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The Tin Man v The Straw Man (Ethical Superiority & Mispresenting an Opponent's Position, fallacies)
Preface
The main source for this article is...
PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.
I reviewed this Pirie text, entry by entry, over roughly a couple of years, online. As I am editing my website articles for entries on academia.edu, I noticed that within the Pirie text, the Straw Man entry referenced the Tim Man entry. This Canadian holiday weekend, I therefore decided to create a new website article as my template for the academia.edu entry with a review of the two fallacies combined.
The Tin Man/Ethical Superiority fallacy
Pirie:
"It is not a fallacy to be ethically superior to your opponent. It is fallacy to assume you are without supporting evidence. And the evidence must be more compelling than the fact that your opponent disagrees with you.' (92).
With my first employment post-Secondary school, a mentor in the insurance field, taught me to never assume, because it makes an:
ass/u/me
I have taken this life lesson and applied it to my academic work. This is similar to my concept of not guessing in academia, as much as possible.
The Tin Man/Ethical Superiority fallacy
Pirie:
"It is not a fallacy to be ethically superior to your opponent. It is fallacy to assume you are without supporting evidence. And the evidence must be more compelling than the fact that your opponent disagrees with you.' (92).
With my first employment post-Secondary school, a mentor in the insurance field, taught me to never assume, because it makes an:
ass/u/me
I have taken this life lesson and applied it to my academic work. This is similar to my concept of not guessing in academia, as much as possible.
Back to Pirie:
One party assumes to be ethical with a position and therefore the other party with a contrary position is assumed unethical. (92). This is also transferred to related morality. But a different worldview or different opinion on a subject, does not necessarily make either position ethical or unethical. Pire reasons this has also been called the 'Tin Man' fallacy as in the Tin Man, from the Wizard of Oz (1939) has no heart. (93).
One party assumes to be ethical with a position and therefore the other party with a contrary position is assumed unethical. (92). This is also transferred to related morality. But a different worldview or different opinion on a subject, does not necessarily make either position ethical or unethical. Pire reasons this has also been called the 'Tin Man' fallacy as in the Tin Man, from the Wizard of Oz (1939) has no heart. (93).
This is opposed to the 'Straw Man' fallacy. (93). The Straw Man fallacy misrepresents an opponent's position, and then knocks that misrepresented position down. (193). Straw Man attacks can be connected to personal (ad hominem) attacks, as in producing fictional intellectual attacks and as well, personal attacks versus an opponent.
The fallacious implementation of Tin Man/Ethical Superiority approach is easy to imagine. The Christian accuses someone of a contrary worldview and that same worldview of being unethical and immoral. The person of a non-Christian worldview condemns the Christian and biblical and gospel views as being unethical and immoral. However, reasonable ethical standards need to be established and then a breaking of these ethics, reasonably established for a rational critique to occur.
Not assumed.
The fallacious implementation of Tin Man/Ethical Superiority approach is easy to imagine. The Christian accuses someone of a contrary worldview and that same worldview of being unethical and immoral. The person of a non-Christian worldview condemns the Christian and biblical and gospel views as being unethical and immoral. However, reasonable ethical standards need to be established and then a breaking of these ethics, reasonably established for a rational critique to occur.
Not assumed.
The Straw Man fallacy
Once again, the straw man fallacy occurs when one misrepresents an opponent's position; this is created to knock down the opponent's position. (193).
Example from my Columbia Bible College experience (Paraphrased).
Student: You do not hold to Mennonite non-resistance and pacifism.
Student: You support the maintaining of law and order through state force (Romans 13, 1 Peter 2).
Student: You support 'just war.'
Student: Therefore, you support 'preventive war', under the guise of 'just war', theory.
Undergrad Russ: No, I clearly stated that I do not support, 'preventive war' theory. Nor do I think every war defined by governments as 'just war' is always a just war.
Student; Yes, you do.
Undergrad Russ: No, I clearly do not based on what I have stated. You are twisting the terminology I have used. Further, you should not be attempting to tell me what I believe.
The student misrepresented my law and order and just war position as equating with preventive war theory. This student built a straw man.
