words, if views are reasoned by deduction and evidence, they can be considered knowledge provided they are not countered by superior arguments. This does not require 100% certainty of anything, but rather an accurate understanding of conditions that would lead to the formation of propositions and arguments.

As mentioned previously on this website, from my PhD, a definition of certainty which I would consider helpful would be along the lines of what I found in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. Peter D. Klein describes the Cartesian account of certainty as being that a proposition is true if there are no legitimate grounds whatsoever for doubting it. Klein (1996: 113). I like the similar idea that a proposition is certain if there are no counter propositions that are superior. Therefore in regard to the religiously historical, Christian faith, and its belief in Scripture inspired by God, the atoning work of Christ, the resurrection, and everlasting life, for the regenerate; these things could be viewed as certain provided there are no legitimate counter arguments that are superior. I believe that evidence shows Christianity is philosophically certain in this sense.

A classic view on certainty discussed in my PhD and in a previous blog article, I shall briefly review is that of Ludwig Wittgenstein: He does admit that there is in a sense objective truth, but something would be objectively true only within a system of reason and knowledge through the understanding of reasonable persons. Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108). His view allows for the logical possibility that something considered objective truth in one system, is not objective truth in another. Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 108).

Philosophy should, therefore, not be understood as primarily making discoveries, as much a reminding persons of the issues that need to be dealt with when one turns to unfamiliar and uncertain issues. Wittgenstein does act with certainty, but it is his own. This does not in his mind justify his view as objective truth to others, it is simply belief. Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 175). He reasons that ‘knowledge and certainty belong in different categories.’ Obtaining knowledge is very important, and more vital than having certitude. Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308).

Knowledge and certainty are two different mental states. Wittgenstein (1951)(1979: 308).

A classic view, but not one I hold to from what I noted.

In regard to probability, I suppose that truth claims could also be made in terms of probability as well as certainty. For example, one could hypothetically state Christianity is 9?% probable using Blackburn's second account as in 'an hypothesis as probable when the evidence bears a favoured relationship to it.'

However, providing a number as percentage does seem somewhat subjective in comparison to using certainty, although not without intellectual value.

Eells states three axioms for probability:

1. Pr (Probability)(X)>0 for all
2. Pr (Probability)(X)=1 if X is necessary
3. Pr (Probability)(X  (or) Y) = Pr (Probability) (X) + Pr (Probability) (Y) where   means logical disjunction or set theoretical union, if X and Y are mutually exclusive. X and Y may be contradictions that both cannot both logically occur as events. Eells reasons these are provable axioms. Eells (1996: 649).

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) 'First Cause Argument', in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

BLACKBURN, S. (1996) ‘Regress’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

BRADLEY, RAYMOND D. (1996) ‘Infinite Regress Argument’, in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 

BROWNING, W. R. F. (1997) 'Alpha', in Oxford Dictionary of The Bible, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York. 

CRAIG, WILLIAM LANE, (1991)(2006) ‘The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe’,Truth: A Journal of Modern Thought 3 (1991) 85-96. http://www.leaderu.com/truth/3truth11.html pp. 1-18. 

DESCARTES, RENE (1637) Discourse on the Method, PW 1, 121.

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Certainty 

EELLS, ELLERY (1996) 'Probability', in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, pp. 649-650. Cambridge University Press.

GETTIER, EDMUND L. (1997)(1963) ‘Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?’, in Analysis 23, 1963, 121-123, Nottingham, England. Analysis 23. http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html

GIJSBERS, VICTOR, (2006) ‘Theistic Arguments: First Cause’ http://positiveatheism.org/faq/firstcause.htm pp. 1-2. 

KEOHANE, JONATHAN, (1997) ‘Big Bang Theory’ http://imagine.gsfc.nasa.gov/docs/ask_astro/answers/971108a.html p. 1.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1996) ‘Certainty’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

KLEIN, PETER D. (1998, 2005). ‘Epistemology’, in E. Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London, Routledge.

KREEFT, PETER, (2006) ‘The First Cause Argument’ excerpted from Fundamentals of Faith.

http://catholiceducation.org/articles/apologetics/ap0168.html pp. 1-5. 

SKLAR, LAWRENCE, (1996) ‘Philosophy of Science’, in Robert Audi, (ed), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

WITTGENSTEIN, LUDWIG (1951)(1979) On Certainty, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 

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Rene Descartes was referenced by Klein and noted by me from Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy

Descartes, Rene, [PW 2], The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Volume 2)

, J. Cottingham, R. Stootfhoff, and D. Murdoch (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. –––, [PW 3], The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (Volume 3), J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991. 

