Being relevant/Variable symbol

Churchleaders.com

In reviewing online ministry work, I reason Christian ministry websites need to be technologically current, content updated, with dated articles both recent and archived, in order to provide ministry credibility.

An online ministry needs to provide visitors, spiritually, with materials, on a regular basis and this can lead to committed regular pageviews and the greater use of more ministry materials.

In this regard, Christian ministry websites should work at 'Being relevant'. But to provide a message that is palatable within our present Western world system, influenced by secular philosophy, at the compromise of the gospel?

No.

trekearth

Variable symbol

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

'If we wish to express symbolically the logical form of a whole list of propositions, we may do this by using what is called a variable symbol. Such a symbol is not a name assigned to a certain one of the elements, but means A. B, C,...or J...(85).

'It is called a variable because it can mean all the elements in turn; its meaning may vary from A to J.' (85).

Langer uses lower case italics for variables to distinguish from specific names. (85).

The author explains that 'once a variable is given a meaning, it keeps it throughout the whole assertion; but it must be remembered that in another assertion it may have another meaning. (87).

Her example (for some clarity, I might add).

a fm a  (fm=fellowman)

Here a=J

Therefore J fm J.

The point here I reason, is that because 'E' and other letters of the alphabet were not mentioned within the related elementary propositions of one total assertion (87); they cannot be replaced by a variable within an assertion or equation. However, in another assertion and equation a variable can be equated with 'E'.

Retreating & Twisting

Retreating & Twisting

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

The Definitional Retreat

'A definitional retreat takes place when someone changes the meaning of the words in order to deal with an objection raised against the original wording. By changing the meaning, he turns it into a different statement.'

Pirie uses an example: 'When I said I hadn't been drinking, officer, I meant that I hadn't had more than I get through in a normal social evening.' (77-78).

My examples:

When I said I was a Christian, I meant that I think there is probably a God.

When I said you were fat, I meant that you were phat, as in excellent.

The author explains that a definitional retreat allows a person to save face when their argument has been demonstrated to significantly lack merit. (78).

Pirie reasons that philosophers often change definitions when shown as questionable. (78).

Definitions are not to be subjective, they have objective meanings.

This is a reason I revise my writing, because sometimes corrections have to be made in premises, conclusions and reasoning. Definition twisting, does not assist with my pursuit of the truth. My revisions are documented when significant. I admit that minor revisions are often made after publish, because some problems are not apparent until after publish. That is a visual issue, not an integrity one.

But if I do change my mind...it is better to revise statements and/or arguments when needed and to note it.

Pirie mentions that UK finance ministers are good at the use of this fallacy. (79). They use definitional retreat.

I think politicians often use fallacies when definitions are changed to portray a different story. Statistics can be stated to mean one thing in January and something else in December.

Definist fallacy

Blackburn defines a similar type of fallacy:

'The illicit insistence on defining a term in a way that is favourable to one's own side of an argument.' (96). I take this point, but it is also possible that with the use of objective reasoning, one's own definition is not fallacious. But, a term should be not twisted. One can insist that a definition based on a true premise (s) and conclusions is sound.

Logical Fallacies

Definist fallacy

'Description: Defining a term in such a way that makes one’s position much easier to defend.

Logical Form: A has definition X. X is harmful to my argument. Therefore, A has definition Y.

Example #1: Before we argue about the truth of creationism, let’s define creationism as, “The acceptance of a set of beliefs even more ridiculous than those of flat-earthers.”

Example #2: Before we argue about the truth of creationism, let’s define evolution as, “Faith in a crackpot theory that is impossible to prove with certainty.”'

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.  

CONWAY DAVID A. AND RONALD MUNSON (1997) The Elements of Reasoning, Wadsworth Publishing Company, New York. 

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York. (Philosophy).

LOGICAL FALLACIES, References: BUNNIN, N., & Yu, J. (2008) The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, John Wiley & Sons.

https://www.logicallyfallacious.com/logicalfallacies/Definist-Fallacy

PIRIE, MADSEN (2006)(2015) How To Win Every Argument, Bloomsbury, London.

SAMPLES, KENNETH (2014) How to Evaluate an Abductive Argument, Reasons to Believe, Covina, California.

Do not forget fellowship

Atlanta Times:  A summer reminder to party with common sense.

Since 2004, I have tried posting longer articles, less often, and more articles, more often. In agreement with most experts, it seems more articles, hopefully shorter, creates more pageviews. Moderate increases in readership are appreciated in today's difficult academic online market. I could have followed my Dad's half-hearted advice and attempted to become a televangelist, theatre implied, but this is rejected for various reasons, including the judgement of God (2 Corinthians 5).

LANGER, SUSANNE K (1953)(1967) An Introduction to Symbolic Logic, Dover Publications, New York.

From previous related post:

The symbol fm2 is introduced. (82). The symbol int is = (equals) by interpretation.or identified with. (82). K=int 'persons' (82). fm2='fellowship of' (82). K=int with persons A, B, and C

The Arabic number two is dropped for Langer's examples. but it has been established that fellowship and fellowman would present two persons in context from my understanding. A fm B (Person A has fellowship with person B) B fm C (Person B has fellowship with person C) Or is A the fellowman of B (82).

A person cannot be a fellowman of self. Therefore A is not the fellowman of A (82-83).

The V means that either way one of the propositions is false. Or they both could be false.

As well, ⊃ is the symbol for implies (75) and implication (80).
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Therefore in regard to constituent relations there are certain implications. (83).