Traditionally the straw man deliberately overstates an opponent's position. (193). This was done by my opponent at Columbia Bible College. The adversary is portrayed as the extremist. (193). As was I falsely portrayed, in my example, as I did not hold to the classic Anabaptist/Mennonite position. Therefore, I disagreed the student that using the straw man. The real position of the opponent is not adequately reasoned with when this fallacy is used. (193).
Example from my Columbia Bible College experience (Paraphrased).
Student: You do not hold to Mennonite non-resistance and pacifism.
Student: You support the maintaining of law and order through state force (Romans 13, 1 Peter 2).
Student: You support 'just war.'
Student: Therefore, you support 'preventive war', under the guise of 'just war', theory.
Undergrad Russ: No, I clearly stated that I do not support, 'preventive war' theory. Nor do I think every war defined by governments as 'just war' is always a just war.
Student; Yes, you do.
Undergrad Russ: No, I clearly do not based on what I have stated. You are twisting the terminology I have used. Further, you should not be attempting to tell me what I believe.
The student misrepresented my law and order and just war position as equating with preventive war theory. This student built a straw man.
Traditionally the straw man deliberately overstates an opponent's position. (193). This was done by my opponent at Columbia Bible College. The adversary is portrayed as the extremist. (193). As was I falsely portrayed, in my example, as I did not hold to the classic Anabaptist/Mennonite position. Therefore, I disagreed the student that using the straw man. The real position of the opponent is not adequately reasoned with when this fallacy is used. (193).
This undergrad example, in my humble opinion, is also an example of lazy intellectual reasoning, which should be avoided. If one is to engage in debate, be prepared and be open-minded. An opponent's position should be evaluated reasonably and with significant rationality.
The straw man will be frequently used in religion and philosophy debates. At a different church than I attend now, a teacher and proponent of incompatiblism stated to me that 'You do not want to be a compatibilist', as he implied that equated to a hard determinist. In other words, anyone that holds to any form of determinism is a hard determinist. This is academically and philosophically, false and a misrepresentation of my position. I explained:
Incompatibilism
There can be no antecedent (prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). With this view, freedom is incompatible with contingently sufficient nonsubsequent conditions of an action. The contingently sufficient nonsubsequent actions would be God making people in such a way that they only freely did one thing or another. Feinberg (1994: 60).
Hard determinism v Soft determinism/Compatibilism
Within hard determinism God (theistic model) would be the only cause of human actions, while with soft determinism God would be the primary cause of human actions and persons the secondary cause.
Compatibilism, like incompatibilism, holds to free will but in a limited form. Pojman (1996: 596). Feinberg, a noted compatibilist, describes compatibilism as stating certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (2001) explains that with this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).
Technically, hard determinism and soft determinism/compatibilism are not defined identically and in fact have significant differences.
The straw man will be frequently used in religion and philosophy debates. At a different church than I attend now, a teacher and proponent of incompatiblism stated to me that 'You do not want to be a compatibilist', as he implied that equated to a hard determinist. In other words, anyone that holds to any form of determinism is a hard determinist. This is academically and philosophically, false and a misrepresentation of my position. I explained:
Incompatibilism
There can be no antecedent (prior) conditions or laws that will determine that an action is committed or not committed. Feinberg (1994: 64). With this view, freedom is incompatible with contingently sufficient nonsubsequent conditions of an action. The contingently sufficient nonsubsequent actions would be God making people in such a way that they only freely did one thing or another. Feinberg (1994: 60).
Hard determinism v Soft determinism/Compatibilism
Within hard determinism God (theistic model) would be the only cause of human actions, while with soft determinism God would be the primary cause of human actions and persons the secondary cause.
Compatibilism, like incompatibilism, holds to free will but in a limited form. Pojman (1996: 596). Feinberg, a noted compatibilist, describes compatibilism as stating certain nonconstraining conditions could strongly influence actions in conjunction with human free will performing these actions. Feinberg (2001) explains that with this viewpoint, there will be no contradiction in stating God would create human beings who were significantly free, unconstrained, and yet committed actions that God willed. Feinberg (2001: 637).
Technically, hard determinism and soft determinism/compatibilism are not defined identically and in fact have significant differences.
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