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Certainty 

Cited 

'Certainty, or the attempt to obtain certainty, has played a central role in the history of philosophy. Some philosophers have taken the kind of certainty characteristic of mathematical knowledge to be the goal at which philosophy should aim. In the Republic, Plato says that geometry “draws the soul towards truth and produces philosophic thought by directing upwards what we now wrongly direct downwards” (527b). Descartes also thought that a philosophical method that proceeds in a mathematical way, enumerating and ordering everything exactly, “contains everything that gives certainty to the rules of mathematics” (Discourse on the Method, PW 1, p. 121).'  DESCARTES, RENE (1637) Discourse on the Method, PW 1, 121.

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A priori & A posteriori

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Interesting discussion after main business hours at work where I emphasized that not all knowledge was empirical knowledge.

Here is edited Blogging and PhD material that is hopefully relevant.

Louis P. Pojman explains that the term a priori comes from the Latin “preceding” and is knowledge that is not based on sense experience but is innate or known to human beings by the meanings of words and definitions. Pojman (1996: 595).

Arthur Pap defines a priori knowledge as being independent of experience. Pap (1973: 666). 

Simon Blackburn notes that a proposition is knowable a priori if it can be known without experience of a certain set of events in the actual world. Blackburn allows for some experience to be obtained in order for a priori knowledge to occur. Blackburn (1996: 21).

He explains that this type of knowledge is very controversial and it is not clear how pure thought without the use of experience can lead to any true knowledge at all. Blackburn (1996: 21). Some empiricists have attempted to deny that any real knowledge can be obtained from a priori means. Blackburn (1996: 21).

In the Critique of Pure Reason of 1781 and revised in 1787, Kant explains that the forms of appearance from which sensations can be understood are not themselves the empirical sensations. Kant (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006: 66).

BonJour states that a priori knowledge is independent of empirical experience, meaning that something can be accepted as knowledge if it does not depend upon sensory experience. BonJour (1996: 29).

Very importantly in my view, BonJour explains that a deductively valid argument can use a priori reasoning, even if the correctness of the argument is challenged. BonJour (1996: 30). This would be very important for non-empirical reasoning in the areas of theology and philosophy in regard to the problem of evil and other topics, but even in other disciplines such as scientific theory where logical and reasonable deductions are at times made without empirical evidence. In other words, it is possible to deduce with logic, reason, and argumentation, truth, even without empirical evidence.

BonJour mentions that rationalists that state God exists are using a priori reasoning. I do not deny that human beings have presuppositions in the areas of knowledge, but I reason that experience and God given nature influences those concepts. It seems doubtful to me that human beings can have philosophical presuppositions without some innate understanding and experience to make sense of reality in order to presuppose.

It is also Biblical and reasonable to deduce that God creates human beings with certain innate understanding of reality that will be assisted by experience. Romans 1:19 explains that God made human beings with a natural understanding of his existence. Perhaps this would be a priori knowledge and would not exist entirely on human presuppositions. The existence of natural knowledge of God does not necessarily mean that human beings worship or obey God.

Edinburgh 1995

Pojman writes that a posteriori comes the Latin “the later” and is knowledge that is obtained from human sense experience only, as in the five senses. Pojman (1996: 595).

Blackburn reasons that something can be known a posteriori when it cannot be known a priori. Blackburn (1996: 21-22).

From a Christian perspective, God through Scriptural religious history and Jesus Christ has revealed himself to finite humanity in an effective, limited, empirical fashion, and this would be considered a posteriori knowledge of God, although God as pure spirit remains beyond the physical senses.

Kant criticized and limited the scope of traditional metaphysical thought, he also sought to defend against empiricism’s claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge which he called a priori knowledge, because no knowledge derived from experience, a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.

Guyer and Wood explain that Kant sought to defend the scientific approach to the acquisition of knowledge against skeptics that dismissed rigorous arguments in favor of ‘common sense.’ Guyer and Wood in Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 2)

Kant concludes The Critique of Practical Reason by noting that the phenomena realm is the external realm where consciousness has existence.

The noumena realm is invisible and has true infinity where Kant believes one can reason that contingent personality is dependent on the universal and necessary connection to the invisible world. Kant (1788)(1898)(2006: 100).

Importantly Kant thought it legitimate for one to postulate the noumena realm in a ‘negative sense’ meaning things as they may be independently or how they are represented, but not noumena in the ‘positive sense’ which would be things based on pure reason alone. Instead, noumena categories were only useful by applying them to empirical data structured in forms of intuition.