(A fm B) ⊃ (B fm A).

A is a fellowman, or is in fellowship with B, implies that B is a fellowman of A, or is in fellowship with A. (83).

As noted in a previous post: Conjunction (.) Conjunctions within the universe of discourse are what 'makes sense' between constituent relations. (80). In other words, what makes sense between the concepts and terms documented.

Langers' example assumes that each relation belongs to the formal context. In other words as a constituent relation, all the elements are in relation. (70). All these persons (elements) know each other.

Therefore:

In brackets is read first...

[(A fm B) . (B fm C)] ⊃ (A fm C). (83).

The relationship between A and C is implied as they are in the same universe of discourse.

This can be true in real life:

B=Bobby Buff
C=Chucky
R=Dr. Russ

[(B fm C) . (C fm R)] ⊃ (B fm R).

However, a person that does fit into the universe of discourse, may know zero to two of these persons (elements), because this other person (element) belongs to a different formal context, and therefore a different universe of discourse.

As 'academic' as this section seems, it has practical applications. When discussing certain bible and theology issues, one should make sure that persons that are new to a universe of discourse are communicated with in an understanding way. A couple of weeks ago Mr, Matt and a friend of his that is a newer friend of mine were discussing bible, while I was chauffeuring them around Vancouver and Burnaby. Mr. Matt stated to me (paraphrased): 'Remember this person has no formal biblical training.'

Do not forget fellowship...(In various contexts).

The Trinity: Panentheism & Pantheism

Braganza, Portugal, trekearth

The Trinity: Panentheism & Pantheism

Preface

Segments edited from archived article with new material added.

Panentheism April 01, 2012

Panentheism & Pantheism

David H. Nikkel (2003) defines panentheism as from the Greek meaning ‘all is in God’. Nikkel (2003: 1). Both God’s transcendence and immanence are accepted, as the world and matter is in God, and God is ‘all-encompassing with respect to being.’ Nikkel (2003: 1).

Panentheism is not identical to pantheism which postulates that ‘God is identical with everything’ Martinich (1996: 556). Pantheism reasons God is in everything and that God and the universe are one. Blackburn (1996: 276). Blackburn also explains Benedictus de Spinoza (1632-1677) is noted for this view within Western philosophy

The difference being that panentheism understands ‘God is in all things’ Martinich (1996: 556). The doctrine being that all things exist in God. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94), but is not identical with all things as with pantheism. Martinich (1996: 556).

As example:

God in pantheism may be considered to be equal with a tree.

God in panentheism may be considered beyond the tree, but the vital force within it.

Panentheism attempts to ‘avoid the pitfalls’ of traditional theism. Nikkel (2003: 1). God is prohibited from having a true and genuine relationship with matter and the universe because of traditional theistic views such as that God is immutable, impassible, and eternal and timeless. Nikkel (2003: 1). God is not eternal within this view.

Panentheism is an intellectual compromise between traditional theism and pantheism. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94). Within panentheism, God is more than just the material universe, as there is an unchanging aspect to God’s being and also a dynamic aspect to God as the divine being changes as matter and the universe do. Kreeft and Tacelli (1994: 94).

In my traditional Christian theistic understanding, God is beyond a tree and sustains it, but is not the vital force within it. This is my example based on Erickson’s presentation. Erickson (1994: 303-307). 

The Trinity

August 10, 2016

Within a trinitarian, biblical perspective, God as transcendent is beyond the finite, material universe. God is the first cause of all things and sustains all finite creation. God is not the vital force within his finite creation, but sustains and maintains it.

God’s nature does not equate to any human nature, for example. The infinite God causes the finite without being finite (This is not contradicted by Jesus Christ, the Word of God taking finite human nature in the incarnation without ceasing to be infinite God). God is immanent within his creation, but his infinite, eternal nature is not mixed with finite nature of any kind. Deity and humanity, two natures, are also not mixed in the incarnation of Christ.

The finite is not infinite. A finite thing is also not eternal. The finite cannot become infinite. The finite cannot become eternal. The finite, can possibly become everlasting. Finite attributes therefore cannot evolve into infinite attributes.

For balance, an academic friend once challenged me that an entity could technically have some infinite attributes and some finite attributes. For example, a being could have eternal life and yet not be omniscient. But the logic of this would be debated. Is not a limitless nature by definition, entirely limitless, lest it be limited? If God was for example, not omniscient, I would reason this would be because infinite, omniscience would be logically impossible. However, an infinite being and first cause could still virtually know all things (divine deduction) even without technical omniscience, in my opinion.

In the same way as God is infinitely good, he cannot logically be infinitely evil. But God is not evil in nature at all, but can use evil for his good purposes. Being evil is not a finite attribute of God. The orthodox view being that God cannot have finite attributes.

Although a reasonable proposition for consideration, I admit. I personally doubt my scholarly friend’s objection as a true.

BLACKBURN, SIMON (1996) Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

ERICKSON, MILLARD (1994) Christian Theology, Grand Rapids, Baker Book House.

GRENZ, STANLEY J. AND ROGER E. OLSON (1992) Twentieth Century Theology, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

KREEFT, PETER and RONALD K. TACELLI (1994) Handbook of Christian Apologetics, Downers Grove, Illinois, InterVarsity Press.

MARTINICH, A.P. (1999) ‘Pantheism’ in Robert Audi, (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

NIKKEL, DAVID H. (2003) ‘Panentheism’, in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, MacMillan Reference USA, New York.

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