The concept of noumena, according to Kant, was bound to the limit of pretension of sensibility and reason, and therefore only negative noumenon was of intellectual use. Noumena in its negative sense are that which is not an object of sense intuition. Kant rejects concepts of positive noumena based on pure reason. Kant (1781)(1787)(1998: 350).

Counter

Conclusion

Christian scholarship does not rely primarily on natural theology, which would be considered by certain scholars to simply use pure reason which some also think Kant had demolished. Revelation from God in Scripture and resulting claims made within could perhaps be tied to Kantian concepts and intuition arising from empirical sensations.

This is not a difficulty for a Reformed and some other approaches to Christianity, which do not rely primarily on philosophical deductions, but in supernatural revelation of God through empirical sensations, such as prophets, Christ, the apostles and scribes.

My conclusion here, which I realize some will debate, is that Scripture is not primarily metaphysical speculation about God as discussed, but is rather coming through the authors and players within his Bible, which are reasoned to be divinely guided by God. In other words: Natural theology, or another term, perhaps natural philosophy, at points can be reasonable philosophically as secondary support for theism and Christianity.

Natural theology does not reveal the God of the Bible specifically. Revelation and Scripture as historical religious history reveals the God of the Bible. Therefore, Christianity is not primarily based on metaphysical speculation or pure reason. 

BONJOUR, LAURENCE. (1996) ‘A Priori’, in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) ‘A priori/A posteriori’, in Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, p. 21-22. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

EDWARDS, PAUL AND ARTHUR PAP (1973) (eds), ‘A priori knowledge: Introduction’, A Modern Introduction To Philosophy, New York, The Free Press.

GUYER, PAUL AND ALLEN W, in KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1998) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated and edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 

KANT, IMMANUEL (1781)(1787)(1929)(2006) Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, Macmillan. KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1997) Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary Gregor (ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1788)(1898)(2006) The Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, London, Longmans, Green, and Co.

KANT, IMMANUEL (1791)(2001) ‘On The Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy’, in Religion and Rational Theology, Translated by George di Giovanni and Allen Wood, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

POJMAN, LOUIS P. (1996) Philosophy: The Quest for Truth, New York, Wadsworth Publishing Company.

John Calvin On Free Will

Versailles-trekearth

Edited from

2003 The Problem of Evil: Anglican and Baptist Perspectives: MPhil thesis, Bangor University

Simon Blackburn defines determinism as follows:

The doctrine that every event has a cause. The usual explanation of this is that for every event, there is some antecedent state, related in such a way that it would break a law of nature for this antecedent state to exist yet the event not to happen. Blackburn (1996: 102).

In the case of human sin, John Calvin did not believe that God used hard determinism as in forcing or coercing human sin, and nor do I.

I agree that God can use human sin for the greater good, yet human beings have limited free will and freely sin by choice within a sinful nature.

Calvin stated concerning free will:

If freedom is opposed to coercion, I both acknowledge and consistently maintain that choice is free and I hold anyone who thinks otherwise to be a heretic. If, I say, it were called free in this sense of not being coerced nor forcibly moved by an external impulse, but moving of its own accord, I have no objection. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

Human beings in Calvin’s thinking were not forced by God to sin, but God as an infinite being had and used the power to use their sin for the greater good. So to say that God willed evil for the greater good means that God could use sinful actions of others in order to accomplish his divine purpose.

Calvin stated:

For we do not say that the wicked sin of necessity in such a way as to imply that they sin without wilful and deliberate evil intent. The necessity comes from the fact that God accomplishes his work, which is sure and steadfast, through them. At the same time, however, the will and purpose to do evil which dwells within them makes them liable to censure. But, it is said, they are driven and forced to this by God. Indeed, but in such a way that in a single deed the action of God is one thing and their own action is another. For they gratify their evil and wicked desires, but God turns this wickedness so as to bring his judgements (judgments) to execution. Calvin (1543)(1996: 37).

God could set up events in such a way that someone would freely choose to sin, but this is not done in such a way that God is forcing or hard determining one to do so.

I reason the problem of evil is, in large measure, a human problem. I believe in a human fall through sinful choice. God can still will, in a sense, that these sinful actions work for the greater good, but I do not believe in a Universe where God forces people to commit individual sin. People are sinful in nature as they are descendants of Adam. This inherited and sinful nature means people will freely choose to sin and God does not coerce them into doing so. He may provide situations where he knows that certain individuals will sin, but his motives in this are for the greater good. This is not the most satisfying doctrine I suppose, but Biblically and philosophically valid nonetheless. This concept will be discussed throughout my thesis.

God was not the antecedent (preceding cause) of sin in the sense of God coercing or forcing people to commit sinful acts. God does not use hard determinism to cause people to sin as if they were sinning by compulsion and not freely. However, it should be pointed out that in another more strictly philosophical sense, as God is sovereign over all events, he is the primary cause of evil and sin and he determines and allows human beings to freely sin as the secondary cause.

In that sense God is the antecedent of sin. However, God's motives remain pure in all that he wills.

Matin Serein, France-trekearth

Edited from

2010 Theodicy and Practical Theology: PhD thesis, the University of Wales, Trinity Saint David, Lampeter

John Calvin’s (1543)(1998) theology holds to a strong view on God’s sovereignty and to a limited view of human freedom.

In modern, but not Reformation era terms, Calvin could be considered a compatibilist and explains that those who committed wrong actions performed them willfully and deliberately. Calvin viewed God as working his good purposes through the evil conduct of people, but he pointed out that God’s motives in willing these deeds were pure while those who committed wrong had wicked motives. Calvin (1543)(1998: 37).

Calvin reasons that a person is not forced or coerced to believe in the gospel. Calvin (1543)(1996: 68).

He suggests outward human preaching ‘strikes only the ears’ while the inward instruction of the Holy Spirit is how a person is enlightened in Christ. Human preaching is valuable in that it works at times in conjunction with the Holy Spirit transforming individuals. Calvin (1543)(1996: 233).

There is a traditional Christian and Reformed concept and theology that the Holy Spirit is God and does the work that only God can do. The Holy Spirit works directly upon a human mind, in a sense remaking a person and creating a person after the image of Christ.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1539)(1998) The Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book IV, Translated by Henry Beveridge, Grand Rapids, The Christian Classic Ethereal Library, Wheaton College. http://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/institutes.html

CALVIN, JOHN (1540)(1973) Romans and Thessalonians, Translated by Ross Mackenzie, Grand Rapids, Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1543)(1996) The Bondage and Liberation of the Will, Translated by G.I. Davies, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

CALVIN, JOHN (1550)(1978) Concerning Scandals, Translated by John W. Fraser, Grand Rapids, William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

CALVIN, JOHN (1552)(1995) Acts, Translated by Watermark, Nottingham, Crossway Books. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1553)(1952) Job, Translated by Leroy Nixon, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House. 

CALVIN, JOHN (1554)(1965) Genesis, Translated by John King, Edinburgh, The Banner of Truth Trust.

Biologically Impossible?

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Bizpac June 3 2015

In light of recent news this is something to ponder on...

A friend of mine has a co-worker that had his penis removed and had reassignment surgery and now years later regrets it. I hold to a Reformed position on corruption which includes the biological and spiritual within present humanity but to assume the fall has effected one so much that his/her sex is scientifically wrong is very questionable indeed.

With the Biblical concept of a fall from Genesis, Scripture documents the idea of God creating male and female in the image and likeness of God; with the creation of the sexes, gender is definitive and definite and cannot be entirely altered. This is as well a New Testament concept (Romans 1-6).

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Former Johns Hopkins chief of psychiatry: Being transgender is a ‘mental disorder . . . biologically impossible’

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'The former psychiatrist in chief for Johns Hopkins Hospital is pouring rain on the Bruce Jenner “Call Me Caitlyn” parade that’s sure to have the former Olympic athlete’s cheerleaders steaming.

Not only does Dr. Paul R. McHugh consider changing sexes “biologically impossible,” he thinks being what is popularly called “transgender” these days is actually a “mental disorder.” McHugh, who has authored six books and at least 125 peer-reviewed medical journal articles, made the statements in a piece he penned for the Wall Street Journal that argued surgery is not the solution for patients who want to live life as the opposite sex. Such people, he wrote, suffer from a “disorder of assumption” in believing they can choose their sex.'

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'He also cited a study that said transgendered people who have reassignment surgery are 20 times more likely to commit suicide than non-transgendered people,'

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'He went on to write that changing sexes is impossible and that what transgendered people actually do is “become feminized men or masculinized women.” 

While there are scientists who disagree, it is important to question whether health professionals, politicians and the media are doing more harm than good by enabling people who believe they were born the wrong sex to go to such extremes. For millennia, the first rule of Western medicine has been summed up as “do no harm.” There’s a reason for that